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AMERICAN   STATESMEN 


EDITED  BY 


JOHN  T.  MOKSE,  JK. 

IN  THIRTY-TWO  VOLUMES 
VOL.   XXVH. 


THE  CIVIL  WAR 
WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 


HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN   &   CO. 


Hmrrtcaii  statesmen 


WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 


BY 


THORNTON  KIRKLAND  LOTHROP 


BOSTON  AND   NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 

<3Hbe  fitoerjH&e  prejj 
1899 


Copyright,  18%  and  1899, 
BY  THORNTON  KIRKLAND  LOTHROP. 

Copyright,  1899, 
BY  HOUGHTON,  MIPFLIN  &  CO. 

All  rights  reserved. 


PEEFACE 

THE  obvious  difficulty  of  giving  within  the 
limits  of  a  single  volume  an  adequate  account  of 
a  statesman  whose  public  career  extended  over 
a  period  ol  loriy  jMBttrs,  is  inureaaml  In  tne"oase  of 
Sewlx3~Ey~the  fact  that  the  period  of  his  political 
life  was  substantially  coincident  with  that  of  the 
great  contest  for  supremacy  between  the  free 
and  slave  States,  from  the  time  of  the  passage  of 
the  Missouri  Compromise  to  the  close  oFTEe"  civil 
wary  and  with  that  of  the  subsequent  struggle  as 
to  reconstruction.  His  first  vote  was  cast  in  the 
year"  after  the  admission  of  Missouri  as  a  slave 
State ;  he  took  his  seat  in  the  New  York  Senate 
in  January,  1831 ;  he  resigned  the  office  of  secre- 
tary of  state  of  the  United  States  in  March,  1869 ; 
for  twenty-eight  of  the  intervening  years  he  was  in 
the  public  service,  —  for  four  years  in  the  Senate 
of  Kew  York,  and  for  four  years  the  governor  of 
that  State.  He  was  a  senator  of  the  United  States 
during  the  twelve  years  in  which  the  contest  be- 
tween freedom  and  slavery  was  carried  on  in  Con- 
gress with  the  utmost  bitterness  of  language  and 


vi  PREFACE 

feeling;  and  then,  entering  Lincoln's  cabinet  as 
secretary  of  state,  he  held  that  office  until  the  in- 
auguration of  General  Grant  as  president. 

In  the  half  century  between  the  time  when  he 
came  of  age  and  his  withdrawal  from  public  life, 
there  were  many  revolutions  in  political  issues 
and  parties,  in  most  of  which,  if  not  in  all,  Sew- 
ard  played  a  leading  part.  His  earliest  published 

I  political  speech  predicted  that  in  this  country  no 
"parties  upon  cardinal  principles  would  again 
arise,"  but  only  those  formed  as  to  "  questions  of 
limited  extent,  or  out  of  regard  to  men  of  differ- 
ently estimated  merit ;  "  yet  he  himself,  contradict- 
ing his  own  prophecy,  spent  many  of  the  best  years 
of  his  life  in  endeavoring  to  induce  the  voters  of 
the  North,  either  to  support  an  existing  party  on 
account  of  its  fidelity  to  the  cardinal  principle  of 
freedom,  or  to  unite  in  building  up  a  new  one,  of 
which  this  principle  should  be  the  corner  stone ; 
and,  circumstances  and  the  mistaken  passion  and 
labors  of  his  political  opponents  working  with  him, 
his  efforts  were  at  last  crowned  with  success. 

It  was  a  long  way,  however,  from  the  purely 
personal  question  between  Clay,  Adams,  and 
Crawford  in  the  presidential  election  of  1824, 
through  the  economic  issues  of  the  United  States 
Bank,  of  internal  improvements  at  the  public  ex- 
pense, of  the  protection  of  American  industry  or 


PREFACE  vii 

a  tariff  for  revenue  only,  to  such  fundamental 
political  and  moral  problems  as  those  connected 
with  the  extension  or  limitation  of  slavery,  the 
nature  and  degree  of  our  constitutional  obligation 
as  to  the  rendition  of  fugitive  slaves,  and  other 
similar  questions  which  convulsed  the  country  in 
the  decade  from  1851  to  1860. 

The  mass  of  the  people,  both  North  and  South, 
was  averse  to  making  party  issues  upon  matters 
so  closely  connected  with  the  whole  frame  of  our 
government  and  with  our  national  life,  and  it  was 
only  gradually  and  by  slow  degrees  that  these 
forced  themselves  to  the  front,  and  at  last  domi- 
nated and  absorbed  all  our  politics. 

As  to  all  these  various  political  issues,  Seward 
held  decided  opinions,  he  took  a  keen  interest  in 
them,  and  he  became  early  a  recognized  party  leader. 
It  is  of  course  impossible,  in  a  work  of  this  size, 
to  give  a  detailed  account  of  his  public  life ;  it  is 
hoped,  however,  that  enough  has  been  said  to  en- 
able the  reader  to  see  how  he  acquired  his  great 
hold  upon  the  people,  and  earned  the  high  place 
which  he  must  always  have  in  the  history  of  our 
country. 

No  attempt  has  been  made  to  describe  his  by  no 
means  undistinguished  professional  labors,  or  his 
personal,  domestic,  and  social  life,  except  so  far  as 
these  may  throw  light  on  his  public  career;  but 


viii  PREFACE 

while  these  omissions  may  affect  the  claim  of  the 
work  as  a  complete  biography,  they  will  not,  it  is 
hoped,  substantially  diminish  its  value  as  a  volume 
in  the  series  of  American  Statesmen.  In  prepar- 
ing this  edition  for  publication  the  book  has  been 
carefully  revised,  some  new  matter  has  been  added, 
and  facts,  never  before  published,  giving  a  differ- 
ent character  to  Mr.  Seward's  letter  to  Mr.  Lin- 
coln of  April  1,  1861,  having  come  to  my  know- 
ledge, parts  of  the  fifteenth  chapter  have  been 
materially  modified. 

T.  K.  L. 

November,  1898. 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  YOUTH.  —  ADMISSION  TO  THE  BAB.  —  FIRST  STEPS 

IN  POLITICS 1 

II.  GOVERNOR  OF  NEW  YORK        ....  21 

III.  PROFESSIONAL   LIFE.  —  Six   YEARS   A   PRIVATE 

CITIZEN 39 

IV.  THE  COMPROMISE  RESOLUTIONS        ...  61 
V.   CALIFORNIA  AND  THE  COMPROMISES:  SEWARD'S 

SPEECH 82 

VI.  FILLMORE'S  ADMINISTRATION     ....  100 

VII.  THE  REPEAL  OF  THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE      .  115 

VIII.  THE  FORMATION  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  133 

IX.  THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS         ....  151 

X.  THE  DRED  SCOTT  CASE.  —  THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE 

FOR  KANSAS 168 

XI.  THE  REPUBLICAN  CONVENTION  OF  1860      .        .  193 

XII.   THE  WINTER  OF  1860-61 203 

Xm.  THE  CABINET.  —  FORT  SUMTER    ....  226 
XIV.  JUSTICE    CAMPBELL  AND  THE   REBEL   COMMIS- 
SIONERS      237 

XV.   LETTER    OF    APRIL    1    TO    THE    PRESIDENT. — 

THE  BLOCKADE 254 

XVI.  ENGLAND'S  RECOGNITION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES 

AS  BELLIGERENTS 271 

XVII.  NEGOTIATIONS  AS  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS. — 

SUSPENSION  OF  THE  HABEAS  CORPUS       .        .  288 

XVIII.  THE  TRENT 296 

XIX.  INTERVENTION. — CABINET  DIFFICULTIES. — EMAN- 
CIPATION        320 

XX.  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR      .        .  338 
XXI.  SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON.  —  RE- 
TIREMENT FROM  PUBLIC  LIFE  .                .        .  364 


ILLUSTKATIONS 

WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD Frontispiece 

From  a  photograph  by  Brady  in  the  Library  of  the 
State  Department  at  Washington. 

Autograph  from  the  Chamberlain  collection,  Boston 
Public  Library. 

The  vignette  of  Mr.  Seward's  home,  Auburn,  N.  Y.,  is 
from  a  photograph  in  the  possession  of  his  son,  Gen. 
William  H.  Seward.  Page 

THUBLOW  WEED facing  144 

From  a  painting  by  Chester  Harding  in  the  possession 
of  Weed's  granddaughter,  Mrs.  George  C.  Hollister,  Ro- 
chester, N.  Y. 

Autograph  from  his  Autobiography. 
LORD  LYONS facing  222 

From  a  photograph  by  Brady. 

Autograph  from  a  MS.  in  the  rooms  of  the  Historical 
Society  of  Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia. 
CHARLES  WILKES facing  300 

From  a  photograph  by  Gurney  in  1862,  kindly  lent  by 
his  daughter,  Miss  Jane  Wilkes. 

Autograph  from  the  Chamberlain  collection,  Boston 
Public  Library. 

THE    FIGHT   BETWEEN   THE  KEARSARGE  AND  THE  ALA- 
BAMA      facing  348 

From  the  painting  by  H.  Durand  Brager  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  Union  League  Club,  New  York,  N.  Y. 


WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 


CHAPTER  I 

YOUTH.  —  ADMISSION  TO  THE  BAK.  —  FIRST  STEPS 
IN  POLITICS 

WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD  was  born  on  the 
16th  of  May,  1801,  in  Florida,  a  village  in  the 
town  of  Warwick,  in  the  county  of  Orange,  and 
State  of  New  York.  His  father,  Dr.  Samuel  S. 
Seward,  was  a  physician  of  good  standing,  and 
the  first  vice-president  of  the  county  medical  so- 
ciety. Dr.  Seward  was  a  farmer  as  well  as  physi- 
cian, and  also  the  magistrate,  storekeeper,  banker, 
and  money-lender  of  the  little  place.  He  lived  to 
a  good  old  age,  dying  after  his  son's  election  to 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  in  1849. 

The  family  was  of  New  Jersey  origin.  John 
Seward,  the  grandfather  of  William  Henry,  served 
in  the  Revolution,  beginning  as  captain,  and  end- 
ing his  campaigns  as  colonel  of  the  First  Sussex 
Regiment.  Sussex  is  the  northernmost  county  of 
New  Jersey,  and  Orange  County  lies  on  the  south- 
ern border  of  New  York,  so  that  the  migration  of 


2  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

Dr.  Seward  did  not  carry  him  far  from  his  origi- 
nal home.  He  married  a  Miss  Jennings  from  the 
neighborhood  of  Florida,  and  Seward  speaks  of 
his  mother  as  a  "person  of  excellent  sense,  gentle- 
ness, truthfulness  and  candor."  William  Henry 
was  the  fourth  of  six  children,  and,  after  the  fash- 
ion of  those  days,  was  selected,  as  the  least  physi- 
cally robust,  to  receive  a  college  education.  The 
village  school,  the  academy  at  Goshen,  and  a  term 
or  two  in  a  short-lived  academy  in  Florida,  gave 
him  his  preparatory  training,  and  at  the  age  of 
fifteen  he  passed  the  examination  for  the  junior 
class  at  Union  College,  Schenectady;  though  the 
rules  as  to  age  at  that  institution  compelled  him 
to  enter  as  sophomore. 

Before  going  to  college,  Seward  had  taken  his 
share  of  the  household  duties  and  labors  at  home. 
His  father  had  three  domestic  servants  (slaves, 
some  of  whom  lived  to  a  good  old  age  and  were 
Seward's  pensioners  to  the  end  of  their  days); 
but  William  Henry  drove  the  cows  to  pasture  in 
the  early  morning  and  back  again  at  night;  he 
had  the  wood  to  chop  and  bring  in,  and  other 
daily  chores  to  do.  He  began  his  labors  at  dawn, 
and  finished  them  at  bedtime,  about  nine  o'clock. 
At  school  he  was  a  bright  and  studious  boy,  per- 
haps a  bit  of  a  prig.  His  first  composition,  an 
essay  on  Virtue,  began :  "  Virtue  is  the  best  of  all 
the  vices."  He  refused,  when  at  the  academy,  to 
join  in  a  lock-out;  at  college  he  sought  his  tutor's 
aid  that  he  might  really  get  hold  of  his  Latin,  and 


YOUTH  3 

was  evidently  desirous  to  make  the  most  of  his 
opportunities.  He  was  not  wanting,  however,  in 
the  hasty  temper  or  the  audacity  of  youth;  and 
when  an  instructor  had,  as  Seward  thought,  treated 
him  unfairly,  he  remonstrated,  refused  to  recite, 
marched  out  of  the  class-room,  left  the  college 
buildings  and  established  himself  in  a  hotel,  de- 
clining to  return  until  he  had  received  an  apology. 
The  judicious  intervention  of  Dr.  Nott,  then  and 
for  nearly  half  a  century  president  of  Union  Col- 
lege, quickly  settled  the  matter,  and  Seward  went 
back  to  his  work.  This  seems  to  have  been  his 
only  collision  with  the  authorities;  but  a  little 
later  in  his  college  career  troubles  of  another  sort 
came  upon  him. 

On  his  arrival  in  Schenectady  he  had  been  dis- 
satisfied with  the  work  of  the  traveling  tailor  who 
had  furnished  his  wardrobe;  and,  that  he  might 
be  dressed  in  a  less  rustic  fashion,  he  had  gone  to 
the  shops  patronized  by  the  students.  His  scanty 
allowance  did  not  enable  him  to  pay  for  this  ex- 
travagance, his  father  would  not  help  him,  and 
his  creditors  became  clamorous;  so  without  con- 
sulting or  even  informing  his  family,  he  resolved 
to  abandon  his  college  career,  and  begin  at  once 
to  make  his  own  way  in  the  world.  He  quietly 
left  Schenectady,  joined  a  friend  who  was  engaged 
to  teach  at  the  South,  and  sailed  with  him  for  Sa- 
vannah. His  father,  learning  of  his  departure, 
started  in  pursuit,  and  endeavored  unsuccessfully 
to  intercept  him  in  New  York.  Seward  arrived 


4  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

safely  in  Georgia,  and  obtained  a  position  there  as 
the  teacher  of  a  newly  established  academy.  His 
father  learned  his  whereabouts  and  wrote  in  a 
rage  to  the  trustees,  threatening  them  with  all  the 
terrors  of  the  law  if  they  continued  to  harbor  the 
delinquent,  whom  he  described  as  "a  much-in- 
dulged son,  who,  without  any  just  provocation, 
had  absconded  from  Union  College,  thereby  dis- 
gracing a  well-acquired  position,  and  plunging  his 
parents  into  profound  shame  and  grief."  Seward, 
however,  remained  at  his  post  as  teacher  until  the 
appointment  and  arrival  of  his  successor,  and  then 
returned  home  to  pass  six  months  studying  law  in 
an  attorney's  office  at  Goshen.  At  the  end  of  this 
time  he  rejoined  the  senior  class  at  Union  College, 
graduating  with  honor  in  1820.  His  father  upon 
his  return  was  far  from  killing  the  fatted  calf  for 
this  wandering  son ;  he  still  declined  to  assist  him 
in  paying  the  tailor's  bills,  and  they  were  finally 
discharged  by  installments  from  Seward's  own 
hard  earnings.  Writing  of  this  after  the  lapse 
of  half  a  century,  Seward  says :  "  I  would  by  no 
means  imply  a  present  conviction  that  the  fault 
was  altogether  with  my  father.  On  the  other 
hand,  I  think  now  the  fault  was  not  altogether 
mine."  As,  before  his  own  exodus,  two  of  his 
brothers  had  already  left  home  on  account  of 
money  difficulties  with  their  father,  there  was 
probably  some  justification  for  these  conclusions. 

On  leaving  college,  Seward  resumed  the  study 
of  the  law,  and  occupied  himself  also  with  office 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  BAR  5 

work  and  such  other  professional  employment  as 
he  could  obtain  in  the  inferior  courts.  He  was 
admitted  to  the  bar  at  Utica  in  October,  1822. 
His  earnings  while  a  student  had  not  only  enabled 
him  to  cancel  his  college  debts  and  to  pay  his  way, 
but  left  him  sixty  dollars  with  which  to  begin  life. 
He  started  at  once  for  western  New  York,  and  at 
Auburn  accepted  an  offer  of  a  partnership  with 
Elijah  Miller,  a  leading  lawyer  of  that  town. 
How  far  Mr.  Miller  was  induced  to  make  this  pro- 
posal by  his  good  opinion  of  Seward's  abilities, 
and  how  much  he  was  influenced  by  his  knowledge 
of  the  mutual  interest  in  each  other  of  his  daughter 
Frances  and  the  young  lawyer,  one  cannot  tell, 
but  the  legal  partnership  was  speedily  followed  by 
a  closer  relation  between  them,  Seward  marrying 
Frances  Miller  on  the  20th  of  October,  1824. 
His  marriage  was  a  satisfaction,  and  his  profes- 
sional success  was  an  agreeable  disappointment  to 
his  father,  who  had  dismissed  him,  when  he  left 
home  to  begin  his  practice,  with  a  present  of  fifty 
dollars,  and  "the  assurance  of  his  constant  expec- 
tation that  he  would  come  back  too  soon." 

Seward's  first  appearance  in  court,  after  his 
admission  to  the  bar,  was  in  defense  of  a  convict 
just  discharged  from  the  state  prison  at  Auburn, 
who  had  been  warned  to  leave  town  at  once.  The 
temptation  of  an  open  house -door  was  too  much 
for  him.  He  went  in  and  began  to  steal,  but  was 
disturbed  in  his  operations  and  only  got  a  few 
trifles.  He  was  indicted  for  the  larceny  of  a 


6  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

quilted  holder  and  a  piece  of  calico.  Seward 
proved  that  the  holder  was  sewed,  not  quilted,  and 
that  the  bit  of  cloth  was  jean,  not  calico.  The 
variance  caused  his  client's  acquittal,  and  his  suc- 
cess in  this  case  was  followed  by  a  considerable 
amount  of  criminal  business.  Seward  was  a  care- 
ful draughtsman,  taking  pains,  not  merely  with 
the  substance  but  with  the  clerkly  appearance  of 
every  instrument  that  left  his  office,  so  that  he 
was  much  employed  in  this  way  also,  and  in  his 
first  year  his  professional  income  exceeded  the  five 
hundred  dollars  guaranteed  him  by  Mr.  Miller. 

In  1828,  he  was  nominated  by  Governor  Clin- 
ton for  surrogate  of  Cayuga  County;  but  while 
he  was  in  Albany,  awaiting  the  confirmation  of 
his  appointment  by  the  Senate,  a  meeting  in  favor 
of  the  renomination  of  President  John  Quincy 
Adams  was  held  there.  Clinton  had  just  come 
out  for  Jackson,  and  a  decided  majority  of  the 
New  York  senators  were  Jackson  men.  Seward 
was  for  Adams.  He  went  to  the  Adams  meeting, 
and  in  consequence  of  this  his  nomination  was  re- 
jected. His  name  was  never  again  submitted  to  a 
senate  for  its  action  until  more  than  thirty  years 
afterward,  when  Lincoln  nominated  him  as  secre- 
tary of  state. 

In  these  early  years  of  his  professional  life,  he 
took  a  lively  interest  in  the  militia  of  the  State 
of  New  York.  He  was  the  adjutant  of  the  troop 
which  met  Lafayette  on  his  arrival  at  Auburn  in 
1825,  and  accompanied  him  on  his  night  journey 


ADMISSION  TO   THE  BAR  7 

eastward  to  Syracuse.  A  few  years  later  he  or- 
ganized a  company  of  artillery,  contributed  largely 
to  its  equipment,  and  was  chosen  its  captain.  By 
successive  promotions  he  attained  the  rank  of  briga- 
dier-general, but  declined  the  major-general's  com- 
mission which  was  subsequently  offered  him. 

Seward's  family  were  Jeffersonian  Republicans, 
and  in  the  divisions  which  rent  that  party  in  the 
State  of  New  York  into  personal  factions,  —  on 
the  one  side  the  Tammany  men,  or  "Buck-tails," 
as  they  were  called,  supporting  Vice-President 
Tompkins;  and  on  the  other  the  followers  of  Gov- 
ernor Clinton,  "the  Clintonians,"  —  Seward  at 
first  remained  with  his  father  on  the  side  of  Tam- 
many. When  Vice-President  Tompkins  visited 
Schenectady,  Seward,  then  in  the  senior  class,  de- 
livered an  address  of  welcome  on  behalf  of  the  stu- 
dents who  were  of  the  Vice-President's  party;  and 
in  his  last  college  term  he  wrote  an  essay  to  prove 
that  the  Erie  Canal,  then  in  process  of  construction 
under  Clinton's  auspices,  was  an  impossibility; 
and  that,  even  if  it  could  be  completed,  it  would 
be  the  financial  ruin  of  the  State.  But  he  had 
never  been  quite  satisfied  with  his  father's  expla- 
nation of  Washington's  dissent  from,  and  Hamil- 
ton's opposition  to,  the  Republican  party,  which 
Dr.  Seward  attributed  to  an  alleged  failure  in 
Washington's  intellectual  power  and  independence, 
and  to  Hamilton's  desire  for  a  monarchy.  More- 
over, his  original  journey  to  Auburn  had  opened 
his  eyes  to  the  importance  as  well  as  to  the  practi- 


8  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

cability  of  the  Erie  Canal ;  and  so  it  happened  by 
a  gradual  process  of  change  and  development,  that 
in  1824  he  cast  his  vote  for  De  Witt  Clinton  as 
governor,  and  definitively  abandoned  the  party  he 
had  been  educated  to  support. 

In  the  summer  of  1824,  before  his  marriage, 
Seward,  with  his  father  and  mother  and  Mr.  Mil- 
ler's family,  made  a  journey  to  Niagara.  As  they 
were  driving  through  Rochester  on  their  way  home, 
a  wheel  came  off  the  coach,  and  most  of  the  party 
were  thrown  out.  Among  the  passers-by  attracted 
by  the  accident  was  Thurlow  Weed,  then  a  resi- 
dent of  Rochester,  "the  editor  of  a  dingy  weekly 
Clintonian  newspaper,  called  the  '  Monroe  Tele- 
gram, '  —  one  of  the  poorest  and  worst  dressed  men 
in  the  town,  living  in  a  cheap  house  in  an  obscure 
part  of  the  village ; "  but  even  then  wielding  a 
very  decisive  power  in  the  politics  of  western  New 
York.  Weed  was  helpful  to  them  in  their  misfor- 
tune; and  this  was  Seward's  first  meeting  with 
the  man  whose  friendship  and  influence  played  so 
important  a  part  in  his  whole  political  career. 

Not  long  after  his  return  from  this  journey, 
Seward  wrote  his  first  published  political  paper, 
an  Address  of  the  county  convention  at  Auburn, 
in  October,  1824.  This  address  was  a  bold  on- 
slaught on  the  "Albany  Regency,"  a  combination 
of  a  dozen  politicians,  who,  under  the  direction  of 
Martin  Van  Buren,  dictated  for  many  years  the 
nominations  and  policy  of  the  Democratic  party 
of  the  State  of  New  York.  On  the  fourth  of 


FIRST   STEPS  IN   POLITICS  9 

July,  1825,  Seward  spoke  at  Auburn,  and  some- 
thing of  what  he  said  is  interesting  as  a  summary 
of  his  own  convictions  at  that  time  and  his  fore- 
cast of  the  political  future :  — 

"The  Missouri  question  is  settled  and  almost 
forgotten;  the  tariff  bill  has  become  a  law;  the 
sceptre  has  passed  from  the  Ancient  Dominion, 
and  the  union  of  these  States  is  still  unshaken. 
Believe  me,  fellow  citizens,  those  men's  wishes  for 
confusion  far  outrun  their  wisdom,  who  believe,  or 
profess  to  believe,  that  parties  upon  cardinal  prin- 
ciples will  again  arise.  The  time  and  the  occasion 
for  these  parties  have  alike  gone  by,  and  the  at- 
tempt to  rouse  the  vindictive  feelings  which  once 
existed  is  as  idle  as  the  hope  to  call  spirits  from 
the  vasty  deep.  New  parties  are  yearly  formed 
and  as  often  dissolved,  because  they  arise  upon 
questions  of  limited  extent,  or  out  of  regard  to 
men  of  differently  estimated  merit.  And  such 
parties  will  succeed  each  other,  as  in  rolling  seas 
wave  succeeds  wave ;  but  there  will  at  times  be  a 
calm,  and  such  light  and  transitory  excitement 
will  only  serve  to  keep  the  political  waters  in 
healthful  motion. 

"Those,  too,  misapprehend  the  true  interests  of 
the  people  of  these  States,  or  their  intelligence, 
who  believe,  or  profess  to  believe,  that  a  separa- 
tion will  ever  take  place  between  the  North  and 
South.  The  people  of  the  North  have  been  sel- 
dom suspected  of  a  want  of  attachment  to  the 
Union,  and  those  of  the  South  have  been  much 


10  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

misrepresented  by  a  few  politicians  of  a  stormy 
character,  who  have  ever  been  unsupported  by  the 
people  there.  The  North  will  not  willingly  give 
up  the  power  they  now  have  in  the  national  coun- 
cils, of  gradually  completing  a  work  in  which, 
whether  united  or  separate,  from  proximity  of 
territory,  we  shall  ever  be  interested  —  the  eman- 
cipation of  slaves.  And  the  South  will  never, 
even  in  a  moment  of  resentment,  expose  them- 
selves to  a  war  with  the  North,  while  they  have 
such  a  great  domestic  population  of  slaves,  ready 
to  embrace  any  opportunity  to  assert  their  freedom 
and  inflict  their  revenge.  ...  If,  indeed,  these 
States  were  to  be  divided  by  a  geographical  line, 
that  line  would  be  drawn  along  the  Alleghany 
Mountains  or  the  Mississippi  River." 

The  sphere  of  Se ward's  political  activity  for  the 
next  few  years  did  not  extend  beyond  the  limits 
of  his  town  and  county,  and  it  is  not  till  1828  that 
we  find  him  appearing  on  a  larger  field  of  public 
affairs.  In  August  of  that  year  he  presided  over 
a  convention  of  the  young  men  of  the  State  favor- 
able to  the  reelection  of  John  Quincy  Adams  to 
the  presidency.  The  convention  numbered  more 
than  three  hundred  and  fifty  members,  a  body  of 
earnest,  active  workers  with  strong  political  con- 
victions. It  was  one  of  the  last  of  the  state  as- 
semblages of  the  National  Republican  party,  which 
was  utterly  routed  and  dispersed  by  the  Democrats 
under  Jackson  in  the  presidential  election  of  that 
year.  Upon  its  disappearance  Seward  joined,  and 


FIRST   STEPS   IN   POLITICS  11 

soon  became  active  in,  the  anti-Masonic  party  in 
western  New  York,  of  which  Thurlow  Weed  was 
a  moving  spirit.  The  rise  and  progress  of  this 
party  is  one  of  the  most  curious  episodes  in  our 
state  and  national  politics. 

In  1826  there  lived  in  Batavia,  in  the  State  of 
New  York,  one  William  Morgan,  a  most  humble 
and  insignificant  person,  a  Freemason,  whose  ex- 
treme poverty  tempted  him  to  publish  a  book,  an- 
nounced as  a  revelation  of  the  secrets  of  the  order, 
by  the  sale  of  which  he  expected  to  make  a  good 
deal  of  money.  Some  over-zealous  and  misguided 
fanatics  among  the  Masons,  learning  of  his  pro- 
posed publication,  arrested  him  on  a  frivolous  pre- 
text, hurried  him  from  place  to  place,  and  at  last 
procured  his  confinement  in  a  deserted  fort  at 
Niagara.  Here  he  utterly  disappeared,  having 
been,  if  one  may  trust  the  evidence,  taken  off  in 
a  boat  and  drowned  in  the  waters  of  Lake  Ontario. 
All  attempts  to  detect  and  convict  the  authors  of 
this  crime  were  baffled  by  the  powerful  association 
of  which  they  were  members;  but  there  was  no 
anti-Masonic  party  before  the  summer  of  1827, 
when  a  gentleman  who  had  been  the  treasurer  of 
the  town  of  Rochester  ever  since  its  incorporation, 
and  to  whose  reelection  there  was  no  open  opposi- 
tion, was  beaten  at  the  polls  by  a  candidate  whose 
nomination  even  had  been  previously  unknown. 
For  this  political  overturn  the  Freemasons  claimed 
the  credit.  The  defeated  officer  was  not  a  Mason; 
he  had  by  chance  been  an  eye-witness  of  something 


12  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

subsequently  shown  to  have  been  connected  with 
Morgan's  disappearance;  and  he  had  also  taken  a 
prominent  part  in  the  investigations  set  on  foot  to 
discover  the  criminals.  The  result  of  this  petty 
local  election,  and  the  consequent  exultation  of  the 
Masons,  angered  the  people  of  the  village  and 
county,  and  in  the  autumn  anti-Masonic  candi- 
dates were  nominated  and  elected  to  the  state 
Assembly.  The  next  year  (1828)  the  anti-Masons 
extended  and  perfected  their  political  organization ; 
they  obtained  control  of  the  western  counties  of 
New  York;  they  captured  some  isolated  towns 
elsewhere,  and  attracted  the  attention  of  the  pub- 
lic throughout  the  State.  They  held  a  convention, 
nominated  a  candidate  for  governor,  and  succeeded 
in  choosing  five  out  of  the  thirty -two  state  senators, 
and  seventeen  members  of  the  Assembly.  The 
"Anti-Masonic  Enquirer,"  Thurlow  Weed's  paper, 
had  a  circulation  not  merely  in  the  western,  mid- 
dle and  northern  counties  of  New  York,  but  in 
some  parts  of  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio.  There  was 
no  general  state  election  in  1829.  In  March, 
1830,  the  "Albany  Evening  Journal"  was  estab- 
lished as  an  anti-Masonic  paper  under  Weed's 
editorship ;  and  a  national  convention  of  the  party, 
which  Seward  attended,  was  held  at  Philadelphia 
in  September. 

In  the  following  year  Seward  came  to  New  Eng- 
land for  the  first  time  in  his  life.  Arriving  in 
Boston  on  the  anniversary  of  Morgan's  abduction, 
he  went  to  the  anti-Masonic  committee  room,  where 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  POLITICS  13 

he  was  called  upon  to  speak,  and  found  himself 
to  his  surprise  "preaching  politics"  in  that  city. 
He  visited  John  Quincy  Adams  at  Quincy,  and 
the  acquaintance  thus  begun  ripened  into  a  warm 
and  enduring  friendship.  He  found  Mr.  Adams 
an  anti-Masonic  candidate  for  Congress,  "in- 
tensely engaged  in  writing  a  bitter  polemic  against 
Freemasonry."  A  little  later  there  was  a  second 
national  anti-Masonic  convention  at  Baltimore,  to 
which  Seward  was  also  a  delegate.  Here  Chief 
Justice  Marshall  occupied  a  seat  on  the  platform, 
and  William  Wirt  (who  had  been  Monroe's  attor- 
ney-general) was  nominated  as  a  candidate  for 
president.  It  was  known,  when  this  was  done, 
that  Henry  Clay  intended  to  be  a  presidential  can- 
didate; but  he  had  already  expressed  himself  so 
strongly  against  the  anti-Masons,  that  his  nomina- 
tion by  them  was  impossible.  It  was  certain, 
therefore,  that  the  opposition  in  New  York  to 
General  Jackson's  reelection  would  be  divided, 
and  it  was  feared  that  it  would  therefore  be  impos- 
sible to  carry  the  State  against  him.  The  result 
justified  this  apprehension.  Jackson  had  a  deci- 
sive majority  in  New  York,  and  both  in  the  elec- 
toral college  and  in  the  country  made  considerable 
gains  over  his  vote  of  four  years  before.  Clay 
sustained  an  overwhelming  defeat.  Wirt  received 
only  the  four  electoral  votes  of  Vermont.  The 
two  parties  representing  the  opposition  to  Jackson 
were  utterly  crushed,  and  his  removal  of  the  gov^ 
ernment  deposits  from  the  United  States  Bank  in 


14  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

the  following  year  failed  to  reanimate  either  of 
them  in  New  York.  The  anti-Masons  sent  only 
nine  members  to  the  Assembly,  as  against  thirty- 
five  the  year  before,  and  at  a  conference  of  the 
leaders  in  December,  1833,  it  was  unanimously 
agreed  that  the  party  was  at  an  end. 

The  anti-Masonic  party  owed  its  origin  and  its 
strength  to  the  conviction  of  the  leading  young 
men  of  western  New  York  that  the  existence  of  a 
secret  society,  whose  members  were  bound  to  one 
another  by  an  obligation  which  had  been  able  to 
paralyze  the  exertions  of  counsel,  to  shut  the 
mouths  of  witnesses  or  compel  them  to  perjure 
themselves,  to  unnerve  the  arm  of  justice  and  to 
override  and  corrupt  all  departments  of  the  govern- 
ment, was  inconsistent  with  the  safety,  and  even 
threatened  the  existence,  of  a  popular  government. 
Many  men  of  distinction,  ability,  and  experience 
shared  these  views,  and  supported  the  party ;  among 
them  were  Chief  Justice  Marshall  and  Judge 
Story,  John  Quincy  Adams,  John  C.  Calhoun, 
William  Henry  Harrison,  Richard  Rush,  and  Ed- 
ward Everett.  The  extent  of  their  feeling  about 
the  matter  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  ex- 
President  Adams  and  Judge  Story  seriously  con- 
sidered whether  such  secrecy  as  there  is  about  the 
college  Greek-letter  societies  ought  not,  on  public 
grounds,  to  be  prohibited. 

A  national  party,  however,  could  not  be  built 
up  on  a  solitary  instance  either  of  the  open  defi- 
ance or  secret  evasion  of  the  law  in  one  section  of 


FIRST  STEPS   IN   POLITICS  16 

a  single  State.  Though  the  popular  excitement 
in  New  York  and  the  neighboring  States,  caused 
by  the  Morgan  affair,  was  natural,  yet  in  their  at- 
tacks upon  the  Masonic  orders  the  anti-Masons 
overlooked  for  the  time  the  benevolent  purposes  of 
the  organization,  and  applied  to  it  a  general  propo- 
sition, that,  "Secret  societies,  composed  of  mem- 
bers bound  together  by  unlawful  oaths,  and  ex- 
tended over  the  whole  land,  are  opposed  to  the 
genius  of  our  government,  subversive  of  the  laws, 
and  inconsistent  with  private  rights  and  the  pub- 
lic welfare." 

Seward  joined  the  anti-Masons,  as  he  himself 
says,  because  he  thought  them  the  only  political 
organization,  having  any  life,  which  was  opposed 
to  Jackson,  Calhoun,  and  Van  Buren,  three  politi- 
cal leaders  whose  policy  seemed  to  him  to  involve 
"not  only  the  loss  of  our  national  system  of  rev- 
enue, and  of  enterprises  of  state  and  national  im- 
provement, but  also  the  future  disunion  of  the 
States,  and  ultimately  the  universal  prevalence  of 
slavery."  It  was  as  the  representative  of  this 
short-lived  but  vigorous  party  that  he  made  his 
entrance  into  public  office,  being  elected  in  the 
autumn  of  1830  to  the  Senate  of  the  State. 

The  New  York  Senate  at  that  time  consisted  of 
only  thirty-two  members,  each  chosen  for  four 
years,  their  terms  expiring  in  rotation,  so  that 
neither  the  whole  Senate  nor  more  than  one  mem- 
ber from  a  district  was  changed  in  any  one  year. 
Seward,  when  he  took  his  seat  there  in  January, 


16  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

1831,  was  only  twenty-nine  years  old,  small  and 
slender,  with  blue  eyes,  light  sandy  hair,  a  smooth 
face,  and  a  youthful  air  and  expression  which  made 
him  appear  even  younger  than  he  was.  He  was 
one  of  a  very  small  minority,  the  majority  being 
all  members  of,  or  dependent  on,  the  Albany 
Regency,  the  all-powerful  central  force  of  the  New 
York  Democracy.  He  had  had  no  previous  expe- 
rience in  public  affairs,  while  nearly  all  his  fellow 
senators  were  not  only  older  and  more  mature,  but 
were  familiar  with  their  position  and  its  labors; 
and  he  was  for  a  time  diffident,  embarrassed  and 
silent.  His  first  set  speech  was  an  argument  for  a 
reform  in  the  militia  system ;  the  changes  he  then 
advocated  were  afterwards  substantially  adopted, 
and  their  value  was  shown  in  the  prompt  response 
of  New  York  to  President  Lincoln's  call  for  troops 
in  April,  1861.  The  closing  passage  of  this  maiden 
speech  of  Seward's,  though  it  may  have  been  a 
mere  rhetorical  flight,  has  about  it,  in  view  of 
later  events,  a  curious,  prophetic  ring,  when  he 
speaks  of  "the  military  spirit  which  brought  the 
nation  into  existence,  and  will  be  able  to  carry 
us  through  the  dark  and  perilous  ways  of  national 
calamity  yet  unknown  to  us,  but  which  must  at 
some  time  be  trodden  by  all  nations." 

During  his  term  in  the  Senate,  he  was  an  ear- 
nest supporter  of  the  first  law  passed  in  New  York 
abolishing  imprisonment  for  debt  except  in  cases 
of  fraud ;  and  an  early  and  strenuous  advocate  for 
the  enactment  of  general  laws,  —  such  as  are  now 


FIRST   STEPS  IN   POLITICS  17 

found  in  the  statute  books  of  most  States,  —  giv- 
ing to  all  citizens  the  right  to  form  business  corpo- 
rations, instead  of  creating  such  companies  as  a 
favor  by  special  charter. 

At  this  time,  and  down  to  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution  of  1846,  the  Senate  of  New  York  was 
not  merely  a  branch  of  the  legislative  department; 
it  had  also  judicial  functions.  Like  the  English 
House  of  Lords,  it  was  the  court  of  last  resort; 
and  a  considerable  portion  of  Seward's  time  was 
taken  up  by  his  judicial  labors.  The  work  was 
excellent  professional  training;  he  was  interested 
in  it,  and  discharged  its  duties  conscientiously,  and 
with  distinct  ability  and  independence. 

In  the  summer  of  1833,  Seward,  at  his  father's 
invitation,  accompanied  him  to  Europe.  The  ac- 
count of  his  travels  has  no  especial  interest  to-day, 
aside  from  a  visit  which  he  made  to  Lafayette  at 
La  Grange.  He  returned  in  season  for  his  last 
winter's  work  as  senator. 

The  presidential  election  of  1824  had  been  purely 
a  personal  contest.  No  one  of  the  series  of  reso- 
lutions recommending  the  various  candidates  sug- 
gested any  difference  in  their  political  opinions; 
and  though  in  the  campaign  of  1828  the  friends  of 
Jackson  attacked  President  Adams's  position  on 
the  tariff,  and  on  questions  of  internal  improve- 
ments, no  distinction  could  be  drawn  between 
Jackson  and  the  President  on  these  points,  since 
Jackson  had  voted  for  all  the  measiires  of  the  kind 
that  Adams  supported.  Jackson's  first  term  was 


18  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

characterized  by  discussions  and  divisions  as  to 
the  tariff  and  internal  improvements,  and  by  the 
opening  of  his  attack  on  the  United  States  Bank. 
Before  his  second  election  a  convention  of  the 
young  men  of  the  National  Republican  party  had 
adopted  a  series  of  resolutions,  declaring  adequate 
protection  to  American  industry  to  be  indispen- 
sable to  the  prosperity  of  the  country,  and  that  a 
uniform  system  of  internal  improvements,  sustained 
and  supported  by  the  general  government,  was  an 
important  security  for  the  harmony,  strength  and 
permanency  of  the  republic.  Yet  it  may  fairly  be 
said,  taking  the  whole  country  together,  that  the 
question  of  personal  loyalty  to  Jackson  entered  into 
the  campaign  of  1832  at  least  as  largely  as  any 
matter  of  public  policy.  The  union  of  the  opposi- 
tion, which  was  divided  into  National  Republicans 
and  anti-Masons,  would  not  have  changed  the  re- 
sult. 

Jackson's  decisive  majority  authorized  him,  as 
he  thought,  to  carry  on  a  personal  government  for 
the  next  four  years  and  to  make  war  in  such  a 
way  as  seemed  to  him  effectual,  without  regard 
to  constitutional  or  legal  limitations,  upon  any 
policy  or  institution  in  which  he  disbelieved,  or 
which  was  supported  by  men  who  withstood  his 
imperious  will.  The  opposition,  demoralized  and 
disheartened  by  its  overwhelming  defeat  in  1832, 
so  far  rallied  two  years  later  as  to  unite  in  the 
formation  of  the  Whig  party,  the  fundamental 
articles  of  whose  political  creed  were  the  support 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  POLITICS  19 

of  a  policy  of  internal  improvements,  protection  to 
American  industry,  and  a  national  bank. 

Of  this  new  party  Seward  was  the  candidate  for 
governor  in  1834.  He  failed  of  an  election,  and 
returning  to  Auburn  resumed  the  practice  of  the 
law.  His  four  years  in  the  state  Senate  had 
strengthened  him  in  every  way;  the  life  had  en- 
larged his  horizon;  the  constant  intercourse  with 
men  of  more  experience  than  himself,  and  discus- 
sions in  public  and  private,  had  developed  him; 
his  position  as  a  judge  not  merely  gave  him  the 
opportunity  to  hear,  but  required  him  to  listen  to 
and  to  weigh  the  arguments  of  all  the  leading  law- 
yers of  the  State;  and  this  legal  work  was  on  a 
higher  plane  than  his  previous  practice  at  the  bar. 
His  absence  had  rather  improved  than  injured  his 
standing  as  a  lawyer;  he  was  at  once  full  of  busi- 
ness, and  was  soon  overworked.  The  summer  of 
1835  he  spent  in  traveling  for  the  benefit  of  his 
wife's  health. 

In  June,  1836,  he  became  the  agent  of  some 
gentlemen  who  had  purchased  of  the  Holland  Com- 
pany its  lands  in  Chautauqua  County,  in  the  ex- 
treme southwest  of  the  State  of  New  York.  The 
settlers  on  these  lands  were  to  pay  for  them  by 
installments,  and  only  received  their  deeds  when 
the  final  payments  were  made.  The  gentlemen  for 
whom  Seward  was  acting  bought  the  rights  of  the 
Holland  Company  in  these  lands,  and  then  got 
into  difficulties  with  the  settlers,  who  were  refusing 
to  pay  and  were  fast  becoming  disorderly  and 


20  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWAED 

dangerous.  To  deal  with  them  required  both  firm- 
ness and  forbearance,  good  sense,  tact,  kindness 
of  heart  and  manner,  and  an  evident  disposition  to 
do  exact  justice.  The  work  necessitated  a  more  or 
less  prolonged  residence  in  the  county,  and  was 
Seward's  most  engrossing  occupation  until  his 
nomination  and  election  as  governor  by  the  Whigs 
of  New  York,  in  the  autumn  of  1838. 


CHAPTER  II 

GOVERNOR   OF  NEW   YORK 

THE  Chautauqua  affairs  had  been  so  far  settled 
in  the  previous  year  that  the  financial  crisis  of 
1837  had  not  seriously  affected  them,  and  when 
he  entered  upon  his  duties  as  governor,  Seward 
thought  himself  free  from  all  personal  and  busi- 
ness anxieties. 

His  election  meant  a  revolution  in  New  York 
politics.  For  forty  years  there  had  been  no  gov- 
ernor who  was  not  a  Democrat;  but  though  the 
Whigs  had  now  carried  the  State,  the  Senate 
was  still  Democratic,  and  could  control  both  the 
legislation  and  appointments  to  office.  It  was  not 
till  1840  that  Seward's  own  party  had  command, 
and  in  the  last  year  of  his  second  term  (1842)  he 
was  again  confronted  by  a  hostile,  not  to  say 
vindictive,  majority  in  both  branches  of  the 
legislature. 

During  his  four  years  as  governor,  the  State 
spent  many  millions  in  public  improvements.  The 
Erie  Canal  was  enlarged,  new  canals  were  built, 
and  state  aid  was  given  to  railways  and  other 
similar  enterprises.  For  only  a  small  part  of  this 
legislation  were  the  Whigs  really  responsible. 


22  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

Most  of  it  they  received  as  an  inheritance  from 
their  Democratic  predecessors.1 

The  Erie  Canal  was  De  Witt  Clinton's  scheme, 
and  its  success,  from  the  outset,  was  so  overwhelm- 
ing that  it  is  not  strange  that  it  gave  rise  to  all 
sorts  of  similar  schemes,  of  varying  merit  and  de- 
merit. Seward  was  an  ardent,  perhaps  an  indis- 
criminate advocate  of  all  these.  He  believed  in 
internal  improvements,  in  constructing  either  by 
the  State  itself,  or  with  the  aid  of  the  State,  all 
manner  of  ways  of  communication  by  land  and  by 
water,  railways  and  canals,  from  north  to  south, 
from  east  to  west,  between  tide-water  and  the 
lakes,  through  the  great  valleys  of  central  New 
York,  to  the  coal  and  iron  fields  within  and  on 
her  borders.  Some  of  the  works  which  he  favored 


1  Seward  says  that  of  the  state  deht  of  §30,000, 000,  in  1844,  all 
but  about  $4,000,000  originated  under  Democratic  administrations 
( Works,  iii.  p.  365) ;  and  Hammond,  the  historian  of  New  York, 
and  a  Democrat,  admits  that  most  of  the  debt  was  contracted  and 
sanctioned  by  Democratic  legislatures  and  governors  ;  though  he 
explains  that  they  were  forced  to  do  this  in  order  to  keep  their 
power,  as  the  people  were  so  eager  for  public  works  that  they 
would  have  brought  in  the  Whigs,  had  the  Democracy  shown  any 
faltering  in  promoting  them.  In  a  letter  of  January  30,  1844, 
Seward  writes  :  "  With  unimportant  exceptions  every  one  of  these 
contracts  was  made  by  the  statesmen  who  now  disavow  and  dis- 
own them.  .  .  .  The  same  statesmen  who  now  denounce  these 
works  (the  enlargement  of  the  Erie  Canal  and  the  New  York  and 
Erie  Railroad)  are  the  same  persons  who  called  the  latter  enter- 
prise into  existence  by  a  loan  of  $3,000,000.  An  intervening  ad- 
ministration [his  own]  added  no  new  enterprise,  and  only  executed 
the  contracts  which  it  found  in  existence." —  Works,  iii.  pp.  392, 
393. 


GOVERNOR   OF  NEW   YORK  23 

may  have  been  premature;  he  may  have  crowded 
and  hurried  them  more  than  the  finances  of  the 
State  would  warrant;  some  may  not  have  been  in 
themselves  good  paying  investments;  but  the  pol- 
icy which  inaugurated  and  fostered  them  was 
broad  and  far-sighted,  and  they  one  and  all  have 
enabled  the  State  to  reap  the  full  benefit  of  its 
admirable  geographical  situation,  and  have  helped 
to  make  the  city  of  New  York  the  seaboard  me- 
tropolis of  the  New  World. 

The  necessity  of  public  education  in  a  commu- 
nity governed  by  universal  suffrage  was  a  cardinal 
article  of  Seward's  political  faith,  and  he  was  ear- 
nest in  season  and  out  of  season  in  his  endeavors 
to  extend  and  develop  the  school  system  of  New 
York.  He  saw  the  reluctance  of  the  Roman  Cath- 
olics to  send  their  children  to  public  schools  not 
under  their  own  control  and  where  the  peculiar 
tenets  of  their  faith  were  not  taught.  For  this 
and  other  reasons,  he  advocated  the  substitution 
of  new  school  boards  in  the  city  of  New  York  in 
the  place  of  the  close  corporation,  the  "Committee 
of  Public  Instruction,"  a  body  exclusively  Protes- 
tant, which  had  the  entire  control  of  its  schools 
and  school  funds.  He  also  earnestly  recommended 
that  sectarian  or  parochial  schools  should  receive 
a  share  of  the  public  money  devoted  to  educational 
purposes.  His  support  of  the  first  of  these  mea- 
sures drew  upon  him  the  hostility  of  many  of  his 
party  in  New  York  city ;  while  his  repeated  recom- 
mendations of  the  latter  policy  alienated  large 


24  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

bodies  of  Protestant  voters.  His  suggestions  of 
changes  in  legal  procedure  and  practice,  to  lessen 
the  delays  and  diminish  the  expense  of  litigation, 
were  not  favorably  received  by  the  bench  or  bar ; 
and  the  opposition  to  him  upon  these  various 
grounds,  to  say  nothing  of  the  hostility  of  the  dis- 
appointed office-holders  and  their  friends,  caused 
the  reduction  of  his  personal  majority  in  1840, 
and  contributed,  with  other  national  and  more 
general  causes,  to  the  total  overthrow  of  the  Whig 
party  in  New  York  in  the  autumn  of  1842. 

During  his  public  service  as  governor,  the  chari- 
ties of  the  State  found  in  him  a  warm  friend ;  and 
its  first  lunatic  asylum  almost  owed  to  him  its  ex- 
istence. The  records  of  his  pardon  papers,  so  far 
as  they  have  been  printed,  are  a  most  honorable 
testimony,  not  merely  to  the  humanity  and  good 
sense  which  he  brought  to  bear  on  each  particular 
case,  but  to  the  sound  principles  which  governed 
him  in  the  exercise  of  this  high  prerogative,  and 
which  are  so  often  neglected  for  the  less  creditable 
reasons  of  importunity  and  influence. 

In  the  distribution  of  offices  he  simply  followed 
the  then  well-established  New  York  custom.  From 
the  beginning  of  the  century,  "the  cohesive  power 
of  public  plunder  "  had  been  the  strongest  bond  of 
union  among  the  members  of  the  different  factions 
who  followed  the  banner  of  one  or  the  other  of  the 
political  leaders;  and  long  before  it  was  formu- 
lated as  a  political  axiom,  it  was  the  well-settled 
rule  of  every  party  and  faction  in  the  State,  that 


GOVERNOR  OF  NEW  YORK  25 

"to  the  victors  belong  the  spoils."  Fifty  years  of 
added  experience  may  enable  us  to  criticise  and 
repudiate  this  doctrine,  from  whose  disastrous 
consequences  we  suffer  daily  in  nearly  every  de- 
partment of  our  administration,  from  that  of  the 
humblest  messenger  in  our  smallest  municipalities 
to  the  most  important  posts  in  our  national  govern- 
ment. But  a  half  century  ago  "civil  service  re- 
form "  would  have  been  an  incomprehensible 
phrase,  not  merely  to  the  politicians  but  to  the 
people,  and  Seward  was  in  this  respect  no  wiser 
than  his  generation.  He  expected  from  those 
whom  he  appointed  to  office  absolute  and  unques- 
tioning support.  When  a  lawyer,  whom  he  had 
nominated  as  judge,  appeared  before  a  legislative 
committee  to  oppose  a  change  in  the  management 
of  the  public  schools,  recommended  by  the  state 
superintendent  of  education,  Seward  withdrew  the 
nomination.  The  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the 
spoils  system  did  not  fail,  however,  to  impress  it- 
self upon  him.  He  says  in  a  letter :  "  The  list  of 
appointments  made  this  winter  is  fourteen  hun- 
dred, for  all  of  which  I  am  of  course  responsible, 
while  in  many,  if  not  most,  instances  the  circum- 
stances under  which  the  nominations  were  made 
left  me  without  freedom  of  election.  ...  I  am 
not  surprised  by  any  manifestation  of  disappoint- 
ment or  dissatisfaction.  This  only  I  claim,  that 
no  interest,  passion,  prejudice  or  partiality  of 
my  own  has  controlled  any  decision  that  I  have 
made." 


26  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

His  courage  and  good  temper  in  the  trying  years 
when  he  was  confronted  with  a  legislature  where 
his  political  opponents  were  in  a  majority  in  either 
one  or  both  branches  were  admirable.  He  never 
flinched  or  lost  his  self-control  before  their  petty 
insults  or  their  grosser  provocations,  but  bore 
them  with  perfect  apparent  equanimity,  repelling 
with  vigor,  when  necessary,  the  attacks  made  on 
him,  but  never  forgetting  his  personal  self-respect 
or  the  dignity  of  his  position. 

His  official  action  in  two  matters,  which  came 
before  him  as  governor,  excited  a  good  deal  of 
public  feeling  and  discussion.  The  first  of  these 
had  its  origin  in  the  Canadian  rebellion  of  1837. 
There  was  in  that  year  an  insurrection  in  Upper 
Canada,  in  which  the  Canadian  ringleaders  were 
largely  assisted  by  reckless  adventurers  from  north- 
ern New  York,  a  party  of  whom  seized  Navy  Is- 
land, in  the  Niagara  River,  intrenched  themselves 
there,  and  manned  their  works  with  cannon  stolen 
from  the  New  York  state  arsenals.  A  little  steam- 
boat, the  Caroline,  had  been  engaged  to  bring 
them  supplies.  At  the  end  of  her  first  day's  em- 
ployment she  was  made  fast  to  a  wharf  on  the 
American  side  of  the  river,  and  within  the  limits 
of  the  State  of  New  York.  Here  about  midnight 
she  was  boarded  by  a  band  of  loyal  Canadians,  set 
on  fire,  cut  loose  and  left  to  drift  over  the  falls. 
There  was  no  resistance.  The  men  on  the  steamer 
were  asleep  and  unarmed.  Some  of  them,  awak- 
ened by  the  attack,  jumped  ashore;  others  were 


GOVERNOR   OF  NEW   YORK  27 

drowned.  One  of  the  crew,  Durfee,  an  American, 
was  shot  and  killed  as  he  was  running  away. 

When  the  news  of  this  affair  reached  Washing- 
ton, the  secretary  of  state,  Mr.  Forsyth,  wrote  to 
the  British  minister,  complaining  of  the  violation 
of  our  territory,  and  saying  that  it  would  form  the 
subject  of  a  demand  for  redress.  In  his  reply  the 
British  minister  offered  as  an  excuse  for  the  attack 
the  "piratical  character  of  the  Caroline,  and  the 
necessity  of  self-defense  and  self-preservation  under 
which  Her  Majesty's  subjects  acted  in  destroying 
her ;  the  temporary  overthrow  of  the  ordinary  laws 
by  piratical  violence  on  the  New  York  frontier; 
and  the  fact  that  Her  Majesty's  subjects  in  Upper 
Canada,  having  already  severely  suffered  from  this 
cause  and  being  threatened  with  still  farther  in- 
jury, .  .  .  were  necessarily  impelled  to  consult 
their  own  security  by  pursuing  and  destroying  the 
vessel  wherever  they  might  find  her." 

After  this  dispatch,  which  treated  the  matter  as 
an  act  of  private  violence  with  extenuating  circum- 
stances, nothing  more  was  heard  on  the  subject 
from  the  British  government  for  three  years,  ex- 
cept the  acknowledgment  of  our  formal  demand 
for  an  apology  and  redress.  "British  interests," 
says  an  English  historian,  "had  apparently  been 
secured  by  the  burning  of  the  Caroline,  and  the 
natural  susceptibilities  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
United  States  seemed  hardly  worth  consideration." 

In  November,  1840,  Alexander  McLeod,  a  Cana- 
dian, while  at  Lockport  in  New  York,  boasted  that 


28  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

he  had  been  one  of  the  party  attacking  the  Caro- 
line, and  had  himself  shot  Durfee.  He  was  there- 
upon arrested  on  a  charge  of  murder  and  arson. 

On  learning  of  his  arrest,  the  British  minister, 
Mr.  Fox,  who  had  previously  treated  the  affair  as 
the  unauthorized  act  of  private  individuals,  and 
rested  his  justification  of  it  upon  the  necessity  of 
self-preservation,  which  had  impelled  the  Cana- 
dians for  their  own  security  to  pursue  and  destroy 
the  steamer  wherever  she  might  be,  at  once  took 
the  opposite  ground,  and  demanded  McLeod's  im- 
mediate release;  because  the  "destruction  of  this 
steamboat  was  a  public  act  of  persons  in  Her  Ma- 
jesty's service,  obeying  the  orders  of  their  superior 
authorities."  This  was  the  first  official  suggestion 
that  the  attack  on  the  steamer  was  the  act  of  the 
government ;  and  in  making  it,  Mr.  Fox  was  speak- 
ing without  authority.  Forsyth  replied  that  the 
matter  was  now  in  the  hands  of  the  judiciary  of 
New  York,  and  beyond  the  President's  control. 
In  February,  1841,  Lord  Palmerston,  then  secre- 
tary of  state  for  foreign  affairs,  wrote  to  Mr.  Fox, 
approving  his  course,  and  saying:  "There  was 
never  a  matter  upon  which  all  parties,  Tory,  Whig 
and  Radical,  more  entirely  agreed.  If  any  harm 
should  be  done  to  McLeod,  the  indignation  and 
resentment  of  all  England  will  be  extreme;  the 
British  nation  will  never  permit  a  British  subject 
to  be  dealt  with  as  the  people  of  New  York  pro- 
pose to  deal  with  McLeod,  without  taking  signal 
revenge  upon  the  offenders;  McLeod's  execution 


GOVERNOR  OF  NEW   YORK  29 

would  produce  war,  war  immediate  and  frightful 
in  its  character,  because  it  would  be  a  war  of  re- 
taliation and  vengeance."  In  this  dispatch  Lord 
Palmerstoii  assumed  on  behalf  of  Great  Britain 
full  responsibility  for  the  original  attack.  On  the 
12th  of  March,  1841,  the  British  minister  commu- 
nicated the  substance  of  this  letter  to  Mr.  Web- 
ster, who,  on  the  change  of  administration,  had 
become  secretary  of  state  under  President  Harri- 
son; and  our  government  then  had  for  the  first 
time  an  authoritative  declaration  that  the  violation 
of  our  territory,  the  killing  of  Durfee,  and  the 
destruction  of  the  steamer,  with  the  incidental  loss 
of  life,  were  acts  done  under  orders  of  the  Ca- 
nadian authorities,  which  England  justified  and 
assumed  as  her  own.  In  the  opinion  of  the  ad- 
ministration this  declaration  entirely  changed  the 
situation,  and  the  transaction  became  a  national 
affair.  Webster's  reply  to  Fox  was  delayed  in 
consequence  of  Harrison's  death.1  Before  sending 
it  he  had  learned  from  Cass,  who  was  in  Paris, 
that  while  McLeod's  execution  would  be  consid- 
ered a  casus  belli,  any  sentence  short  of  this  would 
not  have  that  effect.  This  information,  however, 
did  not  diminish  his  eagerness  to  dispose  of  the 
matter  at  once,  and  he  advised  the  President  to 
send  the  attorney -general  to  confer  with  Governor 
Seward  upon  the  new  aspect  given  to  the  affair  by 
this  letter,  and  to  urge  him  to  direct  the  prosecu- 
tion to  be  discontinued,  and  McLeod  discharged. 
1  He  died  April  4,  1841,  after  ten  days'  illness. 


30  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

Sewarcl  doubted  his  authority  to  interfere  with  the 
case  as  suggested;  and  in  view  of  the  popular  ex- 
citement thought  that  such  interference,  if  lawful, 
would  be  extremely  injudicious.  He  was  confident 
that  the  people  would  acquiesce  in  McLeod's  ac- 
quittal, or  in  his  pardon,  if  convicted,  but  would 
be  very  much  stirred  up  if  he  were  released  in  the 
exceptional  manner  proposed.  For  these  reasons 
he  declined  to  accede  to  the  President's  sugges- 
tions ;  though  he  assured  the  attorney -general  that 
he  would  pardon  McLeod  if  he  were  convicted,  and 
that  there  should  be  no  execution  and  no  war. 
This  did  not  satisfy  Mr.  Webster,  and  in  reply  to 
Palmerston's  dispatch  he  suggested  that  McLeod 
should  apply  to  the  court  for  a  discharge  on  habeas 
corpus.  This  was  done.  The  federal  administra- 
tion, against  Se ward's  earnest  remonstrances,  per- 
mitted the  United  States  attorney,  who  before  his 
appointment  had  been  McLeod's  counsel,  to  con- 
tinue to  act  for  him ;  the  attorney -general  of  New 
York  appeared  officially  on  the  other  side,  and  the 
proceedings  in  court  assumed  in  this  way  the  as- 
pect of  a  controversy  between  the  federal  govern- 
ment on  one  side,  and  the  state  government  on  the 
other,  and  were  generally  so  regarded. 

As  McLeod's  application  for  his  discharge  was 
to  be  heard  in  the  city  of  New  York,  he  was 
taken  there  in  custody.  The  legislature  was  in 
session  when  he  passed  through  Albany.  There 
was  much  excitement,  and  an  outciy  that,  by  collu- 
sion between  the  governor  and  the  United  States 


GOVERNOR  OF  NEW  YORK  31 

authorities,  McLeod  was  to  be  discharged  without 
a  trial.  A  resolve  was  passed  calling  for  all  the 
documents  and  correspondence  relating  to  the  case. 
The  production  of  the  papers  and  Seward's  accom- 
panying message  showed  the  charge  of  collusion 
to  be  absolutely  groundless.  The  discharge  was 
refused  by  the  court.  McLeod  was  tried  in  Oc- 
tober, and  acquitted  on  proof  of  an  alibi.1 

Seward  in  this  matter  was  upholding,  as  was  his 
official  duty,  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  of  New 
York.  Webster's  contention  was  that,  after  Great 
Britain's  admission  of  her  responsibility,  the  case 
should  be  at  once  ended  and  McLeod  released, 
either  by  an  order  of  the  executive  discontinuing 
the  prosecution,  or  by  a  judgment  of  the  court, 
discharging  him. 

1  The  comments  of  the  newspaper  press  on  the  court's  refusal 
to  discharge  McLeod  disclosed  a  distinct  difference  between  the 
Whigs  of  the  city  of  New  York  and  those  beyond  the  Harlem 
River.  Out  of  the  city  opinion  was  unanimously  with  the  court ; 
but  in  New  York  itself  nearly  as  unanimously  against  it.  The 
question  was  treated  as  an  issue  between  the  State  of  New  York, 
her  courts  and  governor  on  the  one  side,  and  on  the  other  the 
federal  administration,  represented  by  Mr.  Webster  with  his  domi- 
nating personality,  and  supported  by  the  whole  weight  and  autho- 
rity of  the  United  States. 

The  public  questions  raised  in  this  case  were  novel ;  and  though 
later  writers  on  international  law  have  supported  Mr.  Webster's 
positions,  yet  at  the  time  so  eminent  a  jurist  as  Lord  Lyndhurst 
was  of  opinion  that  "  it  was  very  questionable  if  the  Americans 
had  not  right  on  their  side,"  and  that  "  in  a  similar  case  in  Eng- 
land they  would  be  obliged  to  try  the  man,  and,  if  convicted,  no- 
thing but  a  pardon  could  save  him."  —  Dana's  Wheaton,  p.  371 ; 
Greville's  Journal,  Part  II.  vol.  i.  p.  383. 


32  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

The  New  York  court  decided  that,  as  peace  ex- 
isted between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
at  the  time  of  the  burning  of  the  Caroline,  and 
McLeod  was  merely  a  private  citizen,  holding  no 
commission  and  acting  under  no  previous  au- 
thority, and  as  no  responsibility  for  his  act  was 
assumed  by  his  government  until  after  he  had  been 
arrested  and  the  court  had  acquired  jurisdiction 
of  the  case,  its  jurisdiction  was  not  ousted  by  the 
subsequent  admission  of  his  government,  and  that 
the  case  must  therefore  proceed  in  the  regular  way. 

What  had  been  done  in  New  York  after  Mc- 
Leod's  arrest  had  been  originally  approved  by  Van 
Buren's  administration,  and  Seward  felt  keenly 
the  treatment  he  received  at  the  hands  of  its  suc- 
cessors, the  representatives  of  his  own  party. 
Writing  to  a  friend  before  the  trial,  he  says: 
"  Nothing  could  have  been  more  unkind  or  unwise 
than  the  course  pursued  towards  me  by  the  general 
government  in  the  McLeod  affair.  It  was  not 
merely  unkind,  it  was  ungenerous.  They  enjoyed 
my  full  confidence,  they  showed  me  none.  I  was 
left  to  learn  the  ground  taken  by  the  administra- 
tion from  the  published  documents  accompanying 
the  President's  message.  ...  It  has  been  some- 
what oppressive  upon  me  personally  to  have  Mr. 
Webster  roll  over  upon  us  the  weight  of  his  great 
name  and  fame  to  smother  me." 

The  matter  created  a  good  deal  of  feeling  on 
both  sides.  If  Seward  was  offended  at  his  treat- 
ment by  the  administration,  the  President  and  Mr. 


GOVERNOR  OF  NEW  YORK  33 

Webster  were  personally  irritated  both  by  his  re- 
fusal to  intervene,  and  by  the  failure  of  the  attempt 
to  obtain  McLeod's  immediate  discharge  by  the 
court.  There  were  also  public  grounds  on  which 
Mr.  Webster  wished  to  dispose  of  the  affair  of  the 
Caroline  as  speedily  and  quietly  as  possible,  and 
it  annoyed  him  that  the  governor  of  New  York 
would  not  yield  to  his  judgment  and  cooperate  in 
carrying  out'  his  wishes. 

Before  the  case  was  finally  disposed  of,  there 
was  a  change  of  government  in  England,  and 
shortly  afterwards  Lord  Ashburton  was  dispatched 
as  a  special  envoy  to  this  country  to  settle  various 
matters  in  dispute.  Among  these  was  the  affair  of 
the  Caroline.  But  with  the  discharge  of  McLeod, 
Great  Britain  relapsed  into  the  same  indifference 
as  before  his  arrest,  and  it  was  with  difficulty  that 
Mr.  Webster  obtained  from  Lord  Ashburton  a 
statement  that  "  it  was  perhaps  most  to  be  regretted 
that  some  explanation  and  apology  for  this  occur- 
rence was  not  immediately  made."  This  doubtful 
expression  of  regret,  and  careful  avoidance  of  an 
apology,  our  government  accepted  as  sufficient 
amends  for  the  invasion  of  our  territory  and  the 
killing  of  our  citizens.  It  was  not  a  triumph  of 
American  diplomacy,  and  the  result  quite  justified 
Lord  Palmerston's  boast,  that  "there  was  no  apo- 
logy for  the  Caroline  and  should  be  none." 

It  is  uncertain  whether  Seward  had  at  any  time 
an  expectation  of  going  into  Harrison's  cabinet, 
or  any  reason  for  such  an  expectation.  A  letter 


34  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

from  Harrison  to  Webster,  printed  in  "Webster's 
Life  and  Correspondence,"  perhaps  indicates  that 
Webster  had  dissuaded  Harrison  from  considering 
Seward  for  any  cabinet  appointment,  and  that 
Harrison  had  listened  to  his  advice.  After  thank- 
ing him  for  suggestions  upon  this  matter,  Harri- 
son writes:  "I  tell  you,  however,  in  confidence, 
that  I  have  positively  determined  against  S.  There 
is  no  consideration  which  would  induce  me  to  bring 
him  into  the  cabinet.  We  should  have  no  peace 
with  his  intriguing,  restless  disposition."  It  would 
have  been  more  useful,  as  well  as  more  interesting, 
if  Mr.  Webster's  biographer  had  either  suppressed 
both  letters,  or  published  the  one  to  which  this  is 
a  reply.  It  is  difficult  to  see  who  the  mysterious 
"S"  could  have  been  except  Seward.  If  he  were 
the  person  named,  it  is  evident  that  Webster  had, 
before  he  went  into  Harrison's  cabinet,  an  opinion 
of  Seward  by  no  means  favorable,  which  may 
partly  account  for  the  tone  assumed  by  him  in  the 
matter  of  McLeod.  If  one  considers  also  that  the 
McLeod  matter  came  up  after  a  controversy  with 
Virginia,  to  be  spoken  of  presently,  had  been 
going  on  for  two  years,  that  President  Tyler  was 
first  and  always  a  Virginian,  and  that  his  personal 
animosity  to  Seward  at  that  time  and  down  to  the 
day  of  his  death  appears  everywhere  in  his  biogra- 
phy, it  is  possible  that  there  is  to  be  found  here 
an  additional  explanation  of  the  arrogant  and  of- 
fensive treatment  which  Seward  received  at  this 
time  at  the  hands  of  the  administration,  and  how 


GOVERNOR   OF  NEW  YORK  35 

it  happened  that,  while  he  gave  them  his  entire 
confidence,  he  was  left  to  learn  their  plans  and 
policy  from  the  newspapers  and  public  documents. 

A  controversy  with  Virginia,  growing  out  of  a 
demand  for  the  surrender  of  persons  charged  with 
aiding  in  the  escape  of  a  fugitive  slave,  involved 
Seward  in  a  long  and  unpleasant  correspondence 
with  the  governor  of  that  State,  gained  him  noto- 
riety and  odium  in  the  South,  a  prominent  position 
among  the  advanced  anti-slavery  Whigs  at  the 
North,  and  induced  the  Abolitionists  to  endeavor 
to  persuade  him  to  join  their  ranks  and  accept 
their  nomination  for  president.  He  preferred, 
however,  to  remain  a  Whig,  believing,  as  he  al- 
ways insisted,  that  there  could  be  only  two  great 
parties  in  the  country,  and  that  a  third  party 
could  never  accomplish,  except  indirectly,  any 
important  end. 

The  facts  of  the  case  were  simple  enough,  and 
the  statement  of  them  is  all  that  is  needed  for 
Seward's  justification.  As  he  was  leaving  Albany 
for  a  few  days'  absence  an  agent  of  Virginia  ap- 
peared with  a  requisition  for  two  colored  men, 
charged  with  stealing  a  slave.  They  had  been 
already  arrested  and  were  in  jail  in  New  York. 
Seward  examined  the  affidavit  on  which  the  appli- 
cation was  founded,  pointed  out  to  the  agent  what 
he  considered  its  fatal  defects,  informed  him  that 
he  should  hear  the  men  before  answering  the  re- 
quisition, and  that  he  would  attend  to  the  matter 
on  his  return.  Nothing  more  was  heard  from  the 


36  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

agent ;  but  a  month  later,  on  receiving  a  letter  on 
the  subject  from  the  acting  governor  of  Virginia, 
Seward  ascertained  by  an  official  report  that  the 
men  had  been  discharged  on  habeas  corpus,  be- 
cause the  judge  before  whom  they  were  brought 
was  satisfied  upon  the  evidence  that  "neither  of 
them  had  committed  an  offense  against  the  laws  of 
Virginia."  A  courteous  note  inclosing  this  report 
would  seem  to  have  been  the  dignified  and  proper 
reply  to  the  letter  from  Virginia;  but  instead  of 
confining  himself  to  this,  Seward  voluntarily  em- 
barked in  a  discussion  of  the  proper  construction 
of  the  constitutional  provision  for  the  surrender  of 
fugitives  from  justice,  insisting  that  it  applied 
only  to  offenses  recognized  as  crimes  by  the  juris- 
prudence of  all  civilized  nations,  or  to  acts  made 
criminal  by  the  laws  both  of  the  State  demanding 
and  of  that  assenting  to  the  surrender,  and  did  not 
apply  to  acts  which  any  one  State  chose  to  make 
highly  penal,  but  which  had  no  criminal  signifi- 
cance in  the  other,  such  as  assisting  in  the  escape 
of  a  slave,  —  an  act  inspired  by  the  spirit  of  hu- 
manity and  of  the  Christian  religion. 

This  letter  gave  great  offense  to  the  authorities 
and  people  of  Virginia;  it  was  considered  an  in- 
sult to  the  State,  a  wanton  attack  on  the  peculiar 
institution  upon  which  its  whole  social  fabric  rested . 
The  correspondence  was  continued  through  more 
than  two  years,  Seward's  letters  alone  covering  sev- 
enty printed  octavo  pages.  Virginia  sent  copies 
of  the  correspondence  to  the  other  slave  States 


GOVERNOR  OF  NEW  YORK  37 

and  asked  their  support ;  the  matter  was  laid  be- 
fore her  legislature,  and  a  committee  of  that  body 
made  an  elaborate  report  upon  it.  Her  governor 
refused  to  surrender  to  New  York  a  fugitive 
charged  with  forgery;  and  when  the  legislature 
disapproved  his  action,  he  resigned.  The  lieuten- 
ant-governor returned  the  alleged  forger ;  but  the 
Virginia  legislature,  by  way  of  retaliation  for 
Se ward's  conduct,  passed  a  law  imposing  special 
burdens  upon  vessels  coming  from  or  bound  to  New 
York;  authorizing  the  governor,  however,  to  sus- 
pend its  operation,  whenever  New  York  should 
repeal  its  statute  giving  alleged  fugitive  slaves  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury,  and  should  either  return 
the  colored  seamen  originally  demanded,  or  show 
a  proper  penitence  and  recant  its  constitutional 
heresies. 

The  friends  of  each  governor  approved  his  course, 
and  praised  his  superior  skill  in  the  discussion. 
All  Virginians,  of  whatever  party,  thought  the 
"attitude,  conduct  and  ability  of  Governor  Gilmer 
was  in  every  way  a  match  for  the  wily  arts  of 
Seward."  But  New  York  was  by  no  means  so 
unanimous  in  its  support  of  its  chief  magistrate. 
"The  controversy  has  hitherto  been  much  more 
ably  managed  by  Seward  than  by  the  Virginians," 
writes  John  Quincy  Adams,  in  his  diary,  "but 
there  have  been  symptoms  of  the  basest  defection 
to  the  cause  of  freedom  among  the  New  York 
Whigs,  and  a  disposition  to  sacrifice  Seward  to 
the  South."  There  is  no  question  that,  at  the 


38  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

time,  this  correspondence  injured  Seward  with  his 
own  party.  The  Democratic  opinion  of  his  posi- 
tion was  expressed  in  a  joint  resolution  of  the  New 
York  legislature,  declaring  that  "stealing  a  slave, 
contrary  to  the  laws  of  Virginia,  is  a  crime,  within 
the  meaning  of  the  constitution,"  and  requesting 
the  governor  to  transmit  to  the  executive  of  Vir- 
ginia a  copy  of  this  resolve.  Seward  returned  the 
resolution  with  a  message  in  which  he  said :  — 

"I  could  not  transmit  the  resolution  in  the  pre- 
sent case,  without  silently  acquiescing  therein,  and 
thus  waiving  a  decision  to  which  I  adhere,  or  ac- 
companying the  communication  to  Virginia  with 
a  protest  of  my  dissent.  The  Senate  and  Assem- 
bly will,  therefore,  excuse  me  from  assuming  the 
duty  which  an  assent  to  their  request  would  im- 
pose, and  will,  if  it  be  proper,  select  some  other 
organ  of  communication  with  the  executive  author- 
ities of  our  sister  commonwealth." 

This  message  was  his  last  important  communica- 
tion to  the  legislature,  his  official  career  in  New 
York  ending  with  the  year. 


CHAPTER   III 

PROFESSIONAL   LIFE  —  SIX   YEARS   A   PRIVATE 
CITIZEN 

WHEN  Seward  returned  to  Auburn  in  January, 
1843,  he  had  some  reason  for  thinking  that  his 
public  career  was  closed.  The  political  condition 
and  outlook  of  the  Whig  party  in  the  country  were 
most  unpromising.  They  had  elected  their  presi- 
dent and  vice-president,  but  the  former  had  died, 
and  the  latter  vetoed  every  measure  intended  to 
carry  out  their  policy.  In  New  York  the  Demo- 
crats had  again  obtained  entire  control  of  the  state 
government,  and  for  this  many  Whigs  held  Sew- 
ard's  administration  responsible.  He  was  blamed 
for  the  state  debt,  though  Democratic  legislation 
had  created  it;  his  Virginia  correspondence  had 
alienated  conservatives;  his  course  in  the  McLeod 
matter  had  incurred  the  hostility  of  Webster's 
friends;  and  his  views  about  the  distribution  of 
the  school  funds  had  given  much  dissatisfaction  to 
Protestants.  It  seemed,  therefore,  not  only  that 
there  was  no  prospect  of  success  for  his  party,  but 
that,  even  should  they  unexpectedly  carry  an  elec- 
tion, there  was  no  probability  that  any  public  ser- 
vice would  be  required  of  him.  It  was  perhaps 


40  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

best  for  him  that  he  felt  that  his  public  career 
was  closed,  for  the  condition  of  his  own  affairs  was 
such  as  to  require  all  his  attention,  and  he  was 
glad  to  think  that  he  was  still  young  enough  to 
"repair  all  the  waste  of  his  private  fortune." 
During  his  term  as  governor  he  had  entirely  neg- 
lected his  own  business  matters,  and  had  spent 
more  than  his  income ;  his  moderate  personal  estate 
had  been  nearly  consumed,  and  he  now  found  him- 
self so  embarrassed  that  he  was  advised  to  seek  the 
benefit  of  the  bankrupt  act.  But  this  he  refused 
even  to  consider,  and  opening  his  old  office  set  him- 
self to  work  to  earn  his  living  and  pay  his  debts. 

Resuming  his  practice  with  a  local  action  of  the 
most  trifling  character,  the  circle  of  his  clients 
continually  widened  and  his  cases  increased  both 
in  number  and  importance ;  he  became  counsel  for 
the  owners  of  several  valuable  patents,  and  in  a 
few  years  was  able  to  write  to  his  wife :  "  Every 
day  since  my  retreat  from  public  life,  the  profes- 
sion which  I  once  so  ungratefully  despised  has 
been  increasing  its  rewards,  until  we  are  no  longer 
pressed  by  fear  of  disaster  or  sickness,  although 
I  have  been  diverted  so  often  and  so  long  from 
lucrative  engagements.  Our  boys  are  pleasantly 
obtaining  an  education  which  is  a  better  patrimony 
than  riches.  If  our  comforts  do  not  decrease,  and 
our  children  have  no  reason  to  complain  of  neglect, 
we  shall  have  passed  through  life  happier,  and  I 
hope  die  better,  than  we  should  if  my  earliest 
schemes  of  wealth  had  been  accomplished." 


PROFESSIONAL  LIFE  41 

One  trial  in  which  he  took  part  at  this  time 
should,  certainly  be  mentioned,  as  Seward's  con- 
duct in  it  exhibited  some  of  the  best  qualities  of 
his  character,  —  the  courage  and  tenacity  with 
which  he  pursued,  in  spite  of  threats  and  obloquy, 
a  course  which  his  conviction  of  right  and  his 
sense  of  humanity  dictated.  A  demented  negro 
named  Freeman,  just  out  of  the  state  prison  at 
Auburn,  killed,  without  the  slightest  provocation 
and  with  revolting  brutality,  a  whole  family  of 
the  neighborhood.  He  was  arrested.  The  people, 
roused  to  a  pitch  of  frenzy,  were  with  difficulty 
restrained  from  lynching  him.  Seward  was  away 
at  the  time.  He  had  recently  been  counsel  in 
another  case  where  the  then  novel  and  unpopular 
defense  of  insanity  had  been  set  up  and  maintained 
by  him  with  some  success;  and  it  was  feared  he 
might  be  induced  to  act  for  Freeman.  Every 
effort  was  made  to  prevent  this.  To  quiet  the 
popular  apprehensions  on  this  point,  one  of  the 
county  judges  publicly  declared  that  no  Governor 
Seward  would  interfere  to  defend  Freeman;  and 
Seward's  own  law  partners  were  persuaded  to  con- 
firm this  assurance,  while  threats  of  personal  vio- 
lence, should  he  appear  for  the  defense,  were  freely 
made.  Seward,  on  his  return,  was  present  in 
court  when  the  poor  lunatic  was  brought  in  to 
be  arraigned;  he  had  no  counsel;  and  thereupon, 
finding  no  other  lawyer  willing  to  defend  him, 
Seward,  though  he  had  full  knowledge  of  the  popu- 
lar feeling  and  of  all  that  had  been  said  and  done 


42  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

as  to  his  appearance  in  this  case,  the  threats  as 
well  as  the  promises,  volunteered  to  act  for  him. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  the  story  of  the  trial. 
It  was  a  most  painful  mockery  of  justice,  equally 
discreditable  to  the  judge,  the  prosecuting  counsel 
and  the  jury.  Seward  was  uniformly  treated  by 
them  all  during  its  progress  as  a  person  who  was 
prostituting  his  great  talents  in  a  wieked  attempt 
to  save  by  unlawful  means  the  worst  of  criminals. 
But  he  was  apparently  unmoved  by  all  this.  He 
bore  with  seeming  composure  the  taunts  and  abuse 
of  the  prosecuting  attorney,  the  ill  manners  and 
injustice  of  the  court,  and  the  gibes  and  insults  of 
the  people.  The  arduous  and  painful  professional 
duty  he  had  undertaken  was  most  faithfully  dis- 
charged. His  closing  argument  was  exhaustive 
and  convincing.  The  insanity  of  Freeman  was 
proved  beyond  a  doubt.  But  conviction  was  a 
foregone  conclusion.  The  public  excitement  had 
made  a  fair  trial  and  verdict  a  matter  of  difficulty. 
The  presiding  judge  did  not  hesitate  to  show  that 
he  shared  the  feelings  of  the  people,  and  his  obvi- 
ous leaning  against  the  prisoner  and  his  defense 
made  any  unbiased  consideration  of  the  case  by  a 
jury  altogether  impossible.  A  higher  court,  less 
subject  to  local  pressure  and  the  temporary  popu- 
lar frenzy,  set  aside  the  verdict  on  Seward 's  appli- 
cation, and  ordered  a  new  trial;  but  before  that 
could  take  place  the  poor  fellow's  mania  had  so 
developed  that  it  was  impossible  to  try  him  again. 
He  lived  only  a  short  time,  and  the  examination 


PROFESSIONAL  LIFE  43 

which  followed  his  death  disclosed  an  organic  dis- 
ease of  the  brain,  from  which  he  had  long  been 
suffering. 

For  his  conduct  in  this  case,  Seward  was  at  the 
time  to  some  extent  proscribed.  "I  rise  from 
these  fruitless  labors,"  he  wrote,  "exhausted  in 
mind  and  in  body,  covered  with  public  reproach, 
stunned  with  protests."  Freeman's  death,  how- 
ever, and  the  clear  proof  of  his  insanity,  caused  a 
revulsion  of  popular  feeling ;  and  in  the  end,  and 
perhaps  especially  with  those  who  had  been  loud- 
est in  their  denunciations  of  him,  his  defense  of 
Freeman  brought  him  far  more  gain,  than  loss,  of 
reputation. 

Though  he  was  not  again  a  candidate  for  office 
until  his  election  to  the  United  States  Senate  in 
1849,  declining  in  the  interval  every  suggestion  of 
a  nomination,  yet  he  was  never  so  absorbed  by  his 
professional  labors  as  to  cease  to  take  an  interest 
in  politics.  Either  from  his  own  choice,  or  be- 
cause he  was  out  of  favor  with  his  party,  he  gave 
little  time  to  public  affairs  in  the  year  1843.  But 
in  the  presidential  campaign  of  1844  he  did  his 
utmost  to  insure  the  success  of  the  Whigs.  He 
began  on  the  22d  of  February  with  a  speech  at 
Auburn  in  favor  of  Clay,  who  was  then  recognized 
as  the  Whig  candidate,  though  it  was  not  till 
May  that  the  convention  ratified,  by  a  formal  vote, 
the  nomination  already  made  by  the  people.  In 
this  election  there  was  but  one  real  issue,  the  an- 
nexation of  Texas.  Though  this  had  been  vaguely 


44  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

threatened  for  some  time,  no  scheme  for  effecting 
it  had  taken  any  definite  shape  until  that  which 
Tyler  had  sprung  upon  the  country,  only  a  few 
weeks  before  the  nominating  conventions  of  the 
different  parties  were  to  be  held. 

Adventurers  from  the  Southern  States  had 
wrested  Texas  from  Mexico,  not  to  make  it  an  in- 
dependent republic,  but  to  secure  its  annexation 
to  the  United  States  and  an  extension  of  the  area 
of  slavery.  There  were  many  intrigues  and  secret 
negotiations  for  this  purpose  during  the  earlier 
years  of  Tyler's  administration,  and  even  before 
that  time;  but  no  decisive  step  was  taken  until 
Calhoun  became  secretary  of  state  in  March,  1844, 
when  he  at  once  negotiated  a  treaty  of  annexation, 
which  the  Senate  rejected  by  a  considerable  major- 
ity. While  it  was  under  consideration,  both  the 
great  parties  held  their  conventions.  The  platform 
of  the  Whigs  was  silent  as  to  Texas  and  slavery, 
though  Clay  had  declared  himself  opposed  to  an- 
nexation. The  Democrats  abandoned  Van  Buren, 
who  had  been  their  most  prominent  candidate,  be- 
cause he  was  known  to  be  against  annexation ;  they 
nominated  James  K.  Polk  of  Tennessee,  and  de- 
clared "the  re-annexation  of  Texas  a  great  Ameri- 
can measure  recommended  to  the  cordial  support 
of  the  Democracy  of  the  Union."  The  Liberty 
party  had  met  the  year  before  and  nominated 
James  G.  Birney,  with  a  platform  of  twenty-one 
resolutions  all  aimed  at  the  slave  system  of  the 
South. 


PROFESSIONAL  LIFE  45 

During  the  summer,  as  the  canvass  went  on,  it 
became  evident  that  the  election  was  to  depend  on 
the  vote  of  New  York.  Whichever  of  the  great 
parties  could  carry  that  State  would  elect  its  can- 
didate. The  Whigs  might  reasonably  hope  to  do 
this,  if  they  could  hold  the  radical  anti-slavery 
members  of  their  party,  and  induce  them  to  sup- 
port the  regular  nominations  instead  of  throwing 
away  their  votes  on  Birney.  Seward's  advanced 
anti-slavery  opinions,  and  his  unhesitating  adher- 
ence to  the  Whig  party  and  its  candidates,  made 
him  a  most  efficient  worker  with  men  of  this  de- 
scription, who  were  opposed  to  the  admission  of 
Texas,  who  meant  to  resist  it  by  their  votes,  and 
wished  to  do  so  in  the  most  effectual  manner;  and 
he  spent  three  months  in  campaign  labors  in  the 
strongholds  of  anti-slavery  opinion  in  northern 
and  western  New  York.  His  speeches  and  letters 
were  of  necessity  much  alike  in  substance,  how- 
ever they  might  differ  in  form.  The  following 
passages  give  an  outline  of  his  principal  arguments 
for  the  support  of  the  Whig  candidates :  — 

"The  annexation  of  Texas  is  identical  with  the 
perpetuation  of  slavery.  Our  opponents  are  for 
it.  The  Whig  party  are  against  it.  If  there  is 
a  friend  of  human  freedom  willing  to  follow  my 
lead  in  this  sacred  cause,  I  appeal  to  him  to  give 
his  suffrage  to  the  Whig  candidates,  not  for  the 
sake  of  Henry  Clay,  nor  even  for  the  sake  of  the 
Whig  party,  but  for  our  country,  for  liberty's 
sake,  and  for  the  sake  of  humanity." 


46  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

"  What  will  Texas  cost  ?  It  will  cost  a  war 
with  Mexico,  an  unjust  war  —  a  war  to  extend  the 
slave  trade.  You  will  not  go  to  war  for  human 
slavery,  will  you  ?  You  say  Henry  Clay  is  a  slave- 
holder. So  he  is.  I  regret  it  as  deeply  as  you 
do ;  I  wish  it  were  otherwise.  But  our  conflict  is 
not  with  one  slaveholder,  or  with  many,  but  with 
slavery.  You  are  opposed  to  the  admission  of 
Texas.  Will  you  resist  it  by  voting  for  James  G. 
Birney?  Your  votes  would  be  just  as  effectual  if 
cast  upon  the  waters  of  the  placid  lake." 

"Henry  Clay  is  opposed  to  the  coming  in  of 
Texas.  He  is  the  candidate  of  the  Whig  party. 
They  are  opposed  to  the  coming  in  of  Texas.  The 
security,  the  duration,  the  extension  of  slavery, 
all  depend  on  the  annexation  of  Texas.  How, 
then,  can  any  friend  of  emancipation  vote  for  the 
Texas  candidate,  or  withhold  his  vote  from  the 
Whig  candidate?" 

"The  integrity  of  the  Union  depends  on  the 
result.  To  increase  the  slaveholding  power  is  to 
subvert  the  Constitution,  to  give  [this  power]  a 
fearful  preponderance,  which  probably  will  be 
speedily  followed  by  demands  to  which  the  Demo- 
cratic free-labor  States  cannot  yield,  and  which 
will  be  made  the  ground  for  secession,  nullification, 
and  disunion." 

Before  the  convention  met  in  May,  Mr.  Clay 
had  written  a  letter  in  which  he  deprecated  either 
urging  or  opposing  annexation  on  sectional  grounds, 
declared  an  acquisition  of  territory  for  the  purpose 


PROFESSIONAL   LIFE  47 

of  strengthening  one  portion  of  the  country  against 
the  other  to  be  a  scheme  pregnant  with  evil,  and 
insisted  that  annexation  and  a  war  with  Mexico 
were  identical,  and  that  such  a  measure  at  that  time 
would  be  dangerous  to  the  integrity  of  the  Union. 
It  was  upon  this  letter  that  he  was  nominated  and 
that  the  Northern  Whigs  were  asked  to  accept  his 
position  on  the  Texas  question  as  satisfactory. 
But  in  August,  yielding  to  the  pressure  of  South- 
ern Whigs  in  States  which  he  could  not  possibly 
carry,  Clay  wrote  a  second  letter,  saying:  "So 
far  from  having  any  personal  objection  to  the  an- 
nexation of  Texas,  I  should  be  glad  to  see  it,  with- 
out dishonor,  without  war,  with  the  common  con- 
sent of  the  Union,  and  upon  just  and  fair  terms." 
The  news  of  this  last  letter  reached  Seward  while 
he  was  canvassing  New  York  on  Clay's  behalf;  its 
effect  was  immediately  apparent :  "  I  met  that  let- 
ter at  Geneva,"  he  writes,  "and  thence  here,  and 
until  now,  everybody  droops,  despairs.  It  jeop- 
ards, perhaps  loses  the  State.  Is  there  any  other 
way  but  to  go  through  to  the  end  more  devotedly 
than  ever  ?  " 

He  followed  the  course  he  here  suggests,  finish- 
ing his  campaign  labors  with  no  apparent  lack  of 
zeal  or  courage,  but  with  an  inward  conviction  of 
the  coming  defeat.  His  exertions,  however,  brought 
him  one  satisfaction,  the  restoration  to  some  extent 
of  the  former  harmonious  relations  between  the 
conservative  Whigs  of  the  city  of  New  York  and 
himself.  The  causes  of  this  were  twofold.  The 


48  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

mass  of  the  Whigs  had  moved  forward  to  where 
Seward  stood,  and  even  the  laggards  had  advanced 
much  nearer  his  position;  while  the  more  intelli- 
gent of  his  opponents  in  his  own  party  were  be- 
coming aware  of  the  fact,  that  whatever  were  his 
hopes  or  beliefs  as  to  the  perfect  republic,  he  en- 
deavored to  consider  and  deal  with  actual  public 
affairs  as  a  practical  statesman  rather  than  as  a 
Utopian  doctrinaire,  and  would  not  knowingly  sacri- 
fice a  possible  present  gain  to  a  remote  and  uncer- 
tain ideal. 

At  the  close  of  the  campaign  he  resumed  his 
professional  labors,  and  remained  until  the  next 
presidential  election  a  simple  looker-on  in  politics, 
even  declining  a  nomination  to  the  constitutional 
convention  of  his  own  State. 

Detained  by  professional  business  at  Washing- 
ton during  several  weeks  in  each  of  the  next  three 
winters,  he  heard  there  much  talk  as  to  the  polit- 
ical questions  of  the  day,  —  the  matter  of  the 
Oregon  boundary,  which  was  in  dispute  between 
this  country  and  Great  Britain,  the  Mexican 
war  and  the  Wilmot  Proviso.  But  he  listened, 
perhaps,  to  more  speculations  as  to  the  possible 
and  probable  candidates  for  the  next  election, 
and  by  March,  1847,  he  felt  that  General  Tay- 
lor's nomination  and  election  scarcely  admitted 
of  a  doubt.  "I  am  not  prepared  to  speculate," 
he  writes,  "upon  the  consequences  of  events  so 
great  and  unlocked  for  as  these.  What  will  be 
their  effect  upon  the  '  Great  Question  of  Ques- 


PROFESSIONAL  LIFE  49 

tions, '   which  underlies  all  present  political  move- 
ments? " 

When  the  nomination  was  actually  made,  he 
accepted  it  as  a  "result  inevitable,  if  not  the  best 
left  within  our  power  to  attain,"  and  took  comfort 
in  thinking  that,  "if  the  Barnburners  continued 
the  conflict,  they  would  be  able  to  save  the  State 
for  the  Whigs." 

Before  the  convention  took  place,  Seward's 
name  had  been  suggested  for  the  vice-presidency; 
but  it  was  immediately  stated  that  he  was  not  a 
candidate.  Fillmore,  who  received  the  nomina- 
tion, was  not  the  choice  of  Taylor's  supporters, 
but  was  a  concession  to  his  opponents ;  and  Seward 
at  once  predicted  that,  if  Fillmore  were  elected, 
that  portion  of  the  Whig  party  of  the  State,  to 
which  he  himself  belonged,  "would  be  in  the  posi- 
tion of  a  faction  apparently  opposed  to  the  New 
York  leader  in  the  general  council  of  the  Whigs 
of  the  Union,"  —  a  prophecy  partially  realized 
during  Taylor's  life,  and  thoroughly  fulfilled  after 
his  death. 

Before  the  Whig  convention  met,  General  Cass 
had  been  nominated  by  the  Democrats;  and  when 
the  new  Free  Soil  party  had  selected  as  its  candi- 
dates Van  Buren  and  Adams,  the  political  cam- 
paign began. 

In  1848  the  Whigs  repeated  the  experiment 
made  eight  years  before.  They  nominated  a  mili- 
tary hero,  admittedly  without  political  experience, 
and  having  at  the  best  but  a  scanty  equipment  of 


50  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

political  knowledge  or  opinions.  Their  convention 
had  no  committee  on  resolutions,  and  made  no 
declaration  of  principles.  The  Democrats  pro- 
claimed the  war  with  Mexico  "just  and  neces- 
sary;" and  the  Free  Soilers  declared  that  there 
should  be  "  no  more  slave  States  and  no  more  slave 
territory;  "  but  "Free  Soil,  Free  Speech,  Free 
Labor  and  Free  Men." 

It  was  soon  evident  that  for  a  second  time  the 
election  was  to  depend  upon  the  fortunes  of  this 
new  third  party  in  the  pivotal  State  of  New  York. 
Would  it  catch  enough  anti-slavery  Whig  votes  to 
give  the  election  there  to  the  Democrats ;  or  could 
Van  Buren,  by  the  magic  of  his  name,  his  personal 
popularity  and  his  political  skill,  seduce  from  their 
allegiance  so  many  Democrats  as  to  compass  the 
defeat  of  his  old  political  rival  and  enemy,  Cass? 
Again,  the  conduct,  the  position,  the  presence  and 
the  labors  of  Seward,  a  pronounced  anti-slavery 
man,  but  an  equally  emphatic  Whig,  were  all-im- 
portant to  his  party. 

Seward  yielded  to  the  numerous  demands  made 
upon  him,  and  for  six  weeks  or  more  spoke  con- 
stantly in  New  York,  New  England,  Pennsylvania, 
New  Jersey,  Delaware  and  Ohio.  In  Boston  he 
and  Abraham  Lincoln  were  heard  together,  and 
at  the  close  of  the  evening  Lincoln  said  to  him: 
"I  have  been  thinking  about  what  you  said  in 
your  speech.  I  reckon  you  're  right.  We  have 
got  to  deal  with  this  slavery  question,  and  got  to 
give  much  more  attention  to  it  hereafter  than  we 


PROFESSIONAL  LIFE  51 

have  been  doing."1  Seward's  last  speeches  were 
made  to  the  anti-slavery  men  of  the  Western  Re- 
serve in  Ohio,  endeavoring  to  persuade  them  to 
cast  their  votes  for  Taylor  rather  than  to  throw 
them  away  on  Van  Buren  and  thereby  assure  the 
election  of  Cass,  and  the  opening  to  slavery  of 
the  Territories  just  wrung  from  Mexico.  His 
friends  thought  his  speech  at  Cleveland  the  boldest 
and  best  he  had  made,  while  his  opponents  charac- 
terized it  as  the  most  perverse  and  dogmatic.  He 
revised  this  speech  for  publication,  thinking  "it 
would  commend  itself  to  consideration."  A  short 
summary  of  it  will  show  his  views  of  the  issues 
between  the  parties,  and  of  the  duty  of  all  oppo- 
nents of  the  extension  of  slavery. 

He  saw  two  antagonistical  elements  of  society 
in  America,  —  freedom  and  slavery.  These  ele- 
ments divided  and  classified  the  American  people 
into  two  parties.  One  of  these,  the  party  of  slav- 
ery, regarded  "disunion  as  among  the  means  of 
defense,  and  not  always  the  last  to  be  employed." 
The  other  maintained  that  the  preservation  of  the 
union  of  the  States,  one  and  inseparable,  now  and 
forever,  was  the  highest  duty  of  the  American 
people  to  themselves,  to  posterity  and  to  mankind. 
"The  party  of  slavery,"  he  said,  "declares  that 
institution  necessary,  beneficent,  approved  of  God, 
and  therefore  inviolable.  The  party  of  freedom 
seeks  complete  and  universal  emancipation.  These 
two  great  elements  exist  and  are  developed  in  the 

1  Seward,  Life,  ii.  p.  GO. 


52  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

two  great  national  parties  of  the  land."  Seward 
did  not  contend  that  an  evil  spirit  had  always  pos- 
sessed one  of  these  parties  without  exception  or 
mitigation,  and  that  a  beneficent  one  had  on  all 
occasions  fully  directed  the  actions  of  the  other; 
but  he  insisted  that  a  beneficent  one  had  worked 
chiefly  in  the  Whig  party,  and  its  antagonist  had 
worked  in  the  other  party ;  and  that  the  Whig  party 
had  been  as  true  and  faithful  to  human  freedom  as 
the  inert  conscience  of  the  American  people  would 
permit  it  to  be ;  that  inert  as  that  conscience  was, 
much  could  be  done,  everything  could  be  done,  for 
freedom. 

"Slavery,"  he  said,  "can  be  limited  to  its  pre- 
sent bounds,  it  can  be  ameliorated,  it  can  and 
must  be  abolished,  and  you  and  I  can  and  must 
do  it.  The  task  is  as  simple  and  easy  as  its  con- 
summation will  be  beneficent  and  its  rewards  glo- 
rious. It  requires  only  to  follow  this  simple  rule 
of  action,  namely,  to  do  everywhere  and  on  every 
occasion  what  we  can,  and  not  to  neglect  or  refuse 
to  do  what  we  can  at  any  time,  because  at  that 
precise  time  and  on  that  particular  occasion  we 
cannot  do  more.  Circumstances  determine  possi- 
bilities. When  we  have  done  our  best  to  shape 
them  and  make  them  propitious,  we  may  rest  satis- 
fied that  superior  wisdom  has  determined  their 
form  as  they  exist,  and  will  be  satisfied  with  us  if 
we  then  do  all  the  good  that  circumstances  leave 
in  our  power.  But  we  must  begin  deeper  and 
lower  than  in  the  composition  and  combinations  of 


PROFESSIONAL  LIFE  63 

factions  and  parties.  Wherein  do  the  strength 
and  security  of  slavery  lie  ?  You  answer  that  they 
lie  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  constitutions  and  laws  of  all  slaveholding  States. 
Not  at  all.  They  lie  in  the  erroneous  sentiment 
of  the  American  people.  Constitutions  and  laws 
can  no  more  rise  above  the  virtue  of  the  people 
than  the  limpid  stream  can  climb  above  its  native 
spring.  Inculcate,  then,  the  love  of  freedom  and 
the  equal  rights  of  man  under  the  paternal  roof; 
see  to  it  that  they  are  taught  in  the  schools  and 
in  the  churches ;  extend  a  cordial  welcome  to  the 
fugitive  who  lays  his  weary  limbs  at  your  door, 
and  defend  him  as  you  would  your  paternal  gods ; 
correct  your  own  error,  that  slavery  has  any  con- 
stitutional guaranty  which  may  not  be  released 
and  ought  not  to  be  relinquished.  Say  to  slavery, 
when  it  shows  its  bond  and  demands  the  pound  of 
flesh,  that  if  it  draws  one  drop  of  blood  its  life 
shall  pay  the  forfeit.  Inculcate  that  free  States 
can  maintain  the  rights  of  hospitality  and  human- 
ity; that  executive  authority  can  forbear  to  favor 
slavery;  that  Congress  can  debate,  that  Congress 
can  at  least  mediate  with  the  slaveholding  States; 
that  at  least  future  generations  might  be  bought 
and  given  up  to  freedom.  .  .  .  Do  all  this,  and 
inculcate  all  this  in  the  spirit  of  moderation  and 
benevolence,  and  not  of  retaliation  and  fanaticism, 
and  you  will  soon  bring  the  parties  of  the  country 
into  an  effective  aggression  on  slavery.  When- 
ever the  public  mind  shall  will  the  abolition  of 


54  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

slavery,  the  way  will  open  for  it.  I  know  that 
you  will  tell  me  that  all  this  is  too  slow.  Well, 
then,  go  faster  if  you  can,  and  I  will  go  with  you ; 
but  .  .  .  remember  that  no  human  work  is  done 
without  preparation,  that  God  works  out  his  sub- 
limest  purposes  among  men  with  preparation." 

If  the  closing  passages  of  this  speech,  which 
have  just  been  quoted,  did  not  indicate  a  new  de- 
parture in  what  Seward  considered  the  political 
aims  of  the  Whig  party,  they  certainly  stated  these 
aims  with  clearness  and  emphasis,  and  are  in 
marked  contrast  with  the  absolute  silence  of  its 
platform  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  The  mass  of 
the  anti-slavery  WThigs  at  the  North,  though  op- 
posed to  the  extension  of  slavery,  were  not  eman- 
cipationists, and  had  by  no  means  reached  Sew- 
ard's  position  as  declared  in  this  speech.  The 
large  majority  of  them  who  were  not  politicians 
voted  for  Taylor,  slaveholder  though  he  was,  on 
the  grounds  upon  which  Seward  advised  it,  —  that 
the  W'hig  party  was,  after  all,  the  party  of  free- 
dom, and  the  personal  question  a  subordinate  one, 
and  that  it  would  be  almost  impossible  to  regain 
for  freedom  what  would  be  lost  by  a  Democratic 
victory. 

Seward  had  no  special  gifts  of  voice  or  presence. 
He  was  below  the  average  height,  with  nothing 
commanding  in  his  appearance,  and  his  voice  was 
harsh  and  shrill ;  but  there  was  a  courage,  an  ear- 
nestness about  his  campaign  speeches  of  this  year, 
which  made  them  most  effective  at  the  time,  and 


PROFESSIONAL  LIFE  55 

a  tone  of  conviction,  which  still  vibrates  as  one 
reads  them  after  the  lapse  of  nearly  half  a  cen- 
tury. 

He  returned  home  the  night  before  the  elec- 
tion. The  next  morning  it  seemed  probable  that 
the  Whigs  had  carried  New  York;  in  a  week's 
time  Taylor's  election  was  ascertained  beyond  a 
doubt. 

The  campaign  over,  Seward  turned  again  to  the 
law,  and  was  busily  engaged  with  his  cases.  But 
though  he  wrote  on  the  16th  of  November :  "  Now 
that  I  have  got  into  the  law  again  pretty  deep,  I 
care  nothing  for  these  [political]  intrigues,"  —  yet 
it  cannot  be  doubted  that  he  took  a  lively  interest 
in  the  canvass  for  the  United  States  Senate,  which 
his  friends  were  making  on  his  behalf,  and  which 
his  opponents  in  his  own  party  were  fighting  by 
the  publication  of  anonymous  pamphlets  and  forged 
letters,  and  the  manufacture  of  fictitious  interviews. 
As  often  happens  in  such  cases,  these  inventions 
returned  only  to  plague  the  inventors,  and  on  the 
6th  of  February,  1849,  Seward  was  chosen  senator 
from  New  York.  He  was  not  at  this  time  forty- 
eight  years  old.  He  had  never  been  in  Congress 
or  held  any  office  under  the  United  States,  yet  he 
had  been  four  years  in  the  New  York  Senate,  and 
for  an  equal  time  the  governor  of  that  State.  He 
was  familiar  with  the  machinery  of  legislation  and 
the  workings  of  a  legislative  body,  and  with  the 
conduct  of  public  affairs.  He  had  been  from  his 
youth  an  ardent  politician,  and  his  ability  had 


66  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

been  quickly  recognized  and  used  by  his  political 
associates.  He  was  but  twenty-three  when  he 
attacked  the  Albany  Regency,  the  all  powerful 
clique  which  then  ruled  New  York,  and  only 
twenty-seven  when  he  was  unanimously  chosen 
president  of  a  state  convention  called  to  promote 
the  reelection  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  The  de- 
feat of  Mr.  Adams  was  a  deathblow  to  the  party 
which  supported  him,  —  the  National  Republicans, 
—  and  Seward  joined  the  anti-Masonic  party  as  the 
most  vigorous  opponent  of  Jackson  and  his  follow- 
ers, and  by  the  anti-Masons  he  was  nominated 
and  elected  to  the  state  Senate  in  1830.  If  at 
the  beginning  of  his  four  years'  service  in  that 
body  he  suffered  some  embarrassment  from  the 
consciousness  of  his  youth  and  inexperience,  this 
feeling  soon  disappeared;  he  rose  rapidly  in  the 
opinion  of  his  fellow  senators  and  of  the  public, 
and  before  the  end  of  his  term  was  the  recognized 
spokesman  of  the  small  minority  opposed  to  the 
Democracy.  His  speeches  there  upon  national 
questions  are  especially  noteworthy  for  their  bold- 
ness and  intellectual  vigor;  while  in  matters  of 
domestic  legislation  he  was  the  strenuous  supporter 
of  all  measures  which  a  liberal  and  enlightened 
policy  suggested  for  the  improvement  and  growth 
of  the  State  or  the  advancement  and  welfare  of 
the  people.  At  the  end  of  his  four  years'  service 
he  was  so  far  a  leader  in  the  new  party  into  which 
the  opponents  of  Jackson  were  endeavoring  to 
unite,  and  which  assumed  the  name  "Whig,"  as 


PROFESSIONAL  LIFE  57 

to  receive  its  nomination  for  governor.  The  party 
was  too  new  to  succeed,  and  though  he  led  his 
ticket  in  all  the  counties,  Seward  failed  to  be 
elected. 

He  now  found  himself,  however,  for  the  first 
time  a  member  of  a  national  party  representing 
upon  the  pressing  national  issues  what  had  long 
been  his  own  cherished  convictions.  With  the 
principles  of  the  Whig  party  he  was  thoroughly 
imbued.  He  believed  in  a  liberal  construction  of 
the  Constitution,  in  the  protection  and  development 
of  American  industries  and  the  policy  and  duty  of 
the  government  in  the  promotion  of  internal  im- 
provements, and  held  generally  the  liberal  views 
of  those  Whigs  who  were  most  radical  and  pro- 
gressive, and  which  were  in  some  respects  much  in 
advance  of  the  time. 

During  the  four  years  which  intervened  before 
his  election  as  governor  in  1838,  though  he  took 
no  active  part  in  politics,  yet  he  spoke  from  time 
to  time  to  the  people  of  western  New  York,  insist- 
ing upon  the  necessity  of  public  education  for  the 
successful  maintenance  of  republican  government, 
and  on  the  importance  of  internal  improvements 
for  the  development  of  the  State ;  and  in  the  finan- 
cial crisis  of  1837  he  gave  wise  and  timely  warn- 
ing of  the  evil  of  the  government's  "pledging  its 
credit  by  issues  of  '  Continental  money  '  to  pay  its 
officers  and  carry  on  a  war."  During  these  four 
years  there  was  a  constantly  increasing  interest  in 
the  slavery  question,  and  a  marked  development 


58  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

of  sectional  bitterness  between  the  North  and  the 
South.  At  the  North,  abolition  societies  were 
becoming  more  prominent  and  aggressive,  and  in 
Congress  John  Quincy  Adams  was  fighting  the 
battle  of  the  right  of  petition ;  while  in  the  South, 
the  postmasters,  with  the  encouragement  and  ap- 
proval of  the  administration,  were  arbitrarily  de- 
stroying the  abolition  newspapers  found  in  the 
mails,  and  the  President  himself  was  recommend- 
ing and  the  Southerners  insisting  upon  the  passage 
of  a  law  punishing  the  circulation  of  such  publica- 
tions through  the  mails  in  the  Southern  States. 
Seward  saw  the  dangers  of  encouraging  these  de- 
mands, and  prophesied  that  if  the  South  persisted 
in  such  monstrous  claims  and  conduct  the  issue 
would  be  fearfully  changed  for  them. 

Sectional  differences,  however,  played  no  part 
of  importance  in  either  the  presidential  campaign 
of  1836  or  that  of  1840,  both  of  which  turned  upon 
the  economic  issues  which  divided  the  Whigs  and 
Democrats;  but  minor  incidents  and  such  events 
as  the  correspondence  between  Seward  and  the 
Southern  governors  kept  alive  and  tended  to  in- 
crease the  hostile  feeling  between  the  two  sections, 
which  the  proposed  annexation  of  Texas  threatened 
at  any  time  to  kindle  into  an  active  flame. 

The  campaign  of  1840  was  practically  the  last 
presidential  election  which  did  not  turn  on  the 
slavery  question.  From  Tyler's  accession  to  power, 
and  his  veto  of  every  bill  passed  by  Congress  to 
carry  out  the  financial  policy  which  he  had  been 


PROFESSIONAL  LIFE  59 

elected  to  support,  the  questions  which,  to  the  mass 
of  the  Whigs  of  the  North,  overshadowed  and 
eclipsed  all  others  in  importance  and  interest  were 
those  of  the  admission  of  Texas  and  the  consequent 
extension  of  slavery,  and  the  compliance  with,  or 
refusal  of,  the  growing  demands  of  the  slaveholders. 
Upon  these  great  questions,  in  whatever  form  they 
presented  themselves,  Seward  had  from  the  outset 
held  fixed  opinions,  while  other  people  were  hesi- 
tating, and  he  had  never  shrunk  from  expressing 
and  acting  up  to  them,  regardless  of  any  obloquy 
he  might  incur. 

In  the  discussions  with  the  governors  of  the 
Southern  States  as  to  persons  charged  with  aiding 
slaves  to  escape,  in  his  arguments  before  the  courts 
in  defending  such  cases,  and  in  his  political 
speeches,  Seward  was  the  recognized  exponent  of 
the  most  advanced  views  as  to  the  slavery  question 
of  the  most  advanced  Northern  Whigs  who  still 
adhered  to  their  party. 

It  would  not  be  true  to  say  of  any  one  man  that 
he  created  the  public  opinion  on  the  subject  of 
slavery  which  at  last  found  its  political  expression 
in  the  Republican  party;  but  it  is  true  of  Seward 
that  his  speeches  and  alignments  at  this  period  in- 
culcated the  doctrines  and  instilled  into  the  voters 
of  the  free  States  the  principles  on  which  that 
party  was  built ;  and  that  these  speeches  were  the 
textbook  from  which  large  and  continually  increas- 
ing masses  of  Northern  voters  were  receiving  their 
political  education.  Of  the  "Conscience  Whigs" 


60  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

in  New  York  he  was  the  representative  man,  and 
it  was  to  his  pronounced  anti-slavery  opinions  and 
his  bold  advocacy  of  them,  quite  as  much  as  to  his 
adherence  to  the  other  doctrines  of  his  party,  that 
Seward  owed  his  strong  hold  upon  the  people  of 
New  York  which  caused  his  election  to  the  Senate 
in  the  winter  of  1849. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   COMPROMISE   RESOLUTIONS 

IN  the  four  and  a  half  years  between  Folk's 
election  and  Taylor's  inauguration,  the  policy  of 
the  slave  States  had  become  distinctly  developed, 
and  the  political  dogmas  of  their  leading  statesmen 
clearly  formulated.  In  1845  they  refused  to  admit 
Iowa,  which  had  a  sufficient  population,  unless 
Florida,  deficient  in  numbers,  should  be  brought 
in  as  a  State  under  the  same  bill.  In  1848  Wis- 
consin came  in  as  a  counterpoise  to  Texas  and  the 
great  acquisitions  of  the  Mexican  war,  which  were 
then  expected  to  inure  to  the  benefit  of  the  South 
and  slavery. 

In  the  closing  days  of  Tyler's  administration,  a 
joint  resolution  for  the  annexation  of  Texas  had 
been  passed  by  the  expiring  Congress,  and  received 
the  President's  signature.  Before  the  middle  of 
January,  1846,  Polk  ordered  Taylor  to  advance 
into  Mexico,  and  our  war  of  invasion  began.  In 
the  following  winter,  while  the  war  was  still  in 
progress  (February  19,  1847),  Calhoun  offered  in 
the  Senate,  and  supported  by  an  elaborate  speech, 
resolutions  declaring  in  substance  that  slavery  was 
national,  freedom  sectional ;  that  the  Constitution 


62  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

authorized  and  protected  slavery  in  all  the  national 
domain,  and  that  neither  Congress  nor  any  terri- 
torial legislature  could  legally  prevent  a  citizen  of 
a  slave  State  from  migrating  with  his  slaves  to 
any  Territory  and  there  holding  them  in  servitude. 

During  the  Mexican  war  the  territory  which 
was  ceded  to  us  by  treaty  at  its  close  had  been 
occupied  by  our  troops  and  governed  by  the  officers 
in  command  of  them,  who  treated  the  laws  of 
Mexico  as  still  in  force,  so  far  as  the  civil  rights 
and  obligations  of  the  people  were  concerned. 
With  the  peace,  the  military  authority  properly 
ceased  ;  and  President  Polk  earnestly  recommended 
Congress  to  provide  some  government  as  a  sub- 
stitute. For  California  this  was  an  imperative 
need,  for  directly  the  discovery  of  gold  was  known, 
hordes  of  adventurers  of  every  description  had 
rushed  in,  and  it  was  absolutely  necessary  that 
there  should  be  some  authority  to  repress  and 
punish  with  a  strong  hand  the  disorderly  and 
vicious,  and  protect  the  honest  and  industrious 
immigrants. 

Congress  was  so  divided  on  the  question  of  free 
soil  or  slave  labor  in  these  new  possessions  that  all 
legislation  was  impossible.  The  House  would  pass 
no  bill  for  their  organization  without  a  proviso 
prohibiting  slavery,  while  the  Senate  would  assent 
to  no  bill  containing  any  such  proviso ;  and  Con- 
gress adjourned  six  months  after  the  peace,  leaving 
them  without  a  legal  government  or  any  provision 
for  forming  one.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 


THE   COMPROMISE   RESOLUTIONS  63 

military  governors  continued,  though  reluctantly, 
to  exercise  the  same  authority  as  before,  relying 
for  their  justification  quite  as  much  upon  the  neces- 
sity of  the  case  and  the  tacit  acquiescence  of  the 
people,  as  upon  the  orders  of  the  President.  The 
acquiescence  of  the  people  was  an  unwilling  one  ; 
they  were  much  disappointed  that  no  permanent 
government  had  been  provided  for  them  ;  but  they 
followed  the  President's  advice,  and  submitted  to 
the  existing  condition  of  things  in  the  expectation 
that,  as  he  assured  them,  Congress  would  give 
them  a  proper  government  before  the  4th  of  March, 
1849.  As,  however,  from  the  inaction  of  Congress 
during  the  winter,  these  hopes  gradually  faded 
away,  while  the  necessity  for  a  strong  and  perma- 
nent government  became  continually  more  mani- 
fest, the  people  of  California  grew  more  and  more 
restless,  and  in  various  localities,  San  Francisco, 
Sacramento  and  elsewhere,  the  inhabitants  made 
abortive  attempts  to  establish  local  legislatures 
and  governments.  General  Riley  succeeded  in  in- 
ducing the  leaders  of  these  tentative  governments 
to  forbear  and  delay,  though  he  had  only  persuasion 
and  argument  to  rely  on,  the  attractions  of  the 
mines  making  it  impossible  to  hold  in  the  ranks  on 
land  either  soldiers,  sailors  or  marines. 

Riley  was  conscious,  however,  that  he  had  ex- 
hausted his  influence  ;  and  when  he  learned  that 
Congress  had  dissolved,  and  California  was  left 
without  legislature  or  government,  he  at  once 
(June  3,  1849)  issued  a  proclamation,  calling 


64  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

upon  the  people  to  choose  delegates  to  a  convention 
to  adopt  a  frame  of  government,  state  or  territorial, 
as  they  might  think  best. 

The  insurmountable  obstacle  to  any  territorial 
legislation  in  the  second  session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  which  expired  March  4,  1849,  had  been, 
as  before,  the  matter  of  slavery ;  the  Senate  again 
rejecting  any  bill  restricting  slavery  in  the  Terri- 
tories, and  the  House  insisting  on  its  absolute 
prohibition  there.  The  presidential  election  of 
the  previous  summer  had  been  fought  by  the 
Whigs  with  no  platform  ;  Northern  voters  had  been 
urged  to  support  Taylor  as  the  candidate  of  the 
party  most  firm  and  persistent  in  its  opposition  to 
slavery ;  while  on  the  other  hand  it  had  been  con- 
tended at  the  South  that  absolute  confidence  could 
be  placed  in  him  as  a  Southern  planter  and  the 
owner  of  three  hundred  slaves.  The  Democratic 
party  had  enunciated  its  doctrines  on  the  subject 
of  slavery  in  the  platform  of  its  convention ;  and 
this  platform  had  been  supplemented  by  a  letter 
from  General  Cass,  insisting  on  the  right  of  the 
people  of  a  Territory  to  settle  the  question  of  slavery 
for  themselves.  This  letter,  however,  was  suscep- 
tible of  a  double  construction,  —  at  the  North  it 
was  declared  to  mean  that  the  people  of  a  Territory 
could  at  any  time  determine  for  themselves  the 
question  of  freedom  or  slavery  there ;  while  at 
the  South  it  was  relied  on  as  containing  the  true 
Southern  doctrine  that  the  people  of  a  Territory 
were  powerless  to  take  any  action  in  regard  to 


THE  COMPROMISE  RESOLUTIONS  65 

slavery  while  in  their  territorial  condition,  and 
could  only  do  so  when  framing  a  state  government. 

Among  the  solutions  of  the  California  question 
proposed  during  the  winter  of  1848-49,  the  one 
which  had  found  most  favor  in  the  eyes  of  the 
South,  though  it  failed  to  be  adopted,  was  that  of 
authorizing  the  inhabitants  to  form  a  state  con- 
stitution and  apply  for  admission  to  the  Union. 
The  Southerners  thought  that,  if  a  convention  for 
this  purpose  should  be  called  under  an  act  of  Con- 
gress, with  sufficient  notice  to  them,  they  could 
flood  California  with  their  own  people  prepared  to 
vote  for  a  pro-slavery  constitution,  before  the  more 
distant  Northerners  could  reach  there.  In  the 
mean  time,  however,  they  hesitated  to  carry  their 
slaves  thither,  partly  because  they  feared  that  the 
Mexican  laws  abolishing  slavery  were  still  in  force, 
and  that  their  slaves  would  therefore  be  free  in 
California ;  partly  because  they  were  afraid  of  the 
passage  of  a  bill  prohibiting  slavery  there ;  partly 
also,  because,  until  the  discovery  of  gold,  it  was 
very  doubtful  how  far  slave  labor  could  be  made 
profitable  in  California;  and  for  another  reason, 
perhaps  of  greater  weight  than  all  these,  that  the 
labor  and  expense  of  moving  slaves  rendered  it 
practically  impossible  for  any  Southern  planter  to 
compete  in  the  ordinary  processes  of  emigration 
with  the  enterprise  of  the  pioneers  of  the  North 
and  West. 

When  General  Taylor  arrived  in  Washington, 
just  before  his  inauguration,  he  was  greatly  disap- 


66 

pointed  to  find  that  Congress  was  likely  to  expire 
without  any  provision  for  the  government  of  Cali- 
fornia, and  he  used  his  best  exertions,  Seward  act- 
ing as  his  representative  and  adviser,  to  secure  the 
passage  of  a  bill  which  should  give  the  Territories 
some  form  of  legal  government.  Having  failed  in 
this  attempt,  he  then,  with  the  approval  of  all  the 
members  of  his  cabinet,  the  majority  of  whom 
were  Southerners,  and  with  the  assent  of  Sewarcl, 
dispatched  to  California  Thomas  Butler  King  of 
Georgia,  a  former  member  of  Congress  from  that 
State,  "to  encourage  the  people  there  to  form  a 
state  constitution  and  ask  for  admission  to  the 
Union,  assuring  them  of  his  support  should  they 
do  so ; "  and  he  took  a  similar  course  as  to  New 
Mexico.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  he 
had  any  special  purpose,  to  introduce  or  to  pro- 
hibit slavery  in  either  Territory.  His  plan  was 
that  which  had  already  been  suggested,  to  look  to 
the  Territories  themselves  for  the  settlement  of  the 
territorial  difficulties,  letting  the  people  organize 
their  own  governments,  since  Congress  would  not 
do  so  for  them.1 

As  it  turned  out,  neither  General  Taylor  nor 
his  messenger  had  any  hand  in  calling  the  Califor- 
nia convention.  General  Riley,  the  military  gov- 
ernor, published  his  proclamation  before  he  had 
any  communication  with  either  of  them.  The 
proclamation  stated  that  the  course  he  was  taking 
was  advised  by  the  President  and  by  the  secreta- 
1  Letter  of  John  Tyler,  March  5,  1849. 


THE  COMPROMISE  RESOLUTIONS          67 

ries  of  state  and  of  war ;  but  it  is  clear  from  a 
comparison  of  dates  that  the  President  and  public 
officers  to  whom  he  referred  were  Polk  and  his 
secretaries.  King  never  saw  Riley  till  the  middle 
of  June,  and  when  the  convention  met  was  danger- 
ously ill  and  unable  to  be  present;  the  only  ad- 
vice he  is  known  to  have  given  was  to  recommend 
that  the  boundaries  of  the  State  be  made  as  large 
as  possible.  This  was  doubtless  in  accordance 
with  Taylor's  view  of  sweeping  into  two  new  States 
all  the  territory  acquired  from  Mexico  ;  and  this 
was  the  course  advocated  in  the  convention  by  the 
Southern  delegates,  who  may  have  hoped  either 
to  prevent  the  admission  of  California  with  such 
extensive  boundaries,  or  at  a  later  date  to  procure 
her  division  into  two  States,  one  of  which  would 
be  slave  though  the  other  were  free.  At  all  events 
the  boundary  question  was  really  the  only  matter 
in  dispute  in  the  convention.  There  was  a  due 
proportion  of  men  from  the  South  among  the  dele- 
gates, but  the  clause  prohibiting  slavery  was  unani- 
mously adopted. 

When  Congress  assembled  in  December,  1849, 
it  was  known  that  California,  with  a  constitution 
prohibiting  slavery,  would  at  once  apply  for  ad- 
mission as  a  State.  The  Mexican  war  had  been  a 
Southern  war,  brought  about  by  Southern  policy, 
largely  fought  by  Southern  officers  and  men,  with 
the  determination  that  its  final  result  should  be 
"  to  adjust  the  whole  balance  of  power  in  the  Con- 
federacy so  as  to  give  the  South  the  control  over 


68  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

the  operations  of  the  government  in  all  time  to 
come,"  and  with  the  expectation  that  the  territory 
acquired  by  the  war  would  create  a  new  demand 
for  slave  labor  and  a  great  advance  in  the  price  of 
slaves.  The  admission  of  California  as  a  free  State 
would  not  merely  rob  the  Southerners  of  what  they 
considered  the  just  political  and  pecuniary  fruits  of 
this  war,  but  also,  unless  accompanied  by  that 
of  a  slave  State  at  the  same  time,  would  destroy 
that  equilibrium  of  sectional  power  in  the  Senate 
which  had  been  successfully  maintained  ever  since 
slavery  had  become  a  political  question. 

Party  ties  were  to  a  certain  extent  dropped  when 
Congress  assembled.  The  Southern  Whigs  and 
Democrats  stood  together  on  every  question  which 
appeared  to  them  to  have  any  sectional  bearing. 
They  were  supported  by  some  Northern  Democrats, 
and  were  also  aided  by  the  small  knot  of  Free 
Soilers  in  the  House,  whose  violence  of  language, 
half  justified  by  the  personal  attacks  on  themselves, 
hindered  the  cause  they  professed  to  have  at  heart, 
and  helped  that  party  which  they  said  they  were 
seeking  to  destroy.  For  a  whole  month  the  House 
of  Representatives  attempted  to  elect  a  speaker,1 
and  during  this  time  the  talk  of  the  Secessionists 
was  defiant  and  treasonable. 

1  The  Free  Soilers  were  not  averse  to  any  speaker  who  would 
pledge  himself  to  give  the  Wilmot  Proviso  members  control  of 
the  Committee  on  Territories,  and  nearly  succeeded  in  electing 
a  Democrat  who  had  promised  in  writing  to  do  this.  Seward 
urged  the  Whigs  of  the  House  to  stand  firmly  by  Mr.  Winthrop, 
the  regular  Whig  candidate. 


THE  COMPROMISE  RESOLUTIONS  69 

When  at  last  the  House  was  organized  and  the 
President's  message  read,  the  vital  struggle  began. 
There  were  several  burning  questions  connected 
with  the  war :  the  admission  of  California  ;  the 
true  limits  of  Texas,  —  those  which  the  United 
States  were  bound  to  recognize  ;  the  proper  gov- 
ernment of  New  Mexico  and  Utah.  The  Presi- 
dent thought  California  should  be  admitted,  be- 
cause she  had  the  population  and  all  the  other 
conditions  requisite  to  form  a  State.  He  hoped 
that  New  Mexico  might  also  come  in  as  a  State 
with  a  proper  frame  of  government,  and  that  the 
Texas,  boundary  question  might  be  settled  as  a 
judicial  matter  before  the  Supreme  Court.  Upon 
the  last  question  he  doubtless  had  some  feeling  and 
a  very  decided  opinion,  as  he  knew  from  his  own 
personal  experience  during  the  war,  that,  whatever 
might  have  been  claimed  on  paper,  Texas  had  never 
actually  governed  a  single  inch  of  the  land  in  dis- 
pute.1 The  only  importance  of  the  matter  arose 
from  the  fact  that  if  the  lands  in  dispute  were  a 
part  of  Texas  they  were  already  slave  territory ;  if 
they  belonged  to  Mexico  and  became  ours  by  the 

1  Texas  had  advanced  claims  to  a  large  portion  of  New  Mexico, 
cutting  off  many  thousand  square  miles  where  there  was  no  shivery, 
and  insisting  that  it  was  included  within  her  own  limits  where 
there  was  slavery.  Polk,  at  the  very  end  of  his  administration, 
issued  orders  to  the  officer  in  command  in  New  Mexico  to  fall 
back  before  any  inroad  of  the  Texans,  and  surrender  possession  of 
the  disputed  territory.  These  orders  Taylor  at  once  revoked,  and 
directed  him  to  maintain  the  boundary  line  as  the  United  States 
found  it,  and  as  ceded  to  them  by  the  treaty. 


70  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

treaty,  slavery  had  been  abolished  there  before  we 
acquired  them.  It  was  not,  therefore,  merely  a 
Texas  question,  but  a  slavery  question,  and  as  such 
a  sectional  one. 

There  were  other  matters,  the  discussion  of 
which  served  to  excite  still  more  the  hostile  feel- 
ing already  existing  between  North  and  South. 
Among  these  were,  the  question  of  the  abolition  of 
slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  of  the 
prohibition  of  the  slave  trade  between  the  States 
(neither  of  which  had  any  such  support  as  to  make 
it  of  political  importance) ;  of  the  inefficiency  of 
the  law  for  the  surrender  of  fugitive  slaves,  and 
of  the  reluctance  of  the  North  to  comply  with  the 
constitutional  requirements  on  this  point ;  and  of  the 
prevention  of  the  use  of  the  District  of  Columbia 
as  the  common  slave  mart  and  exchange  for  the 
entire  South.  Though  this  last  was  hardly  a  sec- 
tional issue,  as  it  received  the  support  of  senators 
and  representatives  from  all  parts  of  the  country, 
yet  it  was  so  closely  connected  with  the  slavery 
agitation  that  debate  upon  it  was  liable  to  become 
passionate  and  personal. 

Upon  the  question  of  slavery  in  the  Territories, 
the  Southern  view  was,  that  the  Constitution  is  a 
compact  of  union  for  limited  purposes  between  sev- 
eral sovereign  States,  the  citizens  of  each  of  which 
have  in  all  the  Territories  a  common  property  and 
equal  rights  with  the  citizens  of  every  other  State, 
any  citizen  having  the  right  to  carry  there  all  pro- 
perty of  every  species  recognized  as  such  by  the  laws 


THE  COMPROMISE   RESOLUTIONS  71 

of  his  own  State,  and  therefore  slaves,  if  slaves  were 
property  in  the  State  from  which  they  were  taken. 
Some  Southerners  went  even  farther  than  this,  and 
insisted  that  under  the  provisions  of  the  Constitu- 
tion for  the  return  of  fugitive  slaves  to  their  mas- 
ters, and  for  slave  representation  in  Congress, 
slaves  were  a  kind  of  property  entitled  to  special 
and  peculiar  favor,  singled  out  by  the  Constitution 
from  the  mass  of  other  property,  invested  with 
higher  dignity  and  guarded  with  greater  security, 
too  precious  to  be  intrusted  solely  to  state  law, 
and  especially  under  the  protecting  jegis  of  the 
Constitution ;  or,  as  it  was  forcibly  put  by  one  of 
the  ablest  exponents  of  the  Southern  doctrine : 
"  This  is  a  pro-slavery  government ;  slavery  is 
stamped  upon  its  heart,  the  Constitution.  No 
matter  where  you  place  the  power  to  legislate  on 
the  Territory,  the  power  to  legislate  on  questions  of 
slavery  is  a  legitimate  instrument  of  it.  Slaves 
are  property  —  our  property.  If  it  is  said  slavery 
is  a  peculiar  institution  against  the  common  law 
of  mankind,  then  I  reply,  our  government  is  a  pe- 
culiar government,  our  Constitution  is  a  peculiar 
Constitution,  for  they  are  both  impregnated  with 
this  peculiarity."  In  short,  it  was  insisted  that, 
without  any  legal  enactments,  slavery  existed  by 
force  of  the  Constitution  in  all  the  Territories  of 
the  United  States,  and  that  neither  foreign  laws 
before  conquest,  nor  domestic  legislation  after- 
wards, could  prohibit  or  abolish  it. 

The  original  opposition  of  the  North  to  the  ex- 


72  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

tension  of  slavery  to  the  new  Territories  was  not 
founded  upon  political  considerations.  The  North- 
erners had  submitted,  without  reluctance,  to  the 
supremacy  of  the  South  for  two  thirds  or  more  of 
the  whole  period  of  the  history  of  the  government, 
and  were  practically  indifferent  about  the  matter. 
The  men  of  the  North  were  engaged  in  all  sorts 
of  industrial  and  commercial  enterprises,  their  in- 
terest in  politics  was  limited,  and  their  opposition 
to  slavery  and  its  extension  was  in  most  cases  an 
objection  upon  moral  grounds.  The  Southerners, 
on  the  contrary,  had  few  occupations  except  poli- 
tics and  the  ordinary  pursuits  of  a  country  life, 
and  they  had  controlled  the  government  almost 
from  its  foundation,  either  directly  through  one 
of  their  own  number,  or  indirectly  through  some 
Northerner  designated  by  them  for  President. 
They  saw  the  possibility,  and  feared  the  proba- 
bility, of  this  political  supremacy  slipping  from 
them,  and  believed  the  admission  of  California  as 
a  free  State  to  be  the  first  fatal  step  in  a  path 
which  would  ultimately  leave  them  in  a  position 
of  inferiority  and  subjection  to  the  North  in  the 
government  and  administration.  To  them  the  con- 
test was  not  merely  for  a  theoretic  principle,  but 
for  a  positive,  actual,  valuable  right. 

General  Taylor  having  been  nominated  with  no 
platform  or  declaration  of  principles,  any  policy 
which  he  advocated  as  to  the  settlement  of  the 
slavery  question  might  fairly  be  called  the  Presi- 
dent's policy,  and  no  Whig  need  feel  that,  if  lie 


THE  COMPROMISE  RESOLUTIONS  73 

failed  to  support  it,  he  was  breaking  loose  from 
his  party.  There  was,  indeed,  no  Whig  party,  in 
that  sense  in  which  party  means  a  combination  of 
persons  agreeing  upon  certain  political  principles, 
and  united  to  carry  out  a  certain  political  policy. 
The  questions  which  had  united  the  Whigs  were 
either  dead  or  dormant,  and  on  the  only  living  politi- 
cal issue  they  had,  as  a  national  party,  no  principles 
and  no  policy.  Those  members  of  Congress,  there- 
fore, who  had  been  always  classed  as  Whigs  and 
were  elected  as  Whigs,  felt  at  liberty  to  vote  as 
they  pleased  upon  all  the  questions  relating  to  the 
Territories. 

Taylor  was  also  unfortunate  in  the  fact  that  he 
had  not  the  support  of  the  two  great  leaders  of 
the  Whig  party,  Clay  and  Webster.  Clay  thought 
himself  ill-treated  by  Taylor  in  regard  to  the  nom- 
ination, and  never  forgave  him.  He  had  declined 
to  advocate  or  support  him  during  the  campaign. 
He  was  not  present  at  the  inauguration.  When 
he  took  his  seat  in  the  Senate  in  the  middle  of 
December,  he  announced  his  purpose  of  taking 
"  the  lead  of  no  subject  and  no  party ; "  yet  a  few 
weeks  later  he  made  a  speech  which  drew  from 
one  of  his  opponents  the  observation,  that  he  well 
knew  "the  senator  from  Kentucky  formally  de- 
clined exercising  on  behalf  of  the  administration 
a  parliamentary  leadership,  but  had  no  suspicion, 
until  he  listened  to  his  speech,  that  he  meditated 
a  regular  course  of  hostilities  against  those  in 
power." 


74  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

Webster,  the  other  great  leader  of  the  Whig 
party,  had  sulked  in  his  tent  by  the  sea  the  whole 
summer  long ;  and  when  he  was  at  last  induced  to 
leave  his  solitude  to  speak  at  a  political  meeting, 
he  only  said  that  Taylor's  nomination  was  one  not 
fit  to  be  made ;  but  that,  as  he  was  the  Whig  can- 
didate, he  should  support  him.  He  was  in  Wash- 
ington when  Taylor  arrived  there,  and  called  upon 
him  at  once ;  but  his  real  feeling  towards  the  in- 
coming President  is  to  be  seen  in  an  extract  from 
a  letter,  in  which  he  says  :  "  Although  I  would  not 
yield  myself  to  any  undue  feelings  of  self-respect, 
yet  it  is  certain  that  I  am  senior  in  years  to  Gen- 
eral Taylor,  that  I  have  been  thirty  years  in  public 
life,  .  .  .  have  had  .  .  .  friends,  who  have  thought 
that  for  the  administration  of  civil  and  political 
affairs  my  own  qualifications  entitle  me  to  be  con- 
sidered a  candidate  for  the  office  to  which  General 
Taylor  has  been  chosen.  I  feel  [therefore]  that  I 
shall  best  consult  my  own  dignity  by  declining  to 
fill  a  subordinate  position  in  the  executive  govern- 
ment." 1 

Before  Congress  met  in  December,  Taylor's 
course  as  to  California  had  alienated  the  lead- 
ing Southern  Whigs,  upon  whom  he  might  have 
thought  he  could  depend  ;  and  either  from  inclina- 
tion or  necessity  he  consulted  Seward,  the  only 

1  Webster's  Life,  ii.  p.  357.  Webster  was  born  in  January, 
1782,  Taylor  in  September,  1784.  A  year  later  Webster  accepted 
a  subordinate  position,  and  became  secretary  of  state  to  Fillmore, 
who  was  born  in  January,  1800,  and  so  was  sixteen  years  younger 
than  Taylor. 


THE  COMPROMISE   RESOLUTIONS  75 

Whig  senator  from  the  most  important  State  in 
the  Union,  and  his  active  supporter  in  the  election 
campaign.  Indeed,  confidential  relations  between 
them  had  begun  even  before  the  inauguration,  and 
a  few  weeks  later  attention  had  been  called  to 
these  relations  by  the  publication  of  a  letter  from 
Seward,  written  to  exonerate  Taylor  from  the 
charge  of  having  used  his  influence  with  the  Con- 
gress which  had  just  expired,  in  favor  of  legislation 
which  would  have  fastened  slavery  on  all  our  newly 
acquired  Territories.  The  letter  was  well  inten- 
tioned  ;  it  had  been  read  and  approved  by  the 
Cabinet  before  it  was  given  to  the  press ;  neverthe- 
less, its  publication  was  unfortunate.  To  have 
public  proclamation  made  that  he  was  taking  for 
one  of  his  chief  counselors  a  radical  anti-slavery 
man  like  Seward,  and  one  so  inexperienced  in 
national  politics,  injured  the  President,  not  only 
with  Clay  and  the  Southern  Whigs,  but  also  with 
Webster  and  his  friends.  There  was  so  little  ap- 
parent necessity  for  printing  the  letter,  that  Seward 
was  taunted  with  having  done  this  that  he  might 
make  a  display  of  his  confidential  relations  with 
General  Taylor,  and  he  became  in  consequence  a 
ready  mark  for  the  attacks  of  all  the  senators,  of 
whatever  party,  who  were  either  tacitly  or  avowedly 
hostile  to  the  administration. 

From  the  moment  of  the  assembling  of  Congress 
the  air  of  the  Capitol  was  heavy  with  the  coming 
storm.  There  seemed  to  be  no  question  the  dis- 
cussion of  which  was  harmless.  A  resolution  to 


76  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

extend  the  courtesies  of  the  Senate  to  Father  Ma- 
thew,  the  Irish  apostle  of  temperance,  brought  on 
a  discussion  as  to  slavery.  A  debate  upon  our 
diplomatic  relations  with  Austria  soon  drifted  into 
the  same  channel. 

In  talking  about  the  subjects  to  be  embraced  in 
the  census,  abolition  and  the  abolitionists  were 
among  the  topics  treated  of,  and  the  discussion 
was  made  the  occasion  for  bitter  personalities. 
Threats  of  disunion  were  frequent.  These  were 
partly  in  earnest,  and  were  partly  intended  to  ex- 
cite the  fears  of  the  people  of  the  North,  that  they 
might  yield  more  readily  to  the  demands  of  the 
slaveholders  and  assent  to  the  legislation  they  de- 
sired. In  many  of  these  debates  Seward  took 
part,  and  was,  when  the  occasion  required,  vigor- 
ous and  outspoken  in  declaring  his  hostility  to  slav- 
ery and  his  hopes  of  ultimate  emancipation.  He 
made  no  personal  attacks  on  any  one,  and  replied 
once  for  all  to  those  made  on  him  :  "  I  am  here  for 
public  measures,  not  for  private  ends,  and  no  im- 
putations shall  ever  put  me  on  a  defense  of  myself 
against  aspersions  or  complaints  of  this  kind." 

Taylor,  though  inexperienced  in  political  affairs 
or  civil  administration,  was  a  man  of  good  sense, 
single-minded,  honest,  direct,  averse  to  anything 
in  the  nature  of  political  intrigue  or  bargain,  of 
sterling  integrity,  of  undoubted  loyalty  and  un- 
hesitating courage,  able  and  determined  to  dis- 
charge his  duty  as  he  understood  it,  and  impatient 
at  the  Southern  bluster  and  threats  of  disunion, 


THE  COMPROMISE  RESOLUTIONS  77 

which  he  considered  treasonable,  and  in  the  face 
of  which  what  was  called  compromise  seemed  to 
him  a  cowardly  surrender  to  disloyalty.  He  saw 
no  connection  between  a  bill  admitting  California 
as  a  free  State  and  acts  organizing  the  other 
Territories,  or  establishing  the  true  boundaries  of 
Texas ;  and  a  combination  to  secure  the  passage  of 
any  one  bill  by  arrangement  with  the  friends  of 
the  others  seemed  to  him  a  base  business.  He 
might  have  assented  to  all  the  measures  contem- 
plated by  Clay's  compromise  resolutions,  each  on 
its  own  merits,  but  never  as  a  bargain  between 
contending  sections.1  On  the  21st  of  January, 
1850,  he  sent  to  Congress  a  message  recommending 
the  admission  of  California  with  the  constitution  it 
had  formed  prohibiting  slavery,  confining  his  mes- 
sage to  this  subject  alone. 

Clay,  Calhoun  and  Webster  were  this  year  to- 
gether in  the  Senate  for  the  last  time.  Clay 
was  the  man  of  compromise.  He  had  been  th» 
father  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  in  1821,  had 
quieted  the  threatened  nullification  outbreak  of 
South  Carolina  a  dozen  years  later  by  another 
compromise,  and  now  came  forward  for  the  last 
time,  offering  a  series  of  resolutions  to  be  after- 

"  I  would  rather  have  California  wait  than  bring  in  all  the 
'  Territories  on  her  back.'  "  Taylor  to  Webster,  Curtis's  Webster, 
ii.  473.  Southern  Whigs  in  Congress  said  the  Southern  officers 
would  refuse  to  obey,  if  ordered  to  maintain  the  line  of  New 
Mexico  against  Texas.  "  Then,"  said  Taylor,  "  I  will  command 
the  army  in  person,  and  hang  any  man  taken  in  treason."  Schou- 
ler,  v.  p.  185. 


78  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

wards  embodied  in  appropriate  legislation.  They 
were  intended  to  cover  all  the  matters  in  dis- 
pute, and  to  be  a  full  and  final  adjustment  of  all 
questions  relating  to  slavery.  California  was  to 
be  admitted  as  a  free  State ;  the  other  territory 
conquered  from  Mexico  was  to  have  a  proper 
territorial  government,  with  no  provision  either 
introducing  or  excluding  slavery ;  the  western 
boundary  of  Texas  was  to  be  established,  and  that 
State  paid  from  the  public  treasury  for  the  relin- 
quishment  of  its  claims  to  any  part  of  New  Mexico. 
The  resolves  further  declared  that,  so  long  as 
slavery  existed  in  Maryland  and  Delaware,  it  was 
inexpedient  to  abolish  it  in  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia without  the  assent  of  those  States  ;  but  that  it 
was  expedient  to  prohibit  there  the  trade  in  slaves 
brought  from  without  the  District ;  that  Congress 
had  no  power  to  interfere  with  the  slave  trade 
between  the  different  slave  States,  and  that  more 
effectual  provision  ought  to  be  made  for  the  resti- 
tution of  fugitive  slaves. 

Clay  had  been  for  some  time  deliberating  on  the 
matter  of  these  resolutions.  On  the  2d  of  January 
he  wrote  to  his  son  James :  "  I  have  been  thinking 
much  of  proposing  some  comprehensive  scheme  of 
settling  amicably  the  whole  question  in  all  its 
bearings,  but  have  not  yet  positively  determined 
to  do  so."  Before  offering  his  resolves,  he  went, 
on  a  stormy  evening,  to  Webster's  house  and 
secured  his  approval.  He  introduced  them  in  the 
Senate  at  the  end  of  the  month,  and  a  little  later 


THE  COMPROMISE  RESOLUTIONS  79 

the  great  debate  began.  For  two  days,  to  a  cham- 
ber crowded  with  an  eager  and  excited  audience, 
Clay  spoke  eloquently  and  persuasively  in  support 
of  his  resolves,  appealing  to  the  North  for  conces- 
sion, and  to  the  South  for  peace.  A  month  later 
Calhoun,  tall,  gaunt,  and  haggard,  with  the  shadow 
of  coming  death  on  his  face,  sat  in  the  Senate, 
while  a  friend  read  for  him  his  carefully  prepared 
argument.  He  opposed  Clay's  resolutions,  and 
insisted  that  the  South  required  further  legislation 
for  the  protection  of  her  peculiar  institution,  and 
for  the  security  and  maintenance  of  that  equilib- 
rium between  the  slave  and  free  States,  which  he 
asserted  was  a  fundamental  condition  originally 
insisted  on  by  the  South  in  joining  the  Union. 
On  the  7th  of  March  Webster  followed.  His 
speech  was  not  a  discussion  of  the  subjects  consid- 
ered in  Clay's  resolutions ;  it  was  an  appeal  "  for 
the  preservation  of  the  Union  "  and  the  restoration 
to  the  country  of  quiet  and  harmony.  Penetrated 
with  a  deep  sense  of  what  the  Union  had  accom- 
plished during  the  seventy  years  of  its  existence, 
and  of  the  future  it  promised,  if  it  remained  un- 
broken, he  compared  slavery  to  a  spot  on  the  face 
of  the  sun,  and  the  persons  who  would  break  up 
the  government  on  account  of  it  to  those  who  would 
strike  the  light  from  the  heavens,  if  there  were 
any  imperfection  in  it,  and  prefer  the  chance  of 
utter  darkness.  He  endeavored  to  make  the  pro- 
posed compromises  acceptable  to  the  free  States, 
and  for  this  purpose  minimized  the  concessions 


80  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

required  of  them,  and  either  wholly  omitted  or 
touched  but  lightly  on  their  complaints ;  on  the 
other  hand,  he  dwelt  at  length  on  the  wrongs  done 
the  South  by  the  general  hostility  to  slavery,  by 
the  violent  language  of  the  abolitionists,  and  by  the 
evasion  of  the  constitutional  provision  for  the  sur- 
render of  fugitive  slaves.  He  would,  therefore,  he 
said,  vote  for  a  more  stringent  law  on  the  last  sub- 
ject ;  while  he  should  vote  against  the  insertion  of  a 
proviso  prohibiting  slavery  in  any  bills  organizing 
governments  for  the  territory  acquired  from  Mex- 
ico, because  slavery  was  excluded  from  those  re- 
gions by  a  law  of  nature,  and  he  would  not  "  reenact 
the  will  of  God,"  or  wound  to  no  purpose  the  pride 
of  the  South.  Upon  the  other  subjects  of  the 
resolves  he  was  silent. 

This  speech  was  a  great  disappointment  to  many 
Northern  Whigs,  including  some  of  Webster's 
warmest  supporters.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  it 
has  a  very  different  ring  from  that  in  which  he 
claimed  the  Wilmot  Proviso  as  his  own  thunder,  or 
from  his  political  utterances  of  the  September  pre- 
vious, when  he  said :  "  There  has  for  a  long  time 
been  no  North ;  I  think  the  North  star  is  at  last 
discovered.  I  think  there  will  be  a  North,  but  up 
to  the  recent  session  of  Congress  there  has  been  no 
North,  no  section  of  the  country  in  which  there  has 
been  found  a  strong,  conscientious,  united  oppo- 
sition to  slavery ;  no  such  North  has  existed." 
Yet,  though  there  was  much  bitterness  of  feeling 
and  criticism,  and  imputation  of  base  motives  at 


THE  COMPROMISE  RESOLUTIONS  81 

the  time,  it  is  only  just  to  Mr.  Webster  to  admit 
that  the  speech  may  have  been  inspired  by  his  pro- 
found love  for  the  Union  and  his  conviction  that  it 
was  in  great  peril ;  that  his  honest  apprehensions 
of  its  imminent  destruction  affected  the  whole  tone 
as  well  as  the  conclusions  of  the  argument  by  which 
he  attempted  to  undo  at  once  with  the  Northern 
voters  his  own  work  of  many  years.  The  success 
he  met  with  at  the  time  was  a  striking  tribute  to 
his  personal  power.  In  the  cities  the  merchants, 
manufacturers  and  business  people  generally,  many 
scholars  and  thoughtful  persons  acting  with  them, 
held  large  and  enthusiastic  Union  meetings,  and 
resolved  their  approval  of  Webster's  speech  and 
Clay's  compromises.  But  the  country  folks,  the 
rural  districts,  held  off,  and  Webster  never  re- 
gained his  hold  on  them.  The  Whig  party  at  the 
North  split  into  two  factions,  the  "  Conscience " 
and  the  "  Cotton  "  Whigs  ;  and  there  were  in  the 
next  Congress  an  increased  number  of  senators 
and  representatives  distinctly  opposed  to  the  doc- 
trine of  the  7th  of  March  speech  and  to  the  mea- 
sures of  compromise,  who  made  the  nucleus  for  the 
formation  of  the  Republican  party. 


CHAPTER  V 

CALIFORNIA    AND    THE    COMPROMISES  :    SEWARD'g 
SPEECH 

SEWARD,  during  the  winter,  was  the  object  of 
many  attacks  and  a  great  deal  of  personal  abuse 
from  Southern  senators,  who  seemed  to  go  out  of 
their  way  to  insult  him.  To  these  he  replied,  as 
has  been  said,  that  he  had  come  to  the  Senate  for 
public,  not  for  private  ends  ;  that  he  should  pass 
by  in  silence,  as  he  had  before  done,  all  such  per- 
sonal attacks  ;  that  he  admitted  the  purity  and 
patriotism  of  the  motives  of  all  other  senators, 
and  expected  the  same  justice  to  be  done  to  him- 
self. He  was  not  on  any  committee  during  this 
session.  He  asked  to  be  excused  from  the  com- 
mittee on  patents,  to  which  he  had  been  assigned, 
upon  the  ground  that  his  previous  employment  as 
counsel  in  patent  suits  might  be  embarrassing  to 
him ;  and  no  other  place  could  be  found  for  him 
except  by  a  re-arrangement  of  all  the  committees, 
which  he  thought  not  worth  while. 

When  Clay  and  Webster  spoke,  the  silver  tongue 
and  personal  charm  of  the  one,  the  majestic  elo- 
quence and  noble  presence  of  the  other,  and  the  na- 
tional reputation  of  both,  filled  the  Senate  chamber 


CALIFORNIA  AND   THE   COMPROMISES      83 

with  their  admirers,  women  as  well  as  men  ;  and 
their  speeches  met  with  a  sympathetic  response 
from  the  people  of  Washington,  Southerners  and 
slaveholders  as  they  were.  Seward  had  no  such 
presence,  no  such  eloquence,  no  such  reputation, 
and  when  a  few  days  later  he  rose  to  speak,  the 
Senate  was  substantially  empty.  The  President's 
message  transmitting  the  constitution  of  California 
was  the  special  order  of  the  day,  and  it  was  to  the 
question  of  the  admission  of  that  State  that  Sew- 
ard particularly  addressed  himself.  It  is  difficult 
to  give  within  moderate  limits  an  analysis  of  this 
great  speech.  An  intelligent  listener  said  of  it,  at 
the  time,  that  it  "  was  marked  by  more  breadth  of 
view,  more  vigor  of  thought,  and  a  more  profound 
and  masterly  treatment  of  the  subject,  than  was 
displayed  by  either  Clay  or  Webster." 

On  the  other  hand,  Clay  wrote  to  his  son  a  few 
days  after  its  delivery :  "  Mr.  Seward's  late  abo- 
lition speech  .  .  .  has  eradicated  the  respect  of 
almost  all  men  for  him."  These  different  state- 
ments represent  the  extreme  divergence  of  public 
opinion  at  the  North  and  South.  The  speech 
marked  an  epoch  in  discussions  on  slavery  in  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States.  It  was  the  first 
time  that  any  senator,  regularly  elected  by  one  of 
the  great  parties  of  the  country,  had  made  in  the 
Senate  not  merely  a  statement  of  his  own  position, 
but  what  was  felt  to  be  an  authentic  declaration 
of  the  attitude  as  to  slavery  of  a  formidable  and 
growing  minority,  if  not  a  majority,  of  the  people 


84  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

of  the  North.  It  was  the  first  time  that  the  sena- 
tors had  been  called  on  to  recognize  the  fact,  which 
many  of  them  were  striving  to  ignore,  that  "  a 
moral  question,  transcending  the  too  narrow  creeds 
of  parties,  had  arisen,  that  the  public  conscience 
was  expanding  with  it,  and  the  green  withes  of 
party  associations  giving  way  and  falling  off." 

Seward  began  by  brushing  aside  the  formal  and 
trifling  objections  brought  forward  by  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  immediate  admission  of  California, 
all  of  which  were  to  be  waived  if  the  admission  of 
this  free  State  should  be  accompanied  by  sundry 
irrelevant  concessions  to  slavery,  —  a  new  fugitive 
slave  law,  a  guaranty  of  the  perpetuity  of  slavery 
in  the  District  of  Columbia,  acquiescence  in  its  ex- 
istence in  the  Territories  of  Utah  and  New  Mexico. 
Passing  from  these  objections,  he  proceeded  to 
state  the  reasons  which  to  his  mind  rendered  the 
immediate  admission  of  California  imperative. 
The  substance  of  these  was  that  California  was 
in  fact  already  a  State,  and  could  never  be  a  Terri- 
tory, colony  or  military  dependence  ;  that  remote 
as  she  was  on  the  Pacific  coast,  with  the  population 
that  had  suddenly  filled  her  borders,  she  needed  a 
constitution,  sovereignty,  independence  and  pro- 
tection, —  either  a  share  of  ours,  which  she  had 
asked  for,  or  her  own,  which  she  could  assume 
without  our  consent,  if  we  rejected  her  appeal ; 
and  that  if  we  wished  to  retain  her,  and  Oregon 
with  her,  we  could  not  afford  to  trifle  or  delay. 
He  then  considered  the  position  of  those  persons 


CALIFORNIA  AND  THE  COMPROMISES      85 

who  insisted  that  to  the  admission  of  California 
should  be  joined  fresh  compromises  on  questions 
connected  with  slavery.  It  was  to  what  he  had 
to  say  on  this  point  that  the  especial  interest  and 
importance  of  his  speech  attached.  The  admis- 
sion of  California  was  almost  conceded.  The  real 
struggle  was  on  what  should  be  yielded  in  return. 
Declaring  himself,  for  various  reasons,  opposed  to 
all  legislative  compromises  not  absolutely  neces- 
sary, he  took  up  in  turn  each  of  the  particular 
measures  proposed,  commenting  briefly  on  the 
incongruity  of  the  subjects  tacked  together  in  the 
resolves.  He  next  examined  Calhoun's  statement, 
that  nothing  would  satisfy  the  South  except  such 
legislation  as  would  secure  a  permanent  equilib- 
rium between  the  free  and  slave  States ;  this  he 
pronounced  absolutely  impossible,  as  it  must  in- 
volve a  veto  by  the  minority  of  the  majority,  which 
meant  nothing  less  than  a  return  to  the  rope  of  sand 
of  the  old  Confederacy,  and  a  subjection  of  the 
people  of  the  growing  States  of  the  North  and 
West  to  the  more  stationary  population  of  the 
slave  States. 

Speaking  of  the  proposed  Fugitive  Slave  Law, 
he  took  the  ground  not  merely  that  a  more  strin- 
gent law  would  be  useless,  as  it  was  opposed  to 
the  moral  convictions  of  the  people  of  the  North, 
denied  all  the  recognized  safeguards  of  personal 
liberty,  and  converted  into  a  crime  that  hospital- 
ity to  the  outcast  and  refugee  which  all  mankind 
save  the  slaveholder  considered  an  act  of  common 


86  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

humanity  ;  but  he  also  insisted  that,  to  have  the 
constitutional  provision  as  to  the  return  of  fugitive 
slaves  honestly  carried  out,  the  rigors  of  the  law 
must  be  alleviated,  not  increased.  Eeferring  to 
the  proposal  that,  as  part  of  the  compromises, 
Congress  should  deprive  itself  of  the  power  of 
emancipation  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  he  de- 
clared that  he  would  at  any  time  vote  for  the  abo- 
lition of  slavery  there,  with  a  proper  compensation 
to  the  slave-owners,  and  was  willing  to  appropriate 
any  sum  necessary  for  this  purpose. 

It  was,  however,  what  he  said  in  treating  of  the 
public  domain,  and  of  the  power  and  duty  of  Con- 
gress in  regard  to  it,  that  so  greatly  stirred  the 
people  of  both  sections  at  the  time,  and  has  since 
been  often  quoted  and  misinterpreted  by  both 
friends  and  enemies. 

"  The  national  domain  is  ours.  ...  It  was  ac- 
quired by  the  valor  and  with  the  wealth  of  the 
whole  nation.  We  hold,  nevertheless,  no  arbitrary 
power  over  it.  ...  The  Constitution  regulates  our 
stewardship ;  the  Constitution  devotes  the  domain 
to  union,  to  justice,  to  defense,  to  welfare  and  to 
liberty.  But  there  is  a  higher  law  than  the  Con- 
stitution, which  regulates  our  authority  over  the 
domain,  and  devotes  it  to  the  same  noble  purposes. 
The  territory  is  a  part  of  the  common  heritage  of 
mankind,  bestowed  upon  them  by  the  Creator.  We 
are  his  stewards,  and  must  so  discharge  our  trust 
as  to  secure  in  the  highest  attainable  degree  their 
happiness.  .  .  .  Whether,  therefore,  I  regard  the 


CALIFORNIA  AND  THE  COMPROMISES      87 

welfare  of  the  future  inhabitants  of  these  new  Ter- 
ritories, or  the  security  and  welfare  of  the  whole 
people  of  the  United  States,  I  cannot  consent  to 
introduce  slavery  into  any  part  of  this  continent, 
which  is  now  exempt  from  what  seems  to  me  so 
great  an  evil,  ...  or  to  compromise  the  questions 
relating  to  slavery,  as  a  condition  of  the  admission 
of  California." 

To  the  argument  that  the  prohibition  of  slavery 
was  unnecessary,  he  answered  :  — 

"  There  is  no  climate  uncongenial  to  slavery.  .  .  . 
Labor  is  in  quick  demand  in  all  new  countries. 
Slave  labor  is  cheaper  than  free  labor,  and  it  would 
go  first  into  new  regions,  and  wherever  it  goes  it 
brings  labor  into  dishonor.  .  .  .  Was  the  ordinance 
of  1787  necessary  or  not  ?  Necessary,  we  all  agree ; 
and  yet  that  ordinance  extended  the  inhibition  of 
slavery  from  the  thirty-seventh  to  the  fortieth  par- 
allel of  latitude.  .  .  .  We  are  told  that  we  may 
rely  on  the  laws  of  God,  which  prohibit  slave  labor 
in  this  new  territory,  and  that  it  is  absurd  to  re- 
enact  the  laws  of  God.  The  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  and  the  constitutions  of  all  the 
States  are  full  of  such  reenactments.  Wherever  I 
find  a  law  of  God  or  a  law  of  nature  disregarded, 
or  in  danger  of  being  disregarded,  there  I  shall 
vote  to  reaffirm  it  with  all  the  sanction  of  civil 
authority." 

In  all  this  there  is  nothing  startling,  revolution- 
ary or  treasonable,  nothing  even  that  is  novel  or 
original.  The  same  thought  had  been  expressed 


88  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

more  than  once  by  English  philosophers  and  writers 
upon  jurisprudence.  Two  hundred  and  fifty  years 
before,  Bishop  Hooker  had  written  those  noble  and 
familiar  words :  "  Of  law,  there  can  be  no  less 
acknowledged  than  that  her  seat  is  in  the  bosom, 
of  God."  Already  in  this  very  speech  Seward  had 
quoted  from  another  political  philosopher,  "  There 
is  but  one  law  for  all,  namely,  that  law  which 
governs  all  law,  —  the  law  of  our  Creator."  In 
any  point  of  view  the  passage  was  harmless,  for 
far  from  antagonizing  or  contrasting  the  Constitu- 
tion and  the  laws  of  God,  Seward  was  insisting 
that  they  were  both  in  harmony  and  working  to 
the  same  noble  ends. 

Nor  was  he  responsible  for  introducing  into  the 
debate  both  the  "higher  law"  and  the  Constitu- 
tion as  conclusive  authorities  as  to  slavery  and  the 
rights  of  the  slaveholders.  Southern  senators  had 
already  appealed  to  them.  On  the  day  on  which 
Clay  introduced  his  resolutions,  Mason,  of  Virginia, 
and  Davis,  of  Mississippi,  had  both  insisted  that 
the  Constitution  carried  slavery  into  all  the  Terri- 
tories, and  protected  it  there.  A  fortnight  later, 
Davis  declared  slavery  to  be  "  a  blessing,  estab- 
lished by  God's  decree,  and  sanctioned  by  the 
Bible,  from  Genesis  to  Revelation."  A  few  days 
before  Seward  spoke,  Davis  had  again  rested  the 
Southern  case  upon  the  same  authorities,  saying : 
"  It  is  the  Bible  and  the  Constitution  on  which  we 
rely,  and  we  are  not  to  be  answered  by  the  dicta  of 
earthly  wisdom  or  more  earthly  arrogance,  when 


CALIFORNIA  AND  THE  COMPROMISES      89 

we  have  those  high  authorities  to  teach  and  to  con- 
strue the  decrees  of  God."  It  was  natural,  there- 
fore, it  was  fit,  and  it  was  necessary,  that  some 
senator  holding  the  opposite  opinions  should  also 
appeal  to  the  "  higher  law  "  which  the  Southerners 
had  already  invoked,  and  should  say  that  he  did 
not  so  read  the  Bible  and  the  Constitution,  though 
he  also  found  them  both  in  accord,  —  the  one  a 
gospel  of  freedom,  not  a  decree  of  bondage,  and 
the  other  a  charter  of  liberty,  not  a  law  of  servi- 
tude. 

The  rest  of  Seward's  speech  was  devoted  to  con- 
sidering the  argument  that  the  Union  was  in  dan- 
ger, and  could  only  be  saved  by  compromise.  He 
was  but  little  moved  by  the  threats  and  passionate 
talk  of  dissolving  the  Union  unless  satisfactory 
concessions  were  made  to  slavery.  He  attached,  or 
professed  to  attach,  but  little  importance  to  them  ; 
but  the  Southern  leaders  and  many  of  their  fol- 
lowers were  in  deadly  earnest  and  meant  all  that 
they  said.  The  Southern  heart,  however,  had  not 
yet  been  thoroughly  fired,  the  slave  States  had  made 
no  preparations  for  secession,  there  had  been  no 
single  act  or  even  fancied  aggression  of  which  they 
could  complain  ;  and  they  knew  that,  while  Taylor 
lived,  there  could  be  no  peaceable  separation,  that 
he  considered  secession  to  be  treason  and  would 
not  hesitate  to  treat  it  accordingly.  Ten  years' 
delay,  and  the  complaisance  of  a  President  as 
feeble  and  vacillating  as  Taylor  was  prompt  and 
resolute,  were  needed  to  complete  their  preparations 


90  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

and  put  them  in  readiness  for  action.  That  Seward 
saw  any  part  of  this  is  more  than  doubtful.  He 
thought  the  Union  practically  indissoluble,  because 
the  centripetal  and  conservative  forces  seemed  to. 
him  much  stronger  than  the  centrifugal.  It  seemed 
to  him  that  the  South,  on  reflection,  would  realize 
that,  if  there  were  to  be  a  dissolution,  the  probable 
line  of  cleavage  would  run  north  and  south,  follow- 
ing the  great  river.  He  could  not  believe  that  the 
people  of  the  South,  when  it  came  to  the  point, 
would  be  willing  to  say  to  the  civilized  world  that 
they  had  seceded  from  the  Union  in  order  to 
establish  a  government  of  which  African  slavery 
should  be  the  corner-stone,  and  its  maintenance 
and  perpetuity  the  final  cause.  Animated  as  he 
personally  was  by  the  conviction  that  slavery, 
which  he  had  abhorred  since  the  youthful  days  of 
his  teaching  in  Georgia,  must  give  way  before  the 
light  of  modern  civilization,  he  felt  confident  that 
the  Southerners,  looking  at  the  question  calmly, 
would  at  last  prefer  that  the  Union  should  stand, 
and  slavery  "  disappear  gradually,  voluntarily  and 
with  compensation,"  rather  than  that  the  Union 
should  be  dissolved,  and,  as  he  foresaw,  "  civil 
war  and  violent,  complete  and  immediate  emanci- 
pation follow."  The  day,  he  trusted,  was  far  off, 
when  the  fountains  of  popular  content  should  be 
broken  up ;  but  should  it  ever  come,  he  felt  certain 
that  it  would  show  "  how  calmly,  how  firmly,  how 
nobly  a  great  people  can  act  in  preserving  their 
Constitution." 


CALIFORNIA  AND  THE  COMPROMISES      91 

At  this  time,  Clay,  Calhoun,  Webster  and 
Seward  practically  represented  all  the  shades  of 
public  opinion  in  the  different  sections  of  the 
country  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  except  the  views 
of  the  radical  abolitionists.  Clay,  recognizing  the 
existing  antagonism  between  the  North  and  South 
arising  from  the  various  questions  connected  with 
slavery,  thought  that,  if  some  arrangement  could 
be  made  by  which  the  pending  issues  could  be 
compromised,  no  further  differences  would  arise, 
and  this  disturbing  and  dangerous  element  would 
be  removed  from  our  politics.  Calhoun  considered 
any  such  compromise  as  a  mere  palliative.  In  his 
opinion  the  Union  was  only  a  compact  between 
two  classes  of  equal,  sovereign  States,  one  class 
having  slaves  and  the  other  not ;  and  there  must 
be  an  exact  equilibrium  of  political  power  between 
these  two  classes,  or  the  compact  could  not  be 
permanent.  Webster  believed  that  the  gain  to 
mankind  by  the  maintenance  and  perpetuation  of 
the  Union  would  far  outweigh  any  loss  or  injury 
from  concessions  to,  or  compromises  with,  slavery 
and  the  slave  States.  Seward  thought  that  the 
slave  States  and  slaveholders  were  entitled  to  the 
exact  rights  and  privileges  which  the  Constitution 
gave  them,  but  to  nothing  more  ;  that  slavery  was 
a  moral  and  political  wrong,  and  that  under  no 
compulsion  and  by  no  persuasion  would  he  ever 
consent  to  give  it  one  hair's  breadth  of  advantage 
not  distinctly  secured  to  it  by  the  compromises  of 
the  Constitution. 


92  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

After  a  debate,  protracted  more  than  two  months, 
Clay's  resolutions,  with  the  amendments  and  the 
substitutes  proposed  by  other  senators,  were  re- 
ferred to  a  committee  of  thirteen,  of  which  he  was 
chairman.  A  month  later  this  committee  reported 
three  bills.  The  first  of  these  made  two  amend- 
ments to  the  Fugitive  Slave  Bill  then  pending  be- 
fore the  Senate ;  the  second  put  an  end  to  the  use 
of  the  District  of  Columbia  as  a  public  slave  mart 
for  the  States.  The  third  was  a  bill  of  thirty-nine 
sections,  —  the  first  four  of  which  provided  for  the 
admission  of  California,  the  next  seventeen  gave 
Utah  a  territorial  government,  and  prohibited  the 
territorial  legislature  from  passing  any  law  as  to 
African  slavery.  Seventeen  more  sections  provided 
a  similar  government  for  New  Mexico.  The  last 
section  contained  a  proposition  to  Texas  as  to  the 
settlement  of  her  boundaries.  This  third  bill  soon 
became  known  as  the  "  Omnibus  bill." 

Those  Southerners  who  had  always  opposed 
Clay's  resolutions  at  once  attacked  this  "  Omnibus 
bill,"  and  all  througli  the  hot  and  sultry  summer 
the  debate  went  on,  personal,  acrimonious,  eager, 
passionate.  The  Southern  senators  were  unwearied 
in  their  efforts  to  gain  here  or  there  something 
more  than  the  bill  gave  them.  They  endeavored 
to  limit  the  southern  boundary  of  California  to  the 
line  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  and  to  provide 
for  a  slave  State  out  of  the  territory  thus  cut 
off,  to  obtain  a  distinct  recognition  of  what  they 
claimed  to  be  their  constitutional  right  to  carry 


CALIFORNIA  AND  THE  COMPROMISES      93 

slaves  into  New  Mexico  and  hold  them  there, 
though  the  laws  of  that  country  abolishing  slavery 
had  never  been  repealed,  and  also  to  secure  an 
admission  of  the  power  of  the  territorial  legisla- 
tures to  pass  laws  for  the  protection  of  slavery, 
but  not  for  its  prohibition.  Clay,  in  spite  of  his 
years  and  feebleness,  was  indefatigable  in  defense 
of  the  committee,  and  in  his  endeavors  to  pass  the 
bill ;  but  all  was  in  vain.  By  successive  amend- 
ments it  was  gradually  reduced  to  a  simple  act  to 
provide  a  territorial  government  for  Utah  ;  and  so 
mutilated,  it  passed  the  Senate  on  the  last  day  of 
July. 

Before  this  happened,  Taylor,  after  a  short  ill- 
ness, had  died.  So  long  as  he  lived,  Clay  had 
against  him,  not  so  much  Taylor's  active  opposi- 
tion as  the  knowledge  of  every  senator  that  this 
plan  was  not  the  President's  or  approved  by  him, 
and  that  he  had  said  to  a  senator  who  was  opposed 
to  the  compromise  measures :  "  Stand  firm,  don't 
yield."  But  when  Fillmore  succeeded  Taylor,  he 
called  to  his  cabinet  Webster  and  Corwin,  the 
leading  compromisers  from  the  free  States,  and 
exerted  all  the  influence  of  his  administration  to 
secure  the  passage  of  the  Omnibus  bill.  Contrary, 
however,  to  the  expectation  of  its  advocates,  it 
turned  out  that  the  tacking  together  of  so  many 
incongruous  matters  was  a  source  of  weakness, 
that  it  served  to  combine  the  opponents  rather 
than  to  unite  the  friends  of  the  separate  measures, 
and  so  brought  about  the  defeat  of  the  entire  bill. 


94  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

All  the  measures  recommended  by  the  committee 
were,  however,  carried  later,  each  in  a  separate  act. 
It  is  the  fashion  to  talk  of  these  as  compromise 
measures,  but  it  is  in  a  certain  sense  a  misnomer ; 
they  did  not  as  a  whole  receive  the  support  of  a 
majority  of  the  committee  of  thirteen,  less  than 
one  third  of  its  members  voting  for  all  the  bills. 
The  separate  acts  were  carried  by  different  com- 
binations of  senators,  only  eighteen  senators  voting 
for  all  the  bills  as  passed ;  of  these,  twelve  were 
Northern  Democrats,  one  a  Northern  Whig  from 
Pennsylvania;  four  were  Southern  Whigs,  and 
one,  Houston,  of  Texas,  a  Southern  Democrat. 
The  analysis  shows  that  it  was  not  to  be  expected 
that  measures,  which  taken  as  a  whole  found  so 
little  general  support,  could  be  a  final  settlement 
of  all  questions  as  to  slavery. 

Had  Taylor  lived,  the  compromise  measures 
would  probably  have  failed  to  pass  in  any  form. 
The  threats  of  disunion  had  steeled  him  against 
concessions  to  the  demands  of  the  South.  "  I  am 
pained  to  learn,"  said  he,  "  that  we  have  disunion 
men  to  deal  with.  Disunion  is  treason."  It  seems 
the  very  irony  of  fate  that  this  Southern  President, 
for  whom  so  many  Northern  Whigs  hesitated  or 
refused  to  vote,  because  he  was  a  slaveholder  and 
the  representative  of  slaveholding  interests,  should 
have  been  abandoned  by  the  great  leaders  of  the 
party  upon  such  a  question,  and  should  have 
stood  without  their  support,  an  immovable  bul- 
wark against  the  slaveholders,  in  spite  of  South- 


CALIFORNIA   AND   THE   COMPROMISES      95 

ern  pressure  and  Northern  weakness.  Webster 
thought  Taylor's  death  delivered  the  country  at 
that  time  from  the  horrors  of  civil  war  ;  and  later 
writers  have  said  that  "  the  slaveholding  States 
would  have  been  more  able  to  hold  their  own  in 
1850  than  they  proved  to  be  in  1861."  But  se- 
cession, had  it  been  then  attempted,  would  have 
lost  the  ten  years  of  organization  and  preparation 
secured  by  delay,  and  would  have  encountered  the 
iron  will  and  firm  resolve  of  a  Southern  soldier, 
who  would  have  acted  while  others  talked,  and 
whose  well  known  character  would  have  made  the 
stoutest  secessionist  hesitate  before  he  took  the 
fatal  step  which  separates  declamation  from  ac- 
tion. The  South  did  not  secede  in  1850  because 
the  masses  were  not  ready  to  do  so,  and  because 
the  leaders  knew  well  what  they  might  expect 
from  the  President.  Had  any  State  committed 
a  single  overt  act  of  rebellion,  thore  would  have 
been  at  once  a  resort  to  force.  The  offenders 
would  have  been  quickly  reduced  to  obedience, 
but  slavery  would  have  been  untouched,  and  the 
whole  battle  would  have  remained  to  be  fought 
out  at  a  later  day. 

The  death  of  Taylor  made  a  great  difference  in 
Seward's  political  weight  in  the  Senate ;  he  had 
been  recognized  as  the  advocate,  if  not  the  official 
representative  of  the  President's  policy,  and  this 
position  lent  additional  importance  to  his  words. 
But  he  had  no  such  relations  with  Fillmore.  On 
the  contrary,  though  in  their  early  political  days 


96  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

both  Fillmore  and  Seward  had  been  anti-Masons, 
and  both  were  original  members  of  the  Whig 
party,  yet  each  of  them  had  his  own  friends  and 
followers,  who  looked  to  him  when  in  office  or 
power  for  crumbs  from  the  political  feast ;  and 
there  was  early  established  between  them  or  their 
partisans  a  rivalry  in  the  prosecution  of  claims  for 
spoils.  When  questions  as  to  slavery  first  became 
prominent,  their  opinions  seemed  substantially  the 
same ;  but  later,  while  Seward  grew  more  out- 
spoken against  slavery,  Fillmore  became  more 
conservative  and  cautious.  When  Fillmore  was 
nominated  for  vice-president,  he  was  understood 
to  represent  the  anti-Seward  wing  of  the  Whig 
party  ;  and  the  probability  of  difficulties  from  the 
counter-claims  to  office  of  their  respective  support- 
ers was  so  fully  recognized,  that  an  attempt  was 
made  to  effect  an  amicable  arrangement  between 
them  as  to  the  division  of  places ;  but  it  did  not 
succeed.  Some  of  Fillmore's  friends  were  first 
served ;  but  the  fact  that  the  governor  and  state 
authorities  of  New  York  belonged  to  the  Seward 
wing  of  the  party,  which  was  far  more  numerous 
than  Fillmore's,  and  that  to  this  wing  Taylor  was 
principally  indebted  for  the  vote  of  the  State,  made 
it  essential  that  this  wing  should  be  chiefly  recog- 
nized in  the  distribution  of  offices. 

The  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  administration 
towards  the  compromise  measures,  which  occurred 
on  Fillmore's  accession  to  office,  did  not  affect 
Seward's  position  regarding  them,  or  that  of  the 


CALIFORNIA  AND  THE  COMPROMISES      97 

Whigs  who  were  his  followers.  The  Whig  pa- 
pers in  the  State  of  New  York  which  had  hitherto 
opposed  them  continued  to  do  so,  and  President 
Fillmore  became  prescriptive.  He  removed  the 
Albany  postmaster,  a  friend  of  the  editor  of  the 
Albany  "  Evening  Journal,"  a  paper  outspoken 
in  its  hostility  to  the  compromises ;  and  the  whole 
influence  of  his  administration  was  exerted,  in 
vain,  to  prevent  the  Whig  state  convention  of 
New  York,  in  the  autumn  of  1850,  from  passing 
any  resolution  approving  Seward's  course.  The 
president  of  the  convention  was  one  of  the  con- 
servative Whigs,  or,  as  they  were  afterwards 
called,  Silver  Greys ;  he  appointed  a  committee 
on  resolutions,  so  selected  as  to  make  it  sure  that 
they  would  let  Seward  severely  alone.  But  when 
they  made  their  report,  a  resolve  indorsing  Sew- 
ard's course  was  moved  as  an  amendment  and  car- 
ried by  a  handsome  majority.  The  administration 
members  of  the  convention  thereupon  withdrew  to 
another  hall  and  indorsed  the  President  and  the 
compromises.  In  the  Senate,  within  three  weeks 
after  Taylor's  death,  a  Southern  senator  threat- 
ened to  move  Seward's  expulsion ;  and  as  he  him- 
self wrote  :  "  By  the  advent  of  Mr.  Fillmore  "  he 
"  was  buried  below  low-water  mark." 

The  compromise  measures,  passed  as  separate 
bills  before  the  adjournment  of  Congress  in  Septem- 
ber, 1850,  and  which  were  practically  all  the  work 
of  the  session,  conceded  to  the  North  the  admission 
of  California  as  a  free  State,  and  the  abolition  of 


98  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

the  slave  trade  in  the  District  of  Columbia ;  to  the 
South,  territorial  governments  for  New  Mexico 
and  Utah,  with  no  exclusion  of  slavery,  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  boundary  line  between  New  Mexico 
and  Texas,  so  as  to  give  Texas  a  large  area  which 
she  had  never  occupied  or  governed  while  an  in- 
dependent republic,  the  payment  to  her  of  ten 
million  dollars  for  relinquishing  a  purely  paper 
and  nominal  claim  to  still  more  of  New  Mexico, 
and  the  enactment  of  a  new  and  more  stringent 
law  for  the  recovery  of  fugitive  slaves.  These 
measures  were  proclaimed  to  be  a  final  settlement 
of  the  whole  slavery  question,  which  had  thus  be- 
come a  dead  issue. 

Perhaps  the  compromises  would  have  allayed 
the  excitement,  and  have  been  accepted  at  the 
North  with  practical  unanimity,  but  for  the  Fugi- 
tive Slave  Law.  But  this  law  was  odious  to  the 
communities  in  which  it  was  to  be  enforced.  It 
contained  no  statute  of  limitations  ;  it  permitted 
the  recapture  of  runaways,  who  had  been  for  years 
residents  in,  and  had  become  citizens  of,  the  dif- 
ferent free  States.  The  proceedings  were  assumed 
to  be  analogous  to  those  by  which  a  person  charged 
with  a  crime  in  a  State  from  which  he  has  fled  is 
surrendered  to  take  his  trial  there  ;  and  the  statute 
was  so  drawn  that  colored  persons  alleged  to  be 
fugitive  slaves  could  be  arrested  upon  ex  parte 
affidavits  and  hurried  into  slavery  upon  the  pro- 
duction of  mere  formal  proofs,  with  no  opportunity 
to  try  the  question  of  their  freedom  in  the  States 


CALIFORNIA  AND  THE  COMPROMISES      99 

where  they  were  living  and  where  all  the  testimony 
tending  to  establish  this  was  naturally  to  be  found. 
While,  as  if  to  make  the  statute  still  more  offen- 
sive to  the  North,  it  was  provided*  that  the  com- 
missioners who  were  to  administer  the  law  should 
receive  a  fee,  when  the  alleged  fugitive  was  re- 
turned, twice  as  large  as  that  to  which  they  would 
be  entitled  if  the  captive  were  discharged.  Had 
the  law  been  less  arbitrary  and  brutal,  had  it  pro- 
vided some  safeguards  for  freedom,  some  remedies 
for  mistakes  of  identity,  had  it  made  any  conces- 
sions to  Northern  sentiment  and  to  the  civilization 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  people  of  the  free 
States  might  have  permanently  acquiesced  in  it  as 
a  legitimate  mode  of  fulfilling  an  obligation  which 
the  Constitution  imposed  on  them,  repugnant  to 
their  conscience  and  feelings  as  that  obligation 
was.  But  the  actual  statute  was  a  mere  firebrand 
flung  among  the  opponents  of  slavery  at  the  North, 
and  every  case  that  arose  added  fuel  to  the  spread- 
ing flames  of  the  popular  excitement  against  it. 


CHAPTER  VI 
FILLMORE'S  ADMINISTRATION 

AFTER  the  passage  of  the  compromise  measures, 
there  was  a  lull  in  the  great  contest  between  free- 
dom and  slavery,  as  often  after  a  battle  both  com- 
batants seek  repose,  and  time  to  recruit  their 
strength  before  renewing  the  conflict;  and  this 
truce  lasted,  with  no  signs  of  any  new  struggle, 
until  the  close  of  Fillmore's  administration  in 
1853. 

The  congressional  session  of  1850-51  was  politi- 
cally unimportant.  It  was  yet  too  soon  for  either 
the  North  or  the  South  to  declare  that  the  compro- 
mise measures  were  not  a  finality  ;  although  in  the 
free  States  many  meetings,  with  resolutions  indors- 
ing the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  and  declaring  an  un- 
faltering determination  to  execute  it,  and  a  deluge 
of  pamphlets  and  sermons  by  its  supporters,  lay 
and  clerical,  were  found  necessary  to  offset  the 
meetings,  speeches  and  sermons  of  its  opponents, 
and  to  endeavor  to  overcome  the  hostility  of  the 
North  to  its  enforcement.  In  November,  1850, 
Mr.  Webster  wrote  to  the  President  from  Boston  : 
"  There  is  now  no  probability  of  any  resistance  if 
a  fugitive  should  be  arrested."  Yet  only  three 


FILLMORE'S  ADMINISTRATION  101 

months  afterwards  a  negro,  arrested  as  a  fugitive 
slave,  was  rescued  from  the  court  house  there  at 
high  noon  and  successfully  carried  to  Canada ;  and 
in  spite  of  the  utmost  exertions  on  the  part  of  the 
government,  no  one  was  ever  convicted  of  taking 
part  in  his  escape.  Quite  as  significant  of  the 
public  opinion  of  the  North,  though  in  a  different 
way,  was  the  election  to  the  Senate  from  New 
York,  Fillmore's  own  State,  of  Hamilton  Fish,  an 
opponent  of  the  compromises,  as  Seward's  col- 
league ;  while  Ohio  sent  Benjamin  Wade,  a  most 
outspoken  Free  Soiler ;  and  in  Massachusetts, 
though  only  by  a  bargain  for  offices  between  Dem- 
ocrats and  Free  Soilers,  Charles  Stunner,  an  ex- 
ponent of  the  extreme  anti-slavery  opinion,  though 
not  a  political  abolitionist,  succeeded  Webster  in 
the  Senate. 

Though  "  political  ends,  and  not  real  evils  result- 
ing from  the  escape  of  slaves,  constituted  the  pre- 
vailing motives  for  the  enactment  of  the  Fugitive 
Slave  Law,"  yet,  in  fact,  during  the  first  year  after 
its  passage,  more  persons  were  seized  as  fugitive 
slaves  than  in  the  preceding  sixty  years.  This 
statement,  however,  does  not  imply  so  much  as  it 
seems  to.  From  many  of  the  New  England  States 
no  slave  had  ever  been  taken  back,  and,  except 
from  Massachusetts,  not  one  from  any  of  them  for 
at  least  a  quarter  of  a  century.  There  was,  even 
so  early  as  February,  1851,  some  foundation  for 
the  complaint  that  bad  faith  threw  all  kinds  of 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  recovery  of  fugitives, 


102  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

often  increasing  the  cost  to  the  full  value  of  the 
slave.  Charges  of  this  kind  became  doubtless 
more  and  more  true  as  time  went  on  and  the  con- 
stantly growing  hostility  to  the  law  continually 
invented  new  and  fresh  obstacles  to  its  speedy  and 
peaceful  execution.  There  were  other  rescues,  and 
an  occasional  murder  either  of  pursuers  or  pur- 
sued, or  the  killing  by  a  mother  of  her  children 
that  they  might  not  be  sent  back  to  slavery.  These, 
with  some  kidnappings,  and  the  not  infrequent  re- 
turn to  slavery,  under  the  summary  processes  of 
the  law,  of  free  colored  persons,  kept  alive  the  pub- 
lic feeling,  and  tended  slowly  to  consolidate  into  a 
new  party  the  plain  people  of  the  Northern  States, 
who  did  not  live  by  commerce  or  manufactures, 
and  had  no  direct  dealings  or  intercourse  with  the 
South. 

Even  in  Congress  there  was  a  certain  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  that  the  finality  of  the  compro- 
mises might  be  questioned.  Before  the  end  of 
January,  1851,  forty-four  senators  and  representa- 
tives of  different  political  parties,  with  Clay  him- 
self at  their  head,  thought  it  advisable  to  publish  a 
manifesto,  declaring  that  they  woidd  support  no 
man  for  office  who  did  not  condemn  any  disturb- 
ance of  the  compromises  or  agitation  of  the  slav- 
ery question.  Yet  congressional  action  on  this 
subject  was  not  always  consistent  with  what  this 
declaration  implied.  Only  a  few  days  later  a  bill 
to  construe  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  so  as  to  increase 
its  rigor  was  introduced  into  the  Senate,  and  at 


FILLMORE'S  ADMINISTRATION  103 

once  referred  to  a  committee,  while  petitions  for 
its  repeal  were  refused  such  reference,  and  imme- 
diately laid  on  the  table.  Yet  even  as  to  these 
the  rule  was  not  uniform,  such  a  petition  presented 
by  Seward  being  summarily  disposed  of,  while 
similar  petitions  presented  by  senators  from  Maine 
and  Pennsylvania  were  appropriately  referred. 

In  a  short  speech  on  this  matter,  Seward,  allud- 
ing to  the  charge  of  being  an  agitator,  said  :  "I 
am  one  of  the  members  of  this  body  who  have 
been  content  with  the  debates  which  were  had 
when  this  subject  came  legitimately  before  us  in 
the  form  of  bills  requiring  debate.  I  have  never 
spoken  on  the  subject  since  those  bills  became 
laws.  I  have  been  content  to  leave  those  measures 
to  the  scrutiny  of  the  people,  and  the  test  of  time 
and  truth.  I  have  added  no  codicils  and  have 
none  to  add,  to  vary,  enforce  or  explain  what  I 
had  occasion  to  say  during  the  debates." 

This  declaration  was  true,  and  his  conduct  in 
this  matter  eminently  characteristic.  He  was  no 
agitator  for  agitation's  sake.  He  recognized  the 
fact  that  the  country  was  for  the  moment  worn  out 
with  discussion,  that  it  was  hopeless  to  attempt  to 
rouse  the  people  by  declamation,  and  that  only 
concrete  facts  of  wrong  and  outrage,  which  he  felt 
sure  would  not  fail  to  occur,  could  do  this. 

There  were  other  subjects  besides  slavery  dis- 
cussed in  the  session  of  1850-51,  —  a  French  Spoli- 
ation Bill,  which  Seward  supported  in  an  elaborate 
speech,  the  improvement  of  rivers  and  harbors,  the 


104  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

disposition  of  the  public  lands,  and  changes  in  our 
postal  system.  In  his  views  on  this  last  subject, 
Seward  was  distinctly  a  reformer,  and  in  advance 
of  the  times.  He  could  not  secure  cheap  postage ; 
but  it  was  to  his  exertions  at  this  session  that  we 
owe  our  street  letter-boxes  and  the  first  attempt  at 
delivery  by  letter-carriers  in  the  cities  and  towns. 

The  summer  of  1851  saw  the  opening  of  the 
Erie  Railway  to  the  Lakes ;  the  President  and 
many  of  his  cabinet  and  Seward  with  them  made 
an  excursion  over  the  whole  length  of  the  road, 
and  there  were  banquets  and  speeches  and  fire- 
works and  all  the  other  festivities  common  to  such 
occasions.  To  the  "  Silver  Greys,"  the  Whigs  who 
had  indorsed  the  administration  and  the  compro- 
mises, the  chief  of  the  "  Woolly  Heads  "  must  have 
seemed  an  undesirable  addition  to  the  presidential 
party  on  this  prolonged  excursion  ;  and  Seward 
himself  felt  that  there  might  be  some  embarrass- 
ment from  his  presence.  But  the  construction  of 
this  railway  had  been  one  of  his  early  and  con- 
stantly cherished  projects,  and  he  would  have  been 
reluctant  to  miss  "the  wedding  of  the  Lakes  to 
the  salt  sea  with  the  ring  of  well  wrought  iron." 
This  was  his  holiday  for  the  year ;  he  spent  the 
rest  of  his  summer  in  the  trial  of  an  important  and 
fatiguing  criminal  case. 

Both  sessions  of  the  thirty-second  Congress 
(December,  1851,  to  March  4,  1853)  were  in 
striking  contrast  to  those  of  the  previous  one.  In- 
stead of  stormy  discussion,  hard  feelings,  bitter 


FILLMORE'S  ADMINISTRATION  105 

words,  and  unbecoming  personalities,  there  were 
courtesy,  fair  debate,  and  general  kindliness  and 
good  feeling.  In  the  opening  days  of  the  first 
session,  resolutions  were  introduced  in  the  Senate 
affirming  the  finality  of  the  compromise  measures ; 
but  the  discussion  of  these,  except  in  a  single 
instance,  was  carried  on  between  the  Southern 
senators,  and  the  resolutions  themselves  were  never 
pressed  to  a  vote.  In  Mississippi,  where  the  issue 
had  been  distinctly  raised  between  secession  or  the 
Union  with  compromises,  Foote,  the  compromise 
Union  candidate,  was  elected  governor  over  Jeffer- 
son Davis,  the  nominee  of  the  pronounced  Seces- 
sionists. A  South  Carolina  convention,  called  to 
promote  the  cause  of  disunion,  collapsed ;  and,  so 
far  as  the  South  was  concerned,  it  was  evident 
that  no  further  concessions  to  the  slaveholding 
interests  were  to  be  asked  for  at  present.  At  the 
North  the  number  of  cases  under  the  Fugitive 
Slave  Law  seemed  to  diminish.  There  was  conse- 
quently less  general  excitement  about  it,  though 
there  were  occasional  bursts  of  indignation,  when 
the  popular  passions  in  some  locality  broke  out  in 
a  flame ;  but  the  flame  never  spread  into  a  con- 
flagration, and  the  elections  in  1852  showed  that, 
on  the  whole,  public  opinion  was  inclined  to  abide 
by  the  compromise  measures  and  not  to  disturb 
them. 

The  event  of  the  winter  (1851-52)  which  prin- 
cipally excited  Congress  and  the  country  was  the 
visit  of  Kossuth  and  his  companions,  who  had 


106  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

been  leaders  in  the  Hungarian  insurrection  of 
1848.  The  efforts  of  the  Hungarians  to  establish 
a  republic  had  seemed  on  the  point  of  success, 
when  the  forces  which  Russia  sent  the  Austrian 
emperor  at  his  request,  joined  to  his  own  army, 
enabled  him  to  crush  the  rebellion.  The  Czar, 
who  had  refused  to  aid  Austria  so  long  as  the 
Hungarians  were  merely  seeking  reforms,  justified 
his  interference  when  they  had  undertaken  to  form 
a  republic,  upon  the  ground  that  "the  internal 
security  of  his  empire  was  menaced  by  what  was 
passing  and  preparing  in  Hungary."  Upon  their 
final  defeat,  Kossuth  and  other  Hungarians  escaped 
to  Turkey.  The  Sultan,  supported  by  England, 
refused  to  surrender  them ;  and  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States,  acting  on  the  belief  that  these 
refugees  wished  to  leave  Europe  forever,  and  to 
seek  new  homes  here,  gave  them  passage  to  this 
country  in  a  national  vessel.  Kossuth,  however, 
leaving  the  ship  at  Gibraltar,  went  directly  to 
England,  where  he  was  received  with  an  enthusiasm 
which  grew  day  by  day.  During  his  visit  there 
he  put  before  the  people  in  public  addresses  of 
marvelous  eloquence,  tinged  with  Oriental  thought 
and  fancy,  and  clothed  in  the  language  of  Shake- 
speare, the  only  English  he  knew,  vivid  pictures  of 
the  wrongs  and  oppression  of  his  country.  He 
made  it  evident  that  it  was  his  purpose  to  induce 
both  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  to  ac- 
knowledge that  it  was  their  duty  to  protest  against 
the  action  of  any  state  which  should  assist  another 


FILLMORE'S  ADMINISTRATION  107 

to  put  down  an  insurrection ;  and  although  he  did 
not  expressly  say  so,  he  evidently  expected  them 
to  be  prepared,  if  necessary,  to  support  their  pro- 
tests by  force.  As  an  earnest  of  their  assent  to 
this  principle,  he  wished  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  each  to  put  on  record  its  official  and 
public  condemnation  of  the  recent  intervention  of 
Russia  in  the  affairs  of  Hungary,  and  his  hope 
was,  under  cover  of  this  declaration,  to  start  a 
fresh  insurrection  there  with  a  better  prospect  of 
success. 

After  a  short  stay  in  England,  he  sailed  for 
New  York,  where  he  was  to  arrive  early  in  Decem- 
ber. On  the  very  day  that  Congress  assembled  in 
that  month,  a  resolution  was  introduced  in  the 
Senate,  at  the  instance,  it  was  said,  of  the  secretary 
of  state,  providing  for  the  welcome  and  reception 
of  the  Hungarian  patriots.  It  was  expected  to 
pass  at  once  and  unanimously,  but  it  was  opposed, 
and  was  therefore  not  pressed.  A  substitute,  of- 
fered by  Seward,  simply  giving  Kossuth  "  a  cordial 
welcome  to  the  capital  and  the  country,"  was 
adopted  by  both  houses  after  some  debate.  The 
small  minority  against  it  consisted,  with  a  single 
exception,  of  Southerners,  whose  opposition  to  the 
resolve,  as  one  of  them  declared,  "  had  been  guided 
solely  by  sensitiveness  on  the  subject  of  slavery." 
Some  Southerners,  whose  sympathies  had  been 
excited  for  the  defeated  leaders  of  an  unsuccessful 
rising  in  a  remote  land,  and  who  had  been  quite 
ready  to  invite  them  here  as  "  exiles  broken  in 


108  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

heart  and  fortune,"  desirous  only  "  to  spend  their 
remaining  days  in  obscure  industry,"  were  quick 
to  take  alarm  when  they  found  Kossuth  preaching 
a  crusade  in  favor  of  freedom  and  the  rights  of 
men,  and  when  they  witnessed  the  effect  of  his 
fervid  appeals  upon  all  classes  of  persons  at  the 
North.  For  it  was  not  merely  the  more  impres- 
sionable and  uncritical  masses  who  were  carried 
away  by  his  eloquence  ;  but  grave  professors,  schol- 
ars, and  men  of  letters,  the  intelligent,  refined, 
and  fastidious  people  of  the  land  were  equally 
moved  by  him ;  and  the  slaveholders  not  unrea- 
sonably apprehended  that  the  quickened  sense  of 
the  wrongs  of  a  people  suffering  under  the  yoke 
of  a  despotism,  might  intensify  and  deepen  the 
growing  conviction  at  the  North  of  the  greater 
wrongs  and  sufferings  of  a  people  borne  down 
by  the  still  heavier  yoke  of  slavery.  The  fact 
that  the  most  earnest  anti-slavery  leaders  were 
among  the  most  ardent  of  Kossuth's  admirers 
naturally  tended  to  increase  these  apprehensions. 
Kossuth  made  a  tour  of  the  South ;  but  though 
he  preserved  a  discreet  silence  on  the  subject  of 
slavery,  his  speeches  failed  to  awaken  there  any 
interest  for  Hungary. 

Some  of  the  men  in  public  life  undoubtedly 
used  the  Hungarian  question  for  political  pur- 
poses; but  Seward  took  it  up  in  dead  earnest.  He 
offered  in  the  Senate  a  resolution  which  denounced 
the  conduct  of  Russia  in  invading  Hungary  with- 
out just  right,  in  subverting  there  the  constitution 


FILLMORE'S   ADMINISTRATION  109 

established  by  the  people,  and  reducing  the  country 
to  the  condition  of  a  province  ruled  by  a  foreign 
power  ;  and  which  further  declared  that  the  United 
States,  in  defense  of  their  own  interests  and  of  the 
common  interests  of  mankind,  protested  against 
this  conduct  of  Russia,  as  a  wanton  and  tyrannical 
infraction  of  the  law  of  nations,  and  would  not  in 
future  be  indifferent  to  any  similar  acts  of  national 
injustice,  oppression,  or  usurpation,  wherever  they 
might  occur.  In  a  very  earnest  and  elaborate 
speech  he  urged  the  passage  of  this  resolve.  He 
admitted  that  it  would  have  been  better  had  we 
made  our  protest  before  the  final  defeat  and  sur- 
render of  the  Hungarians  ;  but  thought  this  of  the 
less  consequence  as  the  surrender  was  quite  recent, 
and  there  was  some  prospect  of  a  new  rising  in 
Hungary,  which  made  the  protest  important  and 
seasonable.1  We  had  an  interest  in  making  this 
protest,  he  said,  as  one  of  the  family  of  nations, 
and  so  deeply  concerned  in  their  general  welfare 
that  it  was  not  merely  our  right  but  our  duty  to 
do  this. 

Nor  did  he  see  any  real  objection  to  it.  A  pro- 
test was  "not  a  declaration,  nor  a  menace,  nor 
even  a  pledge  of  war  in  any  contingency."  It 

1  The  final  defeat  and  surrender  of  the  Hungarians  was  Au- 
gust 10-13,  1849.  This  speech  was  delivered  March  9,  1852.  As 
neither  this  country  nor  England  gave  Hungary  official  encourage- 
ment there  was  never  any  later  outbreak.  The  ninety  thousand 
dollars  ($90,000)  raised  in  this  country  by  subscription,  for  the 
Hungarian  cause,  was  all  spent  for  the  benefit  of  those  who  came 
over  here. 


110  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

was  only  "  a  remonstrance  addressed  to  the  con- 
science of  Russia,  and  an  appeal  to  the  reason  and 
justice  of  mankind.  By  the  law  of  nations,"  he 
argued,  "  no  remonstrance  justifies  a  war."  If 
war  should  come,  the  protest  would  be  not  a 
cause,  but  a  "  pretext,"  and  "  in  a  defensive  war 
levied  against  us  on  such  a  pretext  we  should  be 
unconquerable."  If  Hungary  should  never  rise, 
there  would  be  no  casus  belli,  and  if  she  should  do 
so,  we  should  have  the  right  to  choose  our  own 
time  for  recognizing  her.  He  found  in  our  civil 
reply  to  Louis  XVI. 's  announcement  of  the  forma- 
tion of  the  French  constitution  of  1791,  an  infer- 
ential protest  against  the  foreign  intervention  then 
organized  beyond  the  Rhine,  although  the  reply 
was  absolutely  silent  on  this  point;  and  he  dis- 
covered further  protests  of  the  same  kind  in  the 
friendly  official  messages  sent  to  the  Committee  of 
Safety  of  the  first  French  republic. 

Washington's  policy  of  avoiding  entangling  alli- 
ances with  European  countries  Seward  admitted 
to  have  been  wise  and  necessary  in  its  day ;  but 
he  argued  that  this  policy  was  not  intended  or 
adapted  for  all  time ;  that  Monroe's  course  as 
to  the  Holy  Alliance  and  the  South  American 
republics  was  a  departure  from  it;  and  that  his 
later  expression  of  sympathy  with  Greece  towards 
the  close  of  her  long  struggle  for  independence  was 
inconsistent  with  it.  He  spoke  with  pride  of  the 
instant,  though  unauthorized,  recognition  by  our 
own  minister  of  the  French  republic  of  1848,  as 


FILLMORE'S  ADMINISTRATION  111 

showing  the  trend  of  our  political  relations  and 
influence  with  the  countries  of  Europe  ;  and  he 
insisted  that  the  resolve  he  offered  was  no  greater 
intervention  (if  it  were  intervention  at  all),  than 
what  we  had  done  "  in  every  contest  for  freedom 
and  humanity  throughout  the  world  since  we  be- 
came a  nation." 

Seward  had,  in  fact,  found  no  precedent  for  any 
such  protest,  in  any  act  of  our  foreign  policy  as  to 
the  domestic  difficulties  of  any  European  state. 
The  diplomatic  history  of  the  country  afforded  no 
such  precedent.  The  speech  was  one  in  which  his 
sympathies  got  the  better  of  his  reason.  It  advo- 
cated a  meddlesome  foreign  policy,  inconsistent 
with  the  position,  the  interests,  and  the  prosperity 
of  the  United  States.  Had  his  resolution  been 
adopted,  it  would  have  been  a  new  departure,  at 
variance  with  the  established  practice  and  tradi- 
tions of  this  country,  and  ten  years  later  might 
have  been  relied  on  by  the  countries  of  Europe  to 
justify  a  more  active  interference  with  our  course 
in  crushing  the  Southern  rebellion.  The  sober 
sense  of  Congress  saved  us  from  the  possible  con- 
sequences of  Seward's  rash  and  quixotic  proposal. 

In  forming  the  standing  committees  of  the  Sen- 
ate, in  the  Congress  which  met  in  December,  1851, 
Seward  was  made  a  member  of  that  on  commerce. 
This  brought  him  into  more  familiar  relations  with 
other  senators,  and  gave  him  plenty  of  congenial 
work.  He  was  always  a  believer  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  country,  upon  the  lines  of  the  policy 


112 

of  the  Whig  party,  and  his  place  on  this  committee 
made  more  effective  his  endeavors  to  foster  by 
legislation  our  domestic  and  foreign  commerce. 
He  advocated  government  aid  to  two  lines  of  At- 
lantic steamers,  to  the  ship  canal  round  the  Sault 
Saint  Marie,  and  to  railroads  in  various  parts  of 
the  country,  declared  himself  "  out  and  out "  in 
favor  of  a  railway  across  the  continent,  while  for 
the  benefit  of  our  whalers  and  trade  in  the  Pacific 
he  strenuously  urged  a  government  survey  of  that 
ocean. 

In  the  second  session  of  this  Congress  there 
were  no  political  debates.  When  the  presidential 
conventions  met,  both  parties  inserted  in  their 
platforms  an  indorsement  of  the  finality  of  the 
compromises.  That  of  the  Democrats  was  explicit, 
and  adopted  unanimously ;  that  of  the  Whigs, 
though  more  qualified,  was  opposed  by  one  fourth 
of  the  delegates. 

In  the  Democratic  convention  the  struggle  for 
the  nomination  was  long :  the  party  leaders,  Cass, 
Marcy,  and  Buchanan,  were  all  at  last  abandoned, 
and  Franklin  Pierce  of  New  Hampshire,  who  had 
seen  some  public  service  both  in  the  House  and 
Senate  and  been  a  general  in  the  Mexican  war, 
secured  the  nomination. 

Among  the  Whigs,  Scott  was  the  candidate  of 
the  opponents  of  the  compromises  of  1850 ;  Fill- 
more  and  Webster,  of  those  who  supported  these 
compromises.  On  the  first  ballot  in  the  conven- 
tion Webster  received  only  twenty-nine  votes,  while 


FILLMORE'S  ADMINISTRATION  113 

Fillmore  had  a  hundred  and  thirty-one,  —  enough 
with  Webster's  twenty-nine  to  have  given  him  the 
nomination.  The  conservative  Northern  and  the 
Southern  Whigs  had  together  a  majority  of  the 
convention,  and  the  indorsement  of  the  finality  of 
the  compromise  measures,  including  the  Fugitive 
Slave  Law,  was  not  unexpected.  Indeed  the  out- 
come of  the  convention  was  but  another  compro- 
mise, a  last  attempt  of  the  Whigs  to  preserve  their 
character  as  a  national  party.  The  anti-slavery 
Whigs  of  the  North  secured  the  nomination,  the 
South  the  platform.  Seward  was  disheartened. 
"The  North,  the  free  States,"  he  wrote,  "are 
divided  as  usual,  the  South  united.  Intimidation, 
usual  in  that  quarter,  has  been  met,  as  usual,  by 
concession,  and  so  the  platform  adopted  is  one  that 
deprives  Scott  of  the  vantage  of  position  he  en- 
joyed. ...  I  anticipate  defeat  and  desertion."  He 
was  so  discouraged  as  to  feel  weary  of  his  position 
and  that  he  should  be  glad  to  get  out  of  it.  This 
feeling  continued  throughout  the  summer.  "  When 
will  there  be  a  North  ?  "  he  asks ;  and  says  again  : 
"  I  still  remain  strongly  inclined  to  give  up  this 
place  and  public  life.  If  the  state  Whig  conven- 
tion adopt  the  platform,  I  think  I  shall  be  justified 
in  resigning  at  once." 

The  result  of  the  election  confirmed  his  forecast. 
Pierce  received  two  hundred  and  fifty-four  electoral 
votes  from  twenty-seven  States,  while  General 
Scott  had  only  the  votes  of  Vermont,  Massachu- 
setts, Kentucky,  and  Tennessee,  forty-two  in  all. 


114  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

Pierce's  plurality  over  Scott  on  the  popular  vote 
was  more  than  two  hundred  thousand,  and  his 
majority  over  all  candidates  nearly  sixty  thousand. 
So  far  as  the  election  had  any  political  significance, 
it  showed  that  the  Southerners  believed  the  Demo- 
crats more  subservient  than  the  Whigs  to  the  slave- 
holding  interests ;  while  it  also  indicated  that  the 
majority  of  the  Northern  voters  were  weary  of  anti- 
slavery  agitation,  and  had  accepted  the  compromise 
measures  as  a  solution  of  all  difficulties,  and  as 
the  finality  which  the  platforms  of  both  parties 
asserted  them  to  be. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   REPEAL   OF  THE   MISSOURI   COMPROMISE 

PRESIDENT  PIERCE'S  first  message,  delivered  on 
the  5th  of  December,  1853,  called  attention  to  the 
"  sense  of  repose  and  security  in  the  public  mind," 
and  gave  assurance  that  this  repose  should  suffer 
no  shock  if  he  had  power  to  avert  it.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that,  at  the  time  he  said  this,  the  Pre- 
sident had  not  the  slightest  foreboding  of  the  rude 
shock  which  this  repose  was  at  once,  with  his  own 
assent  and  support,  to  receive  at  the  hands  of  his 
own  party. 

The  Louisiana  purchase,  the  territory  acquired 
from  France  by  the  Treaty  of  1803,  extending 
west  from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Rocky  Mountains, 
first  brought  into  our  politics  the  disturbing  factor 
of  the  extension  of  slavery ;  all  our  previous  hold- 
ings being  free  under  the  Ordinance  of  1787. 
After  a  sharp  contest  the  question  of  freedom  or 
slavery  in  this  territory  was  settled  by  a  compro- 
mise, by  which  Missouri  was  admitted  as  a  slave 
State  ;  and  in  all  the  rest  of  the  territory  slavery 
was  to  be  allowed  south  of  36°  30',  while  north  of 
this  latitude  it  was  forever  prohibited. 

By  this  bargain  between  the  sections,  the  South 


116  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

secured  all  the  rich  and  fertile  lands  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi  to  the  northern  border 
of  Missouri,  and  left  to  the  North  the  uninhab- 
ited regions  beyond,  which  were  abandoned  to  the 
hunter  and  trapper,  or  gradually  given  over  to 
Indian  reservations.  In  1836,  Missouri  obtained 
leave  of  Congress  to  extend  her  boundaries  west- 
ward to  the  Missouri  River,  and  thus  more  than 
three  thousand  square  miles,  which  the  Compromise 
had  made  free,  became  slave  territory.  Aside 
from  this,  however,  the  Missouri  Compromise  had 
remained  practically  unquestioned  from  its  passage 
in  March,  1820,  until  the  year  1853,  and  had  been 
regarded  as  hardly  less  sacred  and  binding  than 
the  Constitution  itself.  But  the  South  had  now 
reaped  the  full  benefit  of  all  it  had  secured  by  the 
bargain  ;  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  southwestern 
counties  of  Missouri,  with  their  twenty-five  thou- 
sand slaves,  were  looking  with  covetous  eyes  upon 
the  fair  lands  of  Kansas,  lying  just  beyond  their 
own  borders. 

Several  attempts  had  been  made  to  secure  from 
Congress  an  act  for  the  organization  of  a  territorial 
government,  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of 
the  Missouri  Compromise  ;  but  they  had  all  been 
defeated  by  Southern  votes,  ostensibly  upon  the 
ground  that  this  Territory  could  not  be  opened  to 
settlement  without  interference  with  Indian  reser- 
vations secured  by  solemn  treaties.  Within  ten 
days  after  the  delivery  of  the  President's  message, 
with  its  promise  of  repose,  a  similar  bill  was  intro- 


REPEAL  OF  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE      117 

duced  into  the  Senate  and  referred  to  the  Com- 
mittee on  Territories,  of  which  Stephen  A.  Douglas 
of  Illinois  was  chairman.  Three  weeks  later  the 
committee  returned  it  with  amendments,  accom- 
panied by  an  elaborate  report,  in  which  it  was  said 
that  it  was  a  disputed  point  whether  the  Compro- 
mise prohibiting  slavery  in  this  Territory  was  a 
valid  enactment ;  eminent  statesmen  holding  that 
Congress  had  no  authority  to  legislate  as  to  slavery 
in  the  Territories,  that  the  Constitution  secured  to 
every  citizen  an  inalienable  right  to  move  into  any 
Territory  with  any  property,  including  slaves,  and 
to  have  the  same  protected  by  law,  and  that  any 
legislation  interfering  with  or  restricting  this  right 
was  null  and  void.  The  committee  added  that 
they  did  not  recommend  any  legislation  either 
affirming  or  repealing  the  Missouri  Compromise, 
or  declaring  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution  upon 
this  disputed  question ;  but  then  went  on  to  say 
that  the  compromise  measures  of  1850  rested  upon 
the  proposition  that  all  questions  pertaining  to  slav- 
ery in  the  Territories,  or  in  the  States  to  be  formed 
therefrom,  should  be  left  to  the  decision  of  the 
people  residing  therein. 

The  purpose  and  effect  of  this  report  did  not 
escape  the  notice  of  the  vigilant  anti-slavery  press 
of  the  North.1  Nor  was  the  hint  at  its  close  wholly 
lost  on  the  South.  On  the  16th  of  January,  a 
Southern  senator  gave  notice  of  an  amendment 

1  New  York  Evening  Post,  January  7,  1854  ;  Tribune,  January 
11 ;  Independent,  January  7. 


118  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

repealing  so  much  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  as 
prohibited  slavery  in  this  Territory,  and  providing 
that  slaves  might  be  taken  there  as  if  that  act  had 
never  been  passed.  A  week  later,  after  a  Sunday's 
conference  with  the  President,  in  which  Pierce  at 
last  yielded  to  the  arguments  and  persuasion  of 
Jefferson  Davis  and  Douglas,  Douglas  again  re- 
ported the  bill  from  his  committee,  and  now  there 
was  no  uncertainty  as  to  its  meaning.  It  created 
two  Territories,  Kansas  the  southern  one,  and  north 
of  this  Nebraska.  It  provided  that  slavery  in  these 
Territories  should  be  left  to  the  decision  of  the 
people  there,  and  declared  the  Missouri  Compro- 
mise inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  the  acts  of 
1850  and  therefore  inoperative  and  void.  The  bill 
in  this  shape  passed  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  thirty- 
seven  yeas  to  fourteen  nays,  —  all  the  Southerners, 
of  whatever  party,  except  Bell  of  Tennessee  and 
Houston  of  Texas,  voting  for  it,  and  only  four 
Northern  Democrats  against  it.1 

When  Douglas  reported  his  bill  he  readily 
granted  its  opponents  a  week's  delay  before  it 
should  be  brought  up  for  discussion.  In  this 
interval  there  was  published  the  address  of  the 
"  Independent  Democrats,"  in  which  the  whole 
history  of  the  growth  and  development  of  the  bill 
was  exposed,  the  report  attacked,  and  a  strenuous 
effort  made  to  rouse  the  people  of  the  North  to 
a  sense  of  the  wrong  attempted  to  be  done  them, 

1  Seven  Whigs  including  Bell,  five  Democrats  including  Hous- 
ton, with  Chase  and  Sumner,  Independents,  made  up  the  minority. 


REPEAL  OF  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE      119 

and  of  the  threatened  danger  to  freedom.  This 
address  was  signed  by  Chase  and  Simmer  of  the 
Senate  and  three  members  of  the  House.  Seward 
did  not  sign  it,  and  it  is  obvious  that  he  could  not 
have  done  so.  He  was  not  an  Independent  Demo- 
crat ;  he  was  a  Whig,  and  there  was  no  reason  for 
his  signing  it  which  did  not  apply  equally  to  the 
other  anti-slavery  Whigs  in  the  Senate,  —  Fessen- 
den,  Foote,  Fish,  Smith,  and  Wade,  none  of  whom 
put  their  names  to  it. 

When  the  day  for  the  debate  arrived,  Douglas, 
assuming  that  the  delay  had  been  asked  to  gain 
time  to  stir  up  sectional  agitation  at  the  North, 
made  a  savage  attack  on  Chase  and  Sumner,  the 
senators  responsible  for  this  manifesto,  and  on 
them,  for  the  time,  came  the  brunt  of  the  battle 
against  the  bill.  Before  its  final  passage  Seward 
made  two  speeches  upon  it.  It  was  a  case,  how- 
ever, where  discussion  was  useless.  Douglas  had 
brought  the  bill  to  its  final  shape,  providing  for 
the  organization  of  two  Territories  with  no  restric- 
tion as  to  slavery,  because  (if  we  are  to  take  his 
own  explanation)  he  thought  some  organization  of 
these  Territories  a  pressing  necessity,  and  was  satis- 
fied that  the  South  would  assent  to  no  other  plan. 

The  Southerners  were  perfectly  well  aware  of 
what  they  were  doing.  They  knew  that  they  were 
breaking  a  bargain  of  which  they  had  reaped  the 
advantage,  and  they  were  at  bottom  quite  indif- 
ferent to  the  charges  of  bad  faith  and  to  all  the 
reproaches  heaped  upon  them.  They  expected  to 


120  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

gain  an  immediate  substantial  advantage  for  slav- 
ery, and  did  not  mind  the  exposure  of  the  flimsy 
and  shifting  pretexts  which  they  offered  in  justi- 
fication of  their  conduct.  They  had  the  united 
Southern  vote,  which  was  pro-slavery  and  "  knew 
no  Whiggery  and  no  Democracy  where  slavery 
was  concerned ; "  and  they  could  rely  on  a  suf- 
ficient number  of  Northern  Democrats  to  carry  any 
measure  on  which  they  had  determined.  To  the 
Senate,  therefore,  argument  was  vain,  and  invectives 
and  personalities  were  useful  only  to  relieve  the 
mind  of  the  speaker.  Whatever  was  said  was  a 
mere  protest,  unavailing  where  it  was  spoken.  "  We 
were  only  a  few  here,"  said  Seward,  "  engaged  in 
the  cause  of  freedom  in  the  beginning  of  this  con- 
test. All  that  we  could  hope  to  do  was  to  organize 
and  prepare  the  issue  for  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives, and  awaken  the  country." 

Seward's  first  speech  was  a  simple  but  exhaus- 
tive statement  of  the  whole  question  in  all  its 
bearings,  entirely  free  from  personalities,  and  with 
little  rhetorical  adornment.  Its  tone  was  one  of 
great  calmness,  and  its  calmness  made  it  all  the 
more  effective.  It  has  been  described  as  a  lawyer's 
argument.  If  it  were  so,  the  jury  to  whom  it  was 
addressed  was  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and 
its  effect  upon  them  was  all  that  Seward  himself 
could  have  desired. 

"  His  words  were  listened  to  not  only  by  his  fol- 
lowers in  New  York,  but  they  had  a  marked  influ- 
ence on  all  the  anti-slavery  Whigs  in  the  country. 


REPEAL  OF  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE      121 

The  speech  was  translated  into  German,  and  exten- 
sively circulated  among  the  Germans  of  western 
Texas.  It  probably  affected  the  minds  of  more 
men  than  any  speech  delivered  on  that  side  of  this 
question  in  Congress."  l  Having  stated  the  history 
of  the  acquisition  of  the  territory  and  of  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Compromise  bill,  which  had  secured  it 
to  freedom,  the  "  universal  acceptance  of  this  mea- 
sure by  both  parties  for  more  than  thirty  years,  as 
a  conclusive  arrangement,  its  confirmation  over 
and  over  again  by  many  acts  of  successive  Con- 
gresses, and  the  fact  that  the  slaveholding  States 
had  received  the  full  benefit  of  what  the  Compro- 
mise secured  them,  while  the  non-slaveholding 
States  had  practically  enjoyed  nothing  under  it," 
Seward  went  on  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  ques- 
tion and  the  momentous  consequences  depending 
upon  its  decision.  "  It  was  no  abstraction  that 
had  brought  the  Compromise  into  being.  Slavery 
and  freedom  were  then  active  antagonists,  seek- 
ing for  ascendency  in  the  Union  ;  and  the  contest 
between  them  had  since  that  day  been  merely  pro- 
tracted —  not  decided.  By  holding  fast  to  the 
Compromise,  the  occupation  of  the  land  by  free- 
men, with  free  labor,  would  be  secured  forever ;  by 
abrogating  it,  this  vast  region  was  to%e  abandoned 
to  the  chances  of  slavery,  which  no  one  could  fore- 
tell." He  announced  his  conviction  that  if  ever 
the  slaveholding  States  should  "  multiply  them- 
selves and  extend  their  sphere,  so  that  they  could, 
1  Rhodes's  Hist.  U.  S.  i.  pp.  453,  454. 


122  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

without  association  with  the  non-slaveholding  States, 
constitute  of  themselves  a  commercial  republic, 
from  that  day  their  rule  would  be  such  as  would 
be  hard  for  the  non-slaveholding  States  to  bear ; 
and  their  pride  and  ambition  would  consent  to  no 
union  in  which  they  should  not  so  rule." 

Notwithstanding  the  compromise  measures  of 
1850,  Seward's  observation  and  his  natural  opti- 
mism had  made  him  hopeful  that  anti-slavery 
opinion  was  gaining  ground,  and  the  country 
making  slow  progress,  with  occasional  drawbacks, 
towards  the  gradual  and  peaceful  emancipation 
which  he  ardently  desired.  The  introduction  of 
Douglas's  original  bill  at  this  session  of  Congress, 
and  the  support  which  it  at  once  received  from 
Northern  Democrats,  were  a  rude  shock  to  this 
hope  ;  and  Seward's  letters  at  this  time  are  full  of 
gloomy  forebodings.  He  wrote  home :  — 

"Douglas  has  introduced  a  bill  for  organizing 
the  Nebraska  territory,  going  as  far  as  the  Demo- 
crats dare  towards  abolishing  that  provision  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise  which  devoted  all  the  new 
regions  north  of  36°  30'  to  freedom. 

"  I  am  heart-sick  of  being  here.  I  look  around 
me  in  the  Senate,  and  find  all  demoralized.  Maine, 
New  Hampshire,  Connecticut,  Rhode  Island,  Ver- 
mont !  !  !  All,  all  in  the  hand  of  the  slaveholders  ; 
and  even  New  York  ready  to  howl  at  my  heels,  if 
I  were  only  to  name  the  name  of  freedom,  which 
once  they  loved  so  much."  1 

1  January  4, 1854. 


REPEAL  OF  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE      123 

To  an  invitation  to  a  meeting  in  New  York  to 
protest  against  the  bill,  he  replied:  "Nebraska  is 
not  all  that  is  to  be  saved  or  lost ;  we  who  thought, 
only  so  lately  as  1849,  of  securing  some  portion  at 
least  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  all  the  Pacific 
coast  to  the  institutions  of  freedom,  shall  be,  before 
1857,  brought  to  a  doubtful  struggle  to  prevent 
the  extension  of  slavery  to  the  shores  of  the  Great 
Lakes  and  Puget  Sound."  1  And  as  the  vote  was 
about  to  be  taken  in  the  Senate,  before  sending 
the  bill  to  the  House,  he  wrote  again :  "  Heaven 
be  thanked  that  since  this  cup  of  humiliation  can- 
not be  passed,  the  struggle  of  draining  it  is  nearly 
over.  .  .  .  This  triumph  of  slavery,  the  greatest 
and  the  worst,  is  the  consummation  of  thirty-four 
years  of  compromise."  2 

In  Mr.  Welles's  "  Lincoln  and  Seward,"  which 
was  written  rather  from  a  controversial  than  a 
historical  point  of  view,  he  prints  a  letter  from 
Mr.  Montgomery  Blair,  in  which  Mr.  Blair  says : 
"  I  shall  never  forget  how  shocked  I  was  at 
Seward's  telling  me  that  he  was  the  man  who  put 
Archie  Dixon,  the  Whig  senator  from  Kentucky 
in  1854,  up  to  moving  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri 
Compromise  as  an  amendment  to  Douglas's  first 
Kansas  bill ;  and  had  himself  forced  the  repeal  by 
that  movement,  and  had  thus  brought  to  life  the 
Republican  party.  Dixon  was  to  out-Herod  Herod 
at  the  South,  and  he  would  out-Herod  Herod  at 
the  North.  He  did  not  contemplate  what  followed. 

1  January  28,  1S54.  2  March  3,  1854. 


124  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

He  did  not  believe  in  the  reality  of  the  passions  he 
excited,  because  he  felt  none  himself.  He  thought 
it  all  a  harmless  game  for  power."  This  statement 
of  Mr.  Blair's,  though  apparently  relied  on  by 
some  careful  writers,  seems  to  show  so  great  forget- 
f ulness  or  ignorance  of  historical  facts,  or  such  a 
reckless  disregard  of  them,  as  greatly  to  impair,  if 
not  wholly  to  destroy  its  claim  to  serious  considera- 
tion; but  as  a  malignant  posthumous  attack  on 
Seward,  it  justifies,  if  it  does  not  require,  even  at 
the  risk  of  repetition,  some  notice  here. 

The  principal  historical  facts,  which  dispose  of 
Mr.  Blair's  charge  that  Seward  forced  the  repeal 
of  the  Missouri  Compromise  by  putting  up  Dixon 
of  Kentucky  to  move  it,  are  as  follows :  early  in 
December,  1853,  Dodge  of  Wisconsin  introduced 
into  the  Senate  a  bill  for  organizing  into  one  Ter- 
ritory, to  be  called  Nebraska,  the  whole  country 
stretching  west  from  Missouri  to  Oregon  and  Utah. 
All  this  region  had  been  declared  free  by  the 
Missouri  Compromise,  and  Dodge's  bill  assumed 
this  to  be  constitutional  and  still  in  force,  unaf- 
fected by  any  subsequent  legislation.  His  bill 
was  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Territories,  of 
which  Stephen  A.  Douglas  of  Illinois  was  chair- 
man, and  that  committee,  on  the  4th  of  January, 
1854,  reported  the  bill  in  a  new  draft,  or,  to  speak 
accurately,  substituted  for  Dodge's  bill  one  of 
their  own.  They  also  submitted  an  elaborate 
report,  in  which  they  said  that  "  it  was  disputed 
whether  the  law  prohibiting  slavery  in  Nebraska 


REPEAL  OF  MISSOURI   COMPROMISE      125 

was  valid ;  that  there  was  involved  in  it  the  ques- 
tion whether  Congress  had  the  constitutional  power 
to  regulate  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  Terri- 
tories, —  the  same  issue  which  produced  the  strug- 
gle of  1850,  —  that  they  thought  it  wise  not  to 
depart  from  the  course  pursued  at  that  time,  and 
would  not  recommend  either  affirming  or  repealing 
the  Missouri  Compromise,  or  the  passage  of  any 
act  declaratory  of  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution 
on  this  point."  Nevertheless  their  bill,  when  it 
first  appeared  in  print  as  an  act  of  twenty  sections, 
on  the  7th  of  January,  1854,  contained  provisions 
borrowed  from  the  laws  organizing  Utah  and  New 
Mexico,  by  which,  whenever  this  or  any  part  of 
this  new  Territory  should  be  admitted  as  a  State, 
its  admission  should  take  place  without  regard  to 
the  fact  that  its  constitution  permitted  or  pro- 
hibited slavery.  This  provision  was  a  violation  of 
the  spirit,  if  not  also  of  the  letter,  of  the  Missouri 
Compromise,  and  an  application  to  this  Territory 
of  the  doctrine  of  squatter  sovereignty  as  estab- 
lished by  the  compromise  measures  of  1850. 

Three  days  later  (January  10,  1854),  there  was 
printed  an  additional  section  (the  twenty-first), 
said  to  have  been  omitted  by  a  mistake  of  the 
copyist  in  the  original  draft  of  the  bill.  This  sec- 
tion contained  several  paragraphs.  It  declared 
that  it  was  the  intent  of  the  act,  so  far  as  slavery 
was  concerned,  to  carry  into  effect  the  principles 
established  by  the  compromise  measures  of  1850  ; 
and  specified  as  the  first  of  these  principles  that 


126  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

"  all  questions  pertaining  to  slavery  in  the  Terri- 
tories, and  in  the  new  States  to  be  formed  there- 
from, are  to  be  left  to  the  decision  of  the  people 
residing  therein,  through  their  appropriate  repre- 
sentatives." If  there  had  previously  been  any 
doubt  as  to  the  purpose  and  effect  of  Douglas's 
bill,  this  new  section  made  its  scope  and  object 
perfectly  clear ;  and  Douglas  was  quite  right  when 
he  said  at  a  later  date  that  "  the  bill,  in  the  shape 
in  which  it  was  at  first  reported,  as  effectually 
repealed  the  Missouri  restriction  as  it  did  when 
the  repeal  was  put  in  express  terms."  The  country 
understood  the  bill  in  this  way,  and  leading  news- 
papers at  once  exposed  its  character. 

Seward  so  understood  it,  and  before  the  10th  of 
January  (the  day  when  the  additional  section  first 
appeared)  had  written  of  it  as  "this  infamous 
Nebraska  bill,  an  administration  move ; "  and 
called  attention  to  its  clause  protecting  Indians  in 
their  rights  of  property,  which  he  declared  to  be 
"  an  equivoque  to  cover  the  slaves  the  Indians  own, 
and  so  sanction  slavery  by  implication."  He  had 
also  written  as  to  meetings  and  legislative  resolu- 
tions to  remonstrate  against  it,  and  expressed  a 
hope  that  Clayton  might  be  induced  "  to  lead  an 
opposition  to  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Com- 
promise." 1 

On  the  16th  of  January,  eight  days  after  the 
date  of  this  letter,  Archibald  Dixon  of  Kentucky, 
who  had  been  elected  to  the  Senate  as  a  Whig, 

1  Letters,  January  8,  1854. 


REPEAL  OF  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE      127 

but  who  openly  declared  that  upon  the  question 
of  slavery  he  knew  no  Whiggery  and  no  Demo- 
cracy, that  he  was  a  pro-slavery  man,  was  from 
a  slaveholding  constituency,  and  was  there  to 
maintain  their  rights,  gave  notice  of  an  amend- 
ment which  he  proposed  to  offer,  expressly  re- 
pealing so  much  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  as 
prohibited  slavery  in  this  new  Territory.  Sumner 
on  the  next  day  proposed  an  amendment  of  an 
exactly  opposite  character.  The  bill  was  recom- 
mitted ;  the  following  week  Douglas  reported  it 
substantially  as  it  was  finally  passed ;  and  we  find 
Seward  writing  to  his  wife  :  "  The  great  news  of 
the  day  I  suppose  you  have  anticipated.  The 
'  Hards,'  finding  fault  with  Douglas's  equivocations 
in  his  first  bill,  insisted  on  the  repeal  of  the  Mis- 
souri Compromise.  Douglas  conferred  last  Sun- 
day with  the  cabinet ;  and  the  matter  resulted  in 
a  unanimous  agreement  to  concede  the  demand, 
and  to  put  the  bill  right  through,  before  the  coun- 
try could  be  aroused,  and  so  silence  agitation  of 
freedom  by  leaving  no  more  for  slavery  to  demand. 
I  shall  not  speculate  yet  on  the  consequences." 

The  course  of  events  in  the  Senate  and  the  ac- 
counts contained  in  these  letters  correspond  with 
one  another.  Douglas  meant  to  repeal  the  prohi- 
bition of  slavery  contained  in  the  Missouri  Com- 
promise, but  hoped  to  do  it  indirectly,  in  such  a 
way  as  to  satisfy  the  South  without  rousing  the 
attention  or  exciting  the  opposition  of  the  North. 
He  made  two  attempts  for  this  purpose,  —  the 


128  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

second  (by  the  restoration  of  the  suppressed 
twenty-first  section)  more  explicit  than  the  first. 
But  the  friends  of  freedom  had  seen  his  object 
from  the  beginning ;  they  believed,  as  he  did,  that 
he  had  accomplished  it  in  his  original  bill,  and  at 
once  began  to  endeavor  to  rouse  public  opinion 
at  the  North.  The  Southern  slaveholders  and 
the  Northern  pro-slavery  Democrats  (the  Hards) 
would  not,  however,  be  satisfied  with  anything 
less  than  a  direct  repeal  in  clear  language.  They 
persuaded  the  President  to  assent  to  this  course, 
and  Douglas  reported  his  final  bill.  Dixon's  mo- 
tion was  an  incident  of  no  special  importance. 
Before  it  was  made  the  committee  had  determined 
that  their  bill  should  open  the  Territory  to  slavery, 
and  believed  that  it  had  done  so  in  the  way  to  at- 
tract least  attention.  The  South  insisted  on  more 
explicit  language  on  this  point,  and  the  committee 
yielded  to  their  persistence.  The  final  shape  of 
the  bill,  proposing  the  organization  of  two  Terri- 
tories instead  of  one,  may  have  been  expected  to 
facilitate  its  passage,  as  it  left  room  for  the  argu- 
ment that  there  was  to  be  a  division  between  the 
North  and  the  South,  as  often  before,  and  that 
though  Kansas,  which  was  next  Missouri,  would 
be  a  slave  State,  yet  Nebraska  was  not  likely  to 
be  so.  Nebraska  it  was  then  quite  safe  to  talk 
about,  as  its  only  denizens  were  Indians  on  their 
reservations,  and  our  hunters  and  the  game  they 
were  pursuing  ;  and  there  was  no  immediate  pro- 
spect of  any  more  stable  population. 


REPEAL  OF  MISSOURI   COMPROMISE      129 

What  Seward  actually  said  to  Mr.  Blair,  which 
enabled  him  to  make  the  statement  he  has  printed, 
can  never  be  known,  since  Mr.  Blair,  however 
shocked  he  was,  never  mentioned  the  matter  dur- 
ing Seward's  lifetime,  when  Seward  might  have 
explained  or  denied  it,  but  reserved  it  for  an  at- 
tack on  him  after  his  death.  To  any  one  who  has 
studied  Seward's  life,  the  suggestion  that  in  his 
opposition  to  the  extension  of  slavery  he  was  play- 
ing a  part  in  "  a  harmless  game  for  power,"  is 
simply  absurd.  Slavery  was  abhorrent  to  him 
from  his  early  experience  in  Georgia.  Later  in 
life  he  abandoned  a  journey  in  Virginia  because 
the  daily  contact  with  slavery  was  so  repulsive  to 
him.  He  believed  it  a  moral  wrong  and  a  politi- 
cal mistake,  and  his  whole  course  in  politics  rested 
upon  this  conviction.  The  substance  and  the  tone 
of  the  letters  we  have  quoted,  his  whole  corre- 
spondence at  the  time,  and  his  speech  on  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  bill  are  absolutely  inconsistent 
with  his  having  "put  up  Dixon"  to  moving  the 
repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise.  There  were 
no  confidential  relations  between  Seward  and  Mr. 
Blair  which  would  have  naturally  led  Seward  to 
make  him  the  sole  depositary  of  this  secret ;  Blair 
himself  had  no  such  tender  regard  for  Seward's 
reputation  as  would  have  caused  him  to  hesitate 
for  an  instant  to  speak  of  this,  if,  at  the  time,  he 
really  understood  what  he  at  last  brought  himself 
to  state  in  this  letter.  There  were  in  Congress, 
when  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  was  under  discus- 


130  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

sion,  many  of  its  opponents  who  did  not  like,  or 
always  agree  with,  Seward,  and  who  did  not  shrink 
from  criticising  him,  or  saying  sharp  and  unplea- 
sant things  about  him.  If  there  were  any  back- 
ground of  facts  to  warrant  Mr.  Blair's  charges,  we 
may  be  quite  sure  that  some  rumor  of  them  would 
have  been  then  circulating  in  Washington,  and 
that  we  should  not  have  waited  till  twenty  years 
after  the  events  happened,  when  all  the  actors  were 
dead,  before  hearing  this  story  for  the  first  time. 
Nor,  if  there  were  any  foundation  for  Mr.  Blair's 
charge  against  him,  if  he  had  any  share  in  Dixon's 
motion,  could  Seward  himself,  when  the  facts  were 
fresh,  and  when  the  evidence  to  convict  him  of 
falsehood,  if  what  he  was  stating  were  untrue,  was 
right  at  hand,  have  written  as  he  did  in  the  letters 
we  have  quoted,  or  have  publicly  said  in  a  speech 
on  this  very  bill :  "  The  shifting  sands  of  compro- 
mise are  passing  from  under  my  feet,  and  they  are 
now,  without  agency  of  my  own,  taking  hold  again 
on  the  rock  of  the  Constitution." 

In  the  House  of  Representatives  there  was  more 
opposition  to  the  bill;  there  seemed  a  possibility 
of  its  defeat,  and  more  than  a  possibility  of  some 
amendments  unacceptable  to  the  slaveholders.  But 
it  was  at  last  forced  through,  without  material 
changes,  by  the  parliamentary  skill  and  the  un- 
hesitating audacity  of  Alexander  H.  Stephens  of 
Georgia,  who  succeeded  most  ingeniously  in  cut- 
ting off  all  possible  amendments  and  stopping  all 
debate. 


REPEAL  OF  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE      131 

A  change,  which  the  Southerners  were  prepared 
to  accept,  made  it  necessary  to  return  the  bill  to 
the  Senate,  that  it  might  be  put  on  its  final  pas- 
sage there.  It  was  on  the  night  before  this  final 
vote  was  taken  that  Seward  made  his  second 
speech ;  and  the  despondency  betrayed  in  his  cor- 
respondence is  even  more  manifest  here. 

"  The  sun  has  set,"  he  began,  "  for  the  last  time 
on  the  guaranteed  and  certain  liberties  of  all  the 
unsettled  and  unorganized  portions  of  the  United 
States.  To-morrow's  sun  will  rise  in  dim  eclipse 
over  them.  How  long  that  obstruction  shall  last 
is  known  only  to  the  Power  that  directs  and  con- 
trols all  human  events.  For  myself,  I  know  only 
this,  that  no  human  power  will  prevent  its  coming 
on,  and  that  its  passing  off  will  be  hastened  and 
secured  by  others  than  those  now  here,  and  per- 
haps only  by  those  belonging  to  future  generations. 
.  .  .  By  the  passage  of  this  bill,  freedom  will  en- 
dure a  severe,  though,  I  hope,  not  an  irretrievable 

loss The  slave  States  are  in  earnest  in 

seeking  for  and  securing  an  object,  and  an  impor- 
tant one.  I  do  not  know  how  long  the  advantage 
gained  will  last,  nor  how  great  and  comprehensive 
it  will  be.  .  .  .  There  is  suspended  on  the  issue  of 
this  contest  the  political  equilibrium  between  the 
free  and  the  slave  States.  It  is  no  idle  question, 
whether  slavery  shall  go  on  increasing  its  influence 
over  the  central  power  here,  or  whether  freedom 
shall  gain  the  ascendency.  ...  I  believe  that,  if 
ever  the  greater  ascendency  of  the  slave  power 


132  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

shall  come,  the  voice  of  freedom  will  cease  to  be 
heard  in  these  halls,  whatever  may  be  the  evils  and 
dangers  which  slavery  shall  produce.  .  .  .  When 
freedom  of  speech  on  a  subject  of  such  vital  inter- 
est shall  have  ceased  to  exist  in  Congress,  then  I 
shall  expect  to  see  slavery  not  only  luxuriating  in  all 
new  Territories,  but  stealthily  creeping  into  the  free 
States  themselves.  Believing  this,  ...  I  am  sure 
that  this  will  be  no  longer  a  land  of  freedom  and 
constitutional  liberty,  when  slavery  shall  have  thus 
become  paramount."  It  was,  therefore,  rather  with 
the  courage  of  despair  than  with  the  confidence  of 
hope  that  he  said :  "  Come  on,  then,  gentlemen 
of  the  slave  States.  Since  there  is  no  escaping 
your  challenge,  I  accept  it  in  behalf  of  the  cause  of 
freedom.  We  will  engage  in  competition  for  the 
virgin  soil  of  Kansas,  and  God  give  the  victory  to 
the  side  which  is  stronger  in  numbers  as  it  is  in 
right." 

The  only  gleam  of  satisfaction  that  he  could  see 
came  from  his  conviction  that  the  so-called  final 
arrangements  with  the  South,  made  only  to  be 
broken,  were  forever  at  an  end. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   FORMATION    OF   THE   REPUBLICAN   PARTY 

THE  vote  on  the  Nebraska  bill  again  demon- 
strated that  all  questions  touching  the  interests  of 
slavery  lay  outside  of  the  creeds  of  parties  and  the 
ties  of  party  associations.  The  disintegration  of 
the  Whig  party  seemed  inevitable.  Every  North- 
ern Whig,  in  either  House  or  Senate,  voted  against 
the  bill ;  while  of  the  Southern  Whigs,  twenty-one 
voted  for  it  and  only  eight  against  it.  Among  the 
Democrats  the  sectional  lines  were  not  so  sharply 
drawn  ;  fifty-eight  Northern  Democrats  voted  for 
the  bill,  and  forty-eight  against  it ;  while  from  the 
South  but  three  voted  against  it,  fifty-eight  for  it. 

From  the  Northern  Democracy,  as  an  anti-slav- 
ery party,  there  was  nothing  to  be  hoped,  and  the 
people  as  well  as  the  politicians  were  discussing 
whether  it  was  more  advisable  to  make  a  fight 
against  slavery  under  the  Whig  name  and  organ- 
ization at  the  North,  or  to  form  a  new  party. 
Already,  before  the  passage  of  the  bill,  there  had 
been  meetings  in  Wisconsin  to  consider  a  fusion  of 
the  Whigs,  Free  Soilers,  and  anti-slavery  Demo- 
crats into  a  new  party,  for  which  the  name  "  Re- 
publican "  had  been  suggested.  The  day  after  the 


134  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

passage  of  the  bill  some  thirty  members  of  Con- 
gress agreed  together  upon  the  necessity  for  a  new 
party,  and  adopted  the  same  name  ;  and  in  the 
summer  there  were  in  several  States,  under  varying 
forms,  fusions  between  the  anti-Nebraska  members 
of  the  different  parties,  and  elections  to  local  offices 
of  candidates  who  represented  the  various  organi- 
zations which  had  united  to  form  a  common  oppo- 
sition to  the  constant  demands  of  slavery.  In 
Michigan  the  new  organization  was  complete.  It 
held  a  regular  convention,  called  itself  the  "Re- 
publican party,"  nominated  its  candidates,  and 
elected  them. 

Something  had  been  said,  even  before  the  pas- 
sage of  the  bill,  as  to  calling  a  convention  of  all 
the  free  States ;  and  Seward  in  reply  to  this  sug- 
gestion had  given  his  opinion  that  "  we  were  not 
yet  ready  for  a  great  national  convention ; "  that 
the  States  were  the  places  for  activity.  "  Let  us 
make  our  power  respected,  as  we  can,  through  our 
elections  in  the  States,  and  then  bring  the  States 
into  general  council." 

The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  any  fusion  of  the 
old  parties  were  much  greater  in  the  East  than  in 
the  West ;  for  at  the  East  the  animosities  were 
much  stronger  between  the  various  political  ele- 
ments from  which  the  opponents  to  the  Nebraska 
bill  were  drawn. 

There  were  several  distinct  bodies.  The  North- 
ern Whigs,  who  on  this  question  were  a  unit,  were 
divided  into  at  least  two  groups,  —  those  who  had 


FORMATION  OF  REPUBLICAN  PARTY     135 

opposed  the  compromises  of  1850,  the  Seward 
Whigs  we  may  call  them,  —  and  those  who  had 
favored  those  compromises,  the  Webster  Whigs. 
The  former  were  the  more  numerous,  and  had  been 
recruited  by  the  addition  of  most  of  the  young 
Whigs  ;  the  strength  of  the  latter  was  in  the  cities 
and  with  the  older,  richer,  and  more  influential 
classes.  Of  the  former  Seward  was  the  leader ; 
but  by  the  latter  he  was  looked  upon  with  distrust 
and  dislike.  If  the  houses  of  some  of  the  con- 
servatives in  New  York  were  again  opening  to  him, 
the  Webster  Whigs  of  Boston  ignored  his  exist- 
ence even  at  a  later  period  ;  when  he  came  to 
Massachusetts  in  December  of  the  following  year 
(1855)  to  deliver  an  oration  at  Plymouth,  no  one 
of  them  called  upon  him,  though  his  arrival  had 
been  announced  in  the  newspapers,  and  he  passed 
a  day  in  Boston,  alone  in  a  hotel  parlor,  reading 
Lewes's  "Life  of  Goethe."  For  the  Whigs  of 
this  class  he  had  gone  too  fast  and  too  far.  To 
the  Free  Soilers  who  had  been  Democrats,  and  to 
those  Democrats  who  had  opposed  the  Nebraska 
bill,  he  was  objectionable,  as  having  been  always, 
upon  all  the  economic  questions  which  had  divided 
the  two  great  parties,  a  pronounced  Whig.  For 
the  successful  formation  of  a  new  national  party, 
it  was  essential  that  Seward  should  lend  to  the 
movement  his  active  assistance,  if  he  must  not  in- 
deed lead  in  it ;  yet  the  politicians  were  too  much 
afraid  of  the  opposition  to  him  from  various 
quarters  to  put  him  at  its  head,  and,  as  he  thought, 


136  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

would  have  liked  him  to  do  the  work  and  decline 
the  honors.  He  wrote  to  his  wife  :  "  I  have  letters 
of  all  sorts  ;  .  .  .  the  amount  of  which  is  that,  in- 
somuch as  I  am  too  much  of  an  anti-slavery  man 
to  be  proscribed  by  anti-slavery  men,  and  yet  too 
much  of  a  Whig  to  be  allowed  to  lead,  that  I  am 
in  the  way  of  great  movements  to  make  a  Demo- 
cratic anti-slavery  party  .  .  .  which  would  revo- 
lutionize the  government  at  once. 

"  Then  again,  I  am  so  important  to  the  Whig 
party  that  it  cannot  move  without  me ;  but  that 
party  (the  Webster  part  of  it)  is  so  jaundiced 
toward  me,  that  I  am  expected  to  decline  being 
a  candidate  right  off,  and  go  in  for  some  other 
Whig  candidate,  and  so  carry  the  election  for 
the  Whig  party. 

"  The  Free  Soilers  are  engaged  in  schemes  for 
nominating  Colonel  Benton  and  dissolving  the 
Whig  party ;  .  .  .  and  there  are  not  less  than  half 
a  dozen  parties  coming  to  negotiate  with  me  as  if 
I  were  a  vendor  of  votes." 

All  that  he  saw  and  learned  increased  his  doubts 
whether  the  various  opponents  of  the  Nebraska 
bill  were  yet  prepared  so  to  subordinate  their 
differences  as  to  work  together  harmoniously  and 
earnestly  for  a  common  end,  and  confirmed  his 
opinion  that  the  time  was  not  ripe  for  a  national 
experiment,  but  for  separate  efforts  in  the  States, 
where  success  would  be  more  probable  and  more 
encouraging,  and  where  failure  would  be  less  dis- 
astrous and  demoralizing.  This  course  seemed 


FORMATION   OF  REPUBLICAN  PARTY     137 

all  the  more  judicious,  as  there  was  no  national 
contest  this  year,  and  separate  congressional  dis- 
tricts could  arrange,  each  in  its  own  way,  for  the 
election  of  anti-Nebraska  congressmen,  more  effec- 
tually than  if  they  were  in  any  degree  under  the 
control  of  a  new  party  organization. 

It  presently  appeared  also  that  there  was  a  new 
element  to  be  taken  into  account  in  any  political 
calculation  :  —  the  mysterious  apparition  of  a  new 
party,  the  "  Dark  Lantern,"  the  "  Know-Nothing  " 
or  "  Native  American  "  party,  which  was  both  a 
political  organization  and  a  secret  order,  whose 
ostensible  purpose  was  to  check  the  power  and 
restrict  the  numbers  of  foreign-born  citizens  by 
a  rigorous  enforcement  and  the  ultimate  modifica- 
tion of  the  existing  naturalization  laws,  to  purify 
the  ballot,  and  to  resist  all  attempts  to  exclude  the 
Bible  from  the  public  schools ;  in  other  words,  it 
seemed  to  be  a  union  of  American  Protestants 
against  Irish  Roman  Catholics.  It  originated  in 
New  York  in  1853,  and  its  avowed  objects  ap- 
pealed to  many  people  in  that  and  other  large 
cities  of  the  East,  where  the  influx  of  illiterate 
foreigners  was  the  greatest,  and  abuse  of  the 
naturalization  laws  most  frequent.  Conservative 
men  all  over  the  country  who  had  been  Whigs, 
and  who  realized  that  their  party  as  a  national 
organization  was  dead,  joined  the  order  in  the 
hope  that  questions  as  to  slavery  might  be  put 
aside  by  these  new  issues,  which  had  nothing  sec- 
tional about  them.  It  was  the  only  refuge  for  a 


138  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

Southern  Whig  ;  and  Northern  Whigs,  who  could 
not  bring  themselves  to  strike  hands  with  Seward 
and  the  advance  guard  of  their  old  party,  found 
here  an  escape  from  so  doing.  It  became  dis- 
tinctly a  Union-saving  party  in  November,  1854, 
when  it  introduced  into  its  ritual  a  third,  or  Union, 
degree,  and  conferred  it  on  the  initiates  with  an 
imposing  ceremonial.  Before  this  time,  however, 
there  were  not  wanting  zealous  anti-slavery  men 
who  had  seen  that  the  Know-Nothing  organization 
might  be  used  as  an  instrument  in  breaking  up 
the  old  parties  and  aiding  the  formation  of  a  new 
one,  and  who  joined  it  for  this  purpose.  They 
were  sufficiently  numerous  in  many  States  to  influ- 
ence the  nominations,  and  to  take  care  that  the 
candidates  for  Congress  should  be  in  harmony 
with  their  views. 

The  Know  -  Nothings  were  badly  defeated  in 
Virginia  in  the  spring  of  1855,  and  their  national 
council,  in  June  of  that  year,  was  hopelessly  di- 
vided by  sectional  strife ;  yet  in  the  elections  of 
1854  they  had  been  formidable  opponents,  all  the 
more  so  because  nothing  was  known  of  them,  of 
their  methods,  their  power,  or  their  numbers.  In 
Philadelphia,  where  they  were  supposed  to  be  very 
numerous,  Douglas  denounced  them  bitterly  in  a 
campaign  speech,  hoping  in  this  way  to  deter  Dem- 
ocrats from  joining  the  organization,  and  to  secure 
for  his  party  the  full  Irish  vote. 

Seward,  whose  hostility  to  any  political  pro- 
scription on  account  of  birth,  race,  or  religion  was 


FORMATION  OF  REPUBLICAN   PARTY     139 

of  long  date  and  had  often  been  stated  by  him  in 
public  addresses  and  letters,  took  no  part  in  the 
campaign.  His  silence  has  been  criticised.  But 
whether  considered  with  reference  to  his  own  per- 
sonal interest  in  his  reelection  to  the  Senate  or  to 
the  success  of  the  party,  it  seems  to  have  been  ju- 
dicious. It  may  be  doubted  whether,  when  the 
largest  national  issue  to  which  he  could  address 
himself  was  practically  that  of  his  own  reelection, 
he  would  have  thought  it  becoming  the  dignity  of 
his  position  to  enter  the  lists  as  a  campaign  speaker 
on  his  own  behalf.  It  was  well  understood,  too, 
that  many  Whigs,  who  looked  on  him  with  jaun- 
diced eyes,  had  joined  the  new,  mysterious  com- 
pany with  its  secret  affiliations.  The  Whig  party 
of  New  York  had  declined  all  alliances  whatso- 
ever, adhered  to  its  old  organization,  and  placed 
itself  squarely  on  anti-Nebraska  ground;  nothing 
that  Seward  could  have  said  would  have  detached 
a  single  "Silver  Grey  "  neophyte  from  his  alle- 
giance to  the  new  order,  though  it  might  have  lost 
him  the  vote  of  some  Know-Nothing,  who  had  a 
more  vivid  interest  in  the  struggle  against  a  mani- 
fest and  growing  evil  at  home  than  in  a  crusade 
to  secure  the  freedom  of  a  region  so  remote  as 
Kansas.  In  the  State  of  New  York  the  Whigs 
carried  their  ticket  by  a  plurality  of  only  three 
hundred  in  a  vote  of  nearly  half  a  million.  A 
change  of  one  hundred  and  fifty-five  votes  would 
have  elected  the  Democratic  candidates. 

Early  in  February  of  the  following  year,  Seward 


140  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

was  reflected  senator ;  and  this  reelection,  con- 
sidering his  antecedents,  was  as  severe  a  blow  as 
could  have  been  dealt  the  Know-Nothings  at  that 
time.  The  earnest  members  of  that  party  had  set 
their  hearts  on  his  defeat ;  but  the  result  showed 
that,  when  an  issue  was  raised  between  anti-slavery 
and  Americanism,  there  were  members  of  that 
party,  at  least  in  the  legislature  of  Seward's  own 
State,  who  were  opponents  of  slavery  before  they 
were  Know-Nothings. 

This  campaign  and  election,  which  seemed  to 
Seward  a  victory  for  himself  as  well  as  his  party, 
was  to  bear  for  him  most  bitter  fruit.  Horace 
Greeley,  who  was  generally  considered  at  that  time 
an  unselfish  patriot,  but  had  at  bottom  an  unsatis- 
fied desire  for  a  nomination,  as  a  recognition  from 
his  party,  had  set  his  heart  on  being  the  Whig 
candidate  for  governor ;  and  had,  as  both  he  and 
his  friends  thought,  every  reason  to  expect  this. 
In  spite  of  Greeley's  ability,  his  advocacy  of  vari- 
ous hobbies  and  crotchets  of  his  own  had  led  so 
many  sensible  people  to  doubt  his  judgment,  that 
it  was  feared  that  his  name  on  the  ticket,  when 
success  was  at  the  best  so  uncertain,  would  insure 
its  defeat,  and  he  did  not  receive  the  nomination ; 
while,  to  make  matters  worse,  a  rival  editor  — 
Henry  J.  Raymond,  of  the  New  York  "  Times  " 
was  nominated  and  elected  as  lieutenant-governor. 
For  all  this  Greeley  chose  to  consider  Seward  re- 
sponsible, and  he  wrote  him  a  letter,  which  Seward 
took  for  a  momentary  ebullition  of  temper,  but 


FORMATION   OF   REPUBLICAN  PARTY     141 

which  was  in  truth  a  declaration  of  undying  hostil- 
ity. Greeley  bided  his  time ;  and  in  1860  went 
from  New  York  to  Chicago  as  a  "  delegate  from 
Oregon "  to  the  Republican  Convention,  that  he 
might  do  all  in  his  power  to  get  even  with  Seward 
and  defeat  his  nomination  for  the  presidency. 

The  defeat  of  the  Know-Nothings  in  Virginia, 
and  their  domestic  disorders  in  Philadelphia,  were 
unmistakable  signs  of  waning  strength.  The  au- 
spicious moment  for  the  formation  of  a  new  party 
in  those  States  which  had  clung  to  their  old  organi- 
zations appeared  to  have  arrived.  In  Ohio,  Penn- 
sylvania, Massachusetts,  and  New  York,  Republican 
conventions  were  called  and  candidates  nominated. 
To  this  movement  in  New  York  Seward  gave  his 
hearty  adhesion  and  a  strong  impulse.  In  a  speech 
at  Albany  he  summed  up  the  case  for  the  Northern 
opponents  of  the  extension  of  slavery,  by  a  most 
graphic  sketch  of  the  changes  of  attitude  of  the 
slaveholders,  from  their  assent  to  the  dedication  to 
freedom  of  all  our  public  lands  by  the  ordinance  of 
1787,  to  their  steady  encroachments  and  constantly 
increasing  demands  as  to  our  newly  acquired  terri- 
tory from  the  time  of  the  Louisiana  purchase  to 
the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise ;  and  he 
showed  the  necessity  of  a  new  party  organization 
to  resist  the  future  exactions  of  this  privileged  and 
persistent  class. 

The  result  of  the  autumn  elections,  however,  in- 
dicated that  the  Northern  seceders  from  the  Know- 
Nothing  party  had  underestimated  its  strength, 


142  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

and  justified  the  boast  of  the  New  York  leader  of 
its  pro-slavery  faction  :  that,  though  they  had  ex- 
pelled thirty  thousand  members  for  supporting 
Seward's  reelection,  they  could  still  muster  votes 
enough  to  carry  the  State.  The  outcome  of  these 
elections,  as  a  whole,  was  somewhat  disheartening 
for  the  Republicans ;  the  Democracy  recovered 
New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Indiana,  and  Illinois  ; 
and  the  pro-slavery  American  party,  with  the 
"  Silver  Grey  "  Whigs,  who  voted  for  its  candi- 
dates, carried  New  York,  California,  and  Massachu- 
setts. If  any  conclusion  is  to  be  drawn  from  the 
result  in  New  York,  it  would  seem  to  be  that, 
had  Seward  surrendered  his  own  judgment  to  the 
opinions  of  those  who  advocated  the  formation  of  a 
new  national  party  the  year  before,  and  had  he 
abandoned  the  Whig  organization  at  that  time, 
the  Know-Nothings  or  the  Democracy  would  have 
carried  the  State,  he  would  have  returned  to  pri- 
vate life,  and  the  country  would  have  lost  his  great 
services  during  the  trying  six  years  to  come. 

The  Republican  party  having  been  organized  in 
the  various  Northern  States,  the  next  step  was  to 
give  it  a  national  character  and  prepare  for  the 
presidential  campaign  of  the  following  year.  A 
preliminary  matter,  to  which  much  consideration 
was  given  by  some  of  the  leading  men,  was  the 
question  of  the  recognition  of  the  Know-Nothings, 
either  in  the  call  for  the  convention,  the  platform, 
or  the  candidates,  and  an  alliance,  if  not  a  fusion, 
of  the  two  parties. 


FORMATION   OF  REPUBLICAN   PARTY     143 

Just  at  the  close  of  the  year,  at  a  conference  to 
which  Seward  was  invited,  but  which  he  declined 
to  attend,  it  was  proposed  to  have  a  convention, 
half  Republican  and  half  Know-Nothing,  and  he 
was  told  that  all  the  free  States  except  New  York 
either  had  acquiesced  in  it  or  would  do  so.  Seward 
declined  to  assume  any  responsibility  as  to  the  ac- 
tion of  his  State  ;  but  for  himself  protested  against 
any  such  combination,  saying  that  if  it  were  car- 
ried out,  he  should  disavow  all  connection  or  sym- 
pathy with  it.  The  prospect  of  some  such  under- 
standing he  thought  increasing  as  time  went  on, 
and  regretted  that  the  tone  of  anti-slavery  senti- 
ment was  becoming  daily  more  and  more  modified 
under  the  pressure  of  Kuow-Nothing  influence, 
feeling  as  if  he  himself  were  half  demoralized  by 
it.  The  question  had  a  personal  bearing  with 
him  from  the  outset.  He  would  have  liked  the 
presidential  nomination,  if  the  new  party  were  to 
put  itself  squarely  on  a  ground  of  principle  and 
not  of  expediency;  but  he  could  not  accept  it  if 
there  should  be  any  taint  of  Know-Nothingism, 
either  about  the  convention  or  the  platform.  At 
the  conference  which  has  been  spoken  of,  it  was 
stated  that  Fremont  and  Chase  were  both  candi- 
dates ;  and  it  was  also  said  on  Weed's  authority 
that  Seward  was  not  so.  This  Seward  confirmed, 
so  far  as  it  related  to  a  nomination  by  the  joint 
convention  then  proposed ;  but  he  by  no  means 
abandoned  either  the  hope  or  the  desire  for  the 
nomination,  though  he  put  himself  as  to  that  in 


144  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

Weed's  hands,  trusting  to  his  political  sagacity  to 
decide  what  was  best.  The  trend  of  opinion  in 
favor  of  Fremont  was  so  strong  that  early  in  April 
Seward  wrote  that  it  had  ripened  into  the  general 
impression  that  it  would  be  expedient  to  nominate 
the  California  candidate  ;  but  his  apprehensions  of 
some  arrangement  with  the  Know-Nothings  were 
by  no  means  relieved.  "  I  am  content  and  quiet 
on  the  personal  question,"  he  wrote  to  Weed,  "  and 
when  the  array  of  the  battle  shall  be  set  and  fixed, 
I  shall  decide  upon  my  own  line  of  duty,  so  as  to 
save  my  independence  without  the  exhibition  of 
personal  susceptibilities." 

A  preliminary  convention,  on  the  22d  of  Febru- 
ary, had  announced  the  organization  of  the  Repub- 
licans as  a  national  party  ;  its  nominating  conven- 
tion was  to  be  held  at  Philadelphia  on  the  17th  of 
June.  As  this  time  drew  near  Seward's  uneasiness 
increased  ;  he  thought  the  indications  decisive  of  a 
compromise  which  would  be  embarrassing  to  him, 
and  "  even  more  injurious  to  the  great  cause  in 
whose  name  it  was  to  be  made."  He  had  not, 
however,  nor  had  the  people  generally,  abandoned 
all  expectation  of  his  being  the  nominee  of  the 
convention ;  and  though  he  learned  —  and  with 
apparent  surprise,  tracing  no  connection  between 
Greeley's  conduct  and  his  letter  —  that  Greeley 
had  struck  hands  with  his  enemies,  and  sacrificed 
him  for  the  good  of  the  cause,  and  that  Weed 
had  concurred  in  this ;  yet  it  was  not  till  the  day 
the  convention  met  that  he  absolutely  declined  the 


FORMATION  OF  REPUBLICAN  PARTY     145 

nomination,  upon  the  ground  that  the  convention 
was  not  prepared  to  adopt  all  his  principles,  and 
that  he  would  not  modify  them  to  secure  the  presi- 
dency. Chase's  name  was  also  withdrawn,  and  the 
only  candidates  practically  before  the  convention 
were  Fremont  and  McLean.  The  latter  was  the 
choice  of  Pennsylvania,  the  only  man,  it  was  said, 
who  could  carry  that  State,  where  the  Republi- 
can party  contained  a  large  admixture  of  Know- 
Nothings,  to  whom  Seward  was  impossible  and 
Fremont  unacceptable.  But  on  the  first  ballot 
Fremont  received  a  decisive  majority,  and  his  nom- 
ination was  at  once  made  unanimous.  The  plat- 
form, contrary  to  Seward's  expectation,  contained 
nothing  to  which  he  could  not  cordially  assent. 
The  result  of  the  convention  was,  as  he  himself  ex- 
pressed it,  "  a  complete  Seward  platform  with  new 
representative  men  upon  it." 

It  is  certainly  very  doubtful  whether,  if  Seward 
himself  had  personally  urged  his  claims  for  the 
nomination  at  this  time,  and  his  friends  had  done 
all  in  their  power  to  procure  it  for  him,  he  could 
have  carried  the  convention.  He  was  not  then  so 
strong  in  the  country  as  he  was  four  years  later ; 
in  the  Republican  party,  especially  in  Pennsylvania 
and  Indiana,  there  were  many  seceders  from  the 
Know-Nothings  to  whom  he  was  particularly  objec- 
tionable ;  the  opposition  of  the  delegates  from  these 
States  in  the  convention  four  years  later  had  a 
powerful,  if  not  a  conclusive,  effect  against  him  at 
that  time,  and  their  influence  would  have  been 


146  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

greater  in  1856  than  it  was  in  1860.  Moreover, 
his  anti-slavery  views  were  more  advanced  than 
those  of  a  large  number  of  Republicans,  who  were 
opposed  to  the  extension  of  slavery,  but  by  no 
means  believers  in  emancipation  in  the  District  of 
Columbia,  or  in  taking  any  steps  towards  ultimate 
emancipation  in  the  slave  States,  even  with  their 
consent  and  with  compensation.  He  was  really,  in 
1856,  the  candidate  of  the  original  anti-slavery 
men,  the  pioneers  of  the  army  of  freedom. 

Two  years  earlier  Seward  had  objected  to  a 
national  convention,  on  the  ground  "  that  it  would 
bring  together  only  the  old  veterans."  Now  the 
ranks  of  the  anti-Nebraska  party  were  filled  with 
new  recruits,  young  men ;  they  were  the  bone  and 
sinew  of  the  party  in  the  country,  and  the  delegates 
at  Philadelphia  represented  them.  Fremont  was 
their  choice.  All  that  was  known  of  him,  his 
pluck,  energy,  persistent  endurance,  and  skill  as 
an  explorer,  justified  their  attributing  to  him  the 
qualities  which  the  times  and  the  triumph  of  the 
Republicans  would  require.  His  career  appealed 
to  them ;  his  adventures  roused  their  interest  and 
excited  their  admiration ;  there  was  a  romance 
about  his  marriage  which  touched  their  sympathies, 
and  there  had  been  an  element  of  martyrdom  in 
his  treatment  by  the  government  which  enlisted  in 
his  behalf  the  lovers  of  justice.  He  was  personally 
handsome  and  attractive  ;  a  Southerner  by  birth, 
and  a  son-in-law  of  Benton,  who,  as  an  opponent  — 
though  on  grounds  peculiar  to  himself  —  of  the 


FORMATION   OF  REPUBLICAN  PARTY     147 

repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  had  more  or 
less  close  relations  with  the  Republican  leaders. 
Everything  told  in  his  favor.  To  those  delegates 
who  were. looking  only  to  the  promotion  of  the 
principles  of  their  party,  as  well  as  to  those  who 
were  eager  for  success,  and  to  the  mass  of  the 
people,  Fremont  appeared  an  ideal  candidate.  He 
was  invested  by  them  with  the  qualities  of  a  hero ; 
and  of  all  the  names  presented  to  the  convention, 
or  suggested  elsewhere,  his  was  doubtless  the  most 
potent  to  conjure  with. 

The  nomination  of  Buchanan  was  the  strongest 
that  the  Democrats  could  have  made,  and  was  dis- 
couraging to  the  Republicans.  "  The  temper  of 
the  politicians  "  (i.  e.,  the  Republican),  wrote  Sew- 
ard,  "  is  subdued  by  Buchanan's  nomination,  and 
indicates  retreat,  confusion,  rout  in  the  election." 
Early  in  August  he  found  that  "  there  was  no 
Republican  organization  or  life  in  eastern  Pennsyl- 
vania or  New  Jersey,"  and  that  "  the  well-informed 
despaired  of  both  these  States,  and  so  of  the  election 
itself."  There  was  a  pressure  on  him  to  take  the 
field ;  nevertheless  he  did  not  make  any  campaign 
speech  till  October.  Congress  was  late  in  adjourn- 
ing. The  two  houses  disagreed  as  to  the  army 
appropriations,  —  the  Representatives  passed  the 
bill  with  a  proviso,  prohibiting  the  employment  of 
troops  to  enforce  the  laws  of  the  fraudulent  legisla- 
ture of  Kansas ;  the  Senate  refused  to  concur  ;  and 
so  the  session  ended.  The  President  immediately 
called  an  extra  session,  and,  after  laboring  ten 


148  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

days  with  the  recalcitrant  Democrats,  succeeded  in 
forcing  through  the  House,  by  the  narrow  major- 
ity of  three,  the  bill  without  the  proviso.  Seward 
took  a  month's  needed  rest,  then  spoke  at  Detroit, 
and  devoted  the  time  till  the  election  to  the 
work  of  the  campaign  at  various  and  widely  sepa- 
rated places  in  his  own  State.  Of  these  speeches 
only  two  have  been  preserved  in  any  permanent 
form. 

In  that  at  Detroit  he  drew  a  vivid  picture,  hardly 
exaggerated,  of  the  slaveholders'  entire  possession 
of  the  government  in  all  its  branches,  —  the  ex- 
ecutive, from  the  President  and  the  heads  of  the 
various  departments  to  the  humblest  tide-waiter  in 
the  Customs,  the  most  unimportant  consul  in  our 
foreign  service,  and  the  merest  scrivener  in  the 
army  of  clerks ;  the  legislative,  through  their  con- 
trol of  the  Senate,  with  the  aid  of  their  Northern 
Democratic  allies ;  and  the  judicial,  by  having  a 
majority  of  the  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court 
from  the  slaveholding  States.  He  also  showed 
how  fidelity  to  the  slaveholders'  policy  was  the  test 
required  of  all  Northern  Democrats  who  wished  to 
share  even  the  crumbs  that  fell  from  the  govern- 
ment's table. 

His  speech  at  Auburn  repeated  his  opinion  that 
the  conflict  was  not  merely  for  "toleration,  but 
for  absolute  political  sway  in  the  Republic,  between 
the  system  of  free  labor  with  equal  and  univer- 
sal suffrage,  free  speech,  free  thought,  and  free 
action,  and  the  system  of  slave  labor  with  unequal 


FORMATION  OF  REPUBLICAN  PARTY     149 

franchises,  secured  by  arbitrary,  oppressive,  and 
tyrannical  laws ; "  and  emphasized  again  his  con- 
viction that  "  the  State,  the  nation,  and  the  earth 
were  to  be,  in  the  fullness  of  time,  the  abode  of 
freemen,  and  its  hills  and  valleys  to  be  fields  of 
free  labor,  free  thought,  and  free  suffrage." 

New  York  responded  handsomely  to  Seward's 
arguments  and  appeals ;  though  Fremont  carried 
the  State  only  by  a  plurality,  he  had  eighty  thou- 
sand votes  more  than  Buchanan,  and  his  majority 
over  Fillmore  was  greater  than  Fillmore's  entire 
vote.  Of  the  sixteen  free  States,  eleven  voted  for 
Fremont.  He  received  only  twelve  hundred  votes 
in  the  slave  States,  and  these  came  from  Delaware, 
Maryland,  Virginia,  and  Kentucky.  Buchanan 
was  elected  by  the  solid  South,  with  the  aid  of 
five  free  States  (New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Indi- 
ana, Illinois,  and  California).  In  the  free  States 
Buchanan  had  a  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  less 
votes  than  Fremont,  and  by  the  popular  vote  of 
the  country  was  in  a  minority  of  nearly  three 
hundred  thousand.  There  were  votes  for  Fillmore 
in  all  the  States  where  the  people  chose  the  elect- 
ors ; 1  but  they  were  so  distributed  that,  though  he 
was  the  choice  of  nearly  nine  hundred  thousand 
voters,  he  received  only  the  eight  electoral  votes 
of  the  State  of  Maryland. 

The  elections  of  the  year  had  an  ominous  aspect. 
In  the  House  of  Kepresentatives  the  speaker  was 
chosen  for  the  first  time  by  a  purely  sectional 

1  In  South  Carolina  they  were  chosen  by  the  Legislature. 


150  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

majority,  no  Southern  man  voting  for  the  success- 
ful candidate,  and  no  Northerner  for  his  opponent. 
The  issue  in  the  presidential  campaign  had  been 
solely  sectional,  —  the  surrender  of  the  Territories 
to  slavery  or  its  exclusion  from  them.  Buchanan, 
though  a  Pennsylvanian,  was  the  nominee  of  the 
South,  and  the  representative  of  the  slaveholders' 
policy.  The  new  party  had  carried  nearly  three 
fourths  of  the  free  States,  had  given  to  Douglas, 
as  a  colleague,  an  anti-Nebraska  senator,  and  sub- 
stituted for  General  Cass  a  radical  Kepublican 
from  Michigan.  If  the  South  had  won  the  victory, 
it  was  one  that  boded  ill  for  their  future  control  of 
the  country. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   STRUGGLE   FOR   KANSAS 

AFTER  the  passage  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill, 
the  political  struggle  during  the  remainder  of 
Pierce's  term  and  for  a  large  part  of  Buchanan's 
was  as  to  slavery  or  freedom  in  Kansas.  On  the 
one  side  were  arrayed  the  administration  with  its 
patronage  and  appointments,  the  solid  South,  with 
its  members  of  Congress,  its  Democratic  supporters 
in  the  North  and  the  border  ruffians  from  Missouri ; 
on  the  other  were  the  free-state  settlers  in  Kansas, 
who  were  largely  in  the  majority  there,  and  the 
Republican  party  in  Congress  and  in  the  country. 
The  battle  was  fought  in  the  Territory  between  the 
settlers  and  immigrants  from  the  North,  and  the 
invaders  from  Missouri  and  the  South  ;  in  Wash- 
ington, by  the  President  and  his  advisers  at  the 
White  House,  by  senators  and  representatives  at 
the  Capitol.  But  as  the  members  of  the  lower 
house  are  more  numerous  and  more  frequently 
elected,  the  change  in  the  public  opinion  of  the 
North  caused  by  the  passage  of  the  bill  was  more 
quickly  shown  there,  the  opposition  to  the  admin- 
istration was  stronger  in  the  House,  and  the  part 
played  by  the  representatives  during  the  struggle 


152  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

was  in  some  respects  more  prominent  and  impor- 
tant than  that  of  the  Senate,  with  which  Seward 
was  directly  concerned.  The  story  of  the  struggle 
cannot,  however,  be  omitted  here,  nor  can  any  one 
part  of  it  be  told  without  the  other. 

The  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  had 
thoroughly  roused  all  the  Northern  people  except 
the  Hunker  Democrats.  Angry  at  the  South's 
breach  of  faith  in  accepting  the  benefits  of  a  bar- 
gain and  then  repudiating  its  obligations,  the 
North  determined  to  save  for  freedom,  if  possible, 
the  territory  secured  by  the  Compromise.  The 
South  recognized  the  struggle  as  a  vital  one.  "  If 
Kansas  is  abolitionized,"  wrote  Atchison,  "  Mis- 
souri ceases  to  be  a  slave  State,  New  Mexico  be- 
comes a  free  State,  California  remains  a  free  State. 
But  if  we  secure  Kansas  as  a  slave  State,  Missouri 
is  secure,  New  Mexico,  and  southern  California,  if 
not  all  of  it,  becomes  a  slave  State  ;  in  a  word,  the 
prosperity  or  ruin  of  the  whole  South  depends  on 
the  Kansas  struggle." 

One  or  more  emigrant  aid  societies  had  been 
organized  at  the  North  before  the  passage  of  the 
bill,  and  others  followed  afterwards.  Among  the 
earliest  was  the  New  England  Emigrant  Aid 
Society,  a  Massachusetts  company,  which  assisted 
five  hundred  free-state  men  to  emigrate  and  settle 
in  Kansas  within  a  year,  and  about  three  thousand 
during  the  entire  struggle.  The  administration 
was  prompt  in  opening  the  Territory  to  settlement, 
and  had  purchased,  while  the  bill  was  still  pend- 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS  153 

ing,  several  reservations  lying  nearest  Missouri, 
from  the  Indian  tribes  to  whom  they  had  been 
secured  by  treaty.  These  purchases  were  known 
to  the  people  of  Missouri  before  the  rest  of  the 
country  had  learned  of  them  ;  and,  within  a  few 
days  after  the  bill  became  a  law,  hundreds  of  Mis- 
sourians  entered  the  Territory  in  small  bodies  at 
various  points,  staked  out,  each  man  for  himself, 
his  quarter  section  or  more,  and  marked  it.  The 
different  companies  then  held  meetings,  at  which 
they  resolved  that  slavery  already  existed  in  the 
Territory,  and  urged  slaveholders  to  bring  in  their 
property  at  once  ;  while  they  also  voted  to  afford 
no  protection  to  abolitionist  settlers.  To  offset  the 
emigrant  aid  societies  of  the  North,  associations 
called  "  Blue  Lodges,"  "  Sons  of  the  South,"  and 
other  similar  names,  were  organized  in  western 
Missouri,  to  take  possession  of  Kansas  in  behalf  of 
slavery,  and  to  assist  in  removing  any  emigrant 
who  might  go  there  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Northern  societies. 

The  first  territorial  governor  appointed  by  Pre- 
sident Pierce  was  Andrew  H.  Reeder  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, whose  loyalty  as  an  administration  Democrat 
was  unquestioned.  An  election  for  a  delegate  to 
Congress  was  had  by  his  orders  at  the  end  of 
November,  1854,  and  of  the  twenty-eight  hundred 
ballots  then  cast,  more  than  seventeen  hundred 
were  the  illegal  votes  of  invading  Missourians.  In 
one  polling  precinct  six  hundred  and  four  votes 
were  thrown,  of  which  only  twenty  were  legal. 


154  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

There  was  no  concealment  about  the  matter ;  what 
was  done  was  done  openly,  and  was  encouraged 
and  approved.  "  When  you  reside  within  one 
day's  journey  of  the  Territory,"  said  Senator  Atchi- 
son  in  a  public  speech  before  this  election,  "  and 
when  your  peace,  your  quiet,  and  your  property 
depend  upon  your  action,  you  can,  without  any 
exertion,  send  five  hundred  of  your  young  men  who 
will  vote  in  favor  of  your  institutions.  Should 
each  county  in  Missouri  only  do  its  duty,  the  ques- 
tion will  be  decided  quietly  and  peaceably  at  the 
baUot  box." 

After  ascertaining  by  a  census  the  number  of 
legal  voters  in  the  Territory,  Governor  Reeder 
appointed  a  day  for  the  election  of  a  territorial 
legislature.  The  evening  before,  about  a  thou- 
sand Missourians,  armed  with  rifles,  pistols,  and 
bowie-knives,  and  supported  by  two  pieces  of 
artillery,  arrived  at  Lawrence,  a  free-state  town. 
They  distributed  their  men  among  the  different 
election  precincts,  overawed  the  judges  of  election, 
and,  reinforced  by  other  men  of  Missouri,  chose 
their  candidates  in  all  but  two  of  the  districts. 
The  census  had  shown  twenty-nine  hundred  voters  ; 
but  more  than  six  thousand  ballots  were  cast,  only 
eight  hundred  of  which  were  legal.  In  some  of 
the  districts,  where  protests  were  seasonably  made, 
the  governor  declined  to  issue  certificates  of  elec- 
tion, and  ordered  a  new  poll ;  but  the  legislature 
refused  to  admit  the  free-state  men  chosen  on  this 
second  ballot,  and  gave  the  seats  to  the  persons  to 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS  155 

whom  the  governor  had  refused  certificates.  The 
legislature  thus  chosen  adopted  by  a  single  act  all 
the  Missouri  statutes  (to  save  time),  and  then  pro- 
ceeded to  pass,  notwithstanding  the  governor's 
veto,  a  criminal  code,  by  which  nearly  all  offenses 
connected  with  slavery,  including  that  of  aiding 
a  fugitive  to  escape,  were  made  punishable  with 
death. 

Reeder's  course  as  to  the  election  and  his  vetoes 
made  it  clear  that  he  was  not  a  sufficiently  pliant 
tool ;  the  President,  yielding  to  the  pressure  from 
the  South,  removed  him,  and  appointed  in  his 
place  Wilson  Shannon  of  Ohio,  who  signalized 
his  arrival  in  the  Territory  by  declaring  in  a  pub- 
lic speech  that  he  was  "for  slavery  in  Kansas." 
Isolated  acts  of  violence  had  taken  place  from 
time  to  time,  before  and  during  Reeder's  adminis- 
tration ;  a  free-state  settler  had  been  occasionally 
murdered ;  the  pro-slavery  newspapers  had  given 
warning  that  they  "  would  continue  to  lynch  and 
hang,  tar,  feather,  and  drown  every  white-livered 
abolitionist  who  dared  pollute  the  soil;"  and  Law- 
rence had  been  threatened  by  a  party  of  more 
than  two  hundred  Missourians.  Under  Shannon's 
misgovernment  such  outrages  became  the  rule ; 
Lawrence  was  plundered  ;  its  printing-offices  and 
hotels  were  burned  by  a  troop  of  about  eight  hun- 
dred men,  partly  from  the  South  and  partly  from 
Missouri,  armed  with  weapons  from  the  United 
States  arsenal,  and  commanded  by  General  Atchi- 
son,  United  States  senator  from  Missouri ;  whilst 


156  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

later  the  town  of  Osawatomie  was  sacked  and 
burned  by  a  similar  force  headed  by  Whitfield, 
the  territorial  delegate  to  Congress. 

Meantime,  the  free-state  settlers,  seeking  relief 
by  a  thoroughly  American  process,  had  called  a 
convention,  which  framed  a  constitution  prohibit- 
ing slavery.  This  was  ratified  by  the  actual  set- 
tlers, a  governor  and  legislature  were  chosen,  and 
a  memorial  was  forwarded  to  Congress  praying  for 
the  admission  of  Kansas  as  a  free  State  under  this 
constitution.  The  President's  annual  message, 
sent  in  on  the  last  day  of  the  year  (1855)  dis- 
missed the  subject  of  Kansas  with  a  word  ;  but 
less  than  a  month  later,  when  he  had  determined 
to  give  a  thorough-going  support  to  the  Southern- 
ers, although  nothing  new  had  happened  in  the 
interval,  he  sent  a  special  message  in  which  he 
characterized  the  proceedings  of  the  free -state 
settlers  as  revolutionary  and  treasonable,1  and 
announced  his  purpose  of  upholding  the  fraudu- 
lent legislature  and  enforcing  its  laws  by  federal 
authority;  and,  in  accordance  with  the  policy 
thus  declared,  the  legislature  at  Topeka  was  dis- 
persed by  United  States  regulars  in  the  following 
July. 

1  It  was  nothing  revolutionary  or  even  unprecedented  for  the 
people  of  a  Territory,  without  any  previous  authority  from  Con- 
gress, to  form  a  state  constitution  and  ask  for  admission  to  the 
Union.  Michigan  did  this  and  was  admitted ;  California  had  done 
it  and  been  admitted  ;  and  the  reasons  for  the  action  of  the  peo- 
ple of  Kansas,  though  of  a  different  nature,  were  quite  as  strong 
as  those  which  existed  in  either  California  or  Michigan. 


THE  STRUGGLE   FOR  KANSAS  157 

A  guerrilla  war  was  carried  on  during  the  sum- 
mer of  the  year  1856  between  bands  of  free-state 
and  pro-slavery  men.  In  August  the  administra- 
tion, unable  longer  to  endure  the  scandals  of  Shan- 
non's misgovernment,  aud  fearing  lest  these  should 
lose  them  the  presidential  election,  removed  him, 
and  appointed  John  W.  Geary  of  Pennsylvania  in 
his  place.  Geary  endeavored  to  restore  order  and 
to  do  exact  justice,  leaning  neither  to  one  side  nor 
the  other ;  but,  finding  that  this  impartiality  was 
not  what  the  administration  required,  he  resigned 
in  the  following  March. 

Whatever  may  have  been  President  Pierce's 
ideas  when  he  assented  to  Douglas's  bill  and  ac- 
cepted the  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty,  in  his 
actual  treatment  of  Kansas  he  had  been  not  the 
honest  exponent  of  that  policy,  but  the  active  and 
unhesitating  agent  of  those  Southerners  who  were 
determined,  by  fair  means  or  foul,  to  make  that 
Territory  a  slave  State.  He  finds  his  severest  con- 
demnation in  the  course  of  the  governors  appointed 
by  him.  The  two  who  were  men  of  character,  and 
who  were  not  willing  to  use  their  power  to  defeat 
the  wishes  of  the  actual  settlers  and  to  drive  the 
free  state  men  from  the  Territory,  were  forced  out 
of  office,  and  became  most  active  opponents  of  his 
policy,  unsparing  in  their  exposure  and  denuncia- 
tion of  the  frauds  and  violence  which  he  was  seek- 
ing to  hide  ;  while  the  third,  who  had  been  at  first 
the  ready  tool  of  the  border  ruffians  of  Missouri, 
and  acceptable  to  the  whole  South,  was  at  last 


158  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

unable  to  satisfy  their  demands,  was  distrusted  by 
them,  despised  by  the  other  party,  and  removed  in 
disgrace  by  the  administration  that  had  appointed 
him. 

In  the  Congress  which  met  in  December,  1855, 
the  House  had  a  majority  hostile  to  the  adminis- 
tration, but  composed  of  heterogeneous  elements. 
There  were  Democrats  and  pro-slavery  Whigs, 
both  pro-slavery  and  anti-slavery  Americans,  and 
Republicans.  No  one  party  had  the  control,  and  it 
was  not  until  the  3d  of  February,  1856,  that  its 
organization  was  perfected  by  the  choice  of  a 
speaker.  Meantime,  both  houses  had  taken  action 
on  the  Kansas  question,  the  Senate  by  resolutions 
of  inquiry,  calling  on  the  President  for  information 
as  to  the  troubles  there ;  and  the  House  by  the 
passage  of  a  resolve  demanding  the  restoration  of 
the  Missouri  Compromise.  In  the  Senate,  the 
President's  special  message  concerning  Kansas, 
and  his  answer  to  the  resolutions  of  inquiry,  were 
referred  to  the  Committee  on  Territories,  of  which 
Douglas  was  chairman.  The  committee  presented 
two  reports ;  that  of  the  majority,  prepared  by 
Douglas,  was  very  severe  upon  the  settlers  from 
the  free  States  and  upon  the  Emigrant  Aid  Society, 
who  were  made  responsible  for  all  that  was  wrong 
in  Kansas;  while  the  fraudulent  legislature,  he 
insisted,  was  a  proper  law-making  body,  whose 
acts  were  legal  statutes  binding  upon  the  people. 
The  minority  report  was  signed  only  by  Senator 
Collamer  of  Vermont,  who  justified  the  Topeka 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS  159 

convention  and  the  proceedings  under  it  as  a  peace- 
ful and  constitutional  effort  for  the  redress  of  griev- 
ances. The  Emigrant  Aid  Society  was  vindicated 
from  Douglas's  attack,  as  soon  as  the  reading  of 
the  reports  was  finished,  by  Sunnier 's  spirited  pro- 
test that  it  had  not  offended,  either  in  letter  or 
spirit,  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  land.  It 
had  sent  men  to  Kansas,  "•  and  it  had  a  right  to  do 
so.  Its  agents  loved  freedom  and  hated  slavery, 
and  they  had  a  right  to  do  so."  "This,  and  no 
more,  was  its  offense." 

In  the  House  Governor  Keeder,  who  had  been 
elected  by  the  legal  voters  of  Kansas  as  territorial 
delegate,  presented  a  petition  claiming  the  seat 
held  by  Whitfield,  the  delegate  fraudulently  chosen 
by  the  Missourians ;  and  this  petition,  after  some 
debate,  was  referred  to  a  committee  empowered  to 
investigate  generally  the  Kansas  troubles.  The 
exhaustive  report  of  this  committee,  with  the  ac- 
companying evidence,  is  a  storehouse  of  informa- 
tion as  to  the  history  of  the  times.  On  the  same 
day  that  this  committee  was  appointed  in  the 
House,  Douglas  addressed  the  Senate  in  support 
of  his  report  and  of  the  bill  in  which  its  conclusions 
were  embodied,  which  authorized  the  people  of 
Kansas  to  form  a  state  constitution,  when  they 
should  have  sufficient  population  to  entitle  them  to 
one  representative  in  Congress.  For  this  bill 
Seward  proposed,  as  a  substitute,  the  immediate 
admission  of  Kansas  under  the  Topeka  constitu- 
tion. Of  his  speech  in  support  of  this  substitute, 


160  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

one  hundred  and  sixty-two  thousand  copies  were 
sent  out  on  the  day  it  was  published. 

Such  defense  as  could  be  made  for  the  invaders 
of  Kansas,  for  the  rule  they  had  established  there, 
and  for  the  government's  support  of  it,  had  already 
been  set  forth  in  the  President's  message  and  in 
Douglas's  report;  and  a  large  part  of  Seward's 
speech  was  devoted  to  a  scathing  criticism  of  the 
President's  message,  and  an  unsparing  exposure  of 
his  misrepresentations  and  concealment  of  facts, 
of  his  unjust  aspersions  on  the  North,  and  of  the 
flimsy  pretexts  and  hardly  specious  arguments  by 
which  he  attempted  to  justify  his  course.  It  might 
almost  be  called,  in  this  aspect,  an  arraignment, 
trial,  and  conviction  of  the  President,  upon  the 
charge  of  prostituting  his  official  power  to  sustain 
in  Kansas  a  government  which  he  knew,  from  his 
own  representatives,  had  been  forced  upon  the 
Territory  by  the  frauds  and  violence  of  the  people 
of  Missouri.  Seward  proved  to  a  demonstration, 
by  the  declarations  of  the  leaders  of  the  border 
ruffians,  by  the  statements  of  independent  observ- 
ers, as  well  as  by  those  of  the  free  settlers  of 
Kansas,  and  by  the  public  avowals  of  the  terri- 
torial governor,  whom  the  President  himself  had 
appointed,  that  "  Kansas  had  been  invaded,  con- 
quered, subjugated  by  an  armed  force  from  beyond 
her  borders,  trampling  under  foot  the  principles  of 
the  Kansas  bill  and  the  rights  of  suffrage ; "  and 
that  the  President  of  the  United  States  was  aiding 
and  abetting  this  wrong,  upholding  with  all  the 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS  161 

resources  of  the  administration  and  all  the  powers 
of  the  federal  authority  the  perpetrators  of  this 
outrage  upon  republican  government,  and  main- 
taining by  force  of  arms  the  tyranny  they  had 
established.  Seward  then  turned  to  the  question 
of  how  these  wrongs  were  to  be  redressed.  His 
contention  was  unanswerable,  that  the  only  sure 
remedy  was  the  immediate  admission  of  Kansas 
as  a  State,  under  the  constitution  presented  by  the 
actual  settlers.  The  objections  urged  to  this  course 
were  practically  only  formal,  and  might  be  waived 
by  Congress  in  this  case,  as  they  had  been  in 
others.  Touching  the  very  heart  of  the  contro- 
versy, he  said  :  "  Congress  can  refuse  admission  to 
Kansas  only  on  the  ground  that  it  will  not  relin- 
quish the  hope  of  carrying  African  slavery  into 
that  Territory;"  .  .  .  and  asked:  "Have  we  come 
to  that  stage  of  demoralization  and  degeneracy  so 
soon  ?  " 

The  speech  was  the  masterly  argument  of  a 
statesman.  If  he  sometimes  showed  a  fondness 
for  philosophical  generalization  and  theorizing, 
there  was  nothing  of  that  here  ;  it  was  an  emi- 
nently practical  speech.  Any  remedy,  other  than 
that  which  he  urged,  was  at  the  best  doubtful. 
Any  plan  authorizing  the  calling  of  a  new  conven- 
tion, and  the  formation  of  a  new  constitution, 
because  of  defects  or  uncertainties  about  the  one 
adopted  at  Topeka,  must  be  carried  out  by  the 
authorities  actually  in  power  in  Kansas,  the  crea- 
tures and  tools  of  the  border  ruffians  who  elected 


162  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

them,  and  under  the  supervision  of  an  admin- 
istration whose  partisan  character  and  absolute 
disregard  of  justice  and  of  the  pledges  of  the  or- 
ganic law  of  the  Territory  had  already  been 
abundantly  manifested.  But  the  truth  was,  as 
Seward  suggested,  that  neither  the  administration 
nor  the  South  was  prepared  to  relinquish  one  inch 
of  the  advantage  which  slavery  had  already  gained 
in  the  Territory,  whether  acquired  by  force  or 
fraud ;  both  were  still  confidently  expecting  to 
make  it  a  slave  State  ;  and  the  majority  of  the 
Senate  were  supporters  of  the  South  and  of  the 
administration. 

The  debate  on  Kansas  continued  till  the  close 
of  the  session  in  August ;  it  resulted  in  no  legisla- 
tion ;  but  the  speeches  of  the  opposition,  circulated 
by  hundreds  of  thousands  all  over  the  North,  had 
an  immense  effect  in  forming  and  stimulating 
public  opinion,  and  produced  a  reaction  even  in 
Congress.  This  was  increased  by  the  assault  upon 
Sumner  in  the  senate  chamber  itself,  by  the  burn- 
ing of  Lawrence,  and  by  the  publication  of  the 
report  of  the  committee  of  the  House,  charged  to 
investigate  the  Kansas  troubles. 

For  two  whole  days  Sumner  addressed  the  Sen- 
ate in  denunciation  of  the  crime  against  Kansas. 
His  speech  was  not  merely  an  unsparing  philippic 
against  slavery,  but  most  bitter  in  its  personalities. 
He  spoke  of  Atchison,  stalking  like  Catiline  into 
the  Senate,  reeking  with  conspiracy,  and  then  like 
Catiline  skulking  away  to  join  and  provoke  the 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS  163 

conspirators,  "  murderous  robbers  from  Missouri, 
hirelings,  picked  from  the  drunken  spew  and  vomit 
of  an  uneasy  civilization ;  "  of  Butler  of  South 
Carolina,  "  with  incoherent  phrases,  discharging 
the  loose  expectoration  of  his  speech ;  "  and  of 
Douglas,  as  "  switching  out  from  his  tongue  the 
perpetual  stench  of  offensive  personality."  It  was 
a  speech  in  this  aspect  to  make  the  judicious  grieve, 
and  feel  a  keen  regret  that  Sumner  should  have 
descended  to  such  a  level.  It  would  hardly  have 
gained  converts  to  the  Republican  party  save  for 
the  assault  by  which  it  was  followed. 

Two  days  later,  while  he  was  writing  at  his  desk 
in  the  senate  chamber,  just  after  the  adjournment, 
he  was  attacked  in  a  most  brutal  and  cowardly 
manner  by  Preston  S.  Brooks,  a  member  of  the 
House  from  South  Carolina,  who  inflicted  on  him 
injuries  from  which  he  never  wholly  recovered. 
The  Senate,  when  Seward  moved  for  a  committee 
to  investigate  this  assault,  so  far  forgot  the  com- 
mon parliamentary  courtesies,  the  requirements  of 
decency,  and  the  gravity  of  the  occasion,  as  to 
choose  a  committee  composed  wholly  of  Sumner's 
personal  and  political  enemies,  who  performed  the 
service  expected  of  them,  and  reported  that  there 
was  nothing  for  the  Senate  to  do.  The  subservi- 
ent judiciary  of  Washington  disgraced  itself  by 
inflicting  on  Brooks  a  paltry  fine,  and  even  in  the 
House  of  Representatives  there  were  not  to  be 
found  the  necessary  two  thirds  to  secure  his  expul- 
sion. Any  difference  of  opinion  there  may  have 


164  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

been  at  the  North  as  to  the  wisdom  or  good  taste 
of  Stunner's  speech  disappeared  at  once,  forgotten 
in  the  universal  outburst  of  sympathy  for  him 
and  indignation  at  the  assault ;  the  recollection  of 
which,  even  to-day,  heightens  Sumner's  fame,  by 
investing  him  with  somewhat  of  the  glory  of  mar- 
tyrdom. 

"  The  blows  that  fell  on  the  head  of  the  senator 
from  Massachusetts,"  said  Seward,  "  have  done 
more  for  the  cause  of  human  freedom  in  Kansas 
and  in  the  Territories  of  the  United  States,  than 
all  the  eloquence  which  has  resounded  in  these 
halls,  from  the  days  when  Rufus  King  asserted 
that  cause  in  this  chamber  until  the  present  hour." 
It  was  not  regarded  merely  as  an  attack  upon  an 
individual,  it  was  an  assault  on  the  freedom  of 
debate,  a  violation  of  the  privileges  and  dignity 
of  the  Senate,  an  insult  to  the  State  that  Sumner 
represented,  and  through  that  to  all  the  other 
States  of  the  Union. 

The  same  day  that  Sumner  was  speaking  in  the 
Senate,  the  free  settlers'  town  of  Lawrence  in  Kan- 
sas was  attacked  and  burned.  A  little  later  came 
the  report  of  the  House  committee,  accompanied 
by  evidence  which  proved,  beyond  question,  that 
the  territorial  elections  were  carried  by  fraud,  the 
Legislature  unlawfully  constituted,  and  its  acts 
without  a  color  of  legality.  Under  these  circum- 
stances it  was  felt  by  some  Southern  senators  that 
there  must  be  further  concessions  to  the  public 
opinion  of  the  North,  some  fresh  attempt  at  a  set- 


THE   STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS  165 

tlement  of  the  Kansas  question.  Various  amend- 
ments to  Douglas's  original  bill  were  proposed, 
and  other  measures  introduced ;  these  were  all 
referred  to  the  Committee  on  Territories,  who  re- 
ported a  bill  which  was,  in  substance,  one  that  had 
been  offered  a  few  days  before  by  Senator  Toombs 
of  Georgia.  Upon  its  face  it  was  a  fair  proposi- 
tion. There  was  to  be  a  new  census  in  Kansas, 
only  actual  male  inhabitants  of  full  age  were  to 
be  registered  as  voters,  and  they  were  to  elect 
delegates  to  a  constitutional  convention.  Com- 
missioners were  to  supervise  the  census  and  the 
registration  ;  and  frauds  and  irregularities  at  the 
election  were  to  be  prevented.  Had  the  measure 
been  proposed  in  January  instead  of  July,  its  de- 
tails might  have  been  modified,  where  they  were 
open  to  criticism,  and  the  bill  have  become  a  law ; 
but  it  was  brought  in  too  late.  The  presidential 
election  was  approaching,  and  Seward  thought, 
and  doubtless  others  with  him,  that  the  change 
from  denunciation  to  compromise  proceeded  only 
from  the  alarm  of  the  Democrats. 

The  Republicans  objected  to  the  bill  as  a  snare 
and  a  delusion.  It  did  not  directly  annul  the  en- 
actments of  the  usurping  legislature.  On  the 
contrary  it  recognized  that  body  as  a  regularly 
chosen  law-making  assemblage,  and  left  it  uncer- 
tain whether  any  of  its  so-called  laws  were  abro- 
gated, remitting  the  determination  of  this  question 
to  the  territorial  judges,  whose  partisan  character 
had  been  already  abundantly  demonstrated.  The 


166  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

proposed  bill  continued  the  existing  regime  in 
Kansas,  until  a  new  census  should  be  had,  dele- 
gates elected,  a  convention  held,  a  constitution 
formed,  and  Kansas  admitted  as  a  State,  thus 
perpetuating  the  tyranny  established  by  fraud 
and  violence,  and  only  maintained  in  power  by 
the  arms  of  the  United  States.  It  provided  that  a 
census  should  be  taken  and  an  election  held  under 
the  direction  of  commissioners,  to  be  appointed  by 
a  president  who  had  already  shown  by  the  appoint- 
ments he  had  made,  by  the  officers  he  had  retained, 
and  by  those  he  had  removed,  how  unevenly  he 
held  the  scales  of  justice  in  the  Territory,  how  little 
freedom  of  action  he  was  allowed  by  his  masters, 
and  how  he  lacked  courage  to  assert  himself  against 
the  hot-headed  Southerners  who  prescribed  his 
policy  and  his  conduct.  All  this  and  more,  which 
made  it  "  a  sham,  evasive  Kansas  bill,"  Seward 
showed  in  his  speech  on  an  amendment,  offered 
by  Wilson,  proposing  the  immediate  repeal  of  all 
the  spurious  laws  of  the  so-called  Legislature, — 
an  amendment  which  the  Southern  and  Democratic 
majority  of  the  Senate  at  once  rejected. 

The  proofs  of  the  wrongs  done  in  Kansas  were 
quite  different  now  from  what  they  had  been  when 
Seward  spoke  in  March.  There  was  no  more  need 
of  argument  or  inference,  and  no  room  for  denial 
or  doubt.  The  evidence  taken  by  the  House  com- 
mittee established  conclusively  not  only  the  public 
wrong  committed  by  the  invaders  from  Missouri 
and  ratified  and  sustained  by  the  President  of  the 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS  167 

United  States  and  his  territorial  officers,  but  also 
the  private  violence  and  crime  by  which  settlers 
from  the  free  States  had  been  robbed  of  their  pro- 
perty, their  houses  burned,  their  cattle  destroyed, 
and  they  themselves  either  murdered  or  compelled 
to  flee  for  their  lives ;  and  it  was  not  to  be  ex- 
pected that  the  Kepublicans  would  accept  as  satis- 
factory a  bill  which  converted  the  illegal  oppressors 
of  the  Territory  into  its  rightful  governors,  and 
substituted  for  the  election  guaranteed  by  its  or- 
ganic law  a  ballot  to  be  taken  after  the  settlers 
from  the  free  States  had  been  driven  from  Kansas, 
and  under  conditions  which  would  permit  the  peo- 
ple from  Missouri  to  come  into  the  Territory,  ac- 
cording to  their  avowed  plan,  "  in  time  to  acquire 
the  right  to  become  legal  voters  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  new 
State." 

The  bill  passed  the  Senate,  but  not  the  House. 
The  House  bill,  admitting  Kansas  as  a  State,  un- 
der the  Topeka  constitution,  was  rejected  in  the 
Senate,  and  Congress  adjourned  without  giving 
any  relief  to  the  people. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE   DEED   SCOTT  CASE  —  THE    FINAL    STRUGGLE 

FOR  KANSAS 

THE  closing  session  of  the  Congress  which  ex- 
pired with  Pierce's  administration  was,  like  most 
of  the  short  sessions  ending  with  a  presidential 
term,  absolutely  colorless  and  unimportant;  and 
Buchanan  was  inaugurated  with  the  hopes  of  many 
Northern  Whigs  and  Democrats,  who  had  voted 
for  him  with  hesitation,  that  he  would  have  a  just 
and  tranquil  administration,  a  reign  of  law  and 
order  in  Kansas,  and  no  further  slavery  agitation. 
But  two  days  had  not  elapsed  before  the  country 
was  shaken  to  its  centre  by  the  extraordinary  in- 
tervention of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  slavery 
discussion.  The  statement  in  Buchanan's  inaugu- 
ral, that  "the  point  of  time  when  the  people  of  a 
Territory  can  decide  the  question  of  slavery  for 
themselves"  would  be  "speedily  and  finally  settled 
by  that  court,"  had  not  at  all  prepared  the  public 
for  what  was  to  follow.  It  was  known  that  a  case 
was  pending  before  the  Supreme  Court,  in  which 
one  Dred  Scott,  a  person  of  African  descent,  and 
once  a  slave,  was  claiming  his  freedom,  on  the 
ground  of  a  residence  with  his  master  in  Minnesota, 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      169 

a  Territory  made  free  by  the  Missouri  Compro- 
mise, and  of  a  shorter  stay  in  Illinois,  where 
slavery  had  been  prohibited  by  the  ordinance  of 
1787.  To  maintain  his  action  it  was  necessary 
that  the  plaintiff  should  be  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States ;  if  he  were  not  so,  the  federal  courts  would 
have  no  jurisdiction  of  the  case.  The  first  objec- 
tion raised  by  the  master  was  to  Scott's  citizen- 
ship, upon  the  ground  that  this  was  a  white  man's 
government,  and  that  no  person  of  African  blood 
could  be  a  citizen.  This  objection  was  not  sus- 
tained by  the  court  in  which  the  suit  was  originally 
brought,  and  the  trial  went  on;  but  the  court 
finally  decided  that  Dred  Scott  was  not  entitled  to 
his  freedom.  The  case  was  then  taken  up  to  the 
Supreme  Court  and  had  been  twice  argued  there. 
A  few  days  after  the  inauguration  that  court  an- 
nounced its  decision.  The  majority  of  the  judges 
held  that  Dred  Scott  was  not  a  citizen,  because 
he  was  of  African  blood,  and  that  the  courts  of 
the  United  States  had,  therefore,  no  jurisdiction 
of  his  suit.  This  was  the  end  of  the  matter,  so 
far  as  Dred  Scott  was  concerned.  From  this  judg- 
ment there  was  no  appeal.  Two  judges,  however, 
dissented  from  the  judgment.  In  their  opinion 
Dred  Scott,  though  of  African  descent,  was  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  the  court  had 
jurisdiction  of  his  suit.  Having  reached  this  con- 
clusion, it  became  necessary  for  them  to  examine 
all  the  facts  of  the  case,  to  consider  the  constitu- 
tionality of  the  Missouri  Compromise  and  of  the 


170  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

ordinance  of  1787,  and  the  effect  of  the  plain- 
tiff's living  in  Minnesota  and  Illinois;  this  they 
did  in  a  most  exhaustive  manner,  and,  affirming 
the  constitutionality  of  both  these  enactments,  de- 
cided in  favor  of  the  plaintiff's  claim  to  his  free- 
dom. 

The  Southern  and  pro-slavery  members  of  the 
court  were  unwilling  to  let  the  statements  and  rea- 
soning of  these  dissenting  opinions  go  out  to  the 
country  without  some  reply  on  their  part,  and  in- 
duced the  chief  justice  to  violate  the  recognized 
and  established  judicial  proprieties,  by  adding  to 
his  opinion  a  statement  of  his  political  views  upon 
the  relations  between  the  Constitution  and  slavery, 
as  if  this  were  a  part  of  the  judgment  of  the  court. 
It  was  a  flagrant  abuse  of  a  judicial  position,  and 
drew  from  one  of  the  dissenting  justices,  in  no 
way  a  sympathizer  with  the  Republican  party  or 
the  anti-slavery  agitators,  this  emphatic  rebuke: 
"I  dissent  from  the  assumption  of  authority  by 
the  majority  of  the  court  to  examine  the  constitu- 
tionality of  the  act  called  the  Missouri  Compro- 
mise. Having  decided  that  this  is  a  case  to  which 
the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  does  not 
extend,  they  have  gone  on  to  examine  the  merits, 
and  so  have  reached  the  question  of  the  power  of 
Congress  to  pass  this  act.  On  so  grave  a  subject 
as  this,  I  feel  obliged  to  say  that,  in  my  opinion, 
such  an  extension  of  judicial  power  transcends  the 
limits  of  the  authority  of  the  court." 

The  political  declaration  of  the  chief  justice  was 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      171 

in  substance  a  repetition  of  Calhoun's  doctrine, 
that  the  Territories  were  the  common  domain  of 
the  several  States,  in  which  each  had  equal  rights ; 
that  therefore  the  people  of  every  State  could 
legally  carry  into  any  Territory,  and  lawfully  hold 
there,  any  property  recognized  as  lawful  in  any 
State;  and  that  all  legislation,  congressional  or 
territorial,  limiting  or  interfering  with  the  full 
and  perfect  enjoyment  of  this  right,  was  unconsti- 
tutional and  void.  If  this  statement  had  been 
necessary  to  the  judgment  of  the  court  in  the  case, 
it  would  have  been  a  hard  blow  to  the  Republican 
party,  whose  avowed  object  was  the  exclusion  of 
slavery  from  the  Territories;  but  it  was  so  obvi- 
ously a  pure  piece  of  politics  that,  stigmatized  as 
it  had  been  by  Mr.  Justice  Curtis,  it  only  im- 
pressed the  people  of  the  North  as  a  fresh  and 
most  convincing  proof  of  the  demoralizing  influ- 
ence of  the  slave  power,  roused  them  to  more 
strenuous  efforts  to  make  Kansas  free,  and  enven- 
omed still  more  the  bitterness  already  existing 
between  the  two  sections  of  the  country. 

Judge  Curtis  had  shown  the  Republicans  that 
the  chief  justice's  politics  were  no  part  of  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court;  that  they  were  only  the  politi- 
cal views  of  a  judge  upon  questions  not  at  the  time 
judicially  before  him,  and  of  no  binding  force 
whatever.  Lincoln  and  Seward  made  another  sug- 
gestion. The  judgment  settled  the  case  of  Dred 
Scott ;  but  it  might  be  reversed  in  some  other  suit, 
as  other  judgments  had  been,  and  one  mission  of 


172  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

the  Republican  party  should  be  to  hasten  this 
result. 

It  was  evident  from  the  President's  inaugural 
that  he  had  been  privately  informed  of  what  the 
court  was  to  do,  and  it  was  believed  and  asserted 
by  Republican  leaders  that  the  decision  had  been 
withheld  until  after  the  election,  lest  it  should  in- 
jure or  destroy  the  chances  of  Democratic  success ; 
and  that  nothing  would  have  been  heard  of  the 
monstrous  doctrines  of  the  chief  justice  had  Fre- 
mont been  chosen  president.  Lincoln,  in  a  public 
speech  in  Illinois,  attacked  the  court  for  its  attempt 
to  render  nugatory  the  right  of  choosing  between 
freedom  and  slavery,  which  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
act  assumed  the  people  of  the  Territory  to  possess. 
Seward  charged  the  court  with  forgetting,  "  in  this 
ill-omened  act,  its  own  dignity,  which  had  always 
before  been  maintained  with  just  judicial  jeal- 
ousy," and  both  the  court  and  the  President  with 
failing  to  remember  "that  judicial  usurpation  was 
more  odious  and  intolerable  than  any  other  among 
the  manifold  practices  of  tyranny." 

The  resignation  of  Governor  Geary,  President 
Pierce 's  last  appointee  in  Kansas,  took  effect  at 
the  close  of  the  presidential  term,  leaving  Buch- 
anan free  to  make  his  own  appointment.  After 
much  persuasion,  he  induced  Robert  J.  Walker, 
of  Mississippi,  to  accept  the  post.  Walker  was  a 
Pennsylvanian  by  birth,  who  had  removed  to  Mis- 
sissippi soon  after  he  began  practicing  the  law. 
He  had  been  in  Congress,  was  Polk's  secretary 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      173 

of  the  treasury,  had  exercised  a  large  influence 
with  several  Democratic  administrations  and  with 
the  Democratic  party,  had  advocated  the  annexa- 
tion of  Texas  and  counseled  a  vigorous  prosecution 
of  the  Mexican  war,  and  was  a  man  of  much  more 
prominence,  of  larger  experience  in  public  affairs, 
and  of  greater  ability  than  is  usually  to  be  found 
in  the  office  of  governor  of  a  Territory.  In  his 
inaugural  address,  Buchanan  had  given  the  assur- 
ance that  any  constitution,  framed  by  a  convention 
in  Kansas,  should  be  submitted  to  the  people;  and 
before  Walker  left  for  the  West,  he  understood 
that  the  President  agreed  with  him  that  the  terri- 
torial act  required  this  to  be  done.  The  fraudu- 
lent legislature  had  called  a  convention,  and  ap- 
pointed a  time  for  the  choice  of  delegates.  Walker 
arrived  in  the  Territory  before  the  day  fixed  for  the 
election,  and  endeavored  to  induce  the  free  state 
men  to  vote.  They  were  afraid  to  trust  him,  and 
suffered  the  election  to  go  by  default ;  a  little  more 
than  one  fifth  of  the  registered  voters  chose  the 
delegates.1  The  convention  met  at  Lecompton, 
but  immediately  adjourned  until  after  the  regular 
election  of  a  new  territorial  legislature.  Mean- 
time, the  governor,  having  satisfied  himself  that 
Kansas  was  lost  to  slavery,  though  he  still  hoped 

1  Had  there  been  no  frauds  and  had  the  free-state  men  voted, 
as  the  governor  urged  them  to  do,  they  would  have  elected  their 
own  candidates  as  delegates,  notwithstanding  that  about  seven- 
teen counties,  settled  principally  from  the  North,  had  been  prac- 
tically disfranchised  by  omitting  them  from  the  census. 


174  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

she  might  be  honestly  saved  to  the  Democracy,  if 
the  two  wings  of  the  Democratic  party,  the  free- 
state  and  pro-slavery  Democrats,  would  unite,  bent 
his  energies  to  accomplishing  this,  and  to  inducing 
the  free-state  men  to  vote  at  the  regular  territorial 
election.  With  some  difficulty  they  were  per- 
suaded to  do  so.  The  election  was,  on  the  whole, 
a  fair  one.  In  one  precinct,  where  there  were 
about  a  hundred  voters,  the  returns  showed  sixteen 
hundred  votes  for  the  pro-slavery  candidate;  in 
another  more  than  twelve  hundred  similar  votes 
represented  about  twenty  settlers  entitled  to  the 
ballot.  Walker  courageously  threw  out  these  re- 
turns, and  the  result  gave  the  free-state  party  the 
control  of  both  branches  of  the  territorial  legisla- 
ture. 

The  Lecompton  convention  met,  pursuant  to  its 
adjournment,  and  framed  a  constitution,  which,  by 
its  terms,  could  not  be  amended  till  1864,  and  its 
provisions  as  to  ownership  in  slaves  not  even  then. 
The  article  entitled  "Slavery"  declared:  "The 
right  of  property  is  before  and  higher  than  any 
constitutional  sanction,  and  the  right  of  the  owner 
of  a  slave  to  such  slave  and  its  increase  is  the 
same,  and  as  inviolable,  as  the  right  of  the  owner 
of  any  property  whatever." 

Since  the  great  majority  of  the  people  of  Kansas 
considered  the  members  of  this  convention  as  rna- 
lignants,  and  its  whole  proceedings  as  an  insult,  it 
was  evident  that  to  submit  its  constitution  to  a  pop- 
ular vote  would  be  merely  to  insure  its  rejection. 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      175 

To  avoid  this,  the  convention  determined  that  the 
vote  should  be  only  upon  the  question  whether 
the  constitution  should  be  adopted  with  slavery 
or  without  it.  If  the  majority  should  be  for  the 
constitution  with  slavery,  the  article  quoted  was  to 
remain;  if  for  the  constitution  without  slavery, 
then  that  article  was  to  be  stricken  out;  slavery 
was  no  longer  "to  exist  in  the  State,  except  that 
the  property  in  slaves  already  in  the  Territory 
should  not  be  interfered  with."  This  was  not 
such  a  submission  of  the  constitution  to  a  vote 
of  the  people  as  Walker  had  promised.  No  pres- 
sure from  Washington  could  induce  him  to  accept 
it  as  a  fulfillment  of  the  requirements  of  the  law 
and  of  the  assurances  he  had  made  with  the  Presi- 
dent's sanction  and  approval.  He  left  the  Terri- 
tory, and,  on  arriving  at  Washington,  finding 
himself  at  issue  with  the  President  on  this  vital 
point,  resigned,  rather  than  be  a  party  to  what  he 
did  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  a  vile  fraud. 

At  the  election  ordered  by  the  convention,  the 
total  vote  was  less  than  seven  thousand.  For  the 
constitution  without  slavery  there  were  five  hun- 
dred and  sixty-nine  votes;  for  the  constitution 
with  slavery,  sixty-one  hundred  and  forty-three, 
of  which  three  thousand  and  twelve  were  fraudu- 
lent.1 

When  Walker  left  the  Territory,  the  secretary, 
Frederic  P.  Stanton,  of  Tennessee,  also  a  South- 
erner and  a  perfectly  fair  and  upright  man,  became 
1  Wilder,  Annals  of  Kansas,  p.  156. 


176  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

acting  governor.  At  the  instance  of  the  people 
of  Kansas  he  summoned  the  newly  elected  legis- 
lature to  meet  in  December.  One  of  its  first  acts 
provided  for  a  direct  vote  on  the  Lecompton  Con- 
stitution, and  at  the  election  held  for  this  purpose 
it  was  almost  unanimously  rejected,  receiving  only 
one  hundred  and  sixty -two  votes,  out  of  ten  thou- 
sand four  hundred.  On  learning  of  Stan  ton's 
action,  Buchanan  at  once  removed  him. 

In  defense  of  his  course  as  to  Kansas  the  Presi- 
dent insisted  that,  as  the  vital  question,  whether 
they  would  have  the  constitution  with  or  without 
slavery,  had  been  submitted  to  the  people,  it  was 
the  same  thing  as  if  they  had  been  allowed  to  vote 
directly  on  its  adoption  or  rejection.  He  per- 
sisted in  this  statement  in  spite  of  his  knowledge 
that  the  election  ordered  by  the  convention  was 
not  open  to  all  qualified  voters,  but  that  every  citi- 
zen, before  he  could  deposit  his  ballot,  was  obliged 
to  take  an  oath  to  support  the  Lecompton  Consti- 
tution.1 He  also  knew  that  it  had  been  proved 
that  the  settlers  there  were  opposed  to  this  consti- 
tution, by  its  rejection  by  an  almost  unanimous 
vote  at  an  un trammeled  election. 

When  Congress  met  in  December,  it  was  quite 
understood  that  any  Democrat  who  did  not  favor 
the  admission  of  Kansas  with  the  Lecompton  Con- 
stitution would  come  under  the  ban  of  the  admin- 
istration ;  and  Washington  was  full  of  speculations 
as  to  what  Douglas  would  do.  The  numbers  and 
1  Lecompton  Const.  Schedule,  Sect.  7. 


THE  FINAL   STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      177 

position  of  the  Republicans  in  both  branches  of 
Congress  had  been  constantly  improving.  "It  did 
look  well,"  wrote  Seward,  "to  see  the  array  of 
twenty  solid  men "  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate. 
There  was  no  longer  any  attempt  at  the  ostracism 
of  which  they  had  heretofore  been  the  victims. 
"All  personal  antipathies  and  prejudices  against 
the  party  and  its  members  seemed  to  have  disap- 
peared." The  Southern  and  Democratic  opposi- 
tion in  social  circles  had  given  way,  and  society  of 
all  classes  was  profuse  in  its  courtesies.  As  an 
illustration  of  the  changed  conditions,  we  find 
Seward,  before  the  session  is  over,  acting  as  peace- 
maker between  Jefferson  Davis  and  Senator  Chan- 
dler of  Michigan ;  and,  in  connection  with  Critten- 
den  and  Jefferson  Davis,  settling  a  difficulty,  in 
which  Wilson  of  Massachusetts  and  Gwin  of  Cali- 
fornia were  the  opposing  parties.  The  thorny, 
solitary  path  which  the  Republicans  had  here- 
tofore pursued  was  now  abandoned  to  Douglas. 
The  Southern  Democrats  transferred  to  him  their 
former  hatred  of  the  Black  Republicans,  and  their 
courtesies  to  the  old  anti-slavery  men  served  to 
emphasize  their  treatment  of  the  deserter. 

Arriving  in  Washington  before  the  meeting  of 
Congress,  Douglas  called  on  the  President  to  dis- 
cuss the  Kansas  question.  Buchanan  said  that  he 
should  recommend  the  admission  of  Kansas  under 
the  Lecompton  Constitution;  Douglas  answered 
that  he  should  denounce  it  in  the  Senate;  and  on 
the  9th  of  January  he  did  so.  "  What  can  equal 


178  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

the  caprices  of  politics!"  wrote  Seward.  "The 
triumph  of  slavery  [in  1850]  would  have  been  in- 
complete, indeed  it  could  not  have  occurred,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  accession  to  it  of  Stephen  A. 
Douglas.  .  .  .  By  that  defection  he  became  soon, 
and  has,  until  just  now,  continued  (under  the  favor 
or  fear  of  successive  administrations)  legislative 
dictator  here,  intolerant,  yet  irresistible.  .  .  . 
That  was  his  position  yesterday  morning.  .  .  . 
Yesterday  he  broke  loose  from  all  that  strong  host 
he  had  led  so  long,  and  although  he  did  not  at  the 
first  bound  reach  my  position,  as  an  ally,  yet 
leaped  so  far  towards  it  as  to  gain  a  position  of 
neutrality  altogether  unsafe  and  indefensible." 

Seward  welcomed  all  accessions  from  the  De- 
mocrats to  the  anti-Lecompton  forces.  "Since 
Walker,  Douglas,  and  Stanton,"  he  wrote,  "have 
been  converted,  at  least  in  part,  we  are  sure  to 
hear  the  gospel  preached  (though  with  adultera- 
tion) to  the  Gentiles."  And,  while  many  of  the 
Republican  leaders  were  distrustful  of  Douglas,  he 
took  the  opposite  view,  saying:  "God  forbid  that 
I  should  consent  to  see  freedom  wounded,  because 
my  own  lead,  or  even  my  own  agency  in  serving 
it,  should  be  rejected.  I  will  cheerfully  cooperate 
with  these  new  defenders  of  this  sacred  cause  in 
Kansas,  and  I  will  award  them  all  due  praise  for 
their  large  share  of  merit  in  its  deliverance." 

The  administration  had  staked  its  all  vipon  sus- 
taining the  Lecompton  Constitution.  Buchanan's 
message,  transmitting  it  to  Congress,  showed  his 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      179 

entire  surrender  to  the  extreme  Southern  opinion. 
"Kansas,"  he  said,  "is  at  this  moment  as  much  a 
slave  State  as  Georgia  or  South  Carolina."  Be- 
fore his  message  was  sent  in,  Denver,  who  had 
succeeded  Walker  as  governor  of  Kansas,  had  en- 
deavored to  dissuade  him  from  sending  to  Congress 
the  Lecompton  Constitution,  advising  him  strongly 
against  his  proposed  policy.  Buchanan  answered 
that  he  had  already  shown  his  message  and  that 
the  advice  came  too  late. 

It  was  hardly  to  be  expected  that  the  debate  on 
this  question  should  add  anything  to  what  had 
already  been  said.  The  Southerners  fell  back  on 
the  doctrines  of  Chief  Justice  Taney,  insisted  that 
all  the  anti-slavery  agitation  had  been  aimed  at 
the  constitutional  rights  of  the  South,  and  that 
both  the  Missouri  Compromise  and  the  Wilmot 
Proviso  were  unconstitutional. 

In  a  speech,  made  early  in  March,  Seward  gave 
a  highly  colored  sketch  of  a  coalition  between  the 
executive  and  judicial  departments  of  the  govern- 
ment, to  undermine  the  legislature  and  the  liber- 
ties of  the  people,  and  of  whispered  conferences 
between  the  chief  justice  and  the  incoming  Presi- 
dent before  the  delivery  of  the  inaugural,  which 
heralded,  not  the  decision  of  the  Dred  Scott  case, 
but  the  extra-judicial  exposition  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, which  the  chief  justice  was  about  to  promul- 
gate. This  drew  from  Judge  Taney  the  declara- 
tion that,  if  Seward  were  elected  president,  he 
should  decline  to  administer  to  him  the  oath  of 


180  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

office,  and  from  both  Taney  and  Buchanan  indig- 
nant denials  of  any  such  conferences.  But  these 
denials  did  not  meet  the  substance  of  the  charges 
then  made,  not  by  Seward  alone,  but  by  many  Re- 
publican leaders.  These  charges  were,  that  the 
political  passages  were  added  by  the  chief  justice 
after  the  result  of  the  presidential  election  was 
known,  and  that  their  substance  was  communicated 
to  Buchanan  just  before  the  4th  of  March,  to  ena- 
ble him  to  make  the  announcement  which  he  did 
in  his  inaugural  address.  Known  facts  justified 
the  accusation,  even  though  they  did  not  conclu- 
sively prove  it.  It  was  understood  that  a  majority 
of  the  judges,  having  reached  the  conclusion  that 
Dred  Scott,  being  of  African  descent,  was  not  a 
citizen,  and  had  therefore  no  standing  in  the  courts 
of  the  United  States,  an  opinion  stating  this  con- 
clusion and  the  reasons  for  it,  and  nothing  more, 
had  been  prepared,  to  be  read  as  the  judgment  of 
the  court;  that  the  chief  justice  afterwards,  and 
not  long  before  the  delivery  of  the  judgment, 
added  to  his  opinion  the  statement  of  his  political 
conclusions,  which  —  if  they  had  been  in  any  sense 
a  decision  of  the  court  —  would  have  fastened  slav- 
ery irrevocably  upon  every  foot  of  the  territory  of 
the  United  States.  Buchanan's  inaugural  address 
substantially  foreshadowed  these  conclusions  as  the 
result  of  the  case,  and  it  was  known  that  the  pas- 
sage in  which  he  did  this  was  added  after  his  arri- 
val in  Washington.  It  was  insisted  that  it  was 
quite  incredible  that  he  should  have  written  this 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      181 

at  that  time  unless  he  had  received  authentic  in- 
formation of  what  the  chief  justice  was  to  say. 

His  long  and  unblemished  judicial  career  and 
his  patriotic  motives  have  been  urged  as  an  excuse 
or  apology  for  the  chief  justice's  course  in  this 
case,  and  it  is  perhaps  only  fair  to  him  to  suppose 
that  he  may  have  thought  his  political  statement 
would  be  quietly  accepted  by  the  North  as  an  au- 
thoritative and  binding  construction  of  the  Consti- 
tution, and  would  put  an  end  to  all  anti-slavery 
agitation  there;  while,  as  it  conceded  to  the  South 
all  that  they  could  gain  by  separation,  the  motives 
for  secession  would  no  longer  exist,  and  the  Union 
would  continue  undisturbed. 

Other  persons  disapproved  of  Seward's  speech 
for  reasons  of  an  opposite  character.  The  aim  of 
the  Republicans  was  to  secure  Kansas  to  freedom ; 
and  in  the  struggle  of  the  moment  —  the  question 
of  its  admission  under  the  Lecompton  Constitution 
—  they  had  the  support  of  several  Democrats, 
among  whom  was  Douglas,  the  author  of  the  repeal 
of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  and  for  that  reason, 
as  well  as  for  his  qualities  as  a  debater,  a  most 
powerful  auxiliary.  Seward  had  already  publicly 
welcomed  the  accession  of  these  new  allies,  and 
announced  his  cordial  cooperation  with  them ;  and 
in  this  speech,  after  declaring  his  opinion  that  "it 
would  be  wise  to  restore  the  Missouri  prohibition 
of  slavery  in  Kansas  and  Nebraska,"  he  went  on 
to  say:  "But  I  shall  not  insist  now  on  so  radi- 
cal a  measure  as  the  restoration  of  the  Missouri 


182  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

prohibition.  I  know  how  difficult  it  is  for  power 
to  relinquish  even  a  pernicious  and  suicidal  policy 
all  at  once.  We  may  obtain  the  same  result,  in 
this  particular  case  of  Kansas,  without  going  back 
so  far.  Go  back  only  to  the  ground  assumed  in 
1854,  the  ground  of  popular  sovereignty.  Hap- 
pily for  the  authors  of  that  measure,  the  zealous 
and  energetic  resistance  of  abuses  practiced  under 
it  has  so  far  been  effective,  that  popular  sover- 
eignty in  Kansas  may  now  be  made  a  fact,  and 
liberty  there  may  be  rescued  from  danger  through 
its  free  exercise."  It  is  difficult  to  see  in  this 
passage  anything  more  than  a  recognition  of  the 
facts  as  they  actually  existed ;  but  it  gave  offense 
to  some  persons,  who  thought  it  implied  a  readi- 
ness to  condone  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Com- 
promise, and  to  welcome  the  cooperation  of  Doug- 
las, who,  they  considered,  should  have  been  re- 
ceived with  reluctance,  hesitation,  and  distrust. 

His  speech  on  the  Lecompton  Constitution  and 
convention  is  not  one  of  Seward's  best.  It  drags 
here  and  there ;  but  the  wrongs  of  Kansas,  as  ma- 
terial for  a  speech,  had  already  been  worn  thread- 
bare. There  are  certain  passages,  however,  to 
which  the  South  might  well  have  given  heed :  — 

"The  nation  has  reached  the  point  where  inter- 
vention by  the  government  for  slavery  and  slave 
States  will  no  longer  be  tolerated.  Free  labor  has 
at  last  apprehended  its  rights,  its  interests,  its 
power,  and  its  destiny,  and  is  organizing  itself  to 
assume  the  government  of  the  republic.  It  will 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      183 

henceforth  meet  you  boldly  and  resolutely  here;  it 
will  meet  you  everywhere,  in  the  Territories  or  out 
of  them,  wherever  you  may  go  to  extend  slavery. 
.  .  .  The  interests  of  the  white  races  demand  the 
ultimate  emancipation  of  all  men.  Whether  that 
consummation  shall  be  allowed  to  take  effect  with 
needful  and  wise  precautions  against  sudden  change 
and  disaster,  or  be  hurried  on  by  violence,  is  all 
that  remains  for  you  to  decide.  ...  It  is  for 
yourselves,  not  for  us,  to  decide  how  long  the  con- 
test shall  be  protracted  before  freedom  shall  enjoy 
her  already  assured  triumph.  I  would  have  it 
ended  now.  .  .  .  But  this  can  be  done  only  in 
one  way,  —  by  the  direct  admission  of  the  three 
new  States  [Kansas,  Minnesota,  and  Oregon]  as 
free  States,  .  .  .  and  by  the  abandonment  of  all 
further  attempts  to  extend  slavery  under  the  fed- 
eral Constitution." 

The  Kansas  question,  however,  was  not  to  be 
decided  by  argument,  or  by  any  sense  of  justice. 
The  best  men  of  the  South  did  not  venture  to 
defend  the  Lecompton  Constitution,  or  the  pro- 
ceedings by  which  it  came  before  Congress,  or  the 
course  of  the  administration.  The  necessity  of 
making  Kansas  a  slave  State  was  the  governing 
motive  with  those  who  supported  the  bill.  A  few 
Southerners,  notably  Bell  and  Crittenden,  opposed 
it.  But  the  administration  controlled  the  Senate, 
and  its  patronage  and  proscription  were  freely  em- 
ployed to  enable  it  to  carry  the  House.  The  out- 
come of  the  whole  matter  for  this  session  (1857-58) 


184  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

was  the  passage  of  a  bill,  —  a  new  compromise,  — 
by  which  the  Lecompton  Constitution  was  to  be 
again  submitted  to  the  people  of  Kansas  for  adop- 
tion or  rejection.  If  it  should  be  adopted,  the 
Territory  would  receive  large  grants  of  public  lands, 
and  be  admitted  at  once  as  a  State.  If  it  should 
be  rejected,  Kansas  was  to  remain  a  Territory  for 
an  indefinite  period.  The  people  spurned  the 
bribe ;  the  constitution  was  a  second  time  rejected 
by  an  overwhelming  majority.  Yet  it  was  only 
when  some  Southern  senators  had  already  vacated 
their  seats  that  the  struggle  was  ended  in  January, 
1861,  by  the  admission  of  Kansas  as  a  free  State. 

There  was  another  matter  before  the  Senate  this 
winter,  in  which  Seward's  course  was  most  severely 
condemned  by  some  of  his  own  party.  The  Mor- 
mons of  Utah  were  in  a  state  of  open,  if  not  of 
avowed  rebellion.  Troops  were  needed  to  compel 
their  obedience  and  to  maintain  the  authority  of 
the  government.  The  administration  wished  to 
raise  two  additional  regiments  for  this  purpose. 
The  Republicans,  distrusting  the  President  and 
remembering  the  use  to  which  the  army  had  been 
put  in  Kansas,  were  opposed  to  giving  him  any 
such  power.  Seward  thought  the  troops  necessary 
for  the  purpose  for  which  they  were  asked,  and 
that  the  President  should  have  the  authority  he 
desired.  "It  is,"  he  said,  "with  a  view  to  save 
life,  to  save  the  public  peace,  to  bring  the  Territory 
of  Utah  into  submission  to  the  authorities  of  the 
land  without  bloodshed,  that  I  favor  the  increase 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      185 

of  force  which  is  to  be  sent  there."  A  letter  from 
Senator  Fessenden  shows  us  how  the  Republicans 
of  the  Senate  looked  at  the  matter.  "Some  of 
our  people,"  he  wrote,  "are  frightened  by  the  idea 
of  refusing  supplies  in  time  of  war.  Seward,  I 
understand,  is  to  make  a  speech  for  the  bill.  He 
is  perfectly  bedeviled.  He  will  vote  alone,  so  far 
as  the  Republicans  are  concerned;  but  he  thinks 
himself  wiser  than  all  of  us."  Hale  spoke  of  him 
as  the  Judas  Iscariot  of  the  little  company  of  Re- 
publicans in  the  Senate.  Nevertheless  he  persisted 
in  his  opinion,  and  spoke  and  voted  in  favor  of 
the  bill,  carrying  out  in  his  conduct  the  policy 
which  he  had  insisted  was  correct  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Mexican  war  a  dozen  years  before,  when  he 
was  still  a  private  citizen.  The  bill,  however, 
after  being  amended,  was  at  last  defeated  by  a 
vote  which  had  no  party  significance  or  character, 
Toombs  voting  with  Seward,  and  Mason  and  Sli- 
dell  with  Fessenden  and  Hale.  Coercion  of  the 
Mormons  became  for  the  time  unnecessary,  as  a 
truce  was  patched  up  between  them  and  the  gov- 
ernment. 

Subsequent  events,  however,  showed  that  Sew- 
ard was  right  in  his  views  of  the  necessity  of  re- 
ducing to  strict  obedience  the  Latter  Day  Saints; 
and  had  this  been  done  earlier  there  would  have 
been  fewer  or  no  unpunished  outrages  upon  Chris- 
tians, no  Danite  bands,  no  cowardly  midnight 
murders  in  Utah.  Seward  himself  must  have  felt 
amply  rewarded  for  his  speech  and  action  in  the 


183  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

matter,  when  three  years  later  he  learned  from 
more  than  one  war  Democrat  that  this  speech 
had  taught  him  to  disregard  unpatriotic  party 
counsels,  and  to  stand  by  the  government  and  the 
Union. 

The  historical  interest  of  the  political  campaign 
of  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1858  is  practically 
confined  to  the  debates  between  Lincoln  and  Doug- 
las; but  Seward  in  his  speech  at  Rochester  struck 
the  keynote  of  the  contest  when  he  spoke  of  "  TJie 
Irrepressible  Conflict  between  Freedom  and  Slav- 
ery." The  idea  was  not  a  new  one,  though  the 
expression  was.  If  we  read  his  speeches  we  shall 
find  him  often  before  struggling  with  a  similar 
thought,  but  never  till  now  finding  the  apt  words 
which  would  best  convey  his  meaning,  and  coining 
a  phrase  which  became  at  once  a  part  of  our  popu- 
lar speech. 

The  substance  of  the  Rochester  address  was  an 
indictment  of  the  Democratic  party  as  sectional 
and  local,  with  its  principal  seat  in  the  slave 
States  and  its  constituency  almost  exclusively 
there,  but  having  in  the  free  States  a  number  of 
supporters  sufficient  to  modify  its  sectional  ap- 
pearance without  altering  its  sectional  character, 
committed  therefore  to  the  policy  of  slavery,  and 
which  had  carried  that  policy  to  its  then  alarming 
culmination.  The  accusation  was  followed  by  a 
statement  of  the  historical  facts  justifying  it,  and 
the  speech  had  great  weight  in  the  autumn  elec- 
tions. In  the  year  before,  the  Republican  party 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE   FOR  KANSAS      187 

had  suffered  a  grievous  setback ;  but  the  course  of 
the  President  in  endeavoring,  by  all  the  means  at 
his  command,  to  crowd  through  Congress  and  force 
upon  Kansas  a  constitution  odious  to  its  inhabit- 
ants, and  so  tainted  with  fraud  that  even  his  own 
officers  there,  Southerners  and  slaveholders  as  they 
were,  refused  to  sustain  him,  had  done  for  the 
opponents  of  the  administration  what  they  could 
not  have  done  for  themselves.  The  Congress 
chosen  in  the  autumn  of  1858  elected,  though  only 
after  a  prolonged  struggle,  a  Republican  speaker. 
To  the  Senate  no  Northern  Democrat  was  returned 
except  Douglas,  and  the  Republicans  there  now 
numbered  twenty-four. 

Nothing  was  done  in  the  short  session  ending 
on  the  4th  of  March,  1859.  The  endeavors  of  the 
South  to  obtain  a  vote  to  put  thirty  millions  of 
money  into  the  hands  of  the  President,  in  order 
to  pave  the  way  for  a  favorable  negotiation  as  to 
the  purchase  of  Cuba,  signally  failed ;  and  a  home- 
stead bill,  granting  moderate  quantities  of  public 
lands  to  actual  settlers,  and  warmly  pressed  by  the 
Republicans,  shared  the  same  fate.  The  antago- 
nism between  the  North  and  South  was  never  more 
conspicuous  than  in  the  discussion  of  these  mea- 
sures. The  House,  it  was  known,  would  not  pass 
the  Cuba  bill,  if  sent  down  to  them,  but  they  had 
already  passed  the  homestead  bill,  which  was  be- 
fore the  Senate,  and  Seward  urged  laying  aside 
Cuba  to  take  up  the  homestead  bill,  saying :  "  The 
Senate  may  as  well  meet  face  to  face  the  issue. 


188  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

.  .  .  The  homestead  bill  is  a  question  of  homes 
for  the  landless  freemen  of  the  United  States. 
The  Cuba  bill  is  the  question  of  slaves  for  the 
slaveholders  of  the  United  States."  Toombs  re- 
torted that,  much  as  he  despised  senators  who 
were  demagogues,  he  despised  still  more  those  who 
were  driven  by  demagogues,  and  who  met  a  great 
question  of  national  policy  by  the  cry  of  land  for 
the  landless;  on  which  Wade  cried  out:  "Shall 
we  give  niggers  to  the  niggerless  or  land  to  the 
landless?  When  you  come  to  niggers  for  the 
niggerless  all  other  questions  sink  into  perfect  in- 
significance." 

The  summer  and  autumn  of  1859  Seward  passed 
in  Europe.  When  he  returned,  the  John  Brown 
raid  in  Virginia  had  ended  in  the  execution  of  its 
leader;  Congress  had  assembled,  and  the  two 
months'  contest  for  the  election  of  speaker  was 
well  under  way.  The  several  parties  were  already 
beginning  to  take  their  positions  for  the  coming 
presidential  campaign.  The  Senate  was  practi- 
cally under  the  control  of  the  extreme  pro-slavery 
leaders,  who  were  determined  to  drive  Douglas  out 
of  the  Democratic  party  as  a  punishment  for  his 
opposition  to  the  admission  of  Kansas  under  the 
Lecompton  Constitution.  For  this  purpose,  Jef- 
ferson Davis  offered  a  series  of  resolutions  em- 
bodying the  political  doctrines  enunciated  by  Judge 
Taney  in  the  Dred  Scott  case,  and  the  most  ex- 
treme deductions  to  be  made  from  them.  These 
resolves  were  meant  to  be  a  complete  statement  of 


THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      189 

the  true  creed  of  the  Democratic  party  on  the  sub- 
ject of  slavery,  as  revised  by  the  chief  justice. 
The  fundamental  article  was  this :  — 

"Resolved,  That  neither  Congress  nor  a  territo- 
rial legislature,  whether  by  direct  legislation,  or 
legislation  of  an  indirect  and  unfriendly  character, 
possesses  power  to  annul  or  impair  the  constitu- 
tional right  of  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  to 
take  his  slave  property  into  the  common  territories, 
and  there  hold  and  enjoy  the  same  while  the  terri- 
torial condition  remains." 

Special  interest  attaches  to  this  resolution,  from 
the  fact  that  in  the  Democratic  national  convention 
of  1848  a  resolve,  offered  by  Mr.  Yancey  of  Ala- 
bama, declaring:  "That  the  doctrine  of  non-inter- 
ference with  the  right  of  property  of  any  portion 
of  the  people  of  this  confederacy,  be  it  in  the  States 
or  Territories  thereof,  by  any  other  than  the  parties 
interested  in  them,  is  the  true  republican  doctrine 
recognized  by  this  body,"  was  rejected  by  a  vote 
of  two  hundred  and  sixteen  to  thirty-six;  while 
against  this  resolution  of  Jefferson  Davis,  intro- 
duced in  the  Senate  eleven  years  later,  there  was 
only  one  Democratic  vote,  that  of  Mr.  Pugh  of 
Ohio.1  The  attitude  of  the  Democracy  as  regards 
slavery  was  clearly  not  stationary.  If  the  Repub- 
licans  were  advancing  in  the  path  of  modern  civili- 
zation, the  Democrats  were  even  more  rapidly 
retrograding  towards  a  government  which  should 
rest  on  slavery  as  its  base.  The  Republicans  stood 

1  Douglas  was  absent  throughout,  from  illness. 


190  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

aloof,  and  left  Davis 's  resolutions  to  be  discussed 
by  the  Democrats.  They  were  adopted  by  a  strict 
party  vote. 

Seward's  most  important  speech  during  the  ses- 
sion was  on  the  bill  for  the  admission  of  Kansas 
under  a  new  constitution,  framed  by  a  convention 
held  at  Wyandot  and  composed  of  delegates  from 
the  actual  settlers  of  the  Territory.  In  this  speech 
he  discussed  the  general  state  of  the  country;  and 
in  a  sketch  of  the  difference  between  the  slave 
and  free  States,  defined  the  former  as  States  where 
the  slave  was  regarded  and  protected,  not  as  a  man, 
but  as  the  capital  of  another  man,  a  special  kind 
of  capital  entitled  to  be  politically  represented  by 
its  owners,  and  which,  with  the  increase  in  slaves, 
had  become  a  great  political  force;  while  in  the 
free  States  the  laborer,  invigorated  and  developed 
by  the  rights  of  citizenship,  was  himself  the  domi- 
nating political  power.  He  therefore  classified  the 
slave  States  as  capital  States,  and  the  free  States 
as  labor  States.  Running  a  historical  parallel 
between  these  two  classes,  he  showed  by  the  de- 
bates on  the  Missouri  Compromise,  —  the  first 
great  struggle  between  them,  —  how  easy  it  was  to 
combine  the  capital  States  in  defense  even  of 
their  external  interests,  and  how  difficult  to  unite 
the  labor  States  in  any  common  policy;  that  the 
labor  States  were  naturally  loyal  to  the  Union, 
while  the  capital  States  were  quick  to  alarm  that 
loyalty  by  threats  of  disunion,  and  either  could 
not  or  would  not  distinguish  between  legitimate, 


THE   FINAL  STRUGGLE  FOR  KANSAS      191 

constitutional  opposition  to  the  creation  of  new 
capital  States  out  of  the  common  territory,  and  un- 
constitutional attacks  upon  slavery  in  the  States 
where  it  already  existed.  The  history  of  the  two 
parties  proved,  he  contended,  that  the  Democratic 
party  was  generally  found  sustaining  the  policy  of 
the  capital  States ;  while  the  Whigs,  being  usually 
an  opposition  party,  had  practiced  some  forbear- 
ance towards  the  interests  of  labor,  until,  in  an 
evil  hour,  the  Whig  representatives  of  the  capital 
States  concurred  in  the  passage  of  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  act,  and  the  Whig  party  instantly  went 
down,  never  to  rise  again. 

To  the  charge  that  the  Republican  party  was  a 
sectional  one,  and  that  its  success  would  therefore 
justify  secession,  he  answered:  "Is  the  Democratic 
party  less  sectional?  Is  it  easier  for  us  to  bear 
your  sectional  sway  than  for  you  to  bear  ours?  Is 
it  unreasonable  that  for  once  we  should  alternate? 
But  is  the  Republican  party  sectional?  Not  un- 
less the  Democratic  party  is.  The  Republican 
party  prevails  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
sometimes,  the  Democratic  party  in  the  Senate 
always.  Which  of  the  two  is  most  prescriptive  ? 
Come,  if  you  will,  into  the  free  States  anywhere, 
address  the  people,  submit  to  them  fully  all  your 
complaints  of  Northern  disloyalty,  oppression, 
prejudice,  speaking  just  as  freely  and  loudly  as 
you  do  here;  you  will  have  hospitable  welcomes 
and  ballot-boxes  for  all  the  votes  you  can  win.  .  .  . 
Extend  to  us  the  same  privileges  and  I  will  engage 


192  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

that  you  will  have  very  soon  in  the  South  as  many 
Republicans  as  we  have  Democrats  in  the  North. 
.  .  .  Our  policy  of  labor  in  the  Territories  was  not 
sectional  during  the  first  forty  years  of  the  repub- 
lic ;  it  will  be  national  again  during  the  third  forty 
years,  and  forever  afterwards."  He  minimized 
the  dangers  of  disunion,  not  because  he  underrated 
the  earnestness  of  the  leaders  of  secession,  but  be- 
cause he  believed  that,  refine  as  one  might  about 
the  nature  of  the  Constitution,  calling  it  a  compact 
between  States,  a  breach  of  any  article  of  which 
by  one  State  would  absolve  all  the  others  from 
their  allegiance,  yet  it  would  be  found,  on  any 
attempt  to  subvert  it,  to  be  a  government  of  the 
whole  people,  in  which  every  member  was  con- 
scious of  his  interest  and  power,  and  which  was 
indestructible  from  the  millions  of  fibres  by  which 
it  was  interwoven  with  the  affections,  the  ambi- 
tions, and  the  hopes  of  all  citizens  of  all  classes. 


CHAPTER   XI 

THE   REPUBLICAN    CONVENTION   OF    1860 

THE  Democratic  national  convention  of  1856 
had  determined  to  hold  that  of  1860  at  Charleston, 
South  Carolina ;  it  accordingly  met  there  towards 
the  end  of  April.  The  irreconcilable  difference 
between  the  supporters  of  the  administration  and 
the  followers  of  Douglas  made  any  agi-eement  as 
to  a  platform  impossible;  and,  on  the  failure  of 
the  resolutions  proposed  by  the  South,  forty-five 
of  the  one  hundred  and  twenty  Southern  delegates 
withdrew.  The  convention  adjourned  to  Baltimore 
and  there  nominated  Douglas  for  the  presidency; 
Herschel  V.  Johnston,  of  Georgia,  being  after- 
wards added  as  the  nominee  for  vice-president. 
The  seceding  delegates  held  a  separate  convention, 
and  chose  as  their  candidates  John  C.  Brecken- 
ridge  of  Kentucky,  and  Joseph  Lane  of  Oregon. 
The  Constitutional  Union  party,  the  survivors  of 
the  Native  American  organization,  put  John  Bell, 
of  Tennessee,  at  the  head  of  their  ticket,  and  gave 
the  second  place  to  Edward  Everett,  of  Massachu- 
setts. 

The  Republican  convention  assembled  at  Chi- 
cago on  the  16th  of  May.  The  organization, 


194  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

preparation,  and  adoption  of  the  platform  occupied 
the  first  two  days,  and  it  was  the  general  expecta- 
tion both  of  his  friends  and  opponents  that  Seward 
would  be  nominated  on  the  following  morning. 
It  was  known  that  there  was  opposition  to  him, 
yet  it  was  thought  that  the  different  elements  com- 
posing it  would  not  be  able  to  unite  on  any  candi- 
date. But  on  the  third  ballot  Abraham  Lincoln, 
of  Illinois,  was  nominated,  a  change  of  four  votes 
of  the  Ohio  delegation  from  Chase  to  Lincoln  giv- 
ing him  the  requisite  majority.  There  is  no  ques- 
tion that  to  the  Republican  party,  as  a  whole,  this 
nomination  was  at  the  time  a  bitter  disappoint- 
ment. Lincoln  was  a  man  comparatively  un- 
known. He  had  served  in  one  Congress  without 
distinction,  and  would  gladly  when  his  term  was 
over  have  accepted  a  subordinate  office.  Four 
years  earlier  he  had  received  a  respectable  vote  on 
an  informal  ballot  as  a  candidate  for  vice-president 
on  the  ticket  with  Fremont;  but  this  was  hardly 
remembered  at  the  time  of  his  nomination  in  1860. 
His  campaign  with  Douglas  had  brought  him  into 
more  prominence,  had  shown  him  to  be  a  clear 
thinker,  and  very  ready  and  formidable  in  debate; 
but  the  interest  in  that  discussion  was  compara- 
tively limited;  and  he  was  best  known  at  the  East 
by  his  address  at  the  Cooper  Institute  in  New 
York,  on  the  27th  of  February,  1860.  He  was  a 
very  popular  local  politician,  but  was  hardly  recog- 
nized elsewhere  as  a  rising  man  with  anything 
that  could  be  called  a  national  reputation.  The 


THE  REPUBLICAN  CONVENTION  OF  1860    195 

opposition  to  Seward,  adopting  the  policy  pursued 
in  previous  conventions  by  the  opponents  of  the 
great  men  of  the  respective  parties,  united  on  Lin- 
coln as  a  more  or  less  colorless  candidate. 

So  far  as  the  success  of  the  Republican  party  in 
1860  was  not  the  inevitable  outcome  of  the  con- 
stantly increasing  demands  and  pressure  of  the 
South,  and  the  consequent  resistance  of  the  North, 
it  was  the  work  of  William  H.  Seward  more  than 
of  any  other  single  individual.  He  had  labored  to 
this  end  for  many  years;  his  speeches  had  been 
printed  in  different  languages,  and  circulated  by 
millions,  and  had  produced  the  deepest  and  widest 
effect  on  public  opinion.  At  the  South  he  was 
fully  recognized  as  the  leader  of  his  party,  the 
price  set  on  his  head  there  being  fifty  thousand 
dollars,  while  only  twenty-five  hundred  was  offered 
for  that  of  any  other  prominent  Republican. 

A  Southern  newspaper  did  no  more  than  justice 
to  his  position,  when  its  editor  wrote:  "Mr.  Sew- 
ard is  a  great  political  leader.  Unlike  others  who 
are  willing  to  follow  in  the  wake  of  popular  senti- 
ment, Seward  leads.  He  stands  head  and  shoul- 
ders above  them  all.  He  marshals  his  forces  and 
directs  the  way.  The  Abolition  host  follow. 
However  we  may  differ  from  William  H.  Seward, 
we  concede  to  him  honesty  of  purpose,  and  the 
highest  order  of  talent.  He  takes  no  halfway 
grounds,  he  does  nothing  by  halves.  .  .  .  He  is 
at  once  the  greatest  and  most  dangerous  man  in 
the  government.  .  .  .  For  eighteen  years  he  has 


1%  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

stood  forth  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  the 
great  champion  of  freedom,  and  the  stern  opposer 
of  slavery."  If  one  turns  from  the  estimate  of 
opponents  to  the  judgment  of  his  political  friends, 
the  words  of  Governor  Andrew  of  Massachusetts, 
in  indorsing  the  nomination  of  Lincoln,  do  not 
exaggerate  the  appreciation  of  Seward  at  that  time 
in  the  Republican  party :  — 

"The  affection  of  our  hearts  and  the  judgment 
of  our  intellects  bound  our  political  fortunes  to 
William  H.  Seward,  —  to  him,  who  is  the  highest 
and  most  shining  light  of  this  political  generation, 
—  to  him  who,  by  the  unanimous  selection  of  the 
foes  of  our  cause,  and  our  own,  has  for  years  been 
the  determined  standard-bearer  of  liberty."  A 
Democratic  newspaper  announced  the  result  of  the 
convention  in  an  article  entitled  "  Actaeou  devoured 
by  his  own  Dogs ; "  and  this  heading  had  quite 
enough  truth  in  it  to  give  it  point,  and  to  need  no 
explanation  for  even  the  dullest  and  most  obtuse. 

Se ward's  failure  to  obtain  the  nomination  at 
Chicago  was  due  to  a  variety  of  causes.  The  in- 
fluence to  be  attributed  to  the  defection  of  Horace 
Greeley  was  probably  exaggerated  at  the  time; 
and  the  episode  is  mostly  interesting  for  the  light 
it  throws  upon  the  characters  of  the  two  men. 
Greeley  was  commonly  thought  to  be  an  unselfish 
patriot,  but  he  had  at  bottom  a  hunger  for  office, 
and,  as  his  conduct  to  Seward  shows,  a  strong 
appetite  for  revenge.  As  has  been  already  stated, 
he  was  very  much  disappointed  at  not  receiving 


THE  REPUBLICAN  CONVENTION  OF  1860    197 

the  nomination  for  governor  of  New  York  in  1854, 
and  still  more  chagrined  that  his  old  associate  and 
subsequent  rival,  Henry  J.  Raymond,  was  nomi- 
nated for  lieutenant-governor  by  the  very  conven- 
tion in  which  he  himself  had  been  defeated.  There 
is  nothing  to  show  that  Seward  personally  had  any- 
thing to  do  with  this  result,  though  Weed,  believ- 
ing it  essential  to  success,  had  undoubtedly  done 
what  he  could  to  bring  it  about;  there  were,  how- 
ever, so  many  objections  to  nominating  Greeley, 
that  it  may  be  doubted  whether  Se ward's  active 
intervention  in  his  behalf  would  have  been  of  any 
avail.  The  election  was  extremely  close.  A 
change  of  less  than  two  hundred  votes  would  have 
altered  the  result;  and  the  party  was  evidently 
wise,  in  so  close  a  contest,  in  declining  to  handicap 
themselves  with  a  candidate  of  such  pronounced 
opinions,  the  eager  advocate  of  so  many  visionary 
schemes  as  Greeley  was  considered  to  be.  Greeley 
himself  subsequently  admitted  that  he  could  not 
have  been  chosen.  Just  after  the  election,  when 
he  was  still  extremely  sore,  he  wrote  Seward  a 
letter,  complaining  of  the  treatment  he  had  re- 
ceived, notifying  him  that  he  could  no  longer  rely 
on  his  support,  and  that  the  so-called  partnership 
of  Seward,  Weed,  and  Greeley  was  at  an  end. 
So  far  was  Seward,  however,  from  penetrating 
Greeley 's  real  meaning,  that  he  shortly  afterwards 
wrote  to  Weed :  "  I  have  a  long  letter  from  Gree- 
ley, full  of  sharp,  pinching  thorns.  I  judge,  as  we 
might  indeed  well  know,  from  his,  at  the  bottom, 


198  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

nobleness  of  disposition,  that  he  has  no  idea  of 
saying  or  doing  anything  wrong  or  unkind;  but  it 
is  sad  to  see  him  so  unhappy.  "Will  there  be  a 
vacancy  in  the  board  of  regents  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  New  York  this  winter?  Could  one  be 
made  at  the  close  of  the  session,  could  he  have  it? 
Raymond's  nomination  and  election  is  hard  for 
him  to  bear.  ...  I  think  this  a  good  letter  to 
burn.  I  wish  I  could  do  Greeley  so  great  a  favor 
as  to  burn  his." 

Seward  did  not  suffer  this  letter  to  interfere 
with  the  personal  relations  between  himself  and 
Greeley;  and  though  Greeley  opposed  Seward's 
nomination  in  1856,  yet,  if  his  opposition  was 
based  on  personal  grounds,  he  carefully  concealed 
them.  Ten  days  after  the  convention  of  that  year 
he  called  on  Seward  in  Washington,  and  wished 
to  be  congratulated  on  having  done  the  very  best 
thing  in  the  very  best  way.  In  the  spring  of  1859 
he  succeeded  in  satisfying  a  politician  so  astute  as 
Weed  that  he  was  all  right  politically  and  "seek- 
ing to  be  useful"  in  California,  whither  he  was 
going;  and  he  dined  with  Seward  on  the  eve  of 
his  departure. 

He  was  not  a  delegate  from  New  York  to  the 
Republican  convention  of  1860;  but  he  procured 
an  appointment  as  substitute  from  Oregon,  and 
going  to  Chicago  in  this  capacity,  devoted  his  time 
and  energy  to  defeating  Seward.  He  nominally 
advocated  the  candidacy  of  Edward  Bates  of  Mis- 
souri, but  was  ready  to  support  anybody  to  beat 


THE  REPUBLICAN  CONVENTION  OF  1860    199 

Seward;  and  it  has  been  said  that,  when  Seward 
was  actually  defeated,  he  openly  gave  thanks  that 
he  was  even  with  him  at  last. 

Seward  had  shown  Greeley's  letter  of  1854  to 
no  one ;  but  after  the  convention  there  began  to  be 
rumors  of  its  existence,  and  Greeley  himself  finally 
printed  it  in  the  "Tribune."  Its  publication  drew 
from  Weed  an  article  in  which  he  said:  "Having 
remained  for  six  years  in  blissful  ignorance  of  its 
contents,  we  should  have  much  preferred  to  have 
ever  remained  so.  It  jars  harshly  upon  cherished 
memories.  It  destroys  ideals  of  disinterestedness 
and  generosity  which  relieved  political  life  from 
so  much  that  is  selfish,  sordid,  and  rapacious." 
The  impartial  reader,  who  wishes  to  think  well  of 
Greeley,  will  probably  agree  with  Weed. 

Greeley's  unaided  exertions  would  hardly  have 
resulted  in  Seward' s  defeat.  There  were  other 
more  powerful  elements  at  work  for  that  end. 
The  body  of  the  Republican  party  was  composed 
of  old  Wrhigs;  but  even  among  these  there  were 
not  wanting  some  conservatives  who  had  joined 
the  party  late  and  half  reluctantly,  and  who  still 
thought  Seward  almost  dangerously  radical.  To 
those  who  had  supported  Fillmore  in  1856,  his 
nomination  would  not  have  been  acceptable;  and 
the  Democratic  Free  Soilers  of  '48,  who  had  voted 
for  Van  Buren,  and  were  now  in  full  Republican 
communion,  were  at  heart  strongly  opposed  to  Sew- 
ard. They  might  put  their  opposition  nominally 
on  various  grounds;  but  the  fundamental  reason 


200  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

was  that  he  had  always  been  a  Whig,  till  that  party 
perished,  and  never  a  Democrat.  Those  members 
of  the  convention  who  had  been  members  of  the 
Know-Nothing  party  remembered  Se ward's  steady 
and  uniform  opposition  to  and  denunciation  of 
that  party  and  its  proscriptive  doctrines.  Many 
Republicans  in  Pennsylvania  and  Indiana  were 
still  Know-Nothings,  slightly  covered  with  a  thin 
varnish  of  Republicanism;  and  the  respective  can- 
didates for  governor  in  these  two  States  professed 
to  think  it  impossible  to  succeed  at  their  state  elec- 
tions in  October,  if  Seward  were  the  national  can- 
didate, and  were  therefore  earnest  to  defeat  his 
nomination;  Cameron  of  Pennsylvania,  who  was 
thought  to  favor  Seward,  did  not  appear  at  the 
convention  and  took  no  steps  in  his  behalf,  and 
Ohio  had  a  favorite  son,  Chase,  whom  she  pre- 
ferred to  him.  Some  Republicans  of  more  or  less 
prominence  nominally  placed  their  opposition  to 
Seward  on  the  ground  of  their  distrust  of  a  New 
York  politician;  they  objected  to  his  connection 
with  Weed;  they  admitted  him  to  be  personally 
honest,  but  thought  him  not  sufficiently  averse  to 
jobs  for  his  friends.  These  objections  came  mainly 
from  persons  who,  had  they  fully  expressed  their 
minds,  would  have  given  other  reasons  why  they 
wished  he  should  not  be  nominated.  If  they  had 
any  effect  upon  the  action  of  the  convention,  it 
was  so  trifling  that  it  need  not  be  taken  into  ac- 
count. The  nomination  was  determined  by  other 
and  quite  different  influences. 


THE   REPUBLICAN   CONVENTION   OF   1860    201 

Lincoln  was  most  ambitious  for  the  nomination, 
and  had  been  working  eagerly  for  it  for  months. 
He  was  personally  a  much  more  adroit  politician 
than  Seward,  who  practically,  during  his  whole 
public  life,  relied  on  Thurlow  Weed  to  manage 
for  him.  Lincoln's  forces  were  well  organized; 
he  had  an  earnest  committee,  determined  to  suc- 
ceed, and  not  over-scrupulous  as  to  the  means; 
and  as  the  convention  was  at  Chicago,  they  were 
on  their  own  ground  and  supported  by  all  the  local 
influences.  The  question  was  how  to  consolidate 
upon  Lincoln  all  the  elements  of  the  opposition  to 
Seward.  This  difficulty  was  solved  on  the  night 
preceding  the  nomination,  by  the  chairman  of  Lin- 
coln's committee  promising  to  Caleb  Smith,  of  In- 
diana, a  place  in  Lincoln's  cabinet  in  return  for 
the  vote  of  that  delegation,  and  giving  a  similar 
pledge  in  favor  of  Simon  Cameron  to  the  delega- 
tion from  Pennsylvania,  on  the  assurance  of  its 
support;  the  votes  of  these  two  delegations,  with 
a  change  of  votes  by  a  few  wavering  members 
from  Ohio,  secured  Lincoln's  nomination.  Lin- 
coln had  telegraphed  his  committee  to  make  no 
bargains  for  him;  nevertheless  he  did  not  after- 
wards repudiate  their  promises,  and  Caleb  Smith 
and  Cameron  were  both  in  his  first  cabinet. 

When  the  news  arrived  at  Auburn,  and  no  one 
else  there  had  the  heart  to  prepare  for  the  "Daily 
Republican "  newspaper  a  paragraph  approving 
the  nomination,  Seward  himself  wrote :  "  No  truer 
or  firmer  defenders  of  the  Republican  faith  could 


202  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

have  been  found  .  .  .  than  the  distinguished  .  .  . 
citizens  on  whom  the  honors  of  the  nomination 
have  fallen."  None  the  less  keenly,  however,  did 
he  feel  himself  to  be  "a  leader  deposed  by  his  own 
party  in  the  hour  of  organization  for  decisive  bat- 
tle." Yet  instead  of  merely  acquiescing  in  the 
result  of  the  convention,  and  remaining  quietly  at 
home,  as  he  might  fairly  enough  have  done,  he 
put  forth  all  his  energies  to  insure  the  success  of 
his  party,  and  devoted  five  weeks  to  a  political 
campaign  in  New  York  and  the  Northwest,  espe- 
cially in  those  States  which  had  been  his  ardent 
supporters  in  the  convention. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  WINTER   OF   1860-61 

THE  narrative  of  the  events  of  the  winter  suc- 
ceeding the  election  of  Lincoln  forms  one  of  the 

O 

most  mortifying  and  melancholy  chapters  in  our 
national  history.  The  withdrawal  of  the  Southern 
Democratic  leaders  from  their  party  convention, 
and  their  nomination  of  a  separate  candidate  in 
the  summer  of  1860,  was  a  mere  prelude  to  the 
secession  of  the  States  they  represented.  It  ren- 
dered the  election  of  Lincoln  certain,  and  thus 
furnished  the  pretext  they  wanted  for  carrying  out 
their  long  cherished  scheme  of  breaking  up  the 
Union  and  forming  a  new  Southern  confederacy, 
of  which  slavery  should  be  the  corner-stone  and 
cotton  the  king.  They  were  not  alarmed  at  the 
prospect  of  any  injury  to  their  property  in  slaves, 
or  of  any  diminution  of  their  material  prosperity 
in  consequence  of  the  Republican  victory.  The 
Democratic  control  in  Congress  not  only  made 
them  absolutely  secure  from  attack,  but  left  the 
incoming  Republican  president  powerless  to  ap- 
point a  single  public  officer,  from  the  members  of 
his  cabinet  down,  who  would  not  be  satisfactory  to 
the  South,  — or  to  carry  any  measure,  or  pursue 


204  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

any  policy,  which  did  not  have  its  approval. 
Moreover,  there  were  practically  no  open  issues, 
by  the  decision  of  which  the  interests  of  the  South 
coidd  be  materially  affected.  The  Dred  Scott 
case,  it  was  claimed,  had  settled  the  right  to  hold 
slaves  in  all  the  Territories  of  the  United  States; 
it  could  not  be  modified  until  the  political  com- 
plexion of  the  Supreme  Court  should  be  changed, 
and  this  would  be,  of  necessity,  a  process  requiring 
many  years  and  a  succession  of  presidents  of  the 
same  political  opinions.  The  excitement,  both 
North  and  South,  about  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law 
had  practically  died  out;  and  the  secession  move- 
ment had  no  strength  in  the  border  States,  the  only 
ones  having  a  material  interest  in  the  observance 
of  this  law,  or  suffering  from  its  evasion. 

The  real  grievance  was  one  which  could  not  well 
be  formulated  or  put  forward  as  a  ground  for 
breaking  up  the  Union.  For  half  a  century  the 
cotton  States  and  Virginia  had  governed  the  coun- 
try; they  had  controlled  its  policy,  made  its  wars, 
annexed  new  territory,  nominated  presidents,  and 
filled  the  government  bureaus  and  departments. 
They  foreboded  from  this  election  the  end  of  their 
political  domination,  and  determined  to  go  off  by 
themselves,  having  faith  that  the  world's  need  of 
their  great  staple  would  bring  them,  should  the 
United  States  use  force  to  prevent  their  carrying 
out  their  plans,  the  recognition  of  their  independ- 
ence by  the  leading  countries  of  Europe,  if  not 
more  material  support.  "Our  leaders  and  public 


THE   WINTER  OF  1860-61  205 

men,  who  have  taken  hold  of  this  question,"  wrote 
Alexander  H.  Stephens,  "  do  not  desire  to  continue 
the  Union  on  any  terms.  They  do  not  wish  any 
redress  of  wrongs;  they  are  disunionists  per  se, 
and  avail  themselves  of  present  circumstances  to 
press  their  objects."  l 

South  Carolina  was  in  the  van  of  the  movement. 
Preliminary  conferences  had  been  held  in  Charles- 
ton as  early  as  September,  1860,  and  at  a  private 
meeting  of  the  leading  men  on  the  25th  of  October 
it  was  unanimously  resolved  that  South  Carolina 
should  secede  in  the  event  of  Lincoln  being  chosen 
president.  To  the  legislature  which  assembled  on 
the  5th  of  November,  the  day  before  the  presiden- 
tial election,  the  governor  in  his  message  declared 
that,  should  the  Republican  party  carry  that  elec- 
tion, the  only  course  for  South  Carolina  would  be 
to  secede  from  the  federal  Union;  that  political 
indications  justified  the  conclusion  that  other  States 
would  immediately  follow  her,  and  that  the  long 
desired  cooperation  for  which  they  had  been  wait- 
ing would  soon  be  realized.  From  this  time  South 
Carolina  marched  forward  in  her  revolutionary 
course  with  steady  steps,  and,  as  the  governor  had 
foreseen,  the  other  cotton  States  were  not  slow  to 
follow.  Before  the  end  of  November  the  prelimi- 
nary steps  had  been  taken  in  eight  Southern  States ; 
within  two  months  afterwards,  six  of  them  — 
South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Mis- 
sissippi, and  Louisiana  —  had  passed  ordinances 
1  November  30,  1860. 


206  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

of  secession;  by  the  middle  of  February  Texas 
had  united  with  them  to  form  a  Southern  Confed- 
eracy, which  had  chosen  a  complete  set  of  officers 
to  administer  its  government.  They  had  also 
seized  for  their  own  use  all  the  forts,  arsenals,  and 
other  public  property  and  moneys  of  the  United 
States  in  the  South,  unfortunately  left  without 
guard  or  protection,  except  Fort  Sumter,  off 
Charleston,  which  Major  Anderson  was  holding 
with  a  handful  of  men,  and  Fort  Pickens,  at  Pen- 
sacola,  into  which  a  gallant  subaltern,  Lieutenant 
Slemmer,  had  thrown  himself  with  his  company. 

The  moment  selected  for  the  outbreak  of  the 
secession  conspiracy  was  most  auspicious.  The 
administration  at  Washington  had  no  sympathy 
whatever  with  the  Republican  party  or  the  domi- 
nant sentiment  of  the  North.  Four  of  Buchanan's 
cabinet  were  from  the  South,  and  three  of  these 
were  either  open  or  ill-disguised  secessionists,  — 
while  every  one  of  the  Northern  members  was  a 
pro-slavery  Democrat,  untainted  by  any  of  the 
heresies  which  had  split  the  party  in  1848,  and 
either  indifferent  to,  or  else  a  supporter  of,  the 
violence  and  fraud  by  which  the  South  had  under- 
taken to  gain  Kansas  for  slavery,  as  well  as  of  the 
administration's  policy  toward  that  Territory.  All 
the  departments  swarmed  with  Southern  rebels. 
Washington  society  was  a  hot-bed  of  treason  and 
secession,  wholly  Southern  in  its  sympathies;  and 
extremists  from  the  South  were  the  closest  com- 
panions and  friends  of  the  President.  His  term 


THE   WINTER  OF  1860-61  207 

was  nearly  over,  and  the  secession  leaders  relied 
on  his  political  and  personal  proclivities  and  inti- 
macies, and  on  his  general  reluctance  to  take  re- 
sponsibility, increased,  as  they  knew  it  would  be, 
by  the  fact  that  he  was  merely  holding  over  until 
the  inauguration  of  his  successor,  as  sufficient  to 
prevent  any  aggressive  action  on  his  part. 

The  President's  annual  message,  sent  to  Con- 
gress on  the  3d  of  December,  did  not  disappoint 
these  anticipations.  It  took  the  Northern  States 
and  people  severely  to  task  for  the  existing  condi- 
tion of  things,  for  which,  it  said,  they  were  wholly 
to  blame.  Secession  was  unlawful;  of  that  there 
could  be  no  question;  but  the  coercion  of  a  State 
was  equally  unlawful,  and  in  the  political  dilemma, 
which  he  had  thus  reached,  the  President  left  the 
subject  to  Congress  and  the  country.  It  was  gen- 
erally known  that  these  views  had  not  merely  the 
support  of  the  cabinet,  but  were  the  conclusions  of 
the  attorney-general,  submitted  to  the  President 
in  a  labored  opinion.  Thus  encouraged,  the  South- 
ern leaders  had  little  hesitation  in  following  their 
inclinations,  and  crossing,  one  by  one,  the  narrow 
Rubicon  which  divides  idle  declamation,  vaporing 
threats,  and  empty  braggadocio  from  actual  rebel- 
lion and  treason.  Within  a  month  matters  had 
gone  so  far  that  South  Carolina,  having  removed 
the  buoys  and  extinguished  the  lights  in  her  har- 
bors, and  occupied  by  hostile  troops  all  the  forts 
except  Sumter,  was  sending  commissioners  to 
Washington  to  treat  with  the  government  as  a 


208  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

foreign  power.  She  insisted,  as  a  preliminary  to 
all  negotiations,  upon  the  immediate  evacuation  of 
Sumter,  on  the  ground  that  the  presence  of  the 
United  States  troops  there  was  a  standing  menace 
to  her  sovereignty.  Under  these  circumstances 
the  attorney -general  revised  his  opinion ;  and  ap- 
proaching the  questions  presented  him  from  a  dif- 
ferent point  of  view,  reached  the  conclusion  that 
it  was  the  President's  clear  constitutional  right 
and  duty  to  defend  the  public  property,  to  resist 
by  force  any  attempt  to  drive  the  troops  of  the 
United  States  from  any  of  its  fortifications,  and 
to  use  both  the  army  and  navy,  if  necessary,  for 
the  purpose  of  aiding  the  proper  officers  in  the 
execution  of  the  laws.  Had  he  been  convinced  of 
this  a  month  earlier,  and  satisfied  the  President's 
mind  then,  it  is  possible  that  the  rebellion  might 
have  been  nipped  in  the  bud;  though  it  is  ex- 
tremely doubtful  if  the  small  force  disposable  for 
this  purpose  would  have  been  sufficient  to  effect 
much,  unless  the  message  and  the  proceedings  of 
the  government  had  evinced  such  a  resolute  pur- 
pose that  the  Southern  leaders  would  have  hesitated 
about  precipitating  a  conflict.  By  the  end  of  the 
year  they  had  gone  too  far,  and  kindled  their  own 
and  their  people's  passions  to  such  an  extent  that 
retreat  was  no  longer  possible. 

The  attorney -general  succeeded,  however,  after  a 
severe  struggle,  in  bringing  the  President  to  his  own 
standpoint.  The  cabinet  was  purged  of  the  seces- 
sionists (Cobb  of  Georgia,  Thomas  of  Maryland, 


THE  WINTER  OF  1860-61  209 

who  succeeded  him,  Floyd  of  Virginia,  and  Thomp- 
son of  Mississippi),  and  their  places  were  filled  by 
Dix,  Stanton,  and  Holt;  the  White  House  ceased 
to  be  the  rendezvous  of  Benjamin,  Mason,  Slidell, 
and  Jefferson  Davis,  the  conspirators  of  the  Sen- 
ate; and  the  efforts  of  the  administration  were 
loyally  and  vigorously  bent  towards  keeping  the 
government  intact  for  delivery  to  its  regularly 
elected  successors. 

Meantime,  the  bold  and  defiant  attitude  of  the 
cotton  States  and  their  hasty  and  rapid  strides 
towards  secession  had  caused  much  alarm  and  a 
good  deal  of  vacillation  of  opinion  and  feeling  at 
the  North,  even  among  the  supporters  of  Lincoln. 
Leading  Republican  newspapers  were  suggesting 
that  our  erring  brethren  should  be  allowed  to  go 
in  peace.  There  were  meetings  in  the  large  cities 
recommending  concessions  to  save  the  Union,  — 
the  concessions  suggested  amounting  in  some  cases 
to  an  abandonment  of  everything  for  which  the 
Republican  party  had  contended ;  and  in  the  press 
and  elsewhere  there  were  from  time  to  time  hints 
that,  should  there  be  any  attempt  at  coercion,  the 
men  from  the  North  might  find  from  their  homes 
a  fire  in  their  rear. 

When  Congress  assembled,  the  aspect  of  affairs 
inspired  the  loyal  members  of  both  Houses  with 
profound  gloom  and  anxiety.  They  knew  that 
Washington  was  the  centre  of  innumerable  plots 
and  intrigues,  all  having  for  their  object  the 
destruction  of  the  Union.  They  felt  themselves 


210  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

absolutely  powerless,  and  the  administration,  which 
was  then  controlled  by  its  Southern  leaders,  they 
considered  worse  than  powerless,  believing  it  to  be 
the  mere  tool  of  the  enemies  of  the  country.  In 
this  great  crisis  no  man  distinguished  himself  as 
a  leader.  Many  men  of  experience  in  public  af- 
fairs, of  character,  resolution,  and  intelligence, 
seemed  hopelessly  bewildered ;  they  made  speeches, 
proposed  and  voted  for  measures,  and  took  posi- 
tions, which  are  only  to  be  explained  by  their  de- 
sire to  postpone  any  violent  outbreak  until  after 
the  4th  of  March,  lest  on  that  day  Washington 
should  be  in  the  hands  of  the  rebels,  and  Lincoln 
trying  to  find  some  safe  retreat  where  he  might 
take  the  oath  of  office  as  president  of  the  United 
States.  This  fear  was  by  no  means  a  groundless 
panic,  but  a  well  justified  apprehension.  From 
early  in  January,  1861,  the  senators  from  seven 
Southern  States  were  sitting  in  a  room  at  the 
Capitol,  as  a  revolutionary  council,  directing  every 
movement  toward  secession,  and  preparing  the 
programme  to  be  carried  out  in  the  formation  of 
the  Confederacy.  There  were  several  months  when 
the  capture  of  Washington  by  surprise  would  have 
been  perfectly  feasible ;  but  so  long  as  Buchanan, 
the  President  whom  the  South  had  elected,  and 
who  had  faithfully  done  its  bidding,  was  in  office, 
it  was  not  easy  to  find  a  pretext  for  seizing  the 
capital.  To  do  so  would  have  been,  not  the  asser- 
tion of  independence,  but  an  act  of  offensive  war- 
fare, for  which  the  seceding  States  were  not  yet 


THE  WINTER  OF  1860-61  211 

prepared;  and  so  they  delayed;  the  chances  for 
the  success  of  a  sudden  attack  were  constantly 
diminishing,  yet  it  was  never  certain  until  some 
time  after  Lincoln's  inauguration  that  such  an 
attack  would  not  be  made,  and  Washington  be 
captured. 

It  needs  but  little  reflection  to  convince  one  that 
the  plan  of  letting  our  erring  brethren  depart  in 
peace  was  impracticable  and  visionary;  that  it 
would  have  merely  postponed  till  after  the  recogni- 
tion of  their  secession  and  independence  the  settle- 
ment of  difficulties,  which  would  then  surely  have 
given  rise  to  war.  An  independent  North  would 
never  have  consented  to  return  a  fugitive  slave  to 
the  seceded  South;  yet  the  Southern  Confederacy 
must  have  insisted  at  all  hazards  on  some  provision 
for  this  purpose,  in  any  treaty  of  separation,  or 
they  would  have  lost  rather  than  gained  by  seces- 
sion. The  policy  of  conciliation,  however,  ac- 
quired new  strength  from  its  advocacy  in  various 
New  York  papers,  and  especially  from  an  editorial 
by  Thurlow  Weed,  which  was  supposed  to  have 
been  inspired  by  Seward,  and  to  represent  his 
views.  Seward  had  in  fact  no  knowledge  of  the 
article  before  its  publication,  and  Weed  was  alone 
responsible  for  it.  But  the  personal  and  political 
relations  between  Seward  and  Weed  naturally 
gave  rise  to  suspicions  of  his  connection  with  it, 
and  these  were  confirmed  by  the  positive  state- 
ment at  the  office  of  the  New  York  "Tribune" 
that  Seward  not  only  wrote  the  article,  but  was 


212  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

meditating  a  great  compromise  after  the  fashion  of 
Clay  and  Webster.  This  whole  statement,  whether 
malicious  or  not,  was  absolutely  false,  and  it  an- 
noyed Seward  extremely.  He  had  nothing  in  view, 
no  plan  but  to  wait,  drifting  like  the  rest.  "I  am 
thus  far  silent,"  he  writes  to  his  wife,1  "not  be- 
cause I  am  thinking  of  proposing  compromises, 
but  because  I  wish  to  avoid,  myself,  and  restrain 
other  Republicans  from  intermeddling  just  now, 
when  concession,  or  solicitation,  or  solicitude  would 
encourage,  and  demonstrations  of  firmness  of  pur- 
pose would  exasperate;"  and  again,  a  day  or 
two  later,  he  says:  "Another  day  in  the  Senate. 
Vaporing  by  Southern  senators ;  setting  forth  the 
grievances  of  their  section,  and  requiring  Northern 
senators  to  answer,  excuse,  and  offer  terms  which 
they  are  told  in  the  same  breath  will  not  be  ac- 
cepted."2 

He  was  desirous,  if  possible,  to  find  some  solu- 
tion of  the  "difficult  task  of  trying  to  reconcile 
the  factious  men  bent  on  disunion,  reckless  of  civil 
war,  to  the  ascendency  of  an  administration  based 
on  the  principles  of  justice  and  humanity."  But 
he  had  no  faith  that  any  constitutional  amendment 
that  might  be  proposed  would  be  of  any  avail. 
He  had  written  earlier :  "  No  amendment  that  can 
be  proposed,  and  would  be  satisfactory,  can  get 
two  thirds  of  both  houses,  although  just  such 
amendments  might  pass  three  fourths  of  the  States 
in  convention." 

1  December  8,  I860.  2  December  11,  1860. 


THE  WINTER  OF  1860-61  213 

Besides  his  conviction  that  the  Fabian  policy 
was  the  best,  Seward  had  another  reason  for  si- 
lence. He  must  have  shared  the  general  expecta- 
tion that  he  would  be  offered  a  seat  in  Lincoln's 
cabinet,  and  was  therefore  unwilling  to  make  or 
assent  to  any  proposals  which  might  not  meet  the 
approval  of  the  incoming  president,  or  be  in  ac- 
cord with  the  policy  of  his  administration.  Ten 
days  after  the  meeting  of  Congress  a  letter  from 
Mr.  Lincoln  invited  him  to  become  secretary  of 
state ;  and  he  left  Washington  that  he  might  con- 
sult his  wife  and  Weed  before  coming  to  a  deci- 
sion. 

He  was  by  no  means  certain  what  he  had  better 
do,  and  wished  for  some  more  definite  knowledge 
as  to  who  were  likely  to  be  his  associates  in  the 
cabinet,  and  as  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  general  policy. 
Weed  had  already  been  asked  to  corne  to  Spring- 
field for  a  conference  with  the  President-elect,  and 
at  Seward's  suggestion  he  decided  to  go  at  once. 
While  he  was  there  Mr.  Lincoln  talked  to  him 
with  entire  frankness,  and  Weed  in  return  stated 
his  own  opinions  with  absolute  freedom.  Weed 
came  away,  satisfied  that  Chase  was  to  be  secre- 
tary of  the  treasury,  and  Bates  attorney-general, 
that  Indiana  was  to  have  a  place  in  the  cabinet, 
and  that  Pennsylvania  would  probably  be  repre- 
sented there  by  Cameron,  that  Gideon  Welles  was 
to  be  secretary  of  the  navy,  and  that  the  only  re- 
maining post  was  likely  to  be  offered  to  Montgom- 
ery Blair.  Against  these  last  two  nominations 


214  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

Weed  protested  strongly.  Many  men  might  be 
named,  he  said  with  perfect  truth,  any  one  of  whom 
would  be  more  satisfactory  to  New  England,  and 
better  qualified  to  be  secretary  of  the  navy,  than 
Mr.  Welles.  He  was  satisfied,  however,  that 
what  he  said  did  not  affect  Mr.  Lincoln's  previous 
decision,  though  he  did  not  learn  till  much  later 
that  this  appointment  was  made  at  the  vice-presi- 
dent's special  request.  To  Blair  he  objected,  be- 
cause he  represented  nobody  and  had  no  following; 
because  his  appointment  would  be  obnoxious  to 
the  Union  men  of  Maryland,  who  were  old  Whigs, 
while  he  had  been  always  a  Democrat,  and  till 
1858  an  office-holder  under  Buchanan ;  and  also 
because,  though  he  was  now  called  a  citizen  of 
Maryland,  he  actually  lived  in  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia. To  appoint  both  Welles  and  Blair  would, 
Weed  urged,  give  an  undue  prominence  in  the 
administration  to  the  Democratic  element  among 
the  Republicans,  as  it  would  leave  the  Whigs, 
who  were  a  majority  in  the  party,  in  a  minority 
in  the  cabinet.  It  was  evident  to  him,  however, 
"that  the  selection  of  Montgomery  Blair  was  a 
fixed  fact,"  unless  some  Union  man  from  one  of 
the  more  southern  States,  who  was  of  undoubted 
loyalty  and  acceptable  to  Lincoln,  could  be  pre- 
vailed on  to  take  the  place.  At  Weed's  instance, 
Mr.  Lincoln  made  the  attempt  to  induce  a  gentle- 
man of  this  description  to  come  into  the  cabinet, 
but  the  hopelessness  of  keeping  these  States  in  the 
Union  made  all  efforts  in  this  direction  fruitless. 


THE   WINTER  OF   1860-61  215 

On  his  journey  home  Weed  saw  Seward,  told 
him  all  he  had  learned  as  to  the  plans  for  the  cabi- 
net, and  also  the  concessions  which  Lincoln  was 
willing  to  make  for  peace  and  harmony.  Seward 
returned  at  once  to  Washington,  and  after  think- 
ing over  the  matter  for  two  or  three  days,  in  the 
light  of  the  information  he  had  received  from 
Weed,  whose  conclusions  as  to  the  composition  of 
the  cabinet  were  subsequently  shown  to  be  abso- 
lutely correct,  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Lincoln  that,  after 
due  reflection  and  with  much  self -distrust,  he  had 
concluded  that,  should  he  be  nominated  and  con- 
firmed as  secretary  of  state,  it  would  be  his  duty 
to  accept  the  appointment. 

During  Seward's  absence  at  Auburn,  Crittenden 
had  offered  in  the  Senate  a  series  of  resolutions 
proposing  various  constitutional  amendments.  The 
Missouri  Compromise  was  to  be  restored,  and  ex- 
tended to  the  Pacific ;  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  was 
to  be  amended,  so  that  the  government  should  pay 
for  a  rescued  slave ;  there  were  to  be  constitutional 
provisions,  prohibiting  Congress  from  abolishing 
slavery  in  any  place  under  its  exclusive  jurisdiction 
in  a  slaveholding  State,  —  or  in  the  District  of 
Columbia  (so  long  as  slavery  existed  in  Maryland 
or  Virginia);  and  from  interfering  with  the  trans- 
portation of  slaves  by  land  or  water  from  any  one 
slave  State  or  Territory  to  any  other  slave  State 
or  Territory. 

The  resolutions  were  referred  to  a  select  com- 
mittee of  thirteen,  of  whom  Seward  was  one,  who 


216  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

were  "  to  consider  the  grievances  between  the  slave- 
holding  and  non-slaveholding  States,  and  to  sug- 
gest if  possible  a  remedy."  At  the  close  of  the 
first  day's  session  of  this  committee,  he  wrote  to  his 
wife:  "We  came  to  no  compromise,  and  we  shall 
not."  Toombs  makes  Seward  responsible  for  this 
result.  "I  supported  Crittenden's  compromise," 
he  says,  "heartily  and  sincerely,  although  the  sul- 
len obstinacy  of  Seward  made  it  almost  impossible 
to  do  anything.  .  .  .  At  length  I  saw  that  the 
compromise  must  fail.  With  a  persistent  obsti- 
nacy that  I  have  never  yet  seen  surpassed,  Seward 
and  his  backers  refused  every  overture.  I  then 
telegraphed  to  Atlanta :  '  All  is  at  an  end.  North 
determined ;  Seward  will  not  budge  an  inch.  Am 
in  favor  of  secession.' ' 

On  his  first  meeting  with  the  committee  Seward 
offered,  with  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  other 
Eepublican  members,  three  propositions  embody- 
ing the  concessions  which  they  understood  Mr. 
Lincoln  would  sanction.  These  were:  first,  A 
constitutional  amendment  providing  that  the  Con- 
stitution should  never  be  altered  so  as  to  authorize 
Congress  to  abolish  or  interfere  with  slavery  in  the 
States.  Second:  A  modification  of  the  Fugitive 
Slave  Act  so  as  to  secure  to  any  alleged  fugitive 
from  service  a  trial  by  jury  in  the  State  where  he 
was  arrested.  Third:  A  recommendation  to  all 
the  States  to  revise  their  legislation  concerning 
persons  recently  resident  in  other  States,  and  to 
repeal  all  such  laws  as  were  in  contravention  of 


THE   WINTER  OF  1860-61  217 

the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  or  of  any 
law  of  Congress  in  pursuance  thereof.1  And  later, 
with  the  concurrence  of  the  other  Republicans,  he 
offered  a  fourth  resolution :  That  Congress  should 
pass  a  law  to  punish  all  persons  engaged  in  the 
armed  invasion  of  one  State  from  another  or  in 
complicity  with  such  invasions. 

Nothing,  however,  came  of  Crittenden's  resolu- 
tions, or  of  Seward's  propositions.  Neither  the 
Senate  committee  of  thirteen,  nor  a  more  numerous 
committee  appointed  by  the  House  for  a  similar 
purpose,  nor  a  Peace  Convention  assembled  in 
Washington  later  in  the  winter  at  the  invitation  of 
Virginia,  were  able  to  make  any  suggestions  which 
would  be  acceptable  to  the  North,  and  would  also 
induce  the  South  to  abandon  its  scheme  of  seces- 
sion. The  only  effect  of  all  the  conferences  and 
discussions  was  to  postpone  any  further  overt  acts 
by  the  South  and  to  enable  Buchanan  to  see  his 
successor  inaugurated  as  the  nominal  President  of 
the  whole  United  States.  The  Republicans  ex- 
pected nothing  more,  and  were  only  fearful  lest 
this  should  not  be  safely  accomplished.  The  se- 
ceding South  meant  to  break  up  the  Union,  and 
could  only  have  been  diverted  from  its  purpose  by 
the  acquiescence  of  the  North  in  the  substance  of 
the  demands  set  forth  in  the  resolutions  offered  by 
Jefferson  Davis  in  the  Senate's  select  committee, 

1  This  was  aimed  at  the  personal  liberty  bills  of  the  North, 
the  laws  of  South  Carolina  as  to  colored  seamen  and  the  similar 
statutes  of  other  States. 


218  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

which  proposed:  "That  it  should  be  declared  by 
an  amendment  of  the  Constitution,  that  property 
in  slaves,  recognized  as  such  by  the  local  law  of 
any  of  the  States  of  the  Union,  shall  stand  on  the 
same  footing  in  all  constitutional  and  federal  rela- 
tions as  any  other  species  of  property  so  recog- 
nized; and  like  other  property  shall  not  be  sub- 
ject to  be  divested  or  impaired  by  the  local  law 
of  any  other  State,  either  in  escape  thereto,  or  by 
the  transit  or  sojourn  of  the  owner  therein.  And 
in  no  case  whatever  shall  such  property  be  sub- 
ject to  be  divested  or  impaired  by  any  legislative 
act  of  the  United  States  or  any  of  the  Territories 
thereof." 

"The  people  of  the  South,  all  of  the  Southern 
States,"  wrote  Seward,  "are  in  the  lead  of  reck- 
less politicians.  They  are  bent  on  coercing  the 
free  States  into  a  recognition  of  slavery,  and 
failing  that,  into  a  civil  war  and  disunion."  To 
this  recognition,  whether  by  amendments  to  the 
Constitution  or  otherwise,  no  Republican  could 
assent. 

The  debates  of  the  winter,  the  wide-spread  pub- 
licity given  to  the  pretensions  of  the  South,  the 
peremptoriness  and  arrogance  with  which  its  claims 
were  insisted  on,  and  the  rejection  of  every  scheme 
of  compromise  or  adjustment  proposed  by  any 
Northern  senator  or  representative,  brought  home 
to  the  people  of  the  free  States  a  realizing  sense 
of  the  impossibility  of  preventing  the  South  from 
attempting  to  break  up  the  Union,  unless  they 


THE   WINTER  OF   1860-61  219 

were  prepared  to  concede  that  this  was  a  gov- 
ernment in  every  part  of  which  negroes  might  be 
lawfully  held  in  bondage,  and  which  had  for  the 
object  of  its  existence  the  maintenance  and  per- 
petuation of  African  slavery. 

In  this  winter  of  talk  Seward  made  a  speech,  on 
the  12th  of  January,  in  which  he  endeavored  to  set 
before  the  country  a  picture  —  drawn  in  colors  as 
glowing  as  possible  —  of  the  advantages  of  the 
Union ;  to  describe  what  it  had  done  for  us,  how 
under  it  we  had  grown  from  feeble  colonists  to  a 
great  nation,  happy  and  prosperous  at  home,  re- 
spected and  feared  abroad;  and  to  contrast  with 
this  the  result  which  would  follow  the  dissolution 
of  the  government  into  several  confederacies,  each 
of  which  would  be  unimportant  and  disregarded; 
each  would  have  its  own  policy,  and  would  en- 
deavor to  stipulate  with  other  countries  for  ar- 
rangements advantageous  to  itself,  though  injuri- 
ous to  its  neighbors.  Their  mutual  jealousies 
would  encourage  civil  wars,  which  must  ultimately 
result  in  the  loss  of  their  liberties  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  their  independent  republican  governments. 
Neither  North  nor  South  would  suffer  the  other 
section  to  possess  our  entire  national  domain,  nor 
would  any  peaceable  division  of  this  be  possible. 
The  resources  of  the  slave  States  might  be  called 
on  to  put  down  risings  of  the  slaves,  or  possibly  to 
meet  invasions  more  extensive  and  formidable  than 
John  Brown's  attack  upon  Harper's  Ferry.  Dis- 
solution would  arrest  the  growth  of  the  country, 


220  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

paralyze  its  industries  and  commerce,  and  substi- 
tute, for  the  brilliant  constellation  of  our  United 
States,  the  feeble  light  of  small  groups,  or  the  un- 
certain glimmer  of  solitary  stars. 

While  not  even  for  peace  and  the  maintenance 
of  the  Union  would  he  make  concessions  that  in- 
volved "any  compromise  of  principle  or  any  ad- 
vantage of  freedom,"  yet  he  would  "meet  prejudice 
with  conciliation,  exaction  with  concession  which 
surrenders  no  principle,  and  violence  with  the 
right  hand  of  peace."  He  suggested  in  the  Senate 
the  propositions  he  had  already  offered  in  the  com- 
mittee of  thirteen,  and  urged  the  immediate  admis- 
sion of  Kansas,  as  settling  all  that  was  vital  or 
even  important  as  to  the  question  of  slavery  in  the 
Territories. 

In  a  second  speech  a  few  weeks  later  he  further 
explained  his  position  upon  this  question.  The 
Territories  of  the  United  States,  he  said,  contained 
more  than  a  million  square  miles,  over  which  a 
slave  code  had  been  in  force  for  twelve  years ;  but 
though  during  this  time  the  courts,  the  legislature, 
and  the  administration  had  maintained  and  guar- 
anteed slavery  there,  yet  only  twenty-four  African 
slaves  were  to  be  found  in  that  whole  region,  one 
slave  for  every  forty -four  thousand  square  miles. 
He  had,  therefore,  no  further  fears  as  to  this  great 
public  domain.  Slavery  there  had  ceased  to  be  a 
practical  question. 

Afterwards,  during  this  same  session,  when  Colo- 
rado, Dakota,  and  Nevada  were  carved  out  of  this 


THE  WINTER  OF  1860-61  221 

vast  country,  the  acts  organizing  them  as  terri- 
tories, which  were  reported  by  a  senator  from 
Missouri,  a  strong  supporter  of  the  Breckenridge 
Democracy,  and  which  contained  no  prohibition 
of  slavery,  received  the  votes  of  such  stalwart  anti- 
slavery  men  as  Sumner,  Wade,  and  Chandler  of 
the  Senate,  and  Thaddeus  Stevens,  Owen  Lovejoy, 
and  the  radical  Republicans  in  the  House;  'no  one 
of  whom  thought  it  worth  while  to  explain  or  jus- 
tify the  omission  of  the  proviso  prohibiting  slavery, 
which  they  had  so  long  and  hotly  contended  was 
of  vital  importance. 

It  was  said  on  the  one  hand  that  Seward  in 
these  speeches  had  "surrendered  his  principles  and 
those  of  his  party  to  avert  civil  war  and  the  disso- 
lution of  the  Union;"  on  the  other  hand  he  was 
denounced  because  he  would  "give  up  nothing  at 
all,  not  even  his  prejudices  or  caprices,  to  save 
peace  and  the  Union,  the  most  inestimable  of  all 
blessings ;  "  whilst  there  were  others  who  thanked 
him  for  his  attempt  to  save  the  Union,  "without 
damage  to  the  sacred  cause  of  freedom,  and  the 
safeguard  of  its  laws." 

He  himself  considered  the  "concessions"  in  his 
speech  "not  compromises  but  explanations."  And 
as  they  were  substantially  only  assurances  that  he 
was  prepared  to  abide  by  the  Constitution  as  it 
was  and  would  not  seek  to  amend  or  alter  it  except 
by  a  convention  duly  called  for  that  purpose,  his 
own  conclusion  may  be  fairly  accepted  as  correct. 

To  the  charge  that  he  had  made  a  Union  speech 


222  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARI) 

and  not  an  anti-slavery  one,  Seward  replied: 
"Twelve  years  ago  freedom  was  in  danger,  and 
the  Union  was  not.  I  spoke  then  so  singly  for 
freedom,  that  short-sighted  men  inferred  that  I 
was  disloyal  to  the  Union.  .  .  .  To-day,  practi- 
cally, freedom  is  not  in  danger;  and  Union  is. 
With  the  loss  of  Union  all  would  be  lost.  Now, 
therefore,  I  speak  singly  for  Union,  striving  if 
possible  to  save  it  peaceably ;  if  not  possible,  then 
to  cast  the  responsibility  upon  the  party  of  slavery. 
For  this  singleness  of  speech  I  am  now  suspected 
of  infidelity  to  freedom.  In  this  case,  as  in  the 
other,  I  refer  myself  not  to  the  men  of  my  time, 
but  to  the  judgment  of  history." 

Perhaps  the  clearest  insight  into  Seward's  hopes 
and  expectations  at  this  time  is  to  be  gained  from 
a  letter  of  Lord  Lyons,  the  British  minister  at 
Washington,  to  Lord  John  Russell,  then  secretary 
of  state  for  foreign  affairs.  "Mr.  Seward's  real 
view  of  the  state  of  the  country,"  he  writes,  "ap- 
pears to  be,  that  if  bloodshed  can  be  avoided  until 
the  new  government  is  installed,  the  seceding  States 
will  in  no  long  time  return  to  the  confederation. 
He  seems  to  think  that  in  a  few  months  the  evils 
and  hardships  produced  by  secession  will  become 
intolerably  grievous  to  the  Southern  States;  that 
they  will  become  completely  reassured  as  to  the 
intentions  of  the  administration,  and  the  conserva- 
tive element  which  is  now  kept  under  the  surface 
by  the  violent  pressure  of  the  secessionists  will 
emerge  with  irresistible  force.  From  all  these 


THE   WINTER  OF   1860-61  223 

causes  he  confidently  expects  that,  when  elections 
for  the  state  legislatures  are  held  in  November 
next,  the  Union  party  will  have  a  clear  majority, 
and  will  bring  the  seceding  States  back  into  the 
confederation.  He  then  hopes  to  place  himself  at 
the  head  of  a  strong  Union  party  having  extensive 
ramifications  both  North  and  South,  and  to  make 
'  Union  or  Disunion,'  not  '  Freedom  or  Slavery,' 
the  watchword  of  political  parties." 

Seward  himself  had  expressed  something  of  the 
same  thought  in  the  closing  passages  of  his  speech 
at  the  dinner  of  the  New  England  Society  in  New 
York  on  the  22d  of  December,  just  after  he  had 
learned  from  Weed  Mr.  Lincoln's  views,  the  con- 
cessions he  was  willing  to  make,  and  his  tone 
toward  the  South.  He  said:  "The  necessities 
which  created  this  Union  are  stronger  to-day  than 
they  were  when  the  Union  was  cemented;  these 
necessities  are  as  enduring  as  the  passions  of  men 
are  short  lived  and  effervescent.  The  cause  of 
secession  was  as  strong  on  the  night  of  Novem- 
ber 6,  when  a  president  and  vice-president  were 
elected  who  were  unacceptable  to  the  slave  States, 
as  it  has  been  at  any  time.  Fifty  days  have 
passed  ;  and  I  believe  that  every  day  the  sun  has 
set  since  that  time,  it  has  set  upon  mollified  pas- 
sions and  prejudices  ;  and  if  you  will  only  await 
the  time,  sixty  more  suns  will  shed  a  light  and 
illuminate  a  more  cheerful  atmosphere." 

Taken  in  its  connection,  the  meaning  of  the  pas- 
sage in  italics  is  obvious.  Sixty  days  more  will 


224  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

see  the  inauguration  of  a  new  president,  whose 
administration  will  dispel  doubts,  clear  the  air, 
purge  the  government  of  secessionists  and  conspira- 
tors, arid  cheer  the  heart  of  every  loyal  lover  of 
the  Union.  But,  wrested  from  their  context,  these 
words  were  tortured  into  a  prophecy  that  the  war 
of  secession  would  be  at  an  end  in  sixty  days,  and 
were  constantly  quoted  to  show  how  false  a  pro- 
phet, how  blind  to  the  signs  of  the  times,  and  how 
untrustworthy  a  guide  Seward  was.  Even  if  this 
had  been  their  real  meaning,  he  would  not  have 
been  alone  at  that  time  in  his  opinion  that  the 
war,  if  it  came,  would  be  a  short  one.  An  ob- 
server equally  intelligent,  with  equal,  if  not  su- 
perior, opportunities  of  seeing  and  knowing  the 
actual  condition  of  the  South  and  Southern  opin- 
ion, General  Grant  himself,  has  left  on  record  a 
statement  that  during  the  winter  of  1860-61,  and 
indeed  until  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  he  believed 
that  the  war  would  be  over  in  ninety  days.1 

It  was  not  Seward 's  natural  optimism  which  led 
him  and  many  others  with  him  to  the  belief  that 
the  advent  of  Lincoln's  administration  would  bring 
a  brighter  outlook  for  the  Union.  Secession  was 
as  yet  confined  to  the  cotton  and  Gulf  States.  It 
was  believed  that,  unless  joined  by  others,  these 
States  alone  had  not  the  power  to  break  up  the 
Union.  In  the  other  slave  States  there  were 
marked  indications  of  a  strong  Union  feeling;  in 
several,  a  distinct  Union  majority.  At  the  North 
1  Grant's  Autobiography,  i.  p.  222. 


THE   WINTER   OF   1860-61  225 

the  hope  was  very  generally  entertained  that  Lin- 
coln's inaugural  and  the  whole  tone  of  his  ad- 
ministration would  allay  the  passions  and  calm 
the  fears  of  the  people  of  those  slave  States  that 
had  not  passed  secession  ordinances,  and  that  they 
would  remain  loyal.  But  those  who  had  this  hope 
did  not  reckon  upon  the  strength  of  the  family 
affections  and  the  wide  ramifications  of  family  ties 
among  the  dominant  class  in  the  slaveholding 
States.  They  overlooked  the  natural  effect  of  the 
slaveholders'  loyalty  to  one  another,  of  their  strong 
sectional  sympathies,  and  of  their  fidelity  to  their 
supposed  common  interest  in  slavery.  They  for- 
got the  Southerners'  dislike  to  the  North,  the  feel- 
ing they  had  that  they  were  looked  down  upon  as 
slaveholders,  were  treated  as  inferior  in  civiliza- 
tion and  humanity,  and  the  belief,  common  in  the 
slave  States,  that  Northern  intermeddling  with 
their  domestic  institutions  was  the  cause  of  all 
their  difficulties.  Nor  did  those  people  who  were 
still  hopeful  of  the  Union  in  any  way  anticipate 
the  expedients  to  which  the  secessionist  leaders 
would  resort  to  drag  any  doubting  State  into  dis- 
union, or  to  stifle  the  voice  of  the  majority  when 
they  feared  it  was  against  them. 


CHAPTER   XIII 
THE  CABINET  —  FORT   SUMTER 

DURING  the  winter  Mr.  Lincoln  had  endeavored 
without  success  to  select  some  Southern  man  as  a 
member  of  his  cabinet.  When  he  reached  Wash- 
ington on  the  23d  of  February,  there  was  still  one 
place  which  was  supposed  to  be  open ;  and,  in  the 
scramble  and  intriguing  for  this,  there  was  a 
moment  when  it  seemed  as  if  Seward  would 
withdraw.  The  President's  decision  to  nominate 
Montgomery  Blair  for  this  post  was  no  surprise  to 
Seward.  The  statements  of  Weed  on  returning 
from  Springfield  in  December  had  quite  prepared 
him  for  this  as  well  as  for  all  the  other  cabinet 
appointments.  He  had  no  personal  objections  to 
Mr.  Blair,  and  no  reluctance  to  serve  with  him  as 
a  colleague.  The  selection,  however,  gave  great 
offense  not  only  to  the  leading  Whigs,  the  most 
numerous  body  of  Lincoln's  supporters,  since  it 
left  them  a  minority  of  the  cabinet  ministers ;  but 
also  to  many  Republicans  of  Democratic  antece- 
dents, who,  while  recognizing  the  ability  of  the 
Blairs,  both  disliked  and  distrusted  them.  It  was 
also  especially  objectionable,  for  the  reasons  al- 
ready given,  to  the  Union  men  of  Maryland,  by 


THE  CABINET  227 

whom  Mr.  Blair  was  not  recognized  as  a  Mary- 
lander,  and  of  whom,  as  they  were  substantially 
of  old  Whig  stock  and  descent,  Mr.  Blair,  as  a 
Democrat  and  a  stranger,  was  in  no  sense  a  re- 
presentative. Under  these  circumstances,  Blair's 
friends  were  naturally  uneasy,  lest  the  President 
should  for  some  reason  change  his  mind  before  the 
nomination  was  actually  made;  and,  when  rumors 
of  such  a  change  were  flying  about  Washington 
three  or  four  days  before  the  inauguration,  one  of 
these  gentlemen,  a  personal  friend  of  the  Presi- 
dent, asked  him  if  they  were  true.  Mr.  Lincoln 
answered,  "No,  — if  that  slate  is  broken  again,  it 
will  be  at  the  top."  This  was  where  Seward's 
name  stood. 

There  can  be  but  little  doubt  that  this  speech  of 
the  President  was  at  once  reported  to  Seward,  and 
that  it  had  much  to  do  with  the  abrupt  manner  in 
which  on  the  2d  of  March  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Lin- 
coln, thanking  him  for  his  kindness  and  confi- 
dence, but  declining  the  office  of  secretary  of  state. 
The  other  considerations  inducing  him  to  this 
course,  and  of  which  he  speaks  in  his  letter  of 
March  8,  presently  to  be  quoted,  may  have  been 
in  his  mind  for  some  time ;  but  they  had  not  moved 
him'  to  any  definite  action.  Something  of  a  differ- 
ent nature  must  have  suddenly  come  to  his  know- 
ledge, which  caused  him  within  forty-eight  hours 
before  the  inauguration  to  write  to  Mr.  Lincoln, 
withdrawing  his  previous  acceptance  of  the  first 
place  in  the  cabinet.  His  short  note  bears  quite 


228  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

as  strong  marks  of  wounded  feelings  as  of  changed 
convictions.  The  coldness  of  its  tone  is  in  marked 
contrast  with  that  of  his  other  letters  to  the  Presi- 
dent. 

WASHINGTON,  March  2,  1861. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  —  Circumstances  which  have  oc- 
curred since  I  expressed  to  you  in  December  last 
my  willingness  to  accept  the  office  of  secretary  of 
state  seem  to  me  to  render  it  my  duty  to  ask  leave 
to  withdraw  that  consent. 

Tendering  to  you  my  best  wishes  for  the  success 
of  your  administration,  with  my  sincere  and  grate- 
ful acknowledgments  of  all  your  acts  of  kindness 
and  confidence  towards  me,  I  remain  very  respect- 
fully and  sincerely, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD. 

The  Hon.  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN,  President-elect. 

Lincoln  got  this  note  on  Saturday,  and  on  Mon- 
day, inauguration  day,  handed  his  answer  to  his 
secretary,  saying  that  he  "could  not  afford  to  let 
Seward  take  the  first  trick."  This  mode  of  speech, 
with  which  the  country  afterwards  became  famil- 
iar, seemed  at  the  time  more  undignified  and  of- 
fensive than  pithy  and  expressive;  and  many  per- 
sons found  it,  in  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  as  unpleasant  as  it  was  novel.  As  Seward 
did  not  persist  in  his  refusal,  one  may  be  quite  sure 
that  the  discreet  secretary  did  not  repeat  to  him 
the  remark  with  which  the  President  accompanied 


THE   CABINET  229 

the  delivery  of  the  note.  Seward  was  not  con- 
sidering the  administration  as  a  game  in  which  he 
was  trying  to  take  the  first  or  any  other  trick ; 
nor  did  he  wish  his  name  on  a  slate  which  the 
President  had  any  inclination  to  break;  he  was 
not  so  hungry  for  place  that  he  would  submit  to 
any  indignities,  if  he  might  thereby  enjoy  either 
the  honors  or  emoluments  of  office;  he  was  under 
no  obligations  to  Lincoln  to  accept  any  appoint- 
ment. The  obligation,  if  there  were  any,  was  the 
other  way:  Lincoln  had  taken  from  Seward  the 
first  trick  at  Chicago,  and  Seward  had  done  his 
best  to  enable  him  to  win  the  game  in  the  country. 
He  went  into  the  cabinet  from  no  motive  less  noble 
than  the  desire  to  perform  for  his  country  the  best 
public  service  he  could.  He  might  not  unreason- 
ably have  hesitated  about  becoming  a  member  of 
an  administration  composed  of  such  discordant 
and  heterogeneous  materials  as  Mr.  Lincoln  had 
got  together,  —  a  cabinet  which  the  caustic  tongue 
of  a  veteran  Republican  described  as  "an  assort- 
ment of  rivals  whom  he  had  appointed  out  of  cour- 
tesy [Seward,  Chase,  and  Cameron],  one  stump 
speaker  from  Indiana  [Caleb  Smith],  and  two  re- 
presentatives of  the  Blair  family  [Mr.  Bates,  for 
whom  General  Frank  Blair  was  said  to  be  respon- 
sible, and  Montgomery  Blair]." 

After  the  inauguration  Lincoln  had  a  long  talk 
with  Seward,  who  at  last  agreed  to  take  office, 
and  on  the  following  day  was  nominated  and  con- 
firmed as  secretary  of  state. 


230  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

In  writing  home  at  this  time  (March  8,  1861), 
Seward  says:  "The  President  is  determined  that 
he  will  have  a  compound  cabinet;  and  that  it  shall 
be  peaceful,  and  even  permanent.  I  was  at  one 
time  on  the  point  of  refusing  —  nay,  I  did  refuse 
—  to  hazard  myself  in  the  experiment.  But  a  dis- 
tracted country  appeared  before  me,  and  I  with- 
drew from  that  position." 

The  cabinet,  as  finally  constituted,  consisted  of 
Chase,  Welles,  Cameron,  and  Blair,  Democrats; 
Seward,  Bates,  and  Smith,  Whigs.  Some  of 
these  have  already  been  spoken  of,  and  of  others 
there  is  no  occasion  to  speak.  The  attorney-gen- 
eral, Edward  Bates  of  Missouri,  was  known  as  a 
gentleman  of  spotless  reputation,  as  an  old  conser- 
vative Whig  of  distinct  anti-slavery  opinions  in  a 
State  where  the  holding  of  such  views  was  as  cour- 
ageous as  it  was  rare,  as  a  man  who  avoided 
rather  than  sought  office,  and  as  a  respectable 
rather  than  an  eminent  lawyer.  Mr.  Welles  was 
a  Democrat  from  Connecticut.  If  he  had  any  po- 
sition or  prominence  in  his  party,  it  was  practi- 
cally confined  to  his  own  State;  he  was  not  known 
throughout  New  England,  of  which  section  he  was 
the  representative  in  the  cabinet.  He  had  been 
a  newspaper  editor,  and  held  a  facile  pen,  had 
been  in  one  of  the  departments  at  Washington, 
and  postmaster  at  Hartford;  but  he  brought  to 
the  cabinet  neither  increased  strength  within,  nor 
additional  support  from  without.  The  vigorous 
and  successful  administration  of  the  navy  during 


THE   CABINET  231 

the  war  was  substantially  due  to  the  energy  and 
executive  ability  of  Captain  G.  V.  Fox,  the  assist- 
ant secretary  in  that  department. 

Lincoln,  in  entering  upon  the  duties  of  his 
office,  was  confronted  by  problems  as  appalling 
and  perplexing  as  any  government  was  ever  called 
upon  to  face.  The  seven  States  which  had  under- 
taken to  secede  and  break  up  the  Union  had 
formed  their  new  Confederacy.  In  the  month 
before  Lincoln's  inauguration  they  had  elected  a 
president,  and  adopted  a  constitution,  whose  fun- 
damental difference  from  that  of  the  United  States 
was  in  its  provision  for  the  most  "ample  and 
avowed  protection  to  property  in  slaves."  Their 
government  was  complete  on  paper ;  the  machinery 
of  their  state  governments  was  the  same  as  before 
the  secession  ordinances  were  passed,  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  same  officers,  and  running  on  with- 
out change.  They  had  banished  the  sovereignty 
of  the  United  States  from  all  places  within  their 
jurisdiction,  except  Forts  Sumter  and  Pickens; 
the  safety  of  which,  insufficiently  garrisoned  and 
provisioned  as  they  were,  must  be  at  once  pro- 
vided for  by  the  administration,  unless  they  were 
to  be  abandoned. 

On  the  morning  after  the  inauguration,  before 
any  member  of  the  cabinet  had  assumed  the  duties 
of  office,  the  War  Department  communicated  to 
the  President  information  just  received  from  Major 
Anderson  at  Sumter,  stating  that  he  had  only 
a  month's  provisions,  that  newly  erected  hostile 


232  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

batteries  commanded  his  position,  that  the  chan- 
nels and  harbor  had  been  obstructed,  that  patrol 
boats  and  other  Confederate  vessels  guarded  the 
approaches   to   his   post   and   watched    his   every 
movement ;  and  that  it  would  take  twenty  thousand 
men  to  relieve  and  hold  the  fort.     General  Scott 
and  the  other  arm}'  officers  confirmed  this  opinion. 
The  relief  of  Fort  Pickens  was  a  much  simpler 
affair,  if  it  were  only  done  promptly.     But  an  ex- 
pedition for  Sumter  on  the  scale  which  these  offi- 
cers thought  requisite  to  insure  success  was  simply 
impossible.     The  President  had  at  his  disposal  no 
forces  adequate  for  such  an  undertaking.     A  vague 
direction  to  General  Scott  by  word  of  mouth,  that 
he  was  "to  exercise  all  possible  vigilance  for  the 
maintenance  of  all  military  posts,  and  to  call  upon 
the  departments  for  the  means  necessary  for  this 
purpose,"  and  a  request  to  him  to  reconsider  care- 
fully the  matter  of  the  relief  of  Sumter,  were  all 
that  could  be  done  for  the  moment.     Four  days 
later  the  whole  matter  was  laid  before  the  cabinet, 
and  on  several  days  following  there  were  consulta- 
tions with  officers  of  the  navy  as  well  as  of  the 
army.     The  latter  adhered  to  their  opinion  as  to 
the  force  required  to  succor  and  hold  Sumter;  the 
former  thought  that  a  small  expedition  of  light- 
draft  steamers  might  successfully  carry  supplies. 
The  President  hesitated.     He  took  from  General 
Scott  an  order  for  the  evacuation  of  the  fort,  but 
did  not  sign   it;   and  on  the  15th  of   March  he 
called  upon  the  members  of  his  cabinet  to  give 


FORT  SUMTER  .  233 

him  in  writing  their  opinions,  whether,  if  it  were 
possible  to  provision  Sumter,  it  would  be  wise  to 
attempt  to  do  so.  The  form  of  the  question  shows 
that  it  was  the  political,  not  the  military,  problem 
which  was  submitted  to  their  consideration. 

Only  two  members  of  the  cabinet,  Chase  and 
Blair,  favored  the  attempt  to  provision  the  fort, 
assuming  it  to  be  possible  to  do  so.  The  other 
five,  Seward,  Bates,  Cameron,  Welles,  and  Smith, 
were  opposed  to  it.  Seward  in  his  answer  assumed 
that  "the  government  was  to  maintain,  preserve, 
and  defend  the  Union,  peacefully,  if  it  could,  for- 
cibly, if  it  must,  to  every  extremity."  It  was  by 
our  standing  on  the  defensive,  he  thought,  that 
the  border  States  had  so  far  been  kept  loyal,  and 
a  perseverance  in  this  policy  was  in  his  opinion 
the  only  means  of  assuring  their  continuing  so. 
He  expressed  his  fear  that  with  a  daily  press,  daily 
mails,  and  incessant  telegraph,  the  design  to  sup- 
ply the  fort  would  become  known  in  Charleston  as 
soon  as  preparations  should  begin,  and  the  garri- 
son fall  by  assault  before  the  expedition  could 
reach  the  harbor. 

To  obtain  more  certain  and  definite  information 
both  as  to  the  condition  of  Sumter  and  the  exist- 
ence of  any  Union  feeling  in  South  Carolina,  the 
President  dispatched  to  Charleston  Captain  Fox, 
the  author  of  the  relief  plan  proposed  by  the  navy, 
and  two  other  gentlemen.  Returning  before  the 
end  of  the  month  they  reported  that  there  was  but 
one  avowed  Union  man  in  Charleston;  and  while 


234  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

Captain  Fox  was  more  confident  than  ever  of  the 
success  of  his  plan,  he  had  been  unable  to  con- 
vince either  his  companion,  who  visited  the  fort, 
or  Major  Anderson,  that  it  was  in  any  way  a  feasi- 
ble one. 

Just  after  their  return  Lincoln  received  from 
General  Scott  a  memorandum,  advising  the  aban- 
donment of  Fort  Pickens,  as  a  measure  of  concilia- 
tion which  would  soothe  the  eight  remaining  slave 
States,  and  render  perpetual  their  cordial  adher- 
ence to  the  Union.  A  cabinet  meeting  was  called, 
and  with  this  memorandum  and  all  the  other  infor- 
mation before  them,  the  members  of  the  cabinet 
gave  the  President  their  written  opinions  as  to 
both  forts.  Of  the  seven  members  of  the  cabinet 
who,  a  fortnight  before,  had  answered  his  question 
as  to  Sumter,  Blair  had  been  then  the  only  advo- 
cate of  that  plan  for  its  relief  of  which  his  brother- 
in-law,  Captain  Fox,  was  the  author;  though  Chase 
had  doubtfully  answered  that  the  fort  should  be 
relieved  if  possible.  But  now,  when  the  situation 
of  both  forts  was  considered  (only  six  members  of 
the  cabinet  being  present),  Chase  and  Welles 
joined  with  Blair;  Bates  thought  Sumter  should 
be  "either  provisioned  or  evacuated,"  and  they 
all,  except  Blair,  were  of  opinion  that  Pickens 
should  be  reinforced.  Having  heard  the  views 
of  his  constitutional  advisers,  the  President  deter- 
mined to  attempt  the  relief  of  Sumter;  and,  as  he 
was  uneasy  at  the  want  of  news  from  Fort  Pickens, 
for  the  reinforcement  of  which  he  had  already 


FORT  SUMTER  235 

taken  specific  measures,  he  resolved  to  send  an 
expedition  there  also.  The  preparations  for  the 
Sumter  expedition,  which  were  made  through  the 
Navy  Department  and  followed  its  usual  routine, 
were  more  or  less  guessed  at  by  the  public  and  dis- 
closed in  the  newspapers.  Notice  of  this  expedi- 
tion was  officially  communicated  to  the  governor 
of  South  Carolina  in  accordance  with  an  assurance 
the  President  had  previously  authorized  to  be 
given,  that  he  would  give  such  information,  if  it 
should  be  decided  to  provision  the  fort.  But  be- 
fore this  notice  reached  Charleston,  two  telegrams 
had  already  made  the  plan  known  and  its  precise 
details  had  been  ascertained  by  the  treacherous 
rifling  of  Major  Anderson's  mail  bags.  The  bom- 
bardment began  before  the  first  vessel  of  the  relief 
expedition  had  reached  the  rendezvous  off  Charles- 
ton harbor ;  a  violent  storm  prevented  the  arrival 
of  the  tugs  which  were  essential  to  success,  and  the 
expedition  was  a  failure. 

Seward  has  been  criticised  for  detaching  and 
sending  to  Fort  Pickens  the  Powhatan,  which  the 
secretary  of  the  navy  had  ordered  on  the  Sumter 
expedition.  But  Se ward's  responsibility  in  the 
matter,  if  any  at  all,  is  very  slight.  Captain  Fox 
asked  for  the  Pocahontas  for  Sumter,  and  the 
President  ordered  her  to  be  given  him.  Mr. 
Welles  substituted  the  Powhatan.  The  President, 
knowing  nothing  of  this  change,  gave  to  the  officer 
in  charge  of  the  Pickens  expedition  a  direct  order 
for  the  Powhatan,  and  he  carried  her  off.  The 


23G  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

loss  of  this  vessel  did  not  in  fact  have  anything  to 
do  with  the  failure  of  the  Sumter  expedition,  the 
causes  of  which  have  been  already  stated.1 

The  Fort  Pickens  expedition  succeeded,  and 
gave  us  during  the  war  the  control  of  that  fort, 
of  Key  West,  and  of  the  Dry  Tortugas.  This  ex- 
pedition was  fitted  out  under  the  direct  orders  of 
the  President  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Navy 
Department,  and  the  secret  was  kept  so  perfectly 
that  the  first  actual  knowledge  of  it  was  derived 
from  the  report  of  the  commander  on  his  return. 
This  mode  of  proceeding  was,  of  course,  all  wrong 
and  irregular,  but  secrecy  was  vital  to  success, 
and  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  in  the  then 
existing  condition  of  affairs  secrecy  would  have 
been  possible  had  the  Navy  Department  directed 
or  even  been  cognizant  of  the  preparations. 

The  Sumter  expedition  failed  of  its  ostensible 
object,  but  it  brought  about  the  Southern  attack 
on  that  fort.  The  first  gun  fired  there  effectually 
cleared  the  air,  put  an  end  to  discussions  and  dif- 
ferences of  opinion,  and  placed  Lincoln  at  the 
head  of  a  united  people,  resolved,  at  whatever  cost, 
to  maintain  the  integrity  of  their  country.  There 
were  no  more  doubts  or  hesitations.  The  border 
States  chose  their  sides.  The  struggle  had  begun. 

1  The  President's  orders  to  F.ox  were,  "  If  on  your  arrival  at 
Charleston  you  shall  ascertain  that  Fort  Sumter  shall  have  been 
attacked  by  an  opposing  force  you  will  return  here  forthwith." 
The  Baltic,  with  Fox  on  board,  the  first  vessel  to  reach  the  ren- 
dezvous off  Charleston,  arrived  there  just  in  time  to  hear  the 
opening  guns  of  the  bombardment.  N.  $•  H.,  iv.  pp.  35,  54. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

JUSTICE    CAMPBELL    AND    THE    REBEL    COMMIS- 
SIONERS 

AT  the  time  of  Lincoln's  inauguration  there 
were  in  Washington  commissioners  accredited  by 
the  "Confederate  States  of  America"  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  as  a  foreign  power, 
and  instructed  to  open  negotiations  "with  a  view 
to  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Con- 
federacy and  the  concluding  of  treaties  of  amity 
and  good  will  between  the  two  nations."  So  far 
as  its  avowed  objects  were  concerned  their  mission 
was  wholly  fruitless.  They  never  saw  the  Presi- 
dent or  any  member  of  his  cabinet.  They  lin- 
gered in  Washington  for  their  own  purposes,  until 
on  the  8th  of  April  they  took  from  the  State  De- 
partment a  copy  of  a  memorandum  which  Seward, 
unwilling  to  give  them  even  such  recognition  as  is 
implied  by  the  writing  of  a  letter,  had  filed  there 
on  the  15th  of  March,  and  which  they  knew  had 
been  waiting  for  them  since  that  time.  In  this 
memorandum  he  distinctly  but  civilly  declined  to 
receive  them,  and  gave  some  reasons  for  so  doing. 
As  they  assumed  to  be  foreign  ambassadors,  they 
should  have  addressed  themselves  in  the  first  in- 


238  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

stance  to  the  secretary  of  state ;  but,  feeling  doubts 
as  to  their  reception,  they  induced  a  senator  from 
a  border  State  that  had  not  yet  seceded,  to  ask  if 
the  secretary  would  see  them  informally;  when 
Seward  declined  to  do  this,  they  sent  a  formal  ap- 
plication, with  the  final  result  that  has  just  been 
stated.  This  is  the  whole  story  of  these  commis- 
sioners, so  far  as  the  nominal  and  declared  object 
of  their  appointment  is  concerned;  but  Southern 
historians  have  accused  the  government  of  having 
adopted  "a  policy  of  perfidy"  toward  them;  and 
Justice  John  A.  Campbell,  of  Alabama,  —  who 
still  retained  his  place  on  the  Supreme  Court, 
although  he  was  in  fact  the  intermediary  of  the 
Southern  commissioners  and  Confederate  authori- 
ties, —  has  devoted  much  labor  to  an  attempt  to 
prove  that  Mr.  Seward  in  his  intercourse  with  him 
was  guilty  of  duplicity  and  equivocation. 

Judge  Campbell's  intervention  began  in  this 
way.  When  Seward  had  written  the  memoran- 
dum which  has  been  spoken  of,  declining  to  re- 
ceive the  commissioners,  he  directed  a  copy  of  it 
to  be  prepared  and  given  them;  but  before  this 
had  been  done  two  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
Nelson  of  New  York,  an  old  acquaintance  and  al- 
most neighbor  of  Seward,  and  Campbell  of  Ala- 
bama called  upon  him  together.  Campbell,  it  is 
said,  had  his  resignation  already  prepared  and  was 
to  have  sent  it  in  on  that  very  day  (March  15, 
1861). 1  Instead  of  doing  this,  however,  he  had 
1  Stanton  to  Buchanan,  March  10,  1861. 


THE   REBEL  COMMISSIONERS  239 

determined  to  withhold  it  for  a  time,  that,  as  he 
wrote  Jefferson  Davis,  he  might  avail  himself  of 
his  position  to  give  him  access  to  the  administra- 
tion, which  he  could  not  otherwise  have.1  He 
probably  thought  the  breaking  up  of  the  Union  a 
mistake,  and  was  therefore  not  a  disunionist;  but 
he  was  a  states-rights  Southern  Democrat,  who  be- 
lieved that  his  State  had  a  claim  on  him  paramount 
to  any  obligation  which  he  owed  to  the  United 
States  government,  whose  sworn  officer  he  was. 
Alabama  had  seceded,  and  he  meant  to  follow  her. 
He  also  believed,  however,  that  if  the  United 
States  were  to  abandon  Sumter  and  Pickens  and 
let  the  Confederacy  go  its  way  unmolested,  war 
might  be  avoided,  and  a  more  satisfactory  conclu- 
sion of  the  questions  between  the  two  "govern- 
ments "  be  speedily  reached.  Seward  knew  no- 
thing of  this.  He  only  knew  that  Campbell  was 
a  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States ;  and  if  he  had  harbored  any  suspicions  as  to 
his  loyalty,  or  had  felt  the  need  of  any  assurance 
of  this  beyond  the  guaranty  of  his  official  position, 
any  such  doubts  would  have  been  dispelled,  and 
every  requisite  assurance  given,  by  his  coming  as 
the  companion  of  Judge  Nelson,  whose  support  of 
the  government  was  absolutely  unquestioned. 

Seward,  Nelson,  and  Campbell  each  wished  to 

preserve  the  existing  condition  of  things,  and  to 

postpone  as  long  as  possible  any  outbreak,  in  the 

hope  that  a  resort  to  force  might  be  at  last  avoided. 

1  April  3, 1861. 


240  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

Their  reasons  for  wishing  so  and  the  objects  they 
had  in  view  were,  however,  quite  different.  Sew- 
ard's  position  and  hopes  were  well  known.  He 
thought  that,  if  any  clash  of  arms  could  be  post- 
poned until  the  border  States  should  realize  the 
scrupulous  care  with  which  Lincoln  would  respect 
and  maintain  the  just  rights  of  the  South,  they 
would  remain  loyal,  and  that  secession,  confined 
to  the  seaboard  and  Gulf  States,  would  fail  from 
its  own  weakness.  Nelson  dreaded  a  war,  had 
grave  doubts  as  to  the  legality  of  some  coercive 
measures  which  it  was  rumored  that  the  govern- 
ment might  adopt,  and  feared  that,  should  there 
be  a  resort  to  arms,  our  constitutional  government 
might  perish  in  the  struggle.  As  to  Campbell's 
position,  perhaps  enough  has  been  already  said. 
He  considered  the  Confederacy  an  established  fact ; 
but  he  knew  that  peace  was  very  important  for 
the  new  government,  and  he  was  willing  to  work 
for  it  in  the  interests  and  as  the  intermediary  of 
Jefferson  Davis  and  his  cabinet.1  Whether  Camp- 
bell had  seen  the  commissioners  before  calling  on 
Seward  seems  uncertain.  His  visit  with  Judge 
Nelson  was  made  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  Sew- 
ard to  reconsider  the  matter,  and  to  write  to  the 
commissioners,  stating  the  desire  of  the  govern- 
ment for  a  friendly  adjustment,  and  saying  that 
"  every  effort  would  be  made  and  every  forbearance 
exercised  before  resorting  to  extreme  measures." 
This  Seward  declined  to  do,  and  told  the  judges 
1  Davis's  Message,  May  6,  1801. 


THE  REBEL  COMMISSIONERS  241 

that  the  cabinet  would  never  assent  to  it.  On 
Seward's  part  the  conversation  was  frank  and 
friendly;  but,  considering  that  Judge  Campbell 
was  a  Southerner  from  a  seceded  State,  it  was 
unwise  and  indiscreet.  That  there  was  any  differ- 
ence between  Campbell's  relations  and  feeling 
towards  the  government  and  those  of  Judge  Nel- 
son, seems  not  to  have  occurred  to  Seward  at  the 
time ;  certainly  no  suspicion  ever  crossed  his  mind 
that  Campbell  was  in  fact  a  secessionist  going  out 
with  his  State,  but  lingering  in  Washington  and 
keeping  his  place,  that  he  might  better  serve  the 
interests  of  the  rebel  authorities. 

It  had  already  been  announced  half  officially  in 
the  newspapers  that  Sumter  was  to  be  evacuated ; l 
and  Campbell  asked  Seward  point-blank  if  this 
was  so.  Campbell  says  that  Seward  replied  that 
Sumter  would  be  evacuated  within  five  days. 
Leaving  Seward,  Campbell  went  at  once  to  the 
rebel  commissioners  and  reported  to  them  the  re- 
sult of  his  conversation.  He  urged  them  to  give 
a  reasonable  delay  before  demanding  an  answer  to 
their  request  for  an  interview,  telling  them  that, 
if  they  pressed  for  it  at  once,  they  would  receive 
a  civil  but  firm  refusal.  As  to  Fort  Sumter,  he 
said  he  felt  perfectly  confident  it  would  be  evacu- 
ated within  five  days.  The  commissioners  were 
not  quite  open  with  Campbell;  he  found  them  ap- 
parently impatient  of  delay;  they  seemed  to  yield 

1  New  York  Herald,  March  10.     National  Republican,  March 
12,  1861. 


242  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

to  his  wishes  reluctantly,  and  only  after  they  had 
satisfied  themselves  that  all  his  information  had 
come  from  Seward;  they  required  him  to  put  his 
statement  as  to  Sumter  in  writing  and  to  sign  it. 
Their  reluctance,  however,  was  more  apparent  than 
real.  Their  secret  instructions  were  to  "play  with 
Seward  and  gain  time,"  until  the  South  was  ready. 
They  meant  to  make  a  peremptory  demand  for 
their  reception  or  rejection  on  the  very  first  day 
that  Jefferson  Davis  and  his  cabinet  were  ready 
to  meet  the  consequences ;  but  not  till  then,  if  they 
could  avoid  it.  Campbell's  intervention  gave  them 
just  the  excuse  they  desired.  It  enabled  them  to 
stay  in  Washington  and  pick  up  such  crumbs  of 
information  and  gossip  as  could  be  found  in  the 
corridors  of  the  hotels  or  in  other  places  accessible 
to  them,  and  to  secure  time  for  the  Confederacy  to 
make  the  necessary  arrangements  for  its  defense. 
Their  course  was  approved,  and  they  were  in- 
structed to  make  no  formal  demand  for  an  answer 
so  long  as  the  United  States  continued  its  hesi- 
tating, uncertain,  and  vacillating  policy. 

After  seeing  the  commissioners,  Campbell  the 
same  evening  (March  15)  wrote  to  Jefferson  Davis : 
"Before  this  reaches  you  Sumter  will  have  been 
evacuated,  or  orders  will  have  been  issued  for  the 
purpose."  This  he  says  that  Seward  authorized 
him  to  do;  he  also  says  that  he  sent  to  Seward  the 
same  evening  the  substance  of  the  memorandum 
which  he  had  given  to  the  commissioners.  The 
memorandum  and  his  statement  as  to  that  are  to 


THE  REBEL   COMMISSIONERS  243 

be  found  in  his  letter  to  Seward  of  April  13, 
1861.  Campbell's  statement  that  Seward  author- 
ized what  he  wrote  to  Davis  was  never  made  pub- 
lic until  after  Seward's  death. 

The  conversation,  memorandum,  and  letter  to 
Davis  are  all  to  be  referred  to  the  same  day  (March 
15),  the  very  day  of  the  decisive  vote  in  the  cabi- 
net (five  to  two)  against  holding  Sumter;  when 
Lincoln  had  already  in  his  possession  the  order 
for  its  evacuation,  which  only  needed  his  sig- 
nature. Seward,  therefore,  had  not  the  slightest 
doubt  that  the  matter  was  settled.  He  communi- 
cated to  his  visitors  the  confidence  he  himself  felt. 
It  was  an  unguarded  statement  on  his  part,  yet 
not  fairly  subject  to  any  severe  criticism.  What 
Judge  Campbell  stated,  on  the  faith  of  what  he 
heard  from  Seward,  he  might  almost  equally  well 
have  said  upon  the  faith  of  what  is  admitted  to 
have  been  the  almost  official  utterance  of  the  gov- 
ernment organ;  his  attempt  to  torture  Seward's 
statement  into  a  promise  and  to  charge  him  with 
duplicity  in  not  carrying  it  out  wrests  the  words 
from  their  natural  meaning  and  from  the  sense  in 
which  the  judge  understood  them  at  the  time.  He 
knew  perfectly  well  that  it  was  not  in  Mr.  Sew- 
ard's power  to  carry  out  any  policy  or  to  control 
the  situation  in  any  way;  that  all  that  he  could 
do,  and  what  he  was  doing,  was  to  state  the  con- 
clusion, which  he  understood  to  have  been  reached 
at  the  time,  but  which  at  any  moment  before  it 
was  acted  upon  might  be  reversed,  against  his  own 


244  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

judgment  and  contrary  to  his  expectation,  as  in 
this  case  actually  happened.  Moreover,  Judge 
Campbell  seems  to  forget,  —  when  he  speaks  of 
this  statement  as  a  promise,  and  charges  Seward 
with  bad  faith  in  not  fulfilling  it,  —  that  a  promise 
necessarily  implies  two  parties  who  are  on  opposite 
sides,  and  that  in  charging  the  secretary  with  bad 
faith  he  assumes  not  merely  that  he  himself  was, 
as  afterwards  appeared,  a  rebel  emissary,  but  that 
he  was  then  known  as  such  to  Mr.  Seward ;  whereas 
just  the  reverse  is  true.  It  had  never  occurred  to 
the  secretary  that  he  might  find  under  the  robes 
of  a  United  States  judge  an  emissary  of  Jefferson 
Davis.  The  two  judges  who  were  present  at  this 
interview  on  the  15th  of  March  seemed  to  have 
come  on  the  same  errand  and  were  presumed  to  be 
in  the  same  position.  Mr.  Seward's  conversation 
was  with  both  alike ;  whatever  he  said  was  said  to 
both;  whatever  assurances  or  promises  he  made 
were  given  to  one  just  as  much  as  to  the  other;  if 
he  was  guilty  of  any  bad  faith,  he  was  equally  so 
to  both  judges.  Judge  Nelson  approved  Judge 
Campbell's  memorandum  which  has  been  quoted, 
but  we  have  yet  to  learn  that  he  ever  gave  to 
Campbell's  charges  against  Seward  any  counte- 
nance or  indorsement. 

When  five  days  had  gone  by,  Campbell,  whose 
true  relations,  if  there  were  still  any  shadow  of 
doubt  about  them,  are  thus  made  absolutely  clear, 
requested  the  rebel  commissioners  to  telegraph 
Beauregard  at  Charleston  and  ascertain  what  had 


THE   REBEL  COMMISSIONERS  245 

been  done  as  to  vacating  Sumter.  Beauregard 
answered  that  there  had  been  no  change;  there- 
upon Judge  Campbell,  taking  Judge  Nelson  with 
him,  went  twice  to  see  Mr.  Seward  (March  21  and 
22)  and  on  the  same  days  wrote  for  the  commis- 
sioners two  memoranda  giving  the  results  of  these 
interviews.  In  the  first  he  says  that  his  confidence 
in  the  evacuation  of  Sumter  is  unabated;  in  the 
last,  that  of  March  22,  he  repeats  this  statement, 
and  adds,  "  I  shall  have  knowledge  of  any  change 
in  the  existing  status."1  At  this  point  Judge 
Nelson  withdrew  from  further  connection  with  the 
matter;  he  had  probably  begun  to  suspect  Camp- 
bell's real  relation  to  the  Confederate  authorities, 
and  was  afraid  of  being  drawn  into  a  false  position 
by  continuing  to  follow  him  further.  Here  it  be- 
comes important  as  well  as  interesting  to  note  the 
difference  in  Judge  Campbell's  language  when  he 
speaks  of  a  promise  actually  made  him,  and  that 
which  he  used  in  stating  his  own  conclusions  from 
what  had  been  said  in  conversation.  He  does  not 
say  now  that  he  is  convinced  he  shall  have  know- 
ledge of  any  change;  he  asserts  positively,  "I 
shall  have  knowledge  of  any  change  in  the  existing 
status."  This  new  mode  of  expression  was  not  acci- 
dental; it  corresponded  to  the  new  situation.  He 

1  In  his  letter  of  April  13  to  Mr.  Seward  Judge  Campbell 
attempts  to  paraphrase  this  sentence  so  as  to  restrict  it,  and  make 
it  mean  that  as  regards  Fort  Pickens  he  was  to  "  have  notice  of 
any  design  to  alter  the  existing  status  there."  This  is  not  so  in 
the  original  memorandum,  and  this  construction  is  not  warranted 
by  the  context  there. 


246  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

now  for  the  first  time  had  a  promise,  which  Seward 
had  been  authorized  by  the  President  to  make,  and 
the  difference  in  his  phraseology  only  repeated  the 
difference  in  Seward's.  The  President  had  been 
informed  by  Seward  of  his  conversation  with  Nel- 
son and  Campbell  on  the  15th  of  March.  He  had 
weighed  the  matter  deliberately,  and  Seward's 
statement  to  Campbell  on  the  22d,  that  he  should 
"have  knowledge  of  any  change  in  the  existing 
status,"  embodied,  as  Mr.  Lincoln's  biographers 
tell  us,  the  conclusion  which  the  President  himself 
had  reached  and  which  he  had  authorized  Mr. 
Seward  to  communicate  to  Judge  Campbell. 

The  President  was  at  this  time  deeply  consider- 
ing his  duty  with  reference  to  the  whole  situation 
and  especially  as  to  Sumter.  He  had  said  in  his 
inaugural  address:  "The  power  confided  to  me 
will  be  used  to  hold,  occupy,  and  possess  the  pro- 
perty and  places  belonging  to  the  government."  It 
might  be  true  that  it  would  require  a  force  greater 
than  he  could  command  to  hold  Sumter  against  a 
hostile  attack,  and  that  to  send  any  reinforcements 
thither  might  provoke  an  attack ;  the  garrison  al- 
ready there  was  quite  sufficient  for  a  time  of  peace, 
but  its  provisions  were  nearly  exhausted.  Should 
he  undertake  to  throw  in  fresh  supplies  by  sea, 
following  a  plan  which  naval  officers  assured  him 
was  practicable;  or  should  he,  notwithstanding  his 
public  declarations,  withdraw  the  troops,  and  evac- 
uate the  fort  without  making  a  single  effort  to 
supply  the  needed  provisions? 


THE  REBEL   COMMISSIONERS  247 

To  determine  this  matter  to  his  own  satisfaction, 
the  President  felt  that  he  must  have  further  and 
more  accurate  information,  and  to  obtain  this  he 
sent  to  Charleston  three  gentlemen  on  whose  judg- 
ment he  thought  he  could  rely.  One  of  them, 
Marshal  Lamon,  besides  visiting, the  fort  and  see- 
ing Major  Anderson,  had  an  interview  with  Gov- 
ernor Pickens,  in  which  he  made  such  inquiries  as 
to  the  best  mode  of  removing  the  garrison,  and 
whether  they  would  be  permitted  to  depart  in 
peace,  that  the  governor  fancied  the  evacuation 
definitely  determined  on,  and  was  constantly  ex- 
pecting to  see  signs  of  preparation  for  it.  Becom- 
ing impatient  after  a  few  days,  he  wrote  to  Beau- 
regard,  whom  the  Confederate  authorities  had  sent 
to  command  at  Charleston :  "  If  Lamon  was  author- 
ized to  arrange  matters,  Anderson  ought  now  to 
say  so."  Failing  to  learn  anything  through  Beau- 
regard's  inquiries,  the  governor,  on  the  30th  of 
March,  telegraphed  to  the  Confederate  commis- 
sioners at  Washington.  They  sent  at  once  for 
their  intermediary,  who  carried  the  dispatch  to 
Seward  on  Saturday  afternoon  and  left  it,  saying 
that  he  would  return  on  Monday.  When  they 
met  on  that  day,  Campbell,  after  some  unimpor- 
tant talk,  asked  Seward  what  he  might  say  to 
Governor  Pickens  on  the  subject  of  Sumter.  Sew- 
ard wrote :  "  The  President  may  desire  to  supply 
Fort  Sumter,  but  will  not  undertake  to  do  so  with- 
out first  giving  notice  to  Governor  Pickens,"  and 
handed  this  to  Campbell.  According  to  a  more 


248  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

detailed  narrative  of  this  interview  given  by  Camp- 
bell (from  whom,  it  should  be  observed,  our  only 
accounts  of  all  these  interviews  come),  Seward,  in 
reply  to  a  further  questi  ^n,  stated  that  he  did  not 
believe  the  attempt  to  throw  in  supplies  would  be 
made,  and  that  there  was  no  design  to  reinforce 
the  fort.  To  which  Campbell  answered  that  he 
had  that  assurance  previously,  and  added  that  it 
was  already  difficult  to  restrain  South  Carolina, 
and  that  he  "  would  not  recommend  an  answer  that 
did  not  express  the  purpose  of  the  government." 
Thereupon  Seward  went  out,  saying  he  must  see 
the  President;  and  returning  presently,  modified 
the  memorandum  so  that  it  read,  "I  am  satisfied 
the  government  will  not  undertake  to  supply  Fort 
Sumter  without  giving  notice  to  Governor  Pick- 
ens."1  With  this,  as  the  definitive  reply  to  his 
inquiry  as  to  what  he  "might  say  to  Governor 
Pickens,"  Campbell  departed;  and  the  interviews 
between  him  and  Seward  were  brought  to  an  end. 
If  there  is  any  substantial  difference  between  the 
two  papers  written  by  Seward  at  this  time,  it  is, 
that  the  probability  of  an  attempt  to  provision  the 
fort  is  more  strongly  suggested  by  the  second, 
which  Campbell  carried  off,  than  by  the  first.  A 
person  comparing  the  two,  and  considering  the 
change  of  phraseology,  might  naturally  find  the 
explanation  of  it  in  a  more  than  half-formed, 
though  not  fully  ripe  purpose  in  the  President,  by 

1  Campbell  to  Seward,  April  13,  1861.    Reb.  Rec.  I.  Doc.  p. 

426. 


THE  REBEL  COMMISSIONERS  249 

whom  the  alteration  had  evidently  been  made,  to 
endeavor  to  supply  the  garrison  of  Sumter. 

The  day  before  Campbell  went  to  Seward  with 
the  telegram  from  Governor  Pickens  the  cabinet 
had  held  its  second  meeting  as  to  Sumter.  At  this 
meeting  Chase,  Welles,  and  Blair  had  given  their 
opinions  in  favor  of  relieving  the  fort,  by  force  if 
necessary,  and  Bates  had  stated  his  conclusion 
that  the  time  had  come  either  to  evacuate  or  to 
relieve  it,  while  Seward  and  Smith  thought  that 
it  should  be  abandoned.  The  President  had  given 
no  definite  orders  for  an  expedition  to  Sumter, 
though  he  had  issued  some  preparatory  directions, 
which  were  probably  known  only  to  the  secretaries 
of  war  and  of  the  navy,  who  were  each  necessarily 
cognizant  of  them.  It  is  clear  from  his  letter  of 
April  1  to  the  President,  which  is  presently  to 
be  spoken  of,  that  Seward  either  did  not  know 
them,  or  had  no  belief  that  they  would  lead  to  any 
consequences.  If  there  was  any  rumor  of  these 
preparations  in  Washington,  it  was  not  sufficient 
to  excite  serious  uneasiness  in  the  Confederate 
commissioners  before  the  6th  of  April,  the  day  on 
which  the  President  gave  to  Captain  Fox  his  final 
orders  for  the  Sumter  expedition,  and  sent  to 
Charleston  a  confidential  messenger  with  the  pro- 
mised notice  to  Governor  Pickens  of  his  intention 
to  provision  the  fort. 

By  the  morning  of  Sunday,  April  7,  however, 
the  commissioners  had  become  so  disturbed  that 
they  again  invoked  Campbell's  assistance;  he  at 


250  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

once  wrote  to  Seward  and  received  from  him  this 
brief  reply :  "  Faith  as  to  Sumter  fully  kept ;  wait 
and  see."  This  of  course  meant  that  notice  had 
been  given  to  the  governor,  as  agreed,  of  the  at- 
tempt to  provision  the  fort,  and  that  Campbell,  if 
he  would  only  wait,  would  see  this.  It  is  evident 
that  Campbell  at  the  time  so  understood  it,  for  on 
the  same  day,  after  receiving  this  line  from  Sew- 
ard, he  wrote  the  commissioners:  "I  believe  that 
my  assurances  to  you,  that  the  government  will 
not  undertake  to  supply  Sumter  without  notice 
to  Governor  Pickens,  will  be  fully  sustained  by 
the  event."  A  further  extract  from  the  draft  of 
a  letter  written  by  him  on  the  same  day  will  show 
that,  while  he  knew  and  shared  the  common  opin- 
ion in  Washington  as  to  the  uncertainties  and 
vacillations  of  the  administration,  he  also  antici- 
pated what  was  to  be  its  ultimate  decision  as  to 
Sumter.  He  says:  "Such  government  by  blind- 
man's-buff,  stumbling  along  too  far,  will  end  by 
the  general  overturn.  Fort  Sumter,  I  fear,  is  a 
case  past  arrangement." 

The  same  Sunday  evening  at  nine  o'clock  the 
commissioners'  secretary  called  at  Se ward's  house 
to  ask  that  the  answer  to  their  request  for  an  in- 
terview, which  they  knew  had  been  waiting  their 
pleasure  at  the  State  Department  for  more  than 
three  weeks,  might  be  delivered  to  them  at  two 
o'clock  the  next  day.  This  was  done.  On  the 
9th  of  April,  they  sent  to  Mr.  Seward  a  reply, 
which  had  previously  been  submitted  to  Judge 


THE   REBEL  COMMISSIONERS  251 

Campbell  and  modified  at  his  request,  and  on  the 
llth  they  left  Washington.  They  had  gained  the 
delay  which  they  were  instructed  to  obtain.  If 
their  hopes  of  a  peaceful  solution  of  their  difficul- 
ties by  the  administration's  abandonment  of  Sum- 
ter  and  Pickens  seem  to  have  been  at  times  some- 
what too  sanguine,  and  their  communications  to 
the  Confederate  authorities  too  rose-colored,  yet 
their  telegram  of  March  22  —  "  And,  what  is  of 
infinite  importance  to  us,  notice  will  be  given  of 
any  change  in  the  existing  status "  —  shows  that 
they  themselves  were  not  over-confident  of  the  ful- 
fillment of  their  own  prophecies  of  evacuation  and 
of  peace.  Jefferson  Davis  and  his  cabinet  never 
put  any  faith  in  these.  On  the  1st  of  March  the 
Confederate  secretary  of  war  wrote  to  Beauregard 
at  Charleston:  "Give  but  little  credit  to  the  ru- 
mors of  an  amicable  adjustment.  Do  not  slacken 
for  a  moment  your  energies;  "  and  this  represents 
the  attitude  and  action  of  the  authorities  at  Mont- 
gomery from  that  time  forward. 

The  news  of  the  bombardment  of  Sumter  reached 
Washington  on  the  12th  of  April;  the  next  day 
Campbell  addressed  to  Seward  a  letter  complain- 
ing that  the  equivocating  conduct  of  the  adminis- 
tration was  the  proximate  cause  of  this  great  ca- 
lamity. To  this  letter  Seward  properly  made  no 
reply.  A  week  later  Campbell  inclosed  a  copy  of 
it  in  another  communication,  in  which  he  said  that 
he  insisted  upon  an  explanation,  adding  that  in 
case  of  refusal  he  should  not  hold  himself  debarred 


252 

from  placing  these  letters  before  such  persons  as 
were  entitled  to  an  explanation  from  him.  This 
letter  also  remained  unanswered.  Shortly  after- 
wards Campbell  gave  his  own  version  of  the  matter 
to  Stanton,  who,  after  hearing  Campbell's  whole 
story,  wrote  to  Buchanan  that  he  did  not  believe 
any  deceit  or  double  dealing  could  be  justly  im- 
puted to  Seward,  that  he  had  no  doubt  that  Seward 
believed  that  Sumter  would  be  evacuated,  as  he 
stated  it  would  be;  but  that  the  war  party  over- 
ruled him.  With  Judge  Campbell's  later  state- 
ments, founded  upon  his  recollections  after  the 
lapse  of  ten  years,  there  is  no  need  to  concern 
ourselves;  so  far  as  they  conform  to  the  contem- 
porary records  they  are  unimportant,  so  far  as 
they  modify  them  they  are  less  trustworthy.  Nor 
is  this  the  place  to  discuss  what  must  be  regarded 
as  Judge  Campbell's  equivocal  and  unfortunate 
position  in  the  whole  affair.  As  an  historical  epi- 
sode, the  incidents  have  but  little  importance, 
though  they  are  not  devoid  of  interest  as  the  story 
of  a  single  Southern  intrigue;  as  the  basis  of  a 
serious  accusation  against  Seward  they  seem  to 
justify  this  somewhat  full  statement  of  them. 

Seward's  natural  optimism  and  his  earnest  desire 
to  avoid  the  "civil  war,  and  the  violent  emancipa- 
tion "  which  he  had  long  before  prophesied  as  its 
inevitable  consequence,  may  have  made  him  over- 
confident that  some  peaceful  settlement  would  be 
reached;  he  may  have  expressed  this  confidence 
too  strongly  to  Judge  Campbell,  with  whom,  as 


THE  REBEL   COMMISSIONERS  253 

subsequent  events  showed,  he  talked  more  freely 
than  was  judicious,  misled,  as  other  people  were, 
as  to  Judge  Campbell's  loyalty,  by  his  retaining 
his  seat  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
notwithstanding  the  secession  of  Alabama,  and  by 
his  selection  of  Judge  Nelson  of  New  York,  a 
familiar  acquaintance  and  almost  neighbor  of  Sew- 
ard,  as  the  companion  of  his  visits.  The  only 
independent  contemporary  opinion  as  to  Se ward's 
conduct  in  these  transactions  is  that  of  Mr.  Stan- 
ton,  who  was  then  far  more  disposed  to  criticise 
the  administration  than  to  commend  it,  and  to  find 
fault  with  Seward  than  to  excuse  or  justify  him ; 
and  who  reached  his  conclusions  solely  from  Judge 
Campbell's  own  story,  told  him  while  the  whole 
matter  and  every  detail  of  it  was  fresh  and  vivid 
in  the  judge's  mind.  Under  these  circumstances, 
it  is  no  more  than  justice  to  Seward  that  these 
conclusions  should  be  accepted  as  final,  and  that 
he  should  be  relieved  from  any  imputation  of  deceit 
or  double  dealing  in  the  whole  affair. 


CHAPTER  XV 

LETTER  OF  APRIL  1  TO  THE  PRESIDENT  —  THE 
BLOCKADE 

BEFORE  the  close  of  Se ward's  first  month  as 
secretary  of  state  there  was  another  incident  which 
there  is  reason  to  believe  has  been  misinterpreted, 
and  has  consequently  subjected  Seward  to  criti- 
cisms both  harsh  and  unjust. 

On  the  1st  of  April  he  submitted  to  Mr.  Lin- 
coln a  paper  entitled  "Some  Thoughts  for  the 
President's  Consideration,"  in  which  he  stated  that 
at  the  end  of  a  month's  administration  we  were 
"without  a  policy,  either  domestic  or  foreign." 
But,  though  he  admitted  this  condition  to  have 
been  unavoidable,  the  presence  of  the  Senate  and 
the  pressure  of  the  office-seekers  having  prevented 
attention  to  graver  matters,  any  further  delay  to 
adopt  and  prosecute  our  policies  for  both  domestic 
and  foreign  affairs  would,  he  said,  not  only  bring 
scandal  upon  the  administration,  but  danger  upon 
the  country. 

As  to  domestic  policy,  he  suggested  that  "we 
must  change  the  question  before  the  public  from 
one  upon  slavery,  or  about  slavery,  for  a  question 
upon  union  or  disunion."  The  occupation  or  evac- 


LETTER   TO   THE  PRESIDENT  255 

uation  of  Fort  Sumter  being  regarded  as  a  slavery 
or  party  question,  although  it  was  not  so  in  fact, 
he  "would  terminate  it,  as  a  safe  means  of  chan- 
ging the  issue;  "  and  he  deemed  it  "fortunate  that 
the  last  administration  created  the  necessity." 
He  would  reinforce  and  defend  all  the  forts  in  the 
gulf,  have  the  navy  recalled  from  foreign  stations 
to  be  prepared  for  a  blockade,  and  put  Key  West 
under  martial  law. 

As  to  foreign  nations,  —  he  "  would  demand  ex- 
planations from  Spain  and  France  categorically, 
at  once;  "  and  would  convene  Congress  and  de- 
clare war  against  them,  if  the  explanations  were 
unsatisfactory;  he  would  also  "seek  explanations 
from  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  and  send  agents 
into  Canada,  Mexico,  and  Central  America  to 
rouse  a  vigorous  continental  spirit  of  independence 
on  this  continent  against  European  intervention." 
"But,"  he  added,  "whatever  policy  we  adopt, 
there  must  be  an  energetic  prosecution  of  it.  It 
must  be  somebody's  business  to  pursue  and  direct 
it  incessantly.  Either  the  President  must  do  it 
himself,  and  be  all  the  while  active  in  it,  or  de- 
volve it  on  some  member  of  his  cabinet.  It  is  not 
in  my  especial  province,  but  I  neither  seek  to  evade 
nor  assume  responsibility." 

This  paper  was  first  printed,  eighteen  years  after 
Se ward's  death  and  a  quarter  of  a  century  after 
that  of  Lincoln,  by  Nicolay  and  Hay.1  Its  exist- 
ence had  been  forgotten  by  those  who  had  ever 
1  Abraham  Lincoln,  a  History,  iii.  pp.  445-447. 


256  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

known  of  it,  and  it  had  apparently  never  been  seen 
or  spoken  of  from  the  day  when  Mr.  Lincoln  re- 
ceived and  answered  it,  nearly  thirty  years  before, 
until  it  fell  into  the  hands  of  his  biographers. 
Every  one,  therefore,  knowing  the  close  relation 
existing  between  them  and  Mr.  Lincoln  naturally 
accepted  without  question  their  account  of  the  mat- 
ter and  their  comments  upon  it.  This  was  done 
in  the  first  edition  of  this  book;  the  paper  was 
treated  as  a  thunderbolt  out  of  a  clear  sky,  —  the 
secretary  appearing  to  recommend  to  the  Presi- 
dent that,  in  the  midst  of  a  civil  convulsion  which 
threatened  the  destruction  of  the  republic,  he 
should  initiate  a  foreign  policy  which  would  ap- 
parently involve  us  at  once  in  a  war  with  at  least 
three  first-class  European  powers,  and  to  suggest 
further  that  it  would  not  be  amiss,  if  the  President 
had  any  hesitation  about  carrying  out  this  scheme, 
that  he  should  step  aside  and  leave  the  secretary 
to  manage  the  whole  business.  But  since  the  pub- 
lication of  that  edition,  it  has  been  stated  to  me 
on  unquestionable  authority  1  that,  when  Seward 
wrote  this  paper,  he  knew  not  merely  of  the  revo- 
lution in  San  Domingo,  in  which  the  Spanish  flag 
had  been  hoisted,  but  also,  —  not  from  newspaper 
reports,  but  from  members  of  the  diplomatic  body 
with  whom  he  had  personal  and  friendly  relations 
—  that  France  and  Spain  were  actively  discuss- 
ing schemes  for  invading  Mexico  and  establishing 
a  European  protectorate  there,  also  that  Great 

1  Letter  of  F.  W.  Seward. 


LETTER  TO  THE  PRESIDENT  257 

Britain  and  Russia  had  been  sounded  on  this 
subject;  that  he  thought  the  surest  way  to  keep 
the  peace  with  France  and  Spain,  and  to  break  up 
their  plans  before  they  were  fairly  committed  to 
them,  was  to  put  on  a  bold  front  and  insist  on 
knowing  at  once  their  intentions,  while  we  at  the 
same  time  endeavored  to  rouse  in  the  other  Ameri- 
can republics  and  in  Canada  an  active  spirit  of 
opposition  to  any  interference  by  the  Continental 
powers  of  Europe  with  the  absolute  independence 
of  any  country  in  America;  that  he  believed  that 
the  manifestation  in  Canada  of  a  strong  public 
sentiment  of  this  kind  might  have  an  almost  deci- 
sive weight  in  determining  the  course  of  England, 
and  would  at  all  events  greatly  diminish  the  pro- 
bability of  her  acquiescing  in  any  such  schemes; 
that,  if  the  republics  of  Central  America  could  be 
made  to  see  that  a  successful  attack  upon  any  one 
of  them  by  a  European  power  would  be  the  pre- 
cursor of  the  downfall  of  all,  they  would  be  in- 
duced to  unite  for  the  repulse  of  the  first  invader, 
and  that  the  apprehension  of  this  union  would  tend 
to  deter  the  European  powers  from  attempting  such 
conquests.1 

From  England  and  Russia  it  will  be  observed 
that  Seward  proposed  in  his  memorandum  not  to 
demand  but  to  seek  explanations;  and  this  differ- 
ence of  phraseology  shows  that  he  hoped  that  these 
explanations  would  be  of  a  friendly  and  reassuring 
character.  Happily  for  us  the  Mexican  scheme 
1  Letter  of  F.  W.  Seward. 


258  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

was  abandoned  for  the  time,  and  there  was  there- 
fore no  necessity  for  any  further  consideration  of 
Se ward's  suggestions  in  this  respect.  It  is  cer- 
tain, however,  that  these  were  intended  to  work 
for  peace  and  not  for  war,  and  to  meet  an  emer- 
gency apparently  threatening  at  the  time,  but 
which  fortunately  passed  by;  that  the  President 
understood  the  circumstances,  and  knew  to  what 
condition  of  affairs  they  were  intended  to  apply 
and  the  results  they  were  expected  to  secure. 

The  paper  was  written  by  Seward  himself,  was 
copied  that  it  might  be  legible,  and  was  then  laid 
before  the  President  and  left  with  him;  it  was 
a  confidential  memorandum  written  for  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's personal  use,  intended  to  aid,  not  to  antag- 
onize him,  and  did  not  differ  in  character  and 
purpose  from  other  similar  memoranda  from  all 
the  members  of  the  cabinet  written  to  serve  as 
reminders  of  views  expressed  in  conversations  or 
in  cabinet  meetings. 

Seward's  suggestion  of  his  readiness  to  assume 
further  responsibilities,  if  called  upon  to  do  so,  was 
simply  a  declaration  of  his  readiness  to  be  helpful 
in  any  way  that  he  could,  and  was  without  any 
selfish  or  ambitious  purpose  on  his  part.  It  was 
intended  to  assist,  not  to  embarrass,  the  President, 
and  its  importance  and  its  sincerity  were  fully 
proved  a  few  weeks  later,  when  the  administration 
began  to  realize  that  our  self-preservation  required 
some  arbitrary  proceedings  by  the  government,  — 
the  arrest  without  legal  authority  of  individuals 


LETTER  TO   THE   PRESIDENT  259 

suspected  of  plotting  its  destruction,  and  a  search 
for  and  seizure  of  the  telegrams  and  correspondence 
of  such  persons.  There  was  no  warrant  of  law  for 
such  acts,  and  any  officer  who  should  assume  the 
responsibility  for  them  ran  the  risk  of  being  com- 
pelled to  pay  heavy  damages,  as  well  as  that  of 
incurring  public  reprobation  and  odium.  There- 
fore, while  the  necessity  of  such  proceedings  was 
fully  recognized,  every  one  shrank  from  tasks  so 
troublesome  and  involving  such  unpleasant  possi- 
bilities ;  until  Seward,  finding  that  no  one  else  in 
the  cabinet  was  willing  to  undertake  them,  con- 
sented to  do  so.  His  conduct  was  recognized  by 
the  loyal  citizens  and  by  the  government  as  emi- 
nently patriotic,  a  self-sacrifice  on  his  part  in  aid 
of  other  overworked  departments,  and  was  cor- 
dially accepted  as  such  by  these  departments. 

Those  persons  whose  relations  with  Seward  were 
most  intimate,  who  enjoyed  his  entire  confidence, 
who  were  in  Washington  at  the  time,  and  in  daily 
and  hourly  communication  with  him,  state  as  a 
matter  of  absolute  certainty  within  their  own  know- 
ledge, that  this  is  the  true  meaning,  and  all  the 
meaning,  that  there  is  in  the  last  two  sentences  of 
his  paper ;  that  Mr.  Lincoln  understood  perfectly 
well  that  this  was  what  was  meant;  and  that  the 
idea  of  asking  the  President  to  allow  him  or  any 
one  else  to  usurp  the  presidential  functions  and 
authority,  and  to  rule  in  his  stead,  never  entered 
Seward 's  mind.1 

1  Letter  of  F.  W.  Seward. 


260  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

An  apparent  difficulty  in  accepting  this  expla- 
nation arises  from  the  fact  that,  though  all  his 
suggestions  as  to  a  policy  in  which  he  was  to  take 
an  active  part  were  made  with  reference  to  our 
foreign  affairs,  which  were  precisely  those  of  which 
he  had  charge,  yet,  in  speaking  of  what  he  recom- 
mends and  offers  to  do,  he  says,  "It  is  not  my 
especial  province."  It  is  natural,  therefore,  to  ask 
what  this  statement  means,  unless  his  purposes  of 
management  extended  to  other  departments  than 
his  own.  The  answer  is  obvious;  the  diplomatic 
correspondence  was  his  province,  but  the  sending 
of  unaccredited  agents  to  excite  public  opinion 
in  Canada  and  the  American  republics  —  a  plan 
like  that  which  he  afterwards  effectively  pursued, 
with  Mr.  Lincoln's  approval,  in  England  and 
France  —  was  not  his  province,  and  required  the 
previous  authority  of  the  President  before  he  could 
move  in  it.  There  is  really  nothing,  therefore, 
upon  the  face  of  the  paper  inconsistent  with  what 
the  only  persons  now  living  who  have  a  right  to 
speak  as  to  Seward's  intent  and  meaning,  knew  at 
the  time  to  be  its  purpose.  So  understood,  it  is  in 
harmony  with  Seward's  own  declarations  in  a  letter 
of  somewhat  later  date  to  some  political  support- 
ers,1 and  in  accordance  with  all  that  we  know 
of  Seward's  character,  disposition,  and  conduct; 
while  on  the  other  hand,  if  this  incident  is  to  re- 
ceive the  construction  which  Seward's  critics  first 
put  upon  it  long  years  after  his  death,  it  stands 
1  Life,  ii.  pp.  50,  51. 


LETTER  TO   THE   PRESIDENT  261 

quite  apart  from  the  rest  of  his  life  and  in  flagrant 
contradiction  to  it,  is  inconsistent  with  his  own 
declarations,  and  is  denied  by  the  authoritative 
statements  of  those  who  are  qualified  to  speak  on 
his  behalf. 

"The  affair  never  reached  the  knowledge  of  any 
other  member  of  the  cabinet,  or  even  the  most 
intimate  of  the  President's  friends."1  All  that 
Mr.  Lincoln  ever  said  about  it  is  to  be  found  in 
his  note  to  Mr.  Seward  written  on  the  same  day. 

Lincoln  was  a  person  exceptionally  politic  and 
shrewd,  and,  taking  these  qualities  into  account,  it 
may  be  contended  that  his  letter  is  not  absolutely 
inconsistent  with  his  understanding  Seward's  mem- 
orandum in  the  sense  afterwards  attributed  to  it 
by  the  critics;  but  at  the  same  time  it  must  be 
admitted  that  there  is  nothing  in  this  letter  incom- 
patible with  his  acceptance  of  the  memorandum  as 
meaning  exactly  what  Seward  intended  it  to  mean. 
If  either  Mr.  Lincoln  believed  the  intent  and 
meaning  of  the  memorandum  to  be  what  his  bio- 
graphers assume  that  it  was;  or  if  Seward  had 
either  so  intended  it,  or  had  any  suspicion  that 
Mr.  Lincoln  so  understood  it,  it  seems  quite  im- 
possible that  there  should  not  have  been  some  tem- 
porary embarrassment  between  the  President  and 
secretary,  if  not  on  Mr.  Lincoln's,  at  least  on 
Seward's  side,  — some  interruption,  however  slight 
and  momentary,  in  the  harmony  of  their  relations. 
But  there  was  nothing  of  the  sort;  during  these 
1  N.  fr  H.,  ill.  pp.  448,  449. 


262  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

very  days  Seward  was  engaged  with  the  President 
in  most  confidential  work  entirely  unconnected  with 
his  department;  and  all  that  is  known  goes  to 
show  that  their  relations  were  never  for  a  single 
instant  changed  or  even  clouded,  that  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's confidence  in  Se ward's  loyalty  and  upright- 
ness of  purpose  was  never  shaken  in  the  slightest 
degree,  that  their  mutual  regard  for  one  another 
grew  steadily,  and  that  their  personal  relations 
became  continually  more  close,  affectionate,  and 
trustful  until  they  were  severed  by  death. 

To  sum  up  all  that  is  now  known  about  this 
matter :  On  the  one  hand  the  precise  and  emphatic 
statements  of  those  who  speak  with  both  knowledge 
and  authority  effectually  dispose  of  the  charge  that 
Seward  in  his  memorandum  intended  any  disloy- 
alty whatsoever  to  his  chief;  while  on  the  other 
hand  Mr.  Lincoln's  uniform  conduct  towards  his 
secretary  both  at  the  time  and  afterwards  gives  no 
indication  that  he  ever  misunderstood  Se  ward's 
intentions,  or  questioned  the  good  faith  and  recti- 
tude of  purpose  of  "  Some  Thoughts  for  the  Presi- 
dent's Consideration." 

Something  has  already  been  said  of  the  condi- 
tion of  our  public  service  at  the  beginning  of  Lin- 
coln's administration.  But  it  is  quite  impossible 
for  any  one  not  at  that  time  in  active  life  to  realize 
the  extent  of  the  disintegration  and  demoralization 
which  then  prevailed  in  every  department.  The 
civil  service  contained  many  men  who  thought  the 


LETTER  TO   THE   PRESIDENT  263 

betrayal  of  their  trusts  no  shame.  The  South 
found  its  most  distinguished  officers  in  deserters 
from  our  army  and  navy.  Before  the  close  of 
Buchanan's  administration  one  of  our  generals  had 
not  only  treacherously  surrendered  to  the  seces- 
sionists the  public  property  of  the  United  States 
confided  to  his  charge,  but  had  attempted  to  carry 
with  him  into  the  rebel  service  the  troops  under 
his  command.  Another  officer,  whose  loyalty  was 
not  put  to  the  test  till  later,  received  and  trans- 
mitted the  orders  for  the  disposition  of  the  troops 
when  there  were  apprehensions  of  a  night  attack 
on  Washington,  and  the  same  evening  fled  and 
joined  the  hostile  forces.  In  the  diplomatic  and 
consular  services  there  were  men  who,  while  hold- 
ing the  commission  of  the  United  States,  nego- 
tiated purchases  of  arms  for  the  rebels,  and  others 
who  assisted  their  cause  by  more  indirect  and  less 
conspicuous  means.  Four,  certainly,  of  Buchan- 
an's foreign  ministers  returned  home  only  to  accept 
commissions  in  the  Southern  army,  and  one  of 
these  had  not  even  the  common  excuse  of  going 
with  his  State,  for  his  State  never  seceded.  In  his 
instructions  to  Mr.  Adams,  written  a  day  or  two 
before  the  attack  on  Sumter,  Seward  gives  a  vivid 
and  forcible  picture  of  the  situation :  — 

"The  party  which  was  dominant  in  the  federal 
government  during  the  period  of  the  last  adminis- 
tration embraced  practically  and  held  in  universal 
communion  all  disunionists  and  sympathizers.  It 
held  the  executive  administration.  The  secretaries 


264  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

of  the  treasury,  war,  and  the  interior  were  dis- 
unionists.  The  same  party  held  a  large  majority 
in  the  Senate,  and  nearly  equally  divided  the 
House  of  Representatives.  Disaffection  lurked, 
if  it  did  not  openly  avow  itself,  in  every  depart- 
ment and  in  every  bureau,  in  every  regiment  and 
in  every  ship  of  war,  in  the  post  office  and  in  the 
custom  house,  and  in  every  legation  and  consulate 
from  London  to  Calcutta.  Of  four  thousand  four 
hundred  and  seventy  officers  in  the  public  service, 
civil  and  military,  two  thousand  one  hundred  and 
fifty -four  were  representatives  of  States  where  the 
revolutionary  movement  was  openly  advocated  and 
urged,  even  if  not  actually  organized."  .  .  .  The 
new  administration  "found  the  disunionists  perse- 
veringly  engaged  in  raising  armies  and  laying 
sieges  around  national  fortifications  situate  within 
the  territory  of  the  disaffected  States.  The  fed- 
eral marine  seemed  to  have  been  scattered  every- 
where except  where  its  presence  was  necessary, 
and  such  of  the  military  forces  as  were  not  in  the 
remote  States  and  Territories  were  held  back  from 
activity  by  vague  and  mysterious  armistices,  which 
had  been  informally  contracted  by  the  late  presi- 
dent or  under  his  authority,  with  a  view  to  post- 
pone conflict  ...  at  least  until  the  waning  term 
of  his  administration  should  reach  its  appointed 
end.  Commissioners  .  .  .  sent  by  the  new  con- 
federacy were  already  at  the  capital,  demanding 
recognition  of  its  sovereignty  and  a  partition  of 
the  national  property  and  domain.  The  treasury, 


THE  BLOCKADE  265 

depleted  by  robbery  and  peculation,  was  ex- 
hausted, and  the  public  credit  was  prostrate. 

"The  period  of  four  months,  which  intervened 
between  the  election  which  designated  the  head  of 
the  new  administration  and  its  advent,  .  .  .  as- 
sumed the  character  of  an  interregnum,  in  which 
not  only  were  the  powers  of  the  government  para- 
lyzed, but  even  its  resources  seemed  to  disappear 
and  be  forgotten." 

From  the  time  when  his  secretary  of  state  trans- 
mitted to  our  ministers  abroad  Buchanan's  message 
of  December,  1860,  which  contained  the  statement 
that  in  his  opinion  secession  was  a  revolutionary, 
not  a  constitutional  right,  but  that  the  federal 
government  had  no  power  to  interfere  with,  re- 
strain, or  coerce  any  State  attempting  to  carry  out 
this  revolution,  no  general  instructions  as  to  their 
duties  in  the  grave  crisis  through  which  we  were 
passing  were  issued  to  our  foreign  ministers,  until 
the  28th  of  February,  1861,  less  than  a  week  be- 
fore Lincoln's  inauguration.  During  this  whole 
period  the  pernicious  doctrines  of  this  message, 
which  gave  to  secession  all  the  countenance  and 
encouragement  its  friends  could  expect,  were  per- 
mitted to  make  their  way  unchecked  throughout 
the  various  countries  of  Europe,  encouraging  their 
rulers  in  the  belief  that  the  ill  contrived  govern- 
mental machine,  the  United  States,  which  its  own 
president  declared  to  be  held  together  only  by  the 
mutual  consent  of  its  several  parts,  was  fast  falling 
to  pieces,  if  indeed  it  were  not  already  broken  up. 


266  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

At  length,  after  this  long  silence,  but  not  until 
the  very  close  of  his  official  term,  the  Democratic 
secretary  of  state  wrote  to  our  representatives 
abroad  a  circular,  in  which,  after  reiterating 
Buchanan's  declaration  that  there  was  no  consti- 
tutional right  of  secession,  and  stating  again  the 
sectional  character  of  the  election  and  the  conse- 
quent apprehensions  of  the  defeated  party,  he  in- 
structed our  ministers  that  the  President  expected 
them  to  use  such  means  as  might  in  their  judgment 
be  necessary  and  proper  to  prevent  the  success  of 
any  attempts  to  secure  from  the  European  powers 
the  recognition  of  the  new  confederation,  declar- 
ing that  such  an  acknowledgment  by  any  Euro- 
pean government  would  tend  to  disturb  the  friendly 
relations  existing  between  that  country  and  our 
own. 

One  of  Seward's  first  acts  on  entering  upon  the 
duties  of  his  office  was  to  endeavor  to  reinforce 
the  formal  and  perfunctory  directions  of  this  dis- 
patch, and  to  counteract  its  statement  of  the  issues 
and  results  of  the  election,  —  a  statement  which 
seemed  half  to  apologize  for  the  conduct  of  the 
seceding  States.  For  this  purpose  he  wrote  a  cir- 
cular dispatch  more  bold  and  vigorous  in  tone,  in 
which  he  inclosed  Lincoln's  inaugural  address. 
In  this  circular  he  expressed  his  entire  confidence 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  Union,  and  strove  to 
impress  foreign  powers  with  the  conviction  that  its 
perpetuity  was  more  for  their  advantage  than  its 
division  into  several  distinct  nationalities  would 


THE   BLOCKADE  267 

be;  while  he  also  called  upon  our  ministers  to 
exercise  the  greatest  possible  diligence  to  prevent 
the  designs  of  those  who  would  invoke  foreign 
intervention  to  embarrass  or  overthrow  the  re- 
public. 

To  purge  our  diplomatic  and  consular  service  of 
all  persons  whose  loyalty  was  uncertain  was,  how- 
ever, his  most  urgent  duty;  in  many  cases  it  was 
not  enough  that  our  representatives  abroad  should 
"speak  only  the  language  of  truth  and  loyalty, 
and  of  confidence  in  our  institutions  and  destiny," 
but  it  was  of  the  utmost  consequence  that  they 
should  be  persons  selected  with  especial  regard  to 
their  ability  and  fitness  for  the  posts  assigned 
them.  It  could  hardly  be  expected  that  Lincoln, 
who  not  unnaturally  considered  our  difficulties  as 
a  domestic  quarrel  with  which  foreign  nations  had 
no  concern,  should  be  so  keenly  alive  to  the  im- 
portance of  these  nominations  as  was  Seward ;  but 
the  President  gradually  brought  himself  to  attach 
more  weight  to  fitness  than  to  pressure  in  his  selec- 
tion from  the  candidates  proposed,  and  was  willing 
to  accept  the  responsibility  for  several  of  them 
being  "huddled  up  and  coming  from  a  small  sec- 
tion of  the  country."  There  may  have  been  dif- 
ferences of  opinion  between  the  President  and  sec- 
retary as  to  who  would  best  fill  some  of  the  vacant 
places ;  but  the  appointments  were  as  a  rule  excep- 
tionally good,  and  the  most  important  one,  which 
we  know  from  the  President's  own  statement  to 
have  been  made  at  Se ward's  pressing  instance  and 


268  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

on  his  responsibility,  that  of  Mr.  Adams  to  Eng- 
land, proved  the  wisest  possible. 

With  the  actual  outbreak  of  the  rebellion,  the 
mode  of  dealing  with  our  Southern  ports  became  a 
matter  of  the  first  importance,  requiring  an  imme- 
diate decision.  To  leave  them  open  to  commerce, 
as  they  were,  was  out  of  the  question.  It  would 
enable  the  seceding  States,  by  the  export  and  sale 
of  their  cotton,  to  raise  money  to  sustain  the  in- 
surrection, and  would  allow  the  unrestricted  im- 
portation of  all  sorts  of  arms,  equipments,  and 
munitions  of  war,  as  well  as  of  such  articles  of 
daily  use  as  those  States  did  not  themselves  manu- 
facture. Two  ways  of  closing  these  ports  were 
suggested.  One  was  their  discontinuance  as  ports 
of  entry,  so  that  any  vessel  landing  her  cargo  there 
would  violate  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  This 
course  had  the  advantage  of  ease  and  simplicity. 
It  required  only  a  notice  from  the  Executive  that 
Charleston,  Savannah,  Mobile,  New  Orleans,  and 
the  other  Southern  cities  where  there  had  been 
United  States  custom  houses,  were  no  longer  ports 
of  entry.  It  had  this  disadvantage,  that  if  any 
vessel  paid  no  heed  to  the  notice,  and  ran  in  with 
her  cargo,  she  had  simply  violated  a  revenue  law, 
and  could  only  be  punished  by  proceedings  in  a 
federal  court  of  the  State  and  district  where  the 
offense  was  committed ;  and  these  courts  were  all 
in  the  hands  of  the  insurgents.  There  were  also 
well  grounded  apprehensions  that  other  nations 
would  consider  the  closing  of  the  ports  by  procla- 


THE   BLOCKADE  269 

mation  an  evasive  attempt  to  establish  a  paper 
blockade,  would  certainly  remonstrate  against  it, 
and  would  probably  disregard  it ;  and  that  it  would 
therefore  be  wholly  ineffectual.1  The  other  method 
was  an  actual  blockade.  The  advantages  of  this 
were,  that,  as  it  closed  the  ports  by  physical  force, 
it  must  necessarily  break  up  foreign  commerce, 
and  that  any  vessel  violating  it  could  be  captured 
and  condemned  as  prize  in  any  admiralty  court 
of  the  United  States,  or  in  that  of  any  foreign 
country,  with  the  assent  of  its  government.  The 
objections  urged  against  it  were,  that  a  blockade 
was  strictly  an  act  of  war,  and  that  to  proclaim  it 
would  either  convert  the  insurgents  into  enemies 
and  the  domestic  insurrection  into  a  war;  or  that 
the  blockade  would  be  declared  unlawful  by  the 
courts,  and  vessels  violating  it  could  not  therefore 
be  condemned ;  that  no  nation  had  ever  attempted 
to  establish  so  extensive  a  blockade,  and  that  we 
had  no  naval  force  at  all  adequate  for  the  purpose. 
Seward  was  earnest  in  advocating  a  blockade, 
and  it  has  been  said  by  one  of  his  associates  in  the 
cabinet  that  he  was  principally  responsible  for  the 
adoption  of  this  alternative.  The  wisdom  of  this 
course  was  amply  justified  by  the  result.  The 
legal  objection  was  not  sustained,  the  supreme 

1  These  apprehensions  were  subsequently  shown  to  be  well 
founded.  When  Congress  in  the  summer  of  1861  passed  a  law 
authorizing  the  President  to  close  the  Southern  ports  by  procla- 
mation, it  was  at  once  made  a  subject  of  remonstrance  by  both 
England  and  France,  though  nothing  whatsoever  had  been  done 
under  it. 


270  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

court  deciding  that  a  blockade  of  their  coast  was 
a  legitimate  mode  of  dealing  with  insurgents.  The 
practical  difficulties  proved  to  have  been  exagger- 
ated; the  coast  was  extensive,  but  the  important 
harbors  were  few.  The  validity  of  the  blockade 
was  never  seriously  questioned;  and  as  it  became 
continually  more  effective,  it  more  and  more  crip- 
pled, and  in  the  end  practically  destroyed,  all  for- 
eign commerce  at  the  South,  cutting  off  both  their 
resources  and  supplies  for  carrying  on  the  military 
operations  of  the  rebellion.  Of  the  two  million 
four  hundred  thousand  bales  of  cotton,  the  crop  of 
1861,  the  largest  part  of  which  should  have  found 
its  way  across  the  Atlantic  by  the  summer  of  1862, 
only  about  fifty  thousand  bales  ever  reached  Eu- 
rope;1 of  these  England  received  the  lion's  share. 
In  December  of  that  year  (1862)  one  of  the  Con- 
federate cabinet  ministers  spoke  of  "the  almost 
total  cessation  of  foreign  commerce  for  the  last 
two  years"  as  producing  a  "complete  exhaustion 
of  the  supply  of  all  articles  of  foreign  growth  and 
manufacture;  "  and  this  statement  was  confirmed 
by  Lord  Russell's  almost  simultaneous  declaration, 
that  "the  United  States  were  enabled  by  the  block- 
ade to  intercept  and  capture  a  great  part  of  the 
warlike  supplies  which  were  destined  to  the  Con- 
federate States  from  Great  Britain." 

1  Bernard's  Neutrality  of  Great  Britain,  pp.  286-87. 


CHAPTER   XVI 
ENGLAND'S  RECOGNITION  or  THE  CONFEDERATES 

AS   BELLIGERENTS 

BEFORE  the  breaking  out  of  the  rebellion  the 
question  of  the  probable  attitude  of  the  great  Eu- 
ropean powers,  in  case  of  the  government's  resort 
to  force  to  maintain  the  Union,  had  occasioned  no 
uneasiness  at  the  North.  If  there  was  any  public 
opinion  there  on  the  matter,  it  was  hardly  more 
than  a  vague  notion  that  we  should  be  left  to  settle 
our  own  quarrel  in  our  own  way,  the  North,  as 
representing  the  cause  of  freedom  and  of  legitimate 
government,  having  the  sympathy  of  civilized 
Europe,  while  the  South  would  labor  under  the 
odium  of  having  stirred  up  a  rebellion  solely  for 
the  purpose  of  perpetuating  and  extending  African 
slavery.  The  tone  of  the  foreign  newspapers 
warranted  this  belief.  In  leading  articles,  which 
showed  their  writers  to  be  familiar  with  our  Con- 
stitution and  the  relations  between  the  federal  and 
state  governments,  any  attempt  to  destroy  the 
Union,  whether  by  individuals  or  by  States,  was 
declared  to  be  treason. 

The  South  was  at  the  same  time  warned  that  a 
proposal  to  intervene  in  their  behalf  in  a  struggle 


272  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

against  the  Union  would  be  scouted  nowhere  with 
more  scorn  and  indignation  than  in  those  districts 
of  England  which  would  most  benefit  by  free  trade 
with  the  United  States;  that  the  dissolution  of  the 
Union,  so  far  from  being  hailed  as  a  profitable 
transaction,  would  be  lamented;  and  that  any  pol- 
icy would  miscarry,  which  assumed  that  England 
could  be  coaxed  or  bribed  into  a  connivance  at  the 
extension  of  slavery.  The  English  government 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  Liberals,  —  the  party  of 
reform,  the  authors  and  advocates  of  an  extended 
suffrage,  and  of  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  in 
the  British  West  Indies.  No  important  questions 
were  open  between  this  country  and  Great  Britain, 
and  the  North  assumed  that,  as  it  would  in  any 
event  remain  the  United  States  of  America,  the 
friendly  relations  then  existing  would  not  be  in- 
terrupted. The  French  emperor  had  been,  it  was 
thought,  especially  cordial  in  his  expressions  of 
good  will  to  the  United  States  at  his  New  Year's 
diplomatic  reception  (January  1,  1861),  and  the 
French  press  had  expressed  its  hopes  for  the  safety 
of  the  great  American  republic  and  the  gradual 
diminution  of  slavery.  There  was  a  prevailing 
notion  that  the  French  would  feel  a  decided  senti- 
ment of  regret  at  the  disintegration  of  that  Union, 
which  France  had  so  largely  aided  to  establish, 
and  that  the  seceding  States  would  meet  at  her 
hands  nothing  but  discouragement. 

At  the  South,  on  the  contrary,  the  confidence  of 
the  leaders  in  their  speedy  recognition  as  an  inde- 


RECOGNITION  AS  BELLIGERENTS         273 

pendent  nation  inspired  them  with  a  conviction  of 
success,  and  encouraged  them  to  hasten  the  work 
of  secession.  They  argued  that  Cotton  was  King, 
and  that  the  loss  of  their  great  staple  would  cause 
such  distress  and  disaffection  in  the  manufacturing 
districts  of  both  England  and  France  that  the  two 
governments  would  be  forced  to  insist  that  any 
war  which  interfered  with  its  production  and  free 
exportation  should  cease.  They  also  relied  on  the 
cupidity  of  the  European  commercial  world,  to 
which  they  proposed  to  offer  the  bribe  of  free 
trade,  while  they  would  exclude  the  North  from 
their  markets  as  a  punishment,  if  their  peaceable 
secession  should  be  opposed. 

The  course  of  events  in  the  winter  and  early 
spring  of  1861  had  a  marked  effect  on  European 
opinion.  First  came  Buchanan's  declaration  that 
there  was  nowhere  any  power  to  prevent  the  with- 
drawal of  any  State  from  the  Union.  This  was 
followed,  during  the  remainder  of  his  administra- 
tion, by  an  inaction  which  was  broken  only  by  an 
abortive  attempt  to  reinforce  Sumter,  when  the 
steamer  carrying  the  troops  was  fired  on  by  South 
Carolina  militia.  The  federal  government  tamely 
submitted  to  the  insult  and  made  no  further  at- 
tempt to  strengthen  the  garrison;  in  Congress 
nothing  was  done  to  prepare  for  the  emergency 
of  a  forcible  resistance  to  the  federal  authority, 
Northern  statesmen  and  newspapers  were  earnestly 
advocating  concessions  and  peace,  and  the  people 
seemed  to  accept  the  situation  with  tranquillity. 


274  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

During  the  month  after  Lincoln's  inauguration 
there  were  no  signs  of  any  more  vigorous  policy ; 
the  government  was  apparently  still  hesitating  and 
drifting.  On  the  other  hand,  the  secessionists  had 
been  making  steady  and  regular  advances.  The 
Southern  States  had  formed  a  new  confederacy, 
organized  its  government  and  elected  its  officers, 
had  ousted  the  United  States  from  all  jurisdiction 
over  its  territory,  and  by  the  seizure  of  forts,  arse- 
nals, custom  houses,  and  mints,  had  turned  against 
the  federal  government  its  own  strongholds,  arms, 
and  resources.  The  Confederate  soldiers  were  be- 
ing drilled,  instructed,  and  commanded  by  officers 
who  had  abandoned  the  government  that  had 
trained  and  educated  them;  and  the  work  of  or- 
ganizing and  administering  the  civil  affairs  of  the 
Confederacy  was  in  the  hands  of  experienced  pub- 
lic men,  who  had  hardly  ceased  to  hold  office  under 
the  United  States. 

The  South  was  an  oligarchy;  the  people  were 
accustomed  to  follow  their  leaders,  and  were  not  so 
sluggish  and  reluctant  to  move  as  were  the  masses 
of  the  free  States.  The  South  was  roused  and  in 
earnest,  the  North  still  apathetic  and  inert.  When 
Sumter  was  attacked;  it  was  generally  believed  in 
Europe  that  the  Union  was  at  an  end,  that  the 
South  had  practically  secured  its  independence, 
and  that  the  North  would  soon  admit  this.  With 
most  of  the  European  governments  the  result  was 
a  matter  of  comparative  indifference;  but  with 
England  and  France  this  was  not  so ;  the  prospect 


RECOGNITION   AS  BELLIGERENTS         275 

that  this  great  republic  might  break  in  pieces  was 
soon  followed  by  a  wish  that  it  would  do  so.  The 
vast  majority  of  the  great  governing  classes  in 
England  thought  that  the  division  of  the  United 
States  would  be  a  fresh  proof  of  the  inability  of 
a  republican  government  to  weather  a  storm,  and 
would  therefore  give  additional  strength  and  sta- 
bility to  their  own  institutions.  Some  of  them, 
who  had  condemned  African  slavery  as  a  foul  blot 
upon  this  country,  excused  their  support  of  the 
slaveholders'  rebellion  by  insisting  that  the  South 
was  fighting  for  independence,  the  North  for  su- 
premacy. The  mill  owners  and  manufacturers  of 
both  countries  were  anxious  lest  a  war  between 
the  sections  should  bring  on  a  cotton  famine  and 
the  distress  which  would  accompany  it;  and  the 
apprehension  of  this  probably  had  the  greatest 
effect  in  determining  the  attitude  of  France  at  the 
outset  of  the  struggle.  Perhaps  the  feeling  preva- 
lent among  the  average  Englishmen,  that  the 
Americans  were  a  boastful  and  conceited  people, 
and  that  it  would  do  them  no  harm  to  have  their 
pride  taken  down, —  though  it  may  not  have  shaped 
the  government's  policy, — had  more  effect  than 
any  other  cause  upon  the  tone  and  attitude  of  most 
of  the  English  press,  which  changed  from  that  of 
friendliness  towards  the  North  to  bitter  hostility 
and  contemptuous  sneers. 

Seward  possessed  a  certain  knowledge  of  Eu- 
rope; he  had  traveled  there  and  met  some  of  her 
leading  statesmen;  he  had  served  several  years 


276  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

on  the  Senate's  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
knew  the  diplomatic  relations  between  this  country 
and  the  great  European  powers ;  he  was  from  the 
State  of  New  York,  had  long  been  interested  in 
the  development  of  the  commercial  connections  of 
its  metropolis  with  foreign  countries,  and  knew 
the  extent  and  closeness  of  these  connections  with 
both  England  and  France,  and  especially  with  the 
former.  What  complications  might  arise  abroad, 
growing  out  of  our  difficulties  at  home,  he  could 
not  foresee;  but  it  was  evident  to  him  that  the 
seceding  States  would  make  all  possible  efforts  to 
obtain  recognition  as  a  nation,  and  were  entirely 
confident  of  their  speedy  success.  He  thoroughly 
realized  the  necessity  of  our  being  represented 
abroad  by  our  ablest  and  fittest  men,  especially  in 
England,  where  he  expected  the  Confederacy 
would  make  its  first  and  most  strenuous  appeal, 
and  would  not  cease  to  renew  its  efforts  so  long  as 
a  possibility  of  hope  remained. 

Early  in  the  spring  Jefferson  Davis  had  sent 
abroad  commissioners  to  negotiate  for  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  Confederacy;  but  their  presence  in 
England  seemed  to  furnish  no  cause  for  anxiety, 
as  we  were  still  confident  of  the  good  will  of  both 
its  government  and  people,  and  had  moreover  the 
assurance  of  Lord  John  Russell,  the  secretary  of 
state  for  foreign  affairs,  that  "the  coming  of  Mr. 
Adams  would  doubtless  be  regarded  as  the  appro- 
priate occasion  for  finally  discussing  and  determin- 
ing the  question  "  of  the  attitude  to  be  taken  by 


RECOGNITION  AS  BELLIGERENTS         277 

Great  Britain  towards  the  rebellion.  The  Confed- 
erate agents  baited  their  hooks  judiciously,  and 
had  the  audacity  to  tell  Lord  John  that  it  was  not 
any  apprehensions  as  to  slavery,  but  the  protective 
tariff  on  which  the  North  insisted,  that  had  made 
it  necessary  for  the  Southern  States  to  secede, 
since  free  trade  was  essential  to  their  prosperity. 
It  was  not  believed  at  the  time  in  this  country 
that  this  assertion  could  impose  upon  any  one,  or 
have  any  effect,  unless  its  flagrant  disregard  of 
truth  should  excite  a  smile.  No  importance  was 
attached  to  it,  for  neither  our  government  nor  our 
people  were  at  all  prepared  to  believe  that  Great 
Britain's  policy  towards  us  was  to  be  that  of  a 
nation  of  shopkeepers,  who  would  justify  their 
course  by  saying  that,  though  they  objected  to 
slavery,  they  wanted  cotton,  and  disliked  the  Mor- 
rill  tariff. 

Seward's  first  serious  anxiety  as  to  our  foreign 
relations  was  caused  by  learning,  through  Russia, 
that  the  French  emperor  had  proposed  to  Eng- 
land that  they  should  act  in  concert  in  their  course 
towards  this  country,  and  that  England  had  as- 
sented ;  that  Russia  had  been  invited  to  join  this 
league,  and  had  declined;  but  that  it  was  confi- 
dently expected  that  the  smaller  European  powers, 
and  those  having  less  interest  in  the  matter,  would 
follow  the  lead  of  France  and  England.  This 
intelligence  showed  him  that  our  quarrel  was  not 
considered  only  our  own  affair ;  that  we  were  not  to 
be  permitted  to  settle  it  in  our  own  way ;  but  were 


278  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

possibly  to  be  threatened  with  a  combined  pres- 
sure from  the  European  powers,  which  we  could 
not  resist,  and  which  might  ultimately  force  us  to 
acquiesce  in  the  breaking  up  of  the  Union.  Upon 
learning  this  arrangement,  Seward  immediately 
took  the  only  means  in  his  power  of  averting 
the  difficulty,  by  notifying  our  ministers  that  this 
government  would  not  recognize  any  such  under- 
standing between  France  and  England,  and  would 
decline  to  receive  any  communications  as  joint 
proposals  from  these  two,  or  any  two  or  more  coun- 
tries. He  adhered  to  this  resolve;  and  when, 
later  in  the  year  1861,  the  British  and  French 
ministers  called  upon  him  together  for  the  purpose 
of  communicating  their  dispatches  at  a  joint  inter- 
view, he  insisted  on  receiving  them  in  separate  in- 
terviews at  different  times,  and  on  treating  each 
dispatch  as  if  it  were  a  distinct  matter,  wholly 
unconnected  with  the  other. 

The  knowledge  of  the  agreement  between  these 
two  great  powers  had  not  at  all  prepared  Seward 
for  the  first  decided  step  taken  by  them  together ; 
or  it  is  perhaps  more  exact  to  say  that  the  state- 
ment of  Lord  John  Russell  already  quoted  had 
given  him  absolute  confidence  that  nothing  would 
be  done  until  Mr.  Adams  had  arrived  and  had  the 
opportunity  of  laying  before  the  ministry  the  views 
of  the  new  administration,  with  which  he  was  fully 
in  accord.  The  recognition  of  the  rebels  as  belli- 
gerents, made  after  Mr.  Adams  was  known  to  have 
sailed  for  England,  and  the  publication,  on  the 


RECOGNITION  AS  BELLIGERENTS         279 

very  day  of  his  landing,  of  the  queen's  proclama- 
tion enjoining  her  subjects  to  observe  a  strict  neu- 
trality in  the  civil  war  then  existing  between  the 
Northern  and  Southern  States,  seemed  to  Seward, 
in  the  moment  selected  for  this  action,  when  a  few 
days'  delay  could  have  done  no  possible  harm,  a 
breach  of  good  faith,  an  act  of  national  discour- 
tesy and  of  personal  disrespect  to  our  minister. 
In  substance,  too,  he  thought  the  proceeding  of 
the  British  government  unprecedented  and  unjus- 
tifiable, and  under  the  influence  of  these  feelings 
he  wrote  a  fiery  dispatch,  which  might  have  pro- 
duced a  rupture  between  the  two  countries,  had 
the  paper  been  treated,  according  to  the  usages  of 
diplomatic  correspondence,  as  a  message  from  one 
government  to  the  other,  and  read  in  full  to  the 
British  secretary  of  state.  But  when  it  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  President,  Mr.  Lincoln,  besides  sug- 
gesting various  modifications  softening  its  tone, 
advised  its  being  sent  to  Mr.  Adams  for  his  own 
guidance,  not  as  a  dispatch  to  be  read,  and  that 
this  should  be  distinctly  stated  in  the  letter  itself. 
The  wisdom  of  this  was  apparent;  it  was  done, 
and  Seward's  original  draft  with  these  changes 
made  by  the  President,  and  a  few  other  unimpor- 
tant verbal  alterations,  conveyed  to  Mr.  Adams, 
in  language  which  did  not  admit  of  a  doubt,  the 
views  of  our  government  as  to  the  course  of  the 
English  ministry. 

Without  undertaking  to  discuss  elaborately  how 
far  the  United  States  had  just  cause  for  a  serious 


280  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

complaint  against  Great  Britain  on  account  of  her 
recognition,  on  the  6th  of  May,  1861,  of  the  Con- 
federacy as  a  belligerent,  it  may  fairly  be  said 
that  the  action  of  that  government  was  unprece- 
dented and  precipitate,  and  could  only  be  regarded 
by  us  as  ungracious,  if  not  intentionally  offensive. 
As  has  already  been  stated,  early  in  April  Lord 
John  Russell  had  suggested  to  Mr.  Dallas,  who 
was  then  our  minister  in  London,  that  the  coming 
of  his  successor,  Mr.  Adams,  would  be  the  suitable 
time  for  discussing  any  question  between  the  two 
countries  connected  with  the  rebellion ;  and  again, 
on  the  1st  of  May,  referring  to  the  rumors  of  a 
proposed  blockade,  he  agreed  that  the  time  for 
discussion  would  be  on  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Adams, 
who  was  to  sail  on  that  day.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  publication,  on  the  very  day  of  Mr. 
Adams's  landing,  of  the  queen's  proclamation 
notifying  her  subjects  of  their  duties  and  obliga- 
tions as  neutrals  in  the  civil  war  then  raging  in 
this  country,  whether  it  arose  from  an  accidental 
forgetfulness,  or  an  intentional  disregard  by  Lord 
John  of  his  conversations  with  Mr.  Dallas  and  his 
assurances  then  given,  was  alike  ungracious  and 
offensive  both  to  Mr.  Adams  and  to  the  country 
he  represented.  It  shut  the  door  in  his  face,  and 
precluded  the  discussions  which  Lord  John  had 
suggested ;  it  was  obviously  intended  to  do  this. 

That  Great  Britain's  recognition  of  the  Confed- 
erates as  belligerents  was  unprecedented  is  not  to 
be  denied.  One  of  the  principal  grounds  on  which 


RECOGNITION  AS  BELLIGERENTS         281 

it  was  attempted  to  justify  this  recognition  was, 
that  an  insurrection  of  so  many  provinces,  with 
organized  governments,  and  a  central  confederate 
administration  arid  army  in  existence  at  the  outset, 
had  been  hitherto  unknown.  Mr.  Adams,  reply- 
ing to  this  contention,  reminded  Lord  Russell  that 
there  had  been  within  a  century  a  revolt  of  thir- 
teen provinces  corresponding  in  every  particular, 
except  that  of  the  numbers  involved,  to  Lord  Rus- 
sell's description;  but  that,  notwithstanding  all 
these  points  of  identity,  Great  Britain  had  not 
been  met  at  the  outset  in  1774  with  the  announce- 
ment by  any  foreign  power  of  a  necessity  for  the 
immediate  recognition  as  belligerents  of  her  insur- 
gent American  colonies ;  and  he  added  that  there 
was  not  the  smallest  ground  for  believing  that 
Great  Britain  would  have  tolerated  for  one  mo- 
ment any  such  proceeding,  if  it  had  been  at- 
tempted. The  only  historical  precedent,  to  which 
Lord  Russell  ever  referred  as  a  vindication  of  his 
course,  was  that  of  the  recognition  of  the  Greeks 
as  belligerents  in  1825,  after  they  had  maintained 
during  four  years  the  struggle  for  independence; 
yet,  when,  after  this  lapse  of  time,  such  recogni- 
tion was  granted  them,  the  Turkish  government 
complained  of  it,  —  but  Great  Britain  answered 
that  a  people  who,  in  a  contest  of  arms,  had  already 
covered  the  sea  with  their  cruisers,  must  either  be 
acknowledged  as  belligerents  or  treated  as  pirates, 
and  that  this  latter  character  England  disclaimed 
for  Greece.  It  is  obvious  that  this  so-called  pre- 


282  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

cedent  bears  no  analogy  to  the  case  of  the  South- 
erners in  May,  1861.  The  cruisers  of  Greece  had 
scoured  the  Mediterranean  and  forced  the  English 
government  to  take  a  decided  stand  for  the  pro- 
tection of  Great  Britain's  commerce  and  merchant- 
men. The  Confederates  in  May,  1861,  had  done 
no  harm  at  sea,  were  then  utterly  incapable  of  do- 
ing any  such  harm,  and,  if  left  to  themselves,  with- 
out the  aid  of  British  intervention  and  British 
ships,  would  have  remained,  until  the  insurrection 
was  crushed,  as  powerless  at  sea  as  when  Great 
Britain  first  created  them  maritime  belligerents. 

It  is  equally  clear  that  the  action  of  the  British 
government  was  precipitate.  Though  France  and 
England  had  determined  to  act  in  concert,  France 
made  no  proclamation,  no  public  declaration  of 
any  kind,  till  a  month  later.  It  is  hardly  credible 
that  Lord  John  Russell,  when  he  was  agreeing 
with  Mr.  Dallas  on  Wednesday  that  the  arrival 
of  Mr.  Adams  a  fortnight  later  would  be  the  ap- 
propriate time  to  discuss  the  questions  of  policy  as 
to  the  Southern  Confederates,  should  have  been 
at  the  same  moment  seriously  considering  the  pro- 
priety of  at  once  recognizing  them  as  belligerents. 
Yet  he  did  so  recognize  them  publicly  and  offi- 
cially, on  the  following  Monday,  in  a  speech  in 
Parliament,  and  in  dispatches  to  the  British  min- 
ister at  Paris,  as  well  as  to  Lord  Lyons,  in  both 
of  which  he  speaks  of  the  late  Union.  The  only 
reason  he  assigned  in  his  speech  or  in  either  of  his 
letters  for  this  recognition  was,  that  the  Southern 


RECOGNITION   AS  BELLIGERENTS         283 

insurgents  had  established  a  government  which 
was  carrying  on  in  regular  form  the  administration 
of  civil  affairs.  But  this  is  an  explanation  which 
does  not  explain  the  British  ministry's  haste. 
The  organization  of  the  Confederacy  took  place 
before  the  end  of  February.  It  was  no  new  fact ; 
it  had  been  known  in  England  for  weeks.  It  was 
not,  however,  even  in  May  absolutely  true  that 
the  Southern  Confederacy  was  performing  all  the 
functions  of  the  federal  government;  for  one  of 
the  most  important  of  them,  the  carrying  of  the 
mails,  was  done  by  the  United  States  throughout 
the  entire  South  until  the  1st  of  June.  Between 
Wednesday,  the  1st,  and  Monday,  the  6th  of  May, 
nothing  had  happened,  no  new  intelligence  had 
been  received^  which  could  either  justify  or  ac- 
count for  the  ministry's  sudden  change  of  front. 
Yet  on  that  day  the  Southerners,  who  up  to  that 
time  had  been  insurgents,  became  belligerents, 
and  the  fact  of  their  recognition  as  such  was 
announced  in  Parliament.  The  queen's  procla- 
mation, a  week  later,  was  merely  a  domestic  publi- 
cation, cautioning  British  citizens  to  govern  them- 
selves accordingly.  The  ministry  had,  on  the  1st 
of  May,  all  the  knowledge  as  to  the  proposed 
blockade  of  the  Southern  ports  by  the  United 
States,  and  the  issuing  of  letters  of  marque  by 
Jefferson  Davis,  which  they  possessed  on  the  6th.1 

1  See  Lord  John  Russell's  letter  of  May  1st  to  the  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Admiralty.  Correspondence  concerning  Claims 
against  Great  Britain,  i.  p.  33. 


284  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

They  had  not  at  either  date  any  official  or  authen- 
tic information  as  to  these  matters,  and  they  did 
not  at  the  time  refer  to  either  of  them  as  a  reason 
for  their  conduct.  They  knew  that  the  proclama- 
tion as  to  each  was  merely  a  declaration  of  an  in- 
tention to  do  something  at  a  future  day,  official 
notice  of  which  might  justify  a  formal  remon- 
strance, but  would  afford  no  excuse  for  any  such 
hasty  action;  and  it  is  a  significant  fact  that  the 
blockade  was  first  officially  mentioned  as  a  reason 
for  this  sudden  announcement  of  the  existence  of 
a  civil  war  in  America  in  the  letters  of  Lord  Rus- 
sell to  Mr.  Adams  at  and  after  the  close  of  the 
rebellion  in  1865. 

In  its  haste  to  recognize  the  Southerners  as  bel- 
ligerents the  English  ministry  almost  anticipated 
the  Confederate  Congress,  whose  act  declaring 
the  existence  of  a  war  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Confederacy  was  first  published  on  the 
same  day  on  which  Lord  John  Russell  announced 
in  the  House  of  Commons  that  Great  Britain  con- 
sidered the  Southern  insurgents  a  belligerent  power. 

In  the  four  days  between  Lord  John's  interview 
with  Mr.  Dallas,  which  left  our  minister  with  the 
understanding  that  nothing  was  to  be  done  until 
Mr.  Adams  arrived,  and  the  government's  decla- 
ration in  Parliament,  there  was  only  one  signifi- 
cant incident,  —  the  unofficial  meeting  of  Mr. 
Yancey  and  the  other  Southern  commissioners 
with  Lord  John,  at  which  they  assured  him  that 
it  was  the  heavy  duties  which  the  North  had 


RECOGNITION  AS  BELLIGERENTS         285 

forced  the  South  to  pay,  and  not  the  attacks  upon 
slavery,  that  had  driven  their  States  to  secession; 
that  the  new  Confederacy  had  abolished  the  slave 
trade,  was  opposed  to  a  high  tariff,  and  wished 
only  to  sell  its  cotton  to  Europe  and  make  its  pur- 
chases there.  This  interview  took  place  on  Satur- 
day; on  Monday  the  letters  to  Lord  Cowley  and 
Lord  Lyons  were  written,  and  it  was  announced 
in  Parliament  that  the  government  had  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  Southern  Confederacy  must 
be  treated  as  a  belligerent. 

The  real  motives  for  this  hasty  action  can  only 
be  conjectured.  So  far  as  the  debates  in  Parlia- 
ment at  this  time  throw  any  light  on  the  matter, 
they  indicate  that,  foreseeing  that  Englishmen 
would  be  likely  to  avail  themselves  of  Jefferson 
Davis 's  offer  of  letters  of  marque,  the  British 
government  determined  to  settle  by  anticipation 
the  question  of  the  character  of  such  adventurers, 
and  after  consulting  the  law  officers  of  the  crown 
decided  to  recognize  at  once  the  Confederates  as 
belligerents,  in  order  to  prevent  any  privateers- 
men  who  were  British  subjects  being  treated  as 
pirates.  This  consideration,  together  with  the 
prevailing  idea  —  probably  strengthened  to  a  con- 
viction by  the  efforts  of  the  rebel  commissioners 
at  their  interview  with  Lord  John  Russell  —  that 
the  schism  was  complete,  the  Southern  seceders 
already  a  perfect  confederacy,  and  cotton  sure  to 
come  more  quickly,  if  there  should  be  some  act  on 
the  part  of  England  which  could  be  interpreted 


286  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

as  the  expression  of  a  wish  for,  and  a  belief  in, 
the  speedy  success  of  the  South,  may  perhaps  be 
fairly  assumed  as  the  leading  motives  for  the  sud- 
den and  decisive  action  which  followed  so  closely 
the  representations  of  the  Southern  agents. 

Seward's  strong  feeling  as  to  the  matter  was 
not  uncalled  for  or  unnatural.  He  realized  what 
British  recognition  meant,  what  courage  and  con- 
fidence it  would  give  the  seceders,  how  great  an 
increase  to  their  strength  and  resources;  while  he 
also  knew  that  it  would  add  incalculably  to  our 
difficulties  and  indefinitely  prolong  the  struggle. 
His  repeated  remonstrances  and  unceasing  endeav- 
ors to  have  this  hasty  step  recalled  were  therefore 
no  more  than  his  duty,  and,  if  ineffectual,  were  in 
no  way  unreasonable. 

Mr.  Motley,  who  was  on  the  spot  and  in  a  posi- 
tion to  form  an  opinion  about  it,  thought  that, 
had  this  recognition  been  delayed  only  "a  few 
weeks  or  even  days,"  it  would  never  have  been 
made.  Possibly  he  was  right;  but  at  all  events 
we  may  moderate  our  natural  resentment  at  this 
early  unfriendliness  of  England  by  considering 
that  our  actual  blockade  a  few  weeks  later  would 
have  justified,  in  point  of  law,  though  it  would  not 
have  required,  her  declaration  that  the  secession- 
ists were  belligerents.  In  judging  of  her  conduct 
at  this  time  we  should  also  bear  in  mind  the  natu- 
ral inclination  of  the  citizens  and  government  of 
a  free  country  to  sympathize  with  any  people  in 
rebellion,  to  assume  that  they  have  good  reason 


RECOGNITION  AS  BELLIGERENTS         287 

for  their  insurrection,  and  are  really  striving  to 
secure  some  right  which  is  wrongfully  withheld 
from  them.  Our  own  political  history  furnishes 
more  than  one  instance  of  such  sympathy  on  our 
part.  And  it  is  only  fair  to  Great  Britain  to 
make  some  allowance  for  the  influence  which  this 
feeling  had  in  bringing  about  the  hasty  and  impul- 
sive step  of  her  government  on  the  6th  of  May. 
Its  action  can  be  called  fortunate  for  us  only  in 
one  aspect.  It  prolonged  the  struggle,  and  so 
brought  about  emancipation.  Had  the  rebellion 
been  crushed  quickly,  slavery,  the  cause  of  all  our 
trouble,  would  have  remained,  and  sooner  or  later 
the  battle  would  have  had  to  be  fought  over  again. 


CHAPTER   XVH 

NEGOTIATIONS    AS    TO    THE    TREATY    OF    PARIS  — 
SUSPENSION   OP  THE   HABEAS   CORPUS 

BY  the  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  which 
was  made  at  the  close  of  the  Crimean  war  in 
1856,  the  leading  powers  in  Europe  agreed  —  in 
order  to  mitigate  the  severities  of  maritime  war- 
fare and  assimilate  its  usages  more  nearly  to  those 
of  war  on  land  —  that  privateering  should  be 
abolished,  and  that  both  enemy's  property,  not 
contraband  of  war,  on  board  a  neutral  vessel,  and 
neutral  property,  not  contraband  of  war,  on  an 
enemy's  vessel,  should  be  exempt  from  capture 
and  condemnation  as  prize.  They  invited  other 
countries  to  subscribe  to  these  articles,  with  the 
hope  of  making  them  in  this  way  rules  which 
should  govern  naval  warfare  for  the  whole  civilized 
world,  stipulating,  however,  that  every  nation's 
assent  must  be  given  to  them  as  a  whole,  or  not 
at  all.  The  United  States,  whose  position  was 
usually  that  of  a  neutral,  wished  to  extend  the 
exemptions  from  condemnation  to  all  private  pro- 
perty not  contraband  of  war,  and,  postponing  its 
assent  to  the  treaty  as  it  stood,  opened  negotia- 
tions for  this  purpose,  which,  though  apparently 


THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS  289 

fruitless,  had  not  been  abandoned  at  the  close  of 
Mr.  Buchanan's  administration.  On  the  24th  of 
April,  1861,  Seward  instructed  our  ministers  to 
England  and  France,  as  well  as  to  other  countries 
which  had  assented  to  these  articles,  to  ascertain 
whether  the  governments  to  which  they  were  sev- 
erally accredited  were  disposed  to  negotiate  for 
the  accession  of  the  United  States  to  this  treaty, 
adding  that  the  assent  of  these  governments  was 
to  be  expected,  as  we  should  accept  the  articles 
precisely  in  the  form  in  which  they  had  been  pro- 
posed to  us.  These  instructions  were  given  before 
the  British  recognition  of  belligerency,  and  when 
there  was  no  anticipation  of  any  such  action. 
France  had  not  yet  proposed  to  England  the  adop- 
tion of  a  common  line  of  conduct  towards  this 
country  in  its  difficulties ;  and  though  a  week  be- 
fore (April  17,  1861)  Jefferson  Davis  had  pub- 
lished his  offer  of  letters  of  marque  to  any  one 
wishing  to  engage  in  privateering  on  behalf  of  the 
Confederate  States,  no  such  letters  had  been  issued 
or  applied  for. 

Our  negotiations  seemed  to  open  prosperously. 
They  were  delayed  on  various  grounds ;  but  by  the 
middle  of  July  Mr.  Adams  was  officially  informed 
that  the  English  ministry  would  advise  the  queen 
to  conclude  the  necessary  convention,  so  soon  as 
they  should  be  informed  that  a  similar  convention 
had  been  agreed  on  with  the  French  emperor,  so 
that  both  might  be  signed  on  the  same  day.  But 
ten  days  later,  when  Mr.  Adams  notified  them  that 


290  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

our  minister  to  France  had  returned  to  Paris  to 
propose  there  the  same  arrangements,  Lord  Rus- 
sell wrote  him:  "On  the  part  of  Great  Britain 
the  agreement  will  be  prospective,  and  will  not 
invalidate  anything  already  done."  The  meaning 
of  this  somewhat  enigmatical  sentence  was  made 
clear  a  few  weeks  later,  by  the  announcement  that 
Great  Britain  proposed  to  add  to  the  convention 
already  agreed  on  a  declaration,  "that  by  execut- 
ing that  convention  Her  Majesty  did  not  intend 
to  undertake  any  engagement  which  should  have 
any  bearing,  direct  or  indirect,  on  the  internal 
difficulties  prevailing  in  the  United  States."  Sew- 
ard  approved  Mr.  Adams's  course  in  declining  to 
sign  the  paper  with  this  addition,  which  there 
seemed  reason  to  believe  an  afterthought ;  and  this 
ended  the  negotiations,  the  French  government 
desiring  to  attach  a  similar  condition  to  its  assent. 
Seward's  objects  in  proposing  our  assent  to  this 
treaty  were,  probably,  to  declare  our  purpose  of 
conducting  our  contest  with  the  South  under  the 
humane  rules  agreed  on  by  the  leading  nations  of 
the  world,  and  also  to  preclude  the  recognition 
of  privateers  under  Jefferson  Da  vis's  letters  of 
marque  as  vessels  having  any  legal  status.  Before 
the  declaration  of  May  6th  this  result  might  have 
followed  the  unqualified  acceptance  of  our  assent 
to  this  treaty ;  but  after  recognizing  the  Confeder- 
acy as  a  belligerent  both  Great  Britain  and  France 
were  in  honor  bound  to  take  no  step  which  might 
impose  on  them  obligations  inconsistent  with  this 


THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS  291 

position.  Seward  was  equally  right  in  declining 
to  accept  the  arrangement  proposed.  It  would 
not  have  been  the  Treaty  of  Paris  to  which  we 
should  thus  have  become  parties,  but  a  different 
and  special  convention  with  England  and  France, 
implying  an  acquiescence  in  the  assumption  of 
these  governments  that  we  were  no  longer  the  sov- 
ereign of  the  States  in  insurrection,  and  had  no 
power  to  treat  for  them,  an  admission  which  would 
have  been  irreconcilable  with  our  position,  that 
the  integrity  of  the  republic  was  unbroken  and 
the  government  of  the  United  States  supreme,  so 
far  as  foreign  nations  were  concerned,  as  well  for 
war  as  for  peace,  over  all  the  States,  all  sections, 
and  all  citizens,  the  loyal  not  more  than  the  dis- 
loyal, the  patriots  and  insurgents  alike.1  Seward 
was  of  opinion,  however,  that  the  real  objection  of 
the  English  government  to  giving  an  unqualified 
assent  to  our  adherence  to  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was, 
that  by  the  middle  of  August  it  was  well  under- 
stood that  any  vessels  cruising  as  Confederate 
privateers  would  be  English  ships,  and  that  Great 
Britain,  while  opposed  to  this  mode  of  warfare  in 
the  abstract  and  on  principle,  was  perfectly  willing 
to  become  the  patron  of  privateering  when  aimed 
at  our  devastation. 

Though  they  knew  that  Jefferson  Davis,  after 
his  call  for  privateers,  would  not  assent  to  the  pro- 
visions of  this  treaty  as  a  whole,  —  the  only  way 
in  which  there  was  any  provision  in  the  treaty 

1  Seward  to  Adams,  July  25,  1861. 


292  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

itself  for  its  acceptance,  —  the  British  ministry 
thought  it  sufficiently  important  to  secure  his  ad- 
herence to  the  other  articles  (those  relating  to 
neutral  and  enemy  property  and  to  blockade)  to 
open  negotiations  with  him,  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  this.  They  selected  as  their  agent  in 
this  matter  an  Englishman,  —  their  own  consul  at 
Charleston,  accredited  to  the  United  States,  whose 
exequatur  was  unrevoked.  Voluntarily  to  open 
direct  negotiations  with  the  insurgents  was  a  pro- 
ceeding sufficiently  contemptuous  of  the  United 
States,  and  encouragingly  near  to  complete  recog- 
nition; and  so  Mr.  Bunch,  the  consul,  an  active 
sympathizer  with  secession,  considered  it.  He 
successfully  performed  the  mission  intrusted  to 
him,  and  obtained  the  adhesion  of  the  Confederacy 
.  to  these  articles ;  but  was  indiscreet  enough  to 
claim  much  more.  The  bearer  of  his  letters  to 
his  government,  having  crossed  the  Union  lines 
without  permission,  was  arrested,  his  papers  were 
taken  from  him,  and  among  them  was  found  a 
letter  saying,  "Mr.  B.  on  oath  of  secrecy  commu- 
nicated to  me  also  that  ike  first  step  to  recognition 
was  taken.  .  .  .  This  is  the  first  step  to  direct 
treating  with  our  government,  so  prepare  for  active 
business  by  1st  January."  The  whole  matter  hav- 
ing in  this  way  come  to  Seward's  knowledge,  he 
remonstrated,  protesting  against  Great  Britain's 
employing  one  of  their  public  officers  accredited 
to  and  recognized  by  the  United  States,  and  still, 
in  the  legal  view  of  both  governments,  exercising 


SUSPENSION  OF  HABEAS  CORPUS         293 

his  functions  there,  to  conduct  a  negotiation  with 
insurgents  in  arms  against  this  government,  whether 
the  insurgents  were  to  be  considered  as  simple  reb- 
els, as  we  viewed  them,  or  to  be  treated  as  belli- 
gerents, as  Great  Britain  had  acknowledged  them. 
The  English  government  expressed  neither  regret 
nor  apology.  They  maintained  the  supercilious 
tone  which  characterized  much  of  their  correspon- 
dence during  the  war,  until  Gettysburg  and  Vicks- 
burg  demonstrated  that  the  suppression  of  the  re- 
bellion was  merely  a  question  of  time.  The  whole 
proceeding  shows  how  illogical  and  inconsistent 
was  the  attitude  of  England  and  France  during 
our  domestic  difficulties.  The  rebels  were  parties 
to  a  war ;  they  were  amenable  to,  and  to  be  gov- 
erned by,  the  laws  of  war;  they  were  sufficiently 
a  nation  to  be  asked  to  become  parties  to  a  treaty, 
yet  not  so  far  a  nation  as  to  permit  negotiations 
for  this  purpose  to  be  conducted  in  any  regular 
manner. 

Not  long  after  the  attack  on  Sumter,  the  Presi- 
dent, acting  upon  the  opinion  of  the  attorney-gen- 
eral that  he  had  the  power  to  do  so,  suspended  the 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  without  any  special  legisla- 
tion authorizing  it.  Chief  Justice  Taney  held  this 
suspension  illegal;  thereupon,  when  a  British  citi- 
zen residing  here,  arrested  and  held  without  regu- 
lar process,  was  unable  to  obtain  relief  by  apply- 
ing for  this  writ,  Lord  Russell  undertook  to  open 
a  diplomatic  discussion  as  to  the  constitutionality 


294  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

of  the  President's  action.  Seward  courteously  but 
peremptorily  declined  to  enter  upon  any  such  dis- 
cussion, or  to  permit  the  constitutionality  of  any 
act  of  the  administration  to  be  called  in  question 
by  any  foreign  power,  and  the  attempt  was  not 
renewed.  Nevertheless  every  foreigner  arrested 
by  arbitrary  process  naturally  appealed  to  his  min- 
ister, in  the  hope  that  diplomatic  influence  might 
procure  his  discharge.  Most  of  these  foreigners 
were  Englishmen;  their  cases  occupied  a  great 
deal  of  time,  and  were  a  constant  source  of  worry 
and  anxiety  to  Seward  during  the  greater  part  of 
the  war.  At  first,  and  until  Mr.  Stanton  became 
secretary  of  war,  all  these  arrests,  as  well  of  our 
own  citizens  as  of  foreigners,  were  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  State  Department,  and  during  this 
period  Seward  was  earning  with  the  disloyal  and 
their  friends  the  name  of  a  tyrant  with  his  hands 
full  of  despotic  orders  of  arrest  and  imprisonment, 
—  a  reputation  which  clung  to  him  long  after  he 
had  ceased  to  have  any  charge  of  these  matters. 

The  accusation  of  officious  intermeddling,  which 
has  been  to  some  extent  taken  up  as  a  popular  cry 
against  him,  has  its  origin  in  these  and  other  acts 
of  his  during  the  first  year  of  the  rebellion,  when 
the  War  Department  was  much  disorganized  by 
the  desertion  of  Southern  officers  and  clerks,  and 
was  also  excessively  overworked.  There  were  many 
things  which  needed  to  be  done  —  some  of  them 
disagreeable,  —  which  did  not  properly  belong  to 
the  secretary  of  state,  but  which  no  one  else  seemed 


SUSPENSION  OF  HABEAS  CORPUS         295 

able  to  find  time  or  inclination  to  do.  At  the 
President's  request  and  to  the  entire  satisfaction 
of  all  loyal  citizens,  Seward  undertook  the  respon- 
sibility and  burden  of  some  of  these  matters.  In 
doing  so,  he  was  no  more  guilty  of  officious  inter- 
meddling than  were  the  "great  war  governors," 
whose  zealous  loyalty  induced  them  to  overstep 
the  strict  line  of  official  duty  and  endeavor  to  re- 
lieve the  War  Department  of  some  of  the  burdens 
of  the  equipment  and  transportation  of  troops, 
which  properly  belonged  to  the  general  govern- 
ment. There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  Seward 
had  any  motives  for  what  he  did  other  than  patri- 
otic ones;  he  had  in  a  high  degree  the  fervor  and 
lofty  spirit  which  then  animated  and  dignified  the 
country.  The  time  had  arrived  of  which  he  had 
spoken,  when  we  were  to  see  "how  nobly,  how 
firmly,  a  great  people  could  act  in  preserving  their 
Constitution." 


CHAPTER   XVIII 

THE   TRENT 

THE  summer  of  1861  wore  away  without  further 
serious  diplomatic  trouble.  The  defeat  at  Bull 
Bun,  and  the  later  repulse  at  Ball's  Bluff,  con- 
firmed the  general  European  opinion  of  the  ulti- 
mate success  of  the  seceding  States.  It  had  se- 
verely taxed  Seward's  optimism  and  ability,  to 
minimize  in  his  dispatches  to  our  ministers  the 
character  and  effect  of  these  failures.  Our  suc- 
cesses in  the  West  were  too  remote  to  offset  them 
with  the  public ;  and  the  importance  of  the  capture 
of  the  forts  and  garrisons  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  Port 
Royal,  and  Hilton  Head,  and  of  the  occupation 
of  these  points  by  the  Union  forces,  was  too  little 
understood  to  check  the  tide  of  European  opinion, 
which  was  running  strongly  against  us.  There 
was  a  time  in  the  autumn  when  Seward,  fairly 
disheartened,  wrote  home :  "  I  have  had  two  weeks 
of  intense  anxiety  and  severe  labor.  The  pressure 
.  .  .  which  disunionists  have  procured  to  operate 
on  the  cabinets  of  London  and  Paris  has  made  it 
doubtful  whether  we  can  escape  the  yet  deeper 
and  darker  abyss  of  foreign  war.  ...  I  have 
worried  through  and  finished  my  dispatches.  They 
must  go  for  good  or  evil.  I  have  done  my  best." 


THE  TRENT  297 

The  moment  which  Seward  thought  so  gloomy 
seemed  to  Jefferson  Davis  auspicious  for  a  vigor- 
ous and  determined  effort  to  obtain  from  England 
and  France  the  full  recognition  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy  as  an  independent  nation ;  and  early 
in  the  autumn  he  sent  James  M.  Mason,  of  Vir- 
ginia, to  England,  and  John  Slidell,  of  Louisiana, 
to  France,  as  commissioners  to  open  negotiations 
for  this  purpose.  Slidell  was  a  Northerner  by 
birth,  who  had  made  his  fortune  in  Louisiana,  and 
who,  while  still  United  States  senator  from  that 
State,  had  been,  during  Buchanan's  administra- 
tion, a  most  zealous  and  efficient  worker  in  the 
cause  of  secession,  using  his  official  position  to 
break  up  the  government  of  which  he  was  a  mem- 
ber. Mason,  if  less  conspicuous,  had  been  no  less 
earnest,  and  had  done  all  in  his  power  to  prevent 
a  free,  honest,  and  independent  vote  in  Virginia 
on  the  question  of  the  secession  of  that  State.  If 
the  United  States  were  a  government  and  not  a 
mere  voluntary  association,  both  were  traitors,  and 
both  were  especially  odious  and  infamous  in  the 
eyes  of  the  loyal  people  of  the  country.  On  a 
dark  night  in  October  these  envoys  with  their 
families  and  secretaries  ran  the  blockade  at  Charles- 
ton in  the  little  steamer  Theodora,  and  arrived 
safely  at  Havana,  where,  after  receiving  much 
attention  from  the  authorities,  they  embarked  on 
the  British  mail  steamer  Trent  for  St.  Thomas, 
proposing  to  sail  thence  for  England.  The  United 
States  frigate  San  Jacinto,  commanded  by  Captain 


298  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

Charles  Wilkes,  boarded  the  Trent  between  Ha- 
vana and  St.  Thomas;  but  instead  of  putting  on 
board  a  prize  crew  and  sending  the  steamer  to  a 
port  of  the  United  States,  that  the  question  of  her 
liability  to  condemnation,  as  a  neutral  carrying 
contraband  of  war,  might  be  settled  in  a  prize 
court,  Captain  Wilkes,  out  of  consideration  for 
the  convenience  of  the  other  passengers  and  for 
the  regular  business  of  the  steamer,  contented  him- 
self with  taking  on  board  his  own  ship  the  commis- 
sioners and  their  secretaries,  leaving  the  Trent  to 
continue  her  voyage  with  her  other  passengers  and 
her  mails. 

When  the  news  of  this  reached  England  the 
excitement  was  intense,  public  opinion  was  unani- 
mous, and  the  public  passion  at  fever  heat.  The 
British  flag  had  been  insulted ;  the  prisoners  must 
be  given  up  and  a  suitable  apology  made.  Troops 
were  at  once  ordered  to  Canada  and  ships  of  war 
were  made  ready  for  sea;  in  the  arsenals  and  dock- 
yards the  business  of  preparation  was  pushed  for- 
ward day  and  night  and  even  on  Sunday ;  and  the 
first  transport  left  the  Mersey  with  the  regimental 
band  playing  "I  wish  I  was  in  Dixie."  The  Brit- 
ish ministry  had  some  time  before  received  infor- 
mation from  a  source  which  they  professed  to 
think  worthy  of  belief,  that  the  government  of  the 
United  States  was  expecting  Mason  and  Slidell  to 
embark  on  the  Trent,  and  had  given  express  orders 
for  their  capture.  On  the  receipt  of  this  informa- 
tion the  law  officers  of  the  crown  had  been  con- 


THE   TRENT  299 

suited,  and  had  advised  the  ministry  that  a  United 
States  man-of-war  overhauling  the  Trent,  captur- 
ing her  and  carrying  her  into  port,  would  be  exer- 
cising a  recognized  belligerent  right;  but  that  if 
she  merely  took  the  Confederate  commissioners 
and  their  dispatches  and  let  the  steamer  go,  she 
would  be  clearly  wrong;  or,  as  has  been  said,  "if 
the  British  flag  were  more  grossly  insulted  there 
would  be  less  or  no  cause  of  complaint."  After 
exact  information  of  what  had  been  done  was  re- 
ceived in  England,  the  queen's  legal  advisers, 
being  again  consulted,  reiterated  their  opinion;  so 
that  upon  the  actual  facts  the  British  case  ap- 
peared quite  perfect.  The  English  ministers  had 
been  told  by  Miss  Slidell  that  the  officer  who 
boarded  the  Trent  stated  that  the  commander  of 
the  San  Jacinto  had  no  instructions,  but  was  act- 
ing solely  on  his  own  responsibility.  They,  how- 
ever, permitted  the  receipt  of  this  information  and 
even  an  authentic  confirmation  of  the  officer's  state- 
ment to  be  denied  by  the  party  press,  though  they 
communicated  it  to  the  queen  when  the  dispatch,  as 
originally  drafted,  was  shown  her.  The  queen  was 
distressed  at  the  peremptory  tone  of  this  paper ;  at 
her  request  Prince  Albert  prepared  a  memorandum 
embodying  her  views,  and  the  dispatch  was  modi- 
fied to  conform  to  them.  A  pathetic  interest  at- 
taches to  this  incident  from  the  fact  that  Prince 
Albert  was  at  the  time  suffering  from  the  illness 
which  shortly  afterwards  proved  fatal,  and  that 
this  memorandum  was  the  last  thing  he  ever  wrote. 


300  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

The  officer  who  boarded  the  Trent  had  stated 
the  simple  truth,  —  Wilkes  was  acting  solely  on 
his  own  judgment  and  responsibility.  The  first 
knowledge  that  either  our  government  or  people 
had  of  the  matter  was  by  a  telegram  from  Fortress 
Monroe,  where  the  San  Jacinto  touched  for  coal 
(November  15,  16,  1861),  and  proceeding  thence 
directly  to  New  York  was  met  in  the  harbor  there 
by  orders  to  carry  the  prisoners  to  Boston,  and 
deliver  them  to  the  commandant  at  Fort  Warren. 
By  universal  consent  Wilkes  became  at  once  a 
hero;  the  newspapers  and  the  people  praised  him 
as  if  he  had  won  a  great  naval  victory;  he  was 
feasted  in  Boston,  and  honored  in  New  York. 
The  secretary  of  the  navy  on  receiving  his  report 
wrote  him:  "Especially  do  I  congratulate  you  on 
the  great  public  service  you  have  rendered  in  the 
capture  of  the  rebel  commissioners.  .  .  .  Your 
conduct  in  seizing  these  public  enemies  was  marked 
by  intelligence,  ability,  decision,  and  firmness, 
and  has  the  emphatic  approval  of  this  department." 
The  annual  report  of  the  Navy  Department  re- 
peated and  indorsed  this  approval,  and  when  Con- 
gress met,  the  House  of  Representatives  voted 
Captain  Wilkes  a  gold  medal  for  his  good  conduct 
in  promptly  arresting  the  rebel  ambassadors. 

Except  the  letter  from  the  secretary  of  the  navy, 
and  the  passage  in  his  report  which  may  be  fairly 
taken  as  representing  his  own  opinion  at  the  time, 
there  is  little  if  any  contemporary  evidence  as  to 
what  the  President  or  any  member  of  his  cabinet 


THE   TRENT  301 

thought  about  the  matter  when  the  news  of  the 
capture  of  the  commissioners  first  reached  them. 
In  writing  from  his  recollection  ten  years  later, 
Mr.  Welles,  whose  object  at  that  time  was  to  de- 
preciate Seward,  said  "that  no  man  was  more 
elated  or  jubilant  than  Seward  at  the  capture  of 
the  emissaries,  and  that  for  a  time  he  made  no 
attempt  to  conceal  his  gratification  and  approval 
of  the  act  of  Wilkes."  Without  actually  indors- 
ing this  assertion  of  Mr.  Welles,  or  bringing  for- 
ward a  single  fact  in  its  support,  Mr.  Lincoln's 
biographers  say :  "  Mr.  Seward  was  doubtless  elated 
by  the  first  news  that  the  rebel  envoys  were  cap- 
tured." So  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  there  is 
nothing  to  justify  either  statement. 

Dr.  Russell,  the  correspondent  of  the  "London 
Times,"  who  was  in  Washington  when  the  news 
of  the  capture  reached  there,  says  that  "at  the 
State  Department  there  was  a  judicious  reticence 
observed  about  it."  Mr.  Sumner,  arriving  there 
for  the  opening  of  Congress,  writes:  "I  learned 
from  the  President  and  from  Mr.  Seward  that 
neither  had  committed  himself  on  the  Trent  affair, 
and  that  it  was  an  absolutely  unauthorized  act. 
Mr.  Seward  told  me  that  he  was  reserving  himself 
in  order  to  see  what  view  England  would  take." 
Even  to  his  family  Seward  said  nothing.  The 
only  allusion  to  the  affair  that  appears  in  any  do- 
mestic letter  prior  to  the  settlement  of  the  case 
is  contained  in  a  single  line,  "The  Mason  and 
Slidell  affair  will  try  the  British  temper." 


302  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

His  son,  then  the  assistant  secretary  of  state, 
and  in  daily  confidential  relations  with  him,  and 
who  was  also  his  biographer,  whose  narrative  of 
the  whole  transaction  is  founded  not  upon  his 
recollection,  but  upon  notes  made  at  the  time,1 
speaks  of  his  abstaining  from  all  conversation  on 
the  subject.  Seward  did  see  McClellan  on  the 
17th  of  November.2  There  seems  to  be  no  reason, 
however,  to  suppose  that  McClellau  was  volunteer- 
ing his  advice,  as  he  has  been  charged  with  doing ; 
on  the  contrary,  it  has  been  said  on  trustworthy 
authority  that  Seward  sent  for  McClellan  when  he 
first  learned  of  the  capture,  and  asked  him  what 
we  could  do  if  Great  Britain  made  a  peremptory 
demand  for  Mason  and  Slidell,  and  the  alternative 
was  either  their  surrender  or  war;  that  he  was 
told  in  reply  that  if  we  went  to  war  with  England 
we  must  at  once  abandon  all  hope  of  keeping  the 
South  in  the  Union;  and  that  he  thereupon  said 
that,  "if  the  matter  took  that  turn,  they  must  be 
at  once  given  up."3  It  is  further  to  be  observed 
that  the  subject  was  not  alluded  to  in  the  Presi- 
dent's message,  and,  Mr.  Sumner  tells  us,  was  not 
touched  upon  in  the  cabinet  or  in  conversation. 

The  first  thing  which  Seward  is  known  to  have 
said  or  written  about  this  affair  is  his  confidential 
letter  to  Mr.  Adams,  on  November  27,  in  which 
he  cautiously  refrains  from  expressing  any  opinion, 

1  Letter  of  F.  W.  Seward,  February,  1896. 

2  McCldlaiCs  Own  Story,  pp.  175,  176. 

8  R.  H.  Dana,  Jr.,  to  the  writer,  January,  1862. 


THE  TRENT  303 

and  says :  "  I  forbear  from  speaking  of  the  capture 
of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell.  The  act  was  done 
by  Commodore  Wilkes,  without  instructions,  and 
even  without  the  knowledge  of  the  government. 
Lord  Lyons  has  judiciously  refrained  from  all 
communication  with  me  on  the  subject,  and  I 
thought  it  equally  wise  to  reserve  ourselves  until 
we  hear  what  the  British  government  may  have  to 
say."  Seward  repeated  this  in  an  official  dispatch 
of  November  30,  which  was  communicated  to  the 
British  government,  but  which,  as  has  already 
been  said,  was  not  suffered  to  find  its  way  to  the 
public,  while  its  statements  were  denied  by  the 
ministerial  press.  From  the  day  when  the  capture 
was  first  known  Mr.  Seward  and  the  British  min- 
ister did  not  meet,  until  on  the  19th  of  December 
Lord  Lyons  came  to  the  State  Department,  and 
acquainted  Mr.  Seward  in  general  terms  with  the 
tenor  of  Lord  Russell's  dispatch. 

The  reserve  of  Seward  and  Lord  Lyons,  and 
their  avoidance  of  each  other  during  this  month 
of  waiting,  show  how  strongly  both  felt  the  grav- 
ity of  the  situation,  and  their  apprehension  of 
most  serious  consequences.  If  Seward  hoped  that 
the  British  demand  might  leave  some  loophole  for 
negotiation,  he  had  evidently  foreseen  the  possi- 
bility that  the  English  might  take  a  tone  which 
left  us  only  the  alternatives  of  the  surrender  of 
our  prisoners  or  of  war,  and  had  decided  upon  his 
course  if  this  should  be  the  case. 

It  was  insisted  in  Lord  Russell's  dispatch  that 


304  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

the  forcible  taking  of  the  commissioners  from  a 
neutral  ship  pursuing  a  lawful  and  innocent  voy- 
age was  an  affront  to  the  British  flag,  and  a  viola- 
tion of  international  law;  and  a  confident  hope 
was  expressed  that,  when  the  matter  was  brought 
under  the  consideration  of  our  government,  it 
would  voluntarily  offer  the  only  redress  that  could 
satisfy  the  British  nation,  —  the  restoration  of  the 
captured  persons  to  British  protection,  and  an 
apology  for  the  aggression  committed.  The  de- 
mand for  an  apology  was  not  pressed,  and  no  apo- 
logy was  ever  made.  That  for  the  return  of  the 
prisoners,  if  not  uncourteous  in  tone,  was  absolute 
and  peremptory.  Two  sets  of  private  instructions 
to  Lord  Lyons  accompanied  the  dispatch.  Both 
these,  however,  were  at  the  time  unknown  to  our 
government  and  to  Seward.  The  first  of  them 
gave  to  the  demand  the  character  of  a  threat.  It 
directed  Lord  Lyons,  if  it  should  not  be  complied 
with  in  seven  days,  to  close  the  legation,  remove 
the  archives,  notify  the  admiral  of  the  British 
Atlantic  fleet  and  the  governors  of  the  North 
American  and  West  Indian  colonies,  and  return 
home;  but  the  second  private  note,  written  later, 
and  apparently  intended  to  soften  the  public  dis- 
patch as  well  as  the  earlier  instructions,  gave  him 
a  discretion  which  would  tend  to  avoid  a  war,  and 
expressed  the  wish  that  he  would  not  formally  de- 
liver the  dispatch  at  once,  but  prepare  the  way, 
and  ask  Mr.  Seward  before  its  delivery  to  settle 
with  the  President  and  cabinet  the  course  they 


THE  TRENT  305 

would  propose.  Acting  upon  these  suggestions, 
Lord  Lyons  on  December  19  called  at  the  State 
Department,  as  has  been  said,  and  stated  to  Mr. 
Seward  the  substance  of  the  British  demands,  and 
on  the  Monday  following  (December  23)  read  to 
him  his  dispatch,  and  left  with  him  a  copy.  In  this 
interval  the  secretary  had  not  been  idle.  The  man- 
ner in  which  he  employed  the  time  leaves  no  room 
for  doubt  that  he  had  already  carefully  considered 
the  situation  and  studied  the  law  of  the  case,  and 
had  determined  not  only  what  he  should  answer  if 
the  British  demand  were  for  an  absolute  surrender 
of  the  men,  but  also  the  grounds  on  which  he  would 
rest  his  compliance.  Shutting  himself  in  his  room, 
and  barring  his  door  against  all  interruption,  he 
began  at  once  the  draft  of  his  reply. 

The  cabinet  met  on  Christmas  day  (Wednesday), 
and  Seward  read  them  his  proposed  answer.  He 
writes :  "  It  (the  case)  was  considered  on  my  pre- 
sentation of  it  on  the  25th  and  26th  of  December. 
The  government,  when  it  took  the  subject  up,  had 
no  idea  of  the  grounds  upon  which  it  would  ex- 
plain its  action,  nor  did  it  believe  it  would  concede 
the  case.  Yet  it  was  heartily  unanimous  in  the 
actual  result  after  two  days'  examination,  and  in 
favor  of  the  release."1  Two  other  members  of 
the  cabinet  have  given  us  accounts  of  these  meet- 
ings which  are  entirely  in  accord  with  this  state- 
ment. Mr.  Bates,  the  attorney-general,  in  his 

1  Letter  to  Weed,  January  2,  1862.  Memoirs  of  Thurlow  Weed, 
ii.  p.  409. 


306  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

diary  says:  "Seward  read  his  proposed  dispatch; 
it  was  examined  and  criticised  by  us  with  appar- 
ently perfect  candor  and  frankness.  All  of  us 
were  impressed  with  the  magnitude  of  the  subject. 
...  I  urged  the  necessity  of  the  case,  —  that  to 
go  to  war  with  England  is  to  abandon  all  hope  of 
suppressing  the  rebellion.  .  .  .  The  maritime  su- 
periority of  Britain  would  sweep  us  from  all  the 
Southern  waters.  Our  trade  would  be  utterly 
ruined  and  our  treasury  bankrupt.  There  was 
great  reluctance  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  cabinet  —  and  even  the  President  him- 
self—  to  acknowledge  these  obvious  truths;  but 
all  yielded  to,  and  unanimously  concurred  in,  Mr. 
Se ward's  letter,  .  .  .  after  some  verbal  and  formal 
amendments."1  Mr.  Chase  wrote  in  his  journal: 
"I  give  my  adhesion,  therefore,  to  the  conclusion 
at  which  the  secretary  of  state  has  arrived.  It  is 
gall  and  wormwood  to  me.  But  I  am  consoled  by 
the  reflection  that  .  .  .  the  surrender  under  exist- 
ing circumstances  is  ...  simply  giving  the  most 
signal  proof  that  the  American  nation  will  not, 
under  any  circumstances,  .  .  .  commit  even  a 
technical  wrong  against  neutrals."2 

Mr.  Lincoln's  biographers  and  other  writers 
have  assumed  or  claimed  that  the  settlement  of 
the  Trent  case  was  substantially  his  work,  that 
his  judgment  favored  the  surrender  of  the  prison- 
ers, and  that  he  intimated  to  Seward  the  need 

1  N.  $•  H.  v.  P.  35. 

2  Warden's  Life  of  Chase,  p.  394. 


THE  TRENT  307 

of  finding  good  diplomatic  reasons  for  so  doing. 
Whatever  Mr.  Lincoln  said,  thought,  or  did  about 
this  matter  can  neither  greatly  add  to  nor  detract 
from  his  fame,  which  rests  upon  other  and  wholly 
distinct  grounds;  but  justice  to  Seward  demands 
that  he  should  receive  in  this  matter  the  credit  to 
which  he  is  fairly  entitled.  It  is  only  so  far  as 
they  are  consistent  with  what  we  know  from  con- 
temporary evidence  that  Mr.  Lincoln  actually  said 
or  did  at  the  time,  that  credit  should  be  given  to 
the  personal  recollections  of  the  popular  writer, 
who  tells  us  that  on  the  day  when  the  news  of  the 
capture  of  the  commissioners  reached  Washington 
he  went  to  the  White  House  in  company  with  a 
treasury  official  and  saw  the  President,  who  said 
to  him:  "We  must  stick  to  American  principles 
concerning  the  rights  of  neutrals.  We  fought 
Great  Britain  for  insisting  by  theory  and  practice 
on  the  right  to  do  precisely  what  Captain  Wilkes 
has  done.  If  Great  Britain  shall  now  protest 
against  the  act,  and  demand  their  release,  we  must 
give  them  up,  apologize  for  the  act  as  a  violation 
of  their  doctrines,  and  thus  forever  bind  her  over 
to  keep  the  peace  in  relation  to  neutrals,  and  so 
acknowledge  she  has  been  wrong  for  sixty  years."1 
This  story  was  first  published  more  than  seven 
years  after  the  transaction  took  place,  and  nearly 
three  years  after  Lincoln's  death.  It  has  never 
been  confirmed;  though  it  has  been  quoted  again 
and  again  by  writers  of  history  and  biography, 
1  Lossing's  Pictorial  History  of  the  Civil  War,  ii.  pp.  156,  157. 


308  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

who  sometimes  give  credit  to  Mr.  Lossing  and 
sometimes  do  not.  Whatever  one  may  think  as 
to  the  substance  of  the  alleged  conversation,  it  is 
evident  that  the  language  as  reported  is  Mr.  Los- 
sing's  own,  and  not  that  of  Mr.  Lincoln;  and  it 
will  be  quite  as  apparent,  when'we  come  to  exam- 
ine what  we  do  really  know  about  Mr.  Lincoln's 
conduct  in  this  matter,  that,  if  he  said  anything 
which  justified  Mr.  Lossing' s  statement,  it  was  a 
mere  passing  thought,  not  the  expression  of  any 
fixed  conviction.  The  anecdote  related  by  Mr. 
Welles  was  so  often  told  at  the  time  that  it  may 
fairly  be  considered  as  supported  by  contempora- 
neous proof.  "The  President,"  says  Mr.  Welles, 
"was  from  the  first  impressed  with  the  gravity  of 
the  situation,  and  thought  the  capture  embarrass- 
ing. His  chief  anxiety  was  as  to  the  disposition 
of  the  prisoners,  who,  to  use  his  own  expression, 
would  be  elephants  on  our  hands  that  we  could 
not  easily  dispose  of.  Public  indignation  was  so 
overwhelming  against  the  chief  conspirators  that 
he  feared  it  would  be  difficult  to  prevent  severe 
and  exemplary  punishment,  which  he  always  de- 
precated." This  opinion  is  quite  different  from 
what  Mr.  Lossing  reports  to  have  been  the  Presi- 
dent's views  expressed  to  him  on  the  same  day, 
even  if  the  two  accounts  are  not  absolutely  incon- 
sistent with  one  another. 

Of  the  President's  subsequent  reticence  we  have 
already  spoken.  Sumner,  after  his  arrival  in 
Washington,  writes  that  he  has  "seen  him  almost 


THE  TRENT  309 

daily  and  most  intimately  ever  since  the  Trent 
question  has  been  under  discussion,1  and  that  he 
has  pressed  upon  him  arbitration."  But,  though 
he  speaks  of  the  President  as  being  "essentially 
honest  and  pacific  in  disposition,  with  a  natural 
slowness,"  he  does  not  give  us  in  his  published 
letters  the  slightest  hint  that  he  had  heard  him 
express  any  opinion  as  to  the  affair  of  the  Trent. 

After  Lincoln's  death  there  was  found  among 
his  papers  the  draft  of  a  letter  proposing  arbitra- 
tion as  a  solution  of  the  difficulty.  This  was  prob- 
ably written  under  the  influence  of  the  interviews 
in  which  Sumner  urged  this  course.  It  was  never 
submitted  to  the  cabinet,  but  it  is  an  authentic 
piece  of  evidence  in  his  own  handwriting,  that  he 
was  seriously  considering  this  aspect  of  the  matter. 

The  intimation  that  there  were  confidential  in- 
terviews between  the  President  and  Seward  as  to 
this  case,  of  which  no  record  has  been  kept,  and 
the  further  suggestion,  that  the  President  inti- 
mated to  Seward,  while  he  himself  was  considering 
the  desirableness  of  arbitration,  that,  as  only  a 
few  days  of  the  grace  allowed  by  the  British  gov- 
ernment for  our  ultimate  decision  of  the  matter 
remained,  he  should  find  good  diplomatic  grounds 
for  the  surrender  of  our  prisoners,  are  both  gratui- 
tous. There  is  no  foundation  for  either  of  them. 
The  latter  falls  to  the  ground,  as  neither  the  Presi- 
dent nor  the  secretary  had  any  knowledge  at  the 
time  that  Lord  Lyons  was  instructed  absolutely  to 
1  Life,  iv.  p.  60. 


310  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

require  his  answer  within  a  limited  period,  much 
less  that  that  period  had  nearly  expired.  The 
former  is  inconsistent  not  only  with  Se ward's  own 
statement  in  his  letter  to  Weed  already  quoted, 
but  also  with  the  President's  reluctance,  as  shown 
by  Mr.  Bates,  to  acquiesce  in  the  conclusion  of 
Seward's  dispatch  and  the  surrender  of  the  pris- 
oners; and  it  is  further  practically  contradicted 
by  Seward's  biographer,  who  tells  us  —  from  his 
memorandum  made  at  the  time  —  that  when  the 
cabinet  separated  on  Christmas  day  after  discuss- 
ing Seward's  dispatch,  the  President  said  to  him: 
"Your  answer  states  the  reasons  why  they  ought 
to  be  given  up;  now  I  've  a  mind  to  try  my  hand 
at  stating  the  reasons  why  they  ought  not  to  be 
given  up;  "  but  told  him  the  next  day  that  he  could 
not  make  an  argument  that  satisfied  his  own  mind, 
and  that  this  proved  to  him  that  Seward's  ground 
was  the  right  one. 

The  contemporary  evidence  all  points  one  way: 
it  shows  that  Lincoln  took  no  lead  in  the  deci- 
sion of  the  matter,  but  acquiesced,  as  the  members 
of  the  cabinet  did,  in  the  reasoning  and  conclu- 
sions of  Seward's  dispatch,  convinced,  though 
against  his  will,  that  the  result  which  Seward  had 
reached  could  not  be  avoided. 

Seward's  dispatch,  whatever  be  its  merits  or 
defects,  is  distinctly  a  technical  document.  It 
has  been  called  an  attorney's  plea.  The  question 
was  one  of  law,  and  he  properly  treated  it  as  such. 
His  paper  bears  evidence  of  a  most  careful  and 


THE   TRENT  311 

exhaustive  study  of  the  adjudicated  cases,  and  of 
the  discussions  in  the  text-books  and  elsewhere 
having  any  bearing  on  the  question  at  issue ;  the 
internal  evidence  as  well  as  the  historical  facts 
show  that,  both  in  its  general  scope  and  in  its  de- 
tails, it  was  the  work  of  one  mind,  and  that  Sew- 
ard's  alone.  The  cabinet,  as  we  know,  adopted 
it  after  discussion,  making  only  some  verbal  and 
formal  amendments,  and  on  the  same  day  it  was 
delivered  to  Lord  Lyons. 

Before  considering  the  argument  of  the  dispatch, 
a  few  words  on  international  law  and  the  political 
situation  of  the  country  at  that  time  may  not  be 
amiss.  The  sources  of  public  international  law 
are  to  be  found  in  those  practices  universally  ad- 
mitted and  recognized  as  legitimate  by  the  usage 
of  civilized  nations,  in  historical  precedents,  and 
in  the  decisions  of  the  prize  courts.  In  every  war 
there  are  two  or  more  belligerents.  Other  coun- 
tries, not  engaged  in  the  war,  are  known  as  neu- 
trals. Neutral  nations  naturally  desire,  if  they 
are  commercial  people,  to  have  their  merchantmen 
free  from  liability  to  capture  and  condemnation, 
and  their  trade  with  any  belligerent  as  secure  and 
untrammeled  as  possible.  They  constantly  en- 
deavor to  procure  such  mitigations  of  the  estab- 
lished rules  of  international  law,  and  such  liberal 
interpretations  of  these  rules,  as  will  enable  them 
to  extend  in  every  way  the  uniformly  profitable 
commerce  of  neutrals  in  war  time.  On  the  other 
hand,  belligerents,  if  maritime  powers,  contend 


312  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

for  a  strict  construction  and  rigorous  enforcement 
of  these  rules,  in  order  that  neutral  trading  with 
the  enemy  may  be  reduced  within  the  narrowest 
limits. 

From  the  time  of  the  formation  of  our  govern- 
ment we  had  uniformly  contended  for  the  largest 
extension  of  the  rights  of  neutrals,  for  in  all  the 
European  wars  we  had  been  a  neutral  nation. 
But  now  the  positions  were  reversed.  We  were 
engaged  in  a  contest  for  the  suppression  of  a  for- 
midable rebellion;  and  were  employing  for  that 
purpose  all  the  recognized  methods  of  modern 
warfare,  both  on  land  and  at  sea.  Other  nations 
had  declared  the  insurrection  a  war,  had  recog- 
nized the  insurgents  as  belligerents,  and  proclaimed 
their  own  neutrality.  Commercial  intercourse  with 
the  insurgents  was  of  immense  profit  to  these  na- 
tions, especially  to  Great  Britain,  and  was  of  vital 
importance  to  the  States  in  rebellion.  We  had 
established  a  blockade  to  put  a  stop  to  this  com- 
merce. Whatever  claims  we  might  have  previ- 
ously put  forth  as  neutrals,  we  could  not  now 
afford  to  make  concessions  impairing  any  right 
heretofore  claimed  by  belligerents,  much  less  any 
undisputed  right.  If  Mason  and  Slidell  were  to 
be  surrendered,  care  must  be  taken  in  stating  the 
grounds  for  their  release  that  no  admission  was 
made  and  no  position  taken  which  in  any  future 
contingency  could  be  turned  against  us. 

The  successful  enforcement  of  our  blockade  de- 
pended on  the  energy,  vigilance,  and  prompt  and 


THE  TRENT  313 

courageous  action  of  the  officers  of  our  navy.  It 
had  been  charged  that  these  officers  were  not  suffi- 
ciently alert  and  watchful.  If  the  zeal  of  Captain 
Wilkes  should  meet  with  anything  like  a  rebuff 
or  rebuke,  it  would  certainly  tend  to  discourage 
other  commanders,  and  induce  them  to  slacken 
their  exertions,  which  it  was  important  to  quicken. 
The  secretary  of  the  navy  and  one  branch  of  Con- 
gress had  already  thanked  Wilkes  for  what  he  had 
done ;  it  was  most  undesirable  that  anything  should 
be  said  which  could  be  interpreted  as  a  reflection 
upon  their  action.  The  whole  country  had  lav- 
ished on  him  unstinted  praise;  men  of  eminence 
and  intelligence,  with  hardly  a  dissenting  voice, 
had  maintained  the  legality  of  his  capture  and 
conduct;  this  universal  outburst  of  patriotic  feel- 
ing and  concord  of  public  opinion  were  not  to  be 
rudely  checked  or  wholly  disregarded.  The  people 
did  not  understand  the  military  exigencies  of  the 
situation,  and  they  were  entirely  unprepared  for 
the  surrender  of  our  prisoners;  the  reasons  for 
giving  up  the  rebel  envoys  must  be  so  put  that  they 
would,  at  the  same  time,  both  satisfy  the  judgment 
and  save  the  pride  of  the  nation.  To  do  this  was 
not  an  easy  task;  but  Seward's  dispatch  met  these 
various  requirements  so  far  as  possible. 

Lord  Russell  had  assumed  that  in  what  had 
been  done  we  claimed  to  be  exercising  a  right,  — 
similar  to  that  on  which  Great  Britain  had  relied 
to  justify  her  taking  from  our  vessels  persons  al- 
leged to  be  her  seamen,  —  a  sort  of  ocean  police 


314  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

for  municipal  purposes  over  vessels  of  a  foreign 
country,  which  would  authorize  any  belligerent  to 
take  from  a  neutral  vessel  rebels,  criminals,  de- 
serters, or  even  the  citizens  of  a  hostile  country. 

This  Seward  at  once  disclaimed.  After  reciting 
the  facts  as  stated  by  Lord  Russell  and  adding 
what  seemed  necessary  to  the  correct  understand- 
ing of  the  matter,  he  went  on  to  say  that,  instead 
of  being  a  flagrant  act  of  violence  on  the  part  of 
Captain  Wilkes,  what  he  did  was  undertaken  as 
a  simple,  legal,  and  customary  belligerent  proceed- 
ing, the  arrest  of  a  neutral  vessel  engaged  in  carry- 
ing contraband  of  war  for  the  use  and  benefit  of 
the  insurgents.  He  then  proceeded  to  enumerate 
and  discuss  the  questions  involved.  These  were, 
as  he  stated  them:  Were  the  commissioners  and 
their  secretaries  with  their  dispatches  contraband 
of  war?  —  Could  Captain  Wilkes  lawfully  stop 
and  search  the  vessel  for  those  persons  and  their 
dispatches?  —  Did  he  exercise  that  right  in  a  legal 
and  proper  manner?  —  Having  found  the  contra- 
band persons  on  board  and  in  presumed  possession 
of  the  contraband  dispatches,  had  he  a  right  to 
capture  the  persons?  If  so,  did  he  exercise  this 
right  in  the  manner  allowed  and  recognized  by 
the  law  of  nations? 

It  was  not  denied  that  persons  in  the  military 
or  naval  service  of  the  enemy  are  contraband. 
The  question  was,  whether  ambassadors,  their 
suites  and  their  dispatches,  fall  within  the  same 
category.  Mr.  Seward  maintained  the  affirma- 


THE   TRENT  315 

tive,  relying  principally  on  the  opinion  of  an  emi- 
nent expounder  of  prize  law,  Sir  William  Scott, 
judge  of  the  British  Admiralty  Court,  that:  "You 
may  stop  the  ambassador  of  your  enemy  on  his 
passage.  Dispatches  are  not  less  clearly  contra- 
band, and  their  bearers  fall  under  the  same  con- 
demnation; .  .  .  when  it  is  of  sufficient  impor- 
tance to  the  enemy  that  persons  shall  be  sent  on 
the  public  service  at  the  public  expense,  it  is  only 
reasonable  that  it  should  afford  equal  ground  of 
forfeiture  against  a  vessel  that  it  has  been  let  out 
for  a  purpose  so  intimately  connected  with  hostile 
operations."  It  was  contended  by  Mr.  Sumner, 
in  his  speech  on  the  Trent  case  delivered  in  the 
Senate  a  few  weeks  later,  that  neither  Mason  nor 
Slidell,  not  being  persons  in  the  military  service, 
nor  their  dispatches,  were  contraband  of  war. 
But  it  may  be  questioned  whether,  though  neutrals 
might  take  this  ground,  Sir  William  Scott's  doc- 
trine may  not  be  defended,  if  not  as  a  universal 
rule,  at  least  as  one  of  limited  application.  While 
all  dispatches  may  not  be  contraband,  there  are 
some  dispatches  which  it  would  be  an  insult  to 
common  sense  not  to  declare  contraband.  It  would 
have  been  a  great  mistake  for  Seward  to  have  con- 
ceded, while  we  were  in  the  midst  of  a  war,  that 
under  no  circumstances  could  the  ambassador  of  a 
belligerent  and  his  dispatches  be  contraband,  — 
even  though  their  successful  transit  in  a  neutral 
vessel  might  give  more  aid  and  comfort  to  an 
enemy  than  many  thousand  stands  of  arms.  The 


316  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

right  of  Captain  Wilkes  to  detain  and  search  the 
Trent,  though  she  was  proceeding  from  one  neutral 
port  to  another,  Mr.  Seward  justified  by  the  mari- 
time law  as  expounded  by  British  magistrates  and 
uniformly  maintained  by  the  British  government. 

That  the  right  of  search,  if  it  existed,  was  exer- 
cised in  a  lawful  and  proper  manner  was  hardly 
disputable,  nor,  if  it  were  once  admitted  that  the 
envoys  and  their  dispatches  were  contraband,  was 
there  any  question  of  the  Trent's  liability  to  cap- 
ture. 

There  remained  only  the  inquiry  whether  Cap- 
tain Wilkes  had  exercised  his  right  of  capture  in 
conformity  with  the  law.  The  law  requires  that 
the  captor  should  bring  the  captured  vessel  into  a 
convenient  port,  and  there  subject  the  validity  of 
her  capture  and  condemnation  to  the  adjudication 
and  decision  of  the  proper  admiralty  court.  If  an 
overwhelming  necessity  prevents  his  doing  this, 
the  captor  is  excused,  but  not  otherwise.  In  this 
case,  upon  the  captain's  own  admission,  a  consid- 
eration of  the  derangement  and  disappointment  it 
would  cause  innocent  passengers  had  operated,  per- 
haps more  powerfully  than  any  other  motive,  in 
inducing  him  to  remove  to  his  own  ship  the  per- 
sons claimed  to  be  contraband,  and  to  suffer  the 
Trent  to  proceed  on  her  voyage.  Though  in  so 
doing  he  followed  exactly  the  practice  of  the  Brit- 
ish officers  in  carrying  off  from  our  merchant  ves- 
sels sailors  whom  they  claimed  to  be  British  sub- 
jects, against  which  we  had  so  often  protested  in 


THE  TRENT  317 

vain;  yet  by  converting  his  quarter  deck  into  a 
court  of  law,  and  constituting  himself  a  judge  in 
his  own  case,  he  violated  the  established  rule  that 
questions  of  prize  are  not  to  be  decided  on  the 
spot  by  the  captor,  but  are  to  be  determined  upon 
a  full  and  impartial  investigation  before  a  compe- 
tent and  regularly  organized  judicial  tribunal. 
The  United  States  had  always  insisted  upon  this 
course,  and  had  so  uniformly  protested  against 
just  such  proceedings  as  took  place  in  this  case, 
that  it  was  impossible  for  us  to  admit  their  suffi- 
ciency and  regularity;  the  prisoners  must,  there- 
fore, be  returned. 

It  was  upon  this  narrow  ground  that  the  sur- 
render of  Mason  and  Slidell  was  determined.  The 
merits  of  this  mode  of  dealing  with  the  case  were : 
that  it  yielded  no  point  of  international  law  on 
which  we  might  at  any  time  desire  to  rest  a  claim 
as  belligerents,  but  made  the  decision  depend  on 
a  doctrine  and  practice  universally  recognized  in 
modern  civilized  warfare  as  the  only  lawful  mode 
of  treating  a  prize;  that  it  gave  due  credit  to 
Wilkes  for  all  the  qualities  which  we  wished  our 
naval  officers  to  cultivate  and  exhibit,  and  only 
indirectly  criticised  and  lamented  his  courtesy  and 
leniency;  that  it  appeared  to  follow  to  their  legiti- 
mate conclusion  the  doubts  suggested  by  the  secre- 
tary of  the  navy  as  to  the  possible  consequences  of 
Wilkes 's  failure  to  bring  in  the  Trent;  that  it 
showed,  therefore,  that  the  government  had  from 
the  outset  been  conscious  of  the  weak  point  of  the 


318  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

case,  and  that  its  first  official  utterance  in  Secre- 
tary Welles 's  letter  to  Captain  Wilkes  was  not 
inconsistent  with  the  final  conclusion  of  the  secre- 
tary of  state. 

As  the  dispatch  followed  precisely  the  argument, 
and  reached  precisely  the  conclusions  of  the  British 
crown  lawyers,  on  exactly  the  grounds  on  which 
they  relied,  though  this  was  not  then  known  to  us, 
it  weakened  any  criticism  on  the  part  of  the  Brit- 
ish government.  From  the  whole  transaction  we 
gained  this  advantage,  —  that  the  surrendering  of 
these  men  so  promptly  and  with  so  little  discussion 
made  both  the  ministry  and  the  people  of  England 
ashamed  of  their  violence  and  haste;  and  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell  instead  of  being  England's 
heroes  became  her  "white  elephants,"  not  ours. 
They  were  quietly  taken  early  one  winter  morning 
from  Fort  Warren  to  Provincetown,  where  they 
were  delivered  on  board  the  British  frigate  Ri- 
naldo.  They  arrived  in  England,  January  29, 
1862.  For  seven  weeks  they  had  been  heroes; 
but  the  tide  was  already  running  against  them, 
and  the  English  did  not  require  the  encouragement 
of  the  "Times"  to  "let  the  fellows  alone." 

When  exactly  what  Captain  Wilkes  had  done 
was  known  in  England,  the  law  officers  of  the 
crown  were  again  consulted.  Somewhat  modify- 
ing their  former  opinions,  they  then  advised  the 
ministry,  that  enemy's  dispatches  and  their  bearers 
were  contraband;  but  that  if  the  dispatches  were 
so  successfully  concealed  as  to  escape  discovery 


THE   TRENT  319 

and  seizure,  the  bearer,  whether  an  ambassador  or 
any  other  person,  could  no  longer  be  taken. 

In  his  original  demand  Lord  Russell  had  made 
no  allusion  to  the  supposed  diplomatic  character  of 
Mason  and  Slidell.  The  complaint  of  the  British 
government  was  simply  that  one  of  our  cruisers 
had  forcibly  stopped  a  neutral  vessel  on  an  inno- 
cent voyage,  and  taken  from  her  two  persons.  In 
his  reply  to  Mr.  Seward,  written  after  the  surren- 
der of  the  prisoners,  Lord  Russell  denied  that 
ambassadors  were  contraband  of  war  subjecting 
the  vessel  to  seizure.  Mr.  Seward,  as  has  been 
stated,  had  maintained  the  contrary.  The  case 
therefore  leaves  that  question  exactly  as  it  was 
before. 

The  surrender  of  our  prisoners  being  placed 
upon  the  well  settled  rule,  that  a  captor  cannot 
take  out  of  a  prize  either  persons  or  property  as 
contraband  without  bringing  in  the  vessel  for  ad- 
judication, unless  he  is  necessarily  prevented  from 
so  doing,  the  decision  settled  in  this  respect  no 
new  principle  of  international  law.  But  Lord 
Russell  persisted  in  his  original  contention,  that 
a  belligerent  cannot  on  any  pretense  take  persons 
out  of  a  neutral  vessel,  thus  not  merely  admitting 
but  insisting  on  what  we  as  a  nation  had  claimed 
for  years;  this  doctrine,  therefore,  for  which  we 
had  so  long  contended  in  vain,  must  now  be  con- 
sidered an  established  rule  of  international  law.1 

i  Dana's  Wheaton,  p.  649,  note. 


CHAPTER   XIX 

INTERVENTION  —  CABINET    DIFFICULTIES  —  EMAN- 
CIPATION 

FROM  the  time  that  Seward  learned  that  France 
had  invited  both  England  and  Russia  to  act  in 
concert  with  her  as  to  our  affairs,  and  that,  though 
Russia  had  declined,  England  had  agreed  to  do 
so,  he  was  very  uneasy  as  to  the  possible  conse- 
quences. He  feared  that  this  arrangement  might 
lead  to  offers  of  mediation,  and,  if  these  were  not 
accepted  by  our  government,  to  a  recognition  of 
the  independence  of  the  South,  if  not  to  more  posi- 
tive intervention  on  its  behalf.  He  was  not  aware 
that  M.  Mercier,  the  French  minister  to  this  coun- 
try, had  already  in  March  (1861)  advised  the 
emperor  to  recognize  the  Confederacy,  and  two 
months  later  had  recommended  the  raising  of  the 
blockade;  nor  did  he  know  that  in  October  of  that 
year,  when  our  summer's  campaign  had  ended  in 
disaster,  there  had  been  a  correspondence  between 
the  British  secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs 
and  the  prime  minister,  in  which  Earl  Russell  had 
written  to  Lord  Palmerston  that  while  it  would 
not  do  for  England  and  France  to  break  a  block- 
ade for  the  sake  of  getting  cotton,  yet  he  felt  sure 


INTERVENTION  321 

that  France  would  join  England  in  saying  to  both 
North  and  South,  as  had  often  been  said  to  Euro- 
pean belligerents,  "Make  up  your  quarrels;  we 
propose  fair  terms  of  pacification ;  if  your  adver- 
sary accepts  them,  and  you  do  not,  you  must  ex- 
pect to  see  us  your  enemies."  To  which  Palmer  - 
ston  had  answered  that  the  best  policy  for  Great 
Britain  was  to  go  on  as  she  had  begun,  and  keep 
quite  clear  of  the  conflict.  Seward  had  at  the 
time  no  knowledge  of  these  occurrences,  but  the 
discussions  in  Parliament,  the  general  tone  of  the 
foreign  press,  his  information  as  to  the  activity 
and  persistent  efforts  of  Jefferson  Davis 's  emissa- 
ries both  in  France  and  England,  and  the  letters 
of  our  ministers,  made  him  keenly  alive  to  the 
constantly  increasing  danger  of  some  such  move- 
ment on  the  part  of  these  countries  as  had  now 
been  proposed. 

To  correct  the  representations  of  the  Southern 
agents  and  counteract  their  influence,  he  deter- 
mined to  send  abroad  some  gentlemen  without 
official  position,  who,  through  the  press,  and  by 
social  intercourse  with  as  many  different  circles 
and  classes  of  people  as  possible,  as  well  as  with 
the  leaders  of  public  opinion,  might  produce  more 
favorable  impressions  of  our  situation  and  pro- 
spects. Accordingly,  in  October  of  this  year,  be- 
fore the  incident  of  the  Trent,  he  dispatched  for 
this  purpose,  with  the  President's  sanction,  Arch- 
bishop Hughes,  the  distinguished  Roman  Catholic 
prelate  of  New  York,  —  whose  position  especially 


322  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

fitted  him  for  such  a  mission  in  France,  —  Bishop 
Mcllvaine  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church, 
and  with  them  his  own  intimate  friend,  the  veteran 
politician  and  editor,  Thurlow  Weed.  Their  pre- 
sence in  Europe  was  an  advantage  to  us  in  the 
storm  that  arose  on  the  news  of  the  capture  of 
Mason  and  Slidell ;  for  though  they  had  no  know- 
ledge of  this  matter  that  was  not  possessed  by 
everybody,  they  were  able,  and  especially  Mr. 
Weed  from  his  intimacy  with  Seward,  to  contra- 
dict the  stories  which  were  widely  circulated  and 
eagerly  believed,  that  the  secretary  had  the  utmost 
animosity  to  Great  Britain,  and  a  serious  purpose 
of  bringing  on  a  war  between  the  two  countries. 

The  affair  of  the  Trent  absorbed  for  a  time  the 
entire  attention  of  the  British  ministry  and  public. 
After  our  surrender  of  the  rebel  commissioners  no 
further  demands  upon  us  from  England  were  ex- 
pected for  the  moment.  But  a  dispatch  from  the 
French  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  received  at  the 
beginning  of  the  new  year,  showed  conclusively 
the  extent  of  the  arrangement  between  the  two 
countries,  and  that,  although  neither  the  honor 
nor  the  interests  of  France  were  in  any  way  af- 
fected by  Captain  Wilkes's  conduct,  yet  the  em- 
peror had  been  prepared  to  make  the  quarrel  his 
own,  and  that  we  should  have  had  both  countries 
to  contend  with  had  there  been  a  rupture  between 
us  and  England. 

When  the  case  of  the  Trent  was  disposed  of, 
our  foreign  ministers,  while  expressing  their  satis- 


INTERVENTION  323 

faction  at  the  temporary  relief  which  this  gave 
them,  wrote  Seward  that  nothing  but  very  marked 
evidence  of  progress  toward  success  would  restrain 
for  any  length  of  time  the  hostile  tendencies  of 
England,  which  this  affair  had  developed.  Fortu- 
nately for  us,  the  New  Year  (1862)  opened  with  a 
series  of  successful  movements.  Important  points 
on  the  Southern  coast  were,  one  after  another,  taken 
and  occupied  by  United  States  troops,  and  New 
Orleans  was  captured.  In  the  West  and  South- 
west a  succession  of  victories  restored  to  the  gov- 
ernment's control  large  portions  of  several  of  the 
States  which  the  Confederacy  had  claimed  as  its 
own.  It  needed  only  the  capture  of  Vicksburg, 
which  then  seemed  close  at  hand,  to  open  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  cut  the  Confederacy  in  two. 

During  the  whole  war  Seward  had  the  habit  of 
writing  from  time  to  time  to  our  foreign  ministers 
accounts  of  the  military  situation,  as  well  of  our 
losses  as  of  our  gains ;  and  these  accounts,  though 
colored  by  his  natural  optimism,  and  strenuously 
cheerful  when  our  prospects  seemed  gloomiest, 
give  excellent  general  descriptions  of  the  important 
military  movements  and  situations.  He  had  pro- 
tested strongly  against  the  recognition  of  the  South 
as  belligerents,  and  now,  encouraged  by  our  achieve- 
ments and  prospects,  he  exerted  all  his  powers  of 
argument  and  persuasion  to  induce  the  European 
governments  to  withdraw  this  concession.  But 
France  declined  to  retract,  upon  the  ground  that 
it  would  be  shabby  to  deprive  the  South,  when  it 


324  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

seemed  weak,  of  the  assurance  that  had  been 
given  when  it  appeared  strong;  and  England  also 
refused,  giving  as  her  reason  that,  although  our 
immediate  success  then  seemed  probable,  it  would 
be  better  to  wait  until  the  victory  had  been  actu- 
ally won. 

The  Northern  gains  in  the  early  months  of  1862 
were  followed  by  a  series  of  reverses.  The  ad- 
vance on  Richmond,  for  which  such  enormous  pre- 
parations had  been  made,  terminated  in  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Union  troops,  after  a  series  of  bloody 
and  destructive  battles.  The  Confederates  moved 
forward  both  in  the  East  and  West,  not  merely 
with  the  purpose  of  repossessing  themselves  of  the 
places  they  had  heretofore  occupied,  but  of  actually 
invading  the  North.  They  were  at  first  successful. 
At  the  West  the  Northern  troops  retreated  in 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  the  Confederates  ad- 
vanced, and  Ohio  was  seriously  threatened;  in  the 
East  the  Southern  forces  fought  their  way  through 
Virginia,  and  actually  invaded  Maryland.  They 
were  driven  back  at  Antietam,  and  compelled  to 
retreat.  Their  forward  movement  in  the  West 
was  checked,  and  there  also  they  were  obliged  to 
withdraw.  Before  this  was  known  in  England, 
when  only  the  news  of  the  Confederate  successes 
had  reached  there,  it  was  agreed  by  Lord  Palmer- 
ston  and  Lord  Russell  in  the  early  autumn  of 
1862,  that  the  proper  moment  for  intervention  had 
arrived,  and  that,  if  the  United  States  declined 
the  proposed  mediation,  the  Southern  Confederacy 


INTERVENTION  325 

should  be  recognized  as  an  independent  nation. 
A  little  later,  a  ministerial  circular  was  prepared, 
describing  the  result  of  the  summer's  campaign, 
and  setting  forth  these  views;  but  before  the 
whole  cabinet  met,  towards  the  end  of  October,  it 
was  evident  that  the  scheme  for  recognition  had 
failed;  the  tide  was  setting  against  mediation; 
the  Southern  victories  were  seen  to  be  barren  of 
results,  and  the  opinion  was  gradually  gaining 
ground  that  the  superior  resources  and  population 
of  the  United  States  would  enable  it  eventually  to 
subdue  the  rebellion. 

In  November  of  the  same  year  the  French  em- 
peror proposed  to  both  England  and  Russia  to 
join  with  him  in  offering  to  arrange  terms  of 
peace.  Both  countries  declined  to  do  so,  and  he 
made  the  proposition  alone.  It  was  communicated 
to  Mr.  Seward  early  in  February,  1863,  at  a  mo- 
ment of  great  discouragement;  to  the  failure  of 
our  summer  campaign  had  been  added  the  disaster 
of  Fredericksburg  and  the  political  defeat  of  the 
administration  in  the  November  elections;  and 
under  these  disheartening  circumstances  Seward 
wrote  his  reply,  refusing  the  offered  mediation. 
His  letter  is  remarkable  for  its  dignity  and  cour- 
age, for  its  forcible  presentation  of  the  situation 
in  which  the  insurrection  found  us,  and  of  what 
had  been  done  to  insure  success,  and  for  the  abso- 
lute reliance  which  it  shows  on  the  patriotism  of 
the  people  and  on  their  determination,  at  whatever 
cost,  to  maintain  the  Union  in  its  integrity. 


326  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

"This  government,"  he  wrote,  "has  not  the 
least  thought  of  relinquishing  the  trust  which  has 
been  confided  to  it  by  the  nation  under  the  most 
solemn  of  all  political  sanctions ;  and  if  it  had  any 
such  thought,  it  would  still  have  abundant  reason 
to  know  that  peace,  proposed  at  the  cost  of  dissolu- 
tion, would  be  immediately,  unreservedly  and  in- 
dignantly rejected  by  the  American  people.  It 
is  a  great  mistake  that  European  statesmen  make, 
if  they  suppose  this  people  are  demoralized.  What- 
ever, in  the  case  of  an  insurrection,  the  people  of 
France  would  do  to  save  their  national  existence, 
no  matter  how  the  strife  might  be  regarded  by,  or 
might  affect,  foreign  nations,  just  so  much,  and 
certainly  no  less,  the  people  of  the  United  States 
will  do.  If  those  now  exercising  their  power 
should,  through  fear  or  faction,  fall  below  this 
height  of  the  national  virtue,  they  would  be  speed- 
ily, yet  constitutionally,  replaced  by  others  of 
sterner  character  and  patriotism." 

No  further  suggestion  of  mediation  was  ever 
made.  But  apprehensions  of  some  form  of  foreign 
interference,  especially  from  Great  Britain,  were 
felt  from  time  to  time  till  nearly  the  close  of  the 
war.  It  was  only  on  the  24th  of  March,  1865, 
ten  days  before  our  troops  entered  Richmond,  that 
Mr.  Adams  was  able  to  state  with  confidence  that 
"no  further  apprehension  need  be  felt  by  us  of 
any  aggressive  policy"  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Atlantic  Ocean. 

Aside  from  the  grave  questions  connected  with 


INTERVENTION  327 

the  war,  the  diplomatic  events  of  the  eighteen 
months  after  the  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell, 
in  which  Seward  found  the  greatest  satisfaction, 
were  a  treaty  with  Great  Britain  for  the  "extirpa- 
tion of  the  African  slave  trade  at  once  and  for- 
ever,"1 and  the  opening  of  diplomatic  intercourse 
with  Hayti  and  Liberia. 

In  the  summer  of  1862,  when  the  army  before 
Richmond  seemed  too  reduced  for  any  effective 
movement,  Seward  left  Washington,  carrying  with 
him  a  letter  from  the  President,  intended  to  sup- 
plement his  own  personal  efforts  with  the  loyal 
governors  and  leading  men  at  the  North,  to  induce 
them  to  urge  the  administration  to  issue  a  fresh 
call  for  troops.  The  President  could  have  made 
such  a  call  without  being  asked ;  but  the  military 
situation  was  critical,  our  prospects  were  gloomy, 
and  he  feared  that  if  he  did  so  "a  general  panic 
and  stampede  would  follow."  Seward  did  his 
work  successfully.  Soon  after  his  return  to  Wash- 
ington, he  was  called  upon  by  Mr.  Seaton,  the 
editor  of  the  "National  Intelligencer,"  who  began 
the  conversation  in  this  way:  "Now  really,  gov- 
ernor, this  is  a  time  to  say  something."  Seward 
began  to  speak  of  the  need  of  reinforcements,  and 
the  promptness  with  which  they  were  arriving; 
but,  either  induced  by  what  Mr.  Seaton  said,  or 
guessing  the  object  of  his  visit,  he  turned  to  per- 
sonal matters,  and  added  that  "every  rumor  of 
a  division  of  counsels,  and  of  a  conflict  about 

1  April  8,  1862. 


328  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

generals,  tended  to  defeat  this  (the  arrival  of  rein- 
forcements); that  he  therefore  felt  at  liberty  to 
state  that  he  had  never  exercised  a  power  or  duty 
in  the  progress  of  the  war  with  which  he  was  not 
specially  charged  by  the  President,  and  in  the  per- 
formance of  which  he  was  not  always  in  free  com- 
munication with  him.  That  to  no  one  had  he  ever 
expressed  distrust  of  the  President,  or  of  any  of 
his  associates  in  the  government;  but  on  the  con- 
trary had  uniformly  supported  them.  That  he 
had  not  been  quick  or  willing  to  entertain  com- 
plaints against  any  general,  but  had  exerted  his 
best  endeavors  to  sustain  them  all.  That  he  had 
never  introduced  or  encouraged  in  the  cabinet  any 
test  question  concerning  men  or  measures;  had 
never  seen  any  intemperance  of  debate  there ;  nor 
had  one  word  of  unkindness  or  distrust  ever  passed 
between  the  President  or  any  of  his  official  advisers 
and  himself." 

This  interview  shows  not  only  that  the  charges 
against  Seward,  which  came  to  a  head  in  Decem- 
ber of  this  same  year  in  the  action  of  a  caucus  of 
senators  requesting  his  removal,  were  in  July  the 
gossip  of  Washington,  but  also  that  they  were 
perfectly  well  known  to  him  at  that  time,  and  that 
he  understood  their  object;  for  he  went  on  to  say 
that  he  was  "content  to  remain  where  he  was  so 
long  as  the  war  continued  and  the  President  re- 
quired it;  but  would  not  prolong  his  stay  one  hour 
beyond  the  time  when  the  President  should  think 
it  wise  to  relieve  "  him. 


CABINET  DIFFICULTIES  329 

It  was  to  Seward  a  summer  of  intense  anxiety. 
Continued  defeats  were  likely  to  bring  on  a  recog- 
nition of  the  independence  of  the  Southern  Con- 
federacy, which  must  be  either  acquiesced  in  or 
met  by  war.  To  avert  the  defeats,  "what  could 
we  do  but  to  push  recruiting,  and,  that  failing,  to 
provide  for  a  draft?"  "I  go  to  Congress  and  im- 
plore and  conjure  them,"  he  writes  to  his  wife. 
"They  give  me  debates  upon  the  errors  of  the 
past,  and  quarrels  about  who  is  to  blame.  These 
disputes  involve  policies  about  dealing  with  slaves, 
upon  which  Congress  angers  itself  and  the  country ; 
and  the  governors  of  the  States  write,  '  You  can 
get  no  recruits.'  I  ask  Congress  to  authorize  a 
draft.  They  fall  into  altercation  about  letting 
slaves  fight  and  work.  Every  day  is  a  day  lost, 
and  every  day  lost  is  a  hazard  to  the  country." 
The  letter  shows  that  his  relations  with  Congress 
were  at  this  time  not  altogether  harmonious.  A 
dispatch  of  the  same  month  to  Mr.  Adams  gives 
us  a  further  insight  into  his  state  of  mind :  — 

"It  seems  as  if  the  extreme  advocates  of  Afri- 
can slavery  and  its  most  vehement  opponents  were 
acting  in  concert  together  to  precipitate  a  servile 
war,  —  the  former  by  making  the  most  desperate 
attempt  to  overthrow  the  federal  Union,  the  latter 
by  demanding  an  edict  of  universal  emancipation 
as  a  lawful  and  necessary,  if  not,  as  they  say,  the 
only  legitimate  way  of  saving  the  Union." 

As  an  official  dispatch,  this  communication  was 
unwise,  if  not  unjustifiable,  and  was  not  helped 


330  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

by  the  word  "confidential"  at  the  top.  It  was 
really  no  dispatch,  but  a  private,  personal  letter, 
expressing  strongly  a  feeling  then  quite  prevalent 
in  parts  of  the  country,  which  Seward  might  fairly 
enough  have  held,  and  which  he  had  a  perfect 
right  to  communicate  in  private  correspondence  to 
a  friend.  His  own  object  at  this  time  was  to  se- 
cure, as  soon  as  possible,  a  victory  which  should 
be  to  Europe  a  demonstration  of  the  certainty  of 
our  ultimate  success.  For  this  troops  were  needed, 
and  every  day  occupied  by  Congress  in  discussing 
political  problems,  instead  of  taking  measures  to 
fill  up  our  armies,  was,  to  his  mind,  a  day  lost  to 
us.  He  knew  that  each  day  so  lost  increased  the 
chances  of  foreign  intervention.  He  thought  that 
the  questions  as  to  slavery  might  wait,  but  that 
our  successes  could  not  do  so;  and  he  was  impa- 
tient of  anything  which  might  endanger  or  delay 
them.  Before  the  meeting  of  Congress  this  dis- 
patch had  become  public.  Mr.  Lincoln  said  that 
it  had  not  been  submitted  to  him.  It  made  no 
reference  whatever  to  either  the  House  or  Senate, 
and  no  allusion  to  Congress.  Seward  spoke  of 
"the  extreme  advocates  of  slavery"  and  of  "its 
most  vehement  opponents."  These  terms  described 
classes,  not  Congressmen ;  nevertheless  the  radical 
anti-slavery  senators  and  representatives  were  in- 
dignant at  what  they  chose  to  consider  an  affront 
offered  them  by  a  cabinet  minister  in  an  official 
document  written  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
President. 


CABINET   DIFFICULTIES  331 

When  the  session  began  in  December,  every  one 
was  depressed  about  the  military  situation,  and  the 
Republicans  very  sore  at  the  results  of  the  Novem- 
ber elections.  The  administration  had  lost  every- 
where. New  York,  Seward's  own  State,  had 
elected  as  governor  a  peace  Democrat;  and  had 
the  new  Congress  met  at  once,  some  peace  would 
probably  have  been  patched  up,  either  with  or 
without  foreign  intervention.  The  change  in  the 
popular  vote  was  to  be  attributed  largely  to  the 
failure  of  our  military  operations  at  the  East. 
There  was  a  general  feeling  that  the  administra- 
tion was  mainly  responsible  for  this,  by  its  inter- 
ference with,  and  mismanagement  of,  the  conduct 
of  the  war.  Some  thought  that  our  misfortunes 
were  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  government  had 
intrusted  important  commands  to  officers  who  had 
not  decided  anti-slavery  opinions,  and  were  not, 
therefore,  it  was  charged,  thoroughly  in  earnest 
in  their  work.  It  was  evident  that  the  emancipa- 
tion proclamation,  which  is  presently  to  be  spoken 
of,  had  further  divided,  instead  of  uniting  the 
people.  The  nation  had  given  a  distinct  vote  of 
want  of  confidence;  and  the  Republican  senators 
wished  to  regain  the  popular  favor.  They  as- 
sumed that  Seward  had  been  the  controlling  mind 
in  the  administration,  the  premier,  in  the  talk  of 
the  day;  that  he  was  practically  responsible  for 
its  domestic  as  well  as  its  foreign  policy,  for  all 
its  mistakes  and  misfortunes,  civil,  political,  and 
military,  and  had  dominated,  in  a  heterogeneous 


332  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

and  discordant  cabinet,  even  the  President  him- 
self. 

It  is  idle  to  speculate  upon  the  origin  or  causes 
of  this  opinion.  It  is  enough  that  it  existed  at 
the  time,  and  was  not  confined  to  Congress.  It  is 
not  easy  to  find  any  foundation  for  it.  From  the 
time  that  supplies  were  ordered  to  Sumter  to  the 
close  of  his  life,  Lincoln  was  the  head  of  his  own 
government,  and  Seward  recognized  this  fact. 
"There  is  but  one  vote  in  the  cabinet,"  he  said, 
"and  that  is  cast  by  the  President."  "The  Pre- 
sident is  the  best  of  us  all,"  he  wrote  to  his  wife  in 
June,  1861.  Lincoln  listened  to  Seward's  opin- 
ions, as  he  did  to  those  of  the  other  members  of 
his  cabinet,  but  the  decision  was  always  his  own; 
if  anybody  interfered  with  the  military  operations 
and  the  disposition  of  the  troops,  it  was  the  Pre- 
sident and  secretary  of  war,  not  Seward. 

It  was  thought,  however,  that  some  change  must 
be  made ;  and  acting  on  their  preconceived  notions, 
a  caucus  of  Republican  senators  voted  by  a  small 
majority  to  request  the  President  "to  dispense 
with  the  services  of  the  secretary  of  state."  Be- 
lieving that  their  object  might  be  equally  well  at- 
tained by  a  resolve  less  personal,  supported  by  a 
larger  majority,  the  caucus  on  the  following  day 
adopted,  with  only  one  dissenting  voice,  a  substi- 
tute, recommending  the  President  to  partially  re- 
model his  cabinet,  and  appointed  a  committee  of 
nine,  —  six  radicals  and  three  conservatives,  —  to 
wait  on  him  and  present  this  resolution.  That 


CABINET  DIFFICULTIES  333 

there  might  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  object  of  the 
resolve,  eight  of  these  nine  committeemen  were 
known  to  think  "Seward  a  serious  obstacle  to  the 
prosecution  of  the  war."  Seward,  learning  of  the 
doings  of  the  caucus,  anticipated  the  action  of  the 
committee  by  sending  in  his  resignation.  Chase 
disapproved  the  action  of  the  caucus ;  he  was  un- 
willing to  be  a  party  to  an  attack  upon  Seward, 
and  finding  the  reason  given  by  the  senators  for 
their  action  broad  enough  to  extend  to  all  the 
members  of  the  cabinet,  he  also  sent  in  his  resig- 
nation. The  whole  thing  disturbed  Lincoln;  he 
was  displeased  with  the  attempt  at  congressional 
dictation,  and  greatly  annoyed  at  the  inability  to 
grasp  the  situation  which  the  proceeding  displayed. 
Seward  and  Chase  represented  the  opposite  ex- 
tremes of  the  Republican  party,  and  it  was  neces- 
sary that  he  should  have  in  his  cabinet  the  support 
of  both.  He  was  relieved  from  all  embarrassment 
on  that  score  when  he  received  Chase's  resignation, 
and,  one  might  almost  say,  ordered  them  both  to 
go  back  at  once  to  their  posts,  because  the  public 
good  required  it.  Speaking  of  the  matter  a  year 
later,  he  said:  "If  I  had  yielded  to  that  storm 
and  dismissed  Seward,  the  thing  would  have 
slumped  over  one  way,  and  we  should  have  been 
left  to  a  scanty  handful  of  supporters." 

As  our  armies  advanced  into  the  seceding  States, 
the  questions  of  the  effect  of  the  war  upon  the 
slaves  found*  within  our  lines,  as  well  as  upon 
slavery  itself,  became  of  constantly  increasing  in- 


334  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

terest  and  importance.  General  Butler's  ingen- 
ious application  of  the  term  "contraband"  to  the 
slaves  coming  within  our  lines,  was  of  great  ser- 
vice in  solving  the  former;  but  the  latter,  the 
vital  question  of  slavery  or  emancipation,  still 
remained,  and  upon  this  there  were  great  differ- 
ences of  opinion.  There  were  many  persons,  not 
necessarily  radicals,  who,  looking  at  the  matter 
only  from  a  moral  point  of  view,  considered  con- 
stitutional scruples  wholly  idle,  that  if  slavery 
were  not  abolished  the  war  would  be  not  merely  a 
crime  but  a  blunder,  and  that  public  proclamation 
of  immediate  emancipation  should  be  made  at  once, 
without  regard  to  consequences,  and  however  inef- 
fectual it  might  in  fact  be.  Our  foreign  ministers 
—  while  they  thought  military  successes  essential, 
if  we  would  prevent  the  recognition  of  the  South 
by  the  governments  of  Europe  —  admitted  that  a 
proclamation  of  emancipation,  which  should  give 
to  the  war  the  aspect  of  a  crusade  against  slavery, 
might  be  of  advantage  to  us;  and  some  of  them 
were  urgent  that  this  proclamation  should  be  made 
at  once. 

At  home  those  persons  who  believed  in  the  su- 
premacy of  the  Constitution,  and  that  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  Union  was  the  object  of  the  war  and 
its  only  justification,  were  in  a  state  of  great  doubt 
both  as  to  the  duty  and  the  powers  of  the  federal 
government.  Many  of  them,  as  the  war  went 
on,  had  come  gradually  to  the  conviction  that  it 
must  end  in  the  abolition  of  slavery,  and  that  the 


CABINET  DIFFICULTIES  335 

struggle  would  be  futile  or  worse  if  in  the  result 
this  cause  for  sectional  strife  should  not  disappear 
forever;  yet  they  saw  no  ground  for  the  govern- 
ment's interference  with  slavery  in  any  State,  ex- 
cept as  a  military  necessity  for  the  purpose  of  more 
quickly  and  successfully  putting  down  the  rebellion. 
They  were  very  doubtful  whether  an  emancipation 
proclamation  would  have  this  effect,  —  whether  it 
would  not  more  strongly  unite  and  give  fresh  cour- 
age to  the  South,  while  it  would  bring  into  oppo- 
sition to  the  government  all  those  elements  at  the 
North  which,  united  in  their  support  of  a  war  for 
the  Constitution,  were  more  or  less  indifferent  to 
slavery ;  and  whether  it  would  not,  by  thus  divid- 
ing the  Northern  people,  make  the  successful  pro- 
secution of  the  war  no  longer  possible ;  or  in  other 
words,  whether  it  would  not  add  an  enemy  in  the 
rear  to  those  already  in  the  field. 

His  own  doubts  upon  this  point,  and  his  convic- 
tion that  he  had  no  right  to  convert  the  war  into 
a  crusade  against  slavery,  had  made  the  President 
hesitate  long.  As  he  declared  in  words  often 
quoted:  "My  paramount  object  in  this  struggle  is 
to  save  the  Union,  and  is  not  either  to  save  or  to 
destroy  slavery.  If  I  could  save  the  Union  with- 
out freeing  any  slave,  I  would  do  it;  and  if  I 
could  save  it  by  freeing  all  the  slaves,  I  would  do 
it;  and  if  I  could  save  it  by  freeing  some  and 
leaving  others  alone,  I  would  also  do  that.  What 
I  do  about  slavery  and  the  colored  race,  I  do  be- 
cause I  believe  it  helps  to  save  the  Union;  and 


336  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

what  I  forbear,  I  forbear  because  I  do  not  believe 
it  would  help  to  save  the  Union.  I  shall  do  less 
whenever  I  shall  believe  that  what  I  am  doing 
hurts  the  cause,  and  I  shall  do  more  whenever  I 
shall  believe  doing  more  will  help  the  cause." 

More  than  a  month,  however,  before  he  wrote 
this  letter,  he  had  submitted  to  his  cabinet  the 
draft  of  an  emancipation  proclamation.  The  dis- 
cussion which  followed  showed  that  there  was  be- 
tween the  secretaries  the  same  difference  of  opinion 
that  existed  among  the  people.  The  attorney- 
general  and  Stanton  favored  the  immediate  issuing 
of  this  proclamation;  the  secretary  of  the  navy 
was  silent;  Mr.  Chase  said  it  was  a  measure  of 
great  danger,  would  lead  to  universal  emancipa- 
tion, and  went  far  beyond  anything  he  had  recom- 
mended; and  Mr.  Blair  prophesied  that  it  would 
cost  the  administration  the  next  elections.  No- 
thing was  said,  however,  that  affected  the  Presi- 
dent's decision,  until  Seward  suggested  that  the 
depression  of  the  public  mind,  in  consequence  of 
our  repeated  reverses,  was  so  great  that  this  might 
be  considered  the  last  resource  of  an  exhausted  gov- 
ernment, a  cry  for  help,  the  government  stretching 
forth  its  hands  to  Ethiopia,  instead  of  Ethiopia 
stretching  forth  her  hands  to  the  government ;  and 
that  the  proclamation  had  better  be  postponed 
until  it  could  be  supported  by  military  successes, 
instead  of  coming  upon  the  heel  of  great  disasters. 
The  wisdom  of  this  struck  Mr.  Lincoln  so  forcibly 
that  he  put  the  paper  away,  and  waited  till  our 


EMANCIPATION  337 

partial  victory  at  Antietam  had,  to  some  extent, 
redeemed  the  failures  of  the  summer.  The  procla- 
mation was  then  issued;  and  when  the  days  of 
grace  which  it  gave  to  the  seceding  slaveholders 
had  expired,  its  assurances  were  fulfilled.  As  our 
armies  advanced,  the  government  in  all  its  branches 
recognized  and  maintained  the  freedom  which  the 
proclamation  promised,  and  the  interests  of  hu- 
manity became  identified  with  the  cause  of  the 
country. 


CHAPTER   XX 

DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS   OF   THE   WAR 

WHEN  Lincoln  entered  upon  the  duties  of  his 
office  the  troops  at  his  command  were  too  few  to 
permit  him  even  to  consider  the  question  of  pro- 
perly reinforcing  and  holding  Fort  Sumter.  Our 
navy  consisted  of  forty-two  ships  fit  for  immediate 
service,  thirty  of  which  were  dispersed  in  different 
parts  of  the  world,  leaving  only  twelve  for  use  at 
home.  To  suppress  the  rebellion  took  us  four 
years.  At  its  close  we  had  an  army  of  a  million 
men,  and  a  navy  of  nearly  six  hundred  ships, 
seventy-five  of  which  were  ironclads.  It  was,  of 
course,  impossible  that  a  contest  of  this  magnitude, 
as  to  which  the  great  European  powers  had  pro- 
claimed their  neutrality  almost  before  it  began, 
could  be  carried  on  by  sea  and  land  for  so  long 
a  period  without  giving  rise  to  an  infinite  number 
and  variety  of  diplomatic  questions  and  complaints. 
The  published  correspondence  of  the  St<*ce  Depart- 
ment for  this  period  fills  thirteen  volumes;  the 
mere  enumeration  of  the  matters  treated  of  would 
be  extremely  tedious.  It  may  be  said  in  general, 
that  Seward  claimed  for  us  as  belligerents  the 
fullest  exercise  of  all  the  rights  upon  which  Great 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    339 

Britain  had  insisted  when  at  war;  but  that,  with- 
out waiving  these,  he  at  times  made  concessions 
for  the  purpose  of  relieving  the  tension  between 
this  country  and  the  leading  European  powers, 
and  of  diminishing  if  possible  the  hostile  feelings 
of  their  citizens.  His  mode  of  dealing  with  the 
mails  found  on  captured  blockade  runners  is  an 
illustration  of  this. 

These  vessels  often  had  mails  on  board;  the 
question  of  the  disposition  to  be  made  of  these  was 
important  and  troublesome,  and  involved  a  good 
deal  of  feeling.  Should  we  open  them  and  exam- 
ine their  contents?  They  might  contain  official 
dispatches  or  private  letters  having  important  in- 
formation ;  but,  to  ascertain  this,  it  would  be  ne- 
cessary to  pry  into  domestic  letters  of  a  strictly 
personal  character.  Was  this  permitted  by  the 
laws  of  war?  The  governments  under  whose  flags 
these  vessels  sailed  insisted  that  the  mail  bags 
should  be  forwarded  unopened  to  their  destina- 
tion; our  Navy  Department  contended  that  they 
were  liable  like  the  cargo  to  examination  for  con- 
traband. Seward,  after  some  consideration,  agreed 
that  the  public  mails  of  any  friendly  or  neutral 
power  should  be  forwarded  unopened.  The  secre- 
tary of  the  navy  thought  this  a  weak  yielding  to 
an  unreasonable  demand.  Seward  made  the  con- 
cession not  as  a  matter  of  right,  but  of  expediency, 
and  was  unquestionably  wise  in  so  doing.  In  any 
event  the  advantages  to  us  would  have  been  slight 
and  rare ;  the  irritation  of  other  governments  and 


340  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

of  their  citizens,  whose  private  correspondence 
might  have  been  tampered  with,  would  have  been 
constant  and  extreme,  and  might  have  led  to  most 
serious  consequences. 

The  permission  granted,  at  the  request  of  their 
government,  to  the  French,  who  wished  to  do  so, 
to  leave  New  Orleans  by  passing  through  the 
blockade  is  another  instance  of  the  same  policy. 
The  abuse  of  a  similar  privilege  by  a  British  con- 
sul and  the  commander  of  an  English  man-of-war, 
which  had  been  authorized  for  a  special  purpose 
to  enter  a  blockaded  port,  shows  the  extent  to 
which  their  sympathy  with  the  South  could  carry 
two  British  public  servants.  They  permitted  the 
Confederate  government  to  ship  and  send  to  Eng- 
land by  this  vessel  gold  for  the  payment  of  its 
obligations  there,  that  it  might  in  this  way  escape 
any  risk  of  capture.  When  Seward  remonstrated, 
the  consul  was  dismissed  from  the  service;  but  the 
mischief  had  been  already  done. 

The  blockade  gave  rise  to  many  complaints, 
most  of  them  depending  on  questions  of  fact,  as 
to  which  it  was  not  always  easy  to  ascertain  the 
truth.  Though  the  investigation  of  these  cases 
occupied  a  great  deal  of  time,  they  hardly  fur- 
nished any  cause  for  serious  anxiety;  but  our 
attempt  in  the  autumn  of  1861  to  obstruct  some 
of  the  channels  of  Charleston  harbor  by  sinking 
old  hulks  loaded  with  stones  —  the  stone  blockade, 
as  it  was  called  —  seemed  at  one  moment  to  threaten 
difficulties  of  a  graver  character.  Similar  modes 


of  closing  the  entrance  to  a  harbor,  by  quasi-per- 
manent obstructions,  were  not  wholly  unknown. 
The  British  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution  had  done 
something  of  the  sort  at  Savannah;  the  Confeder- 
ates during  their  four  years'  struggle  placed  such 
obstructions  in  many  harbors.  But  on  learning 
of  our  stone  blockade  Earl  Russell's  temper  seems 
to  have  got  the  better  of  his  courtesy.  He  in- 
structed Lord  Lyons  to  remonstrate  with  Mr. 
Seward  against  this  as  a  "cruel  plan,  which  could 
only  be  adopted  as  a  measure  of  revenge  and  of 
irremediable  injury  against  an  enemy;"  and  to 
say  further  that,  "even  as  a  scheme  of  bitterest 
and  sanguinary  war,  such  a  measure  would  not  be 
justifiable;  that  it  would  be  a  plot  against  the 
commerce  of  all  maritime  nations  and  against  the 
free  intercourse  of  the  Southern  States  of  America 
with  the  civilized  world."1  How  far  Lord  Lyons 
in  his  interview  with  Mr.  Seward  softened  the 
offensive  phraseology  of  this  letter  cannot  be 
known.  Mr.  Seward 's  position  in  the  matter, 
according  to  Lord  Lyons 's  report  to  his  govern- 
ment, is  exactly  what  he  himself  stated  it  to  be  in 
a  dispatch  of  February  17,  1861,  to  Mr.  Adams, 
in  which  he  said :  "  I  am  not  prepared  to  recognize 
the  right  of  other  nations  to  object  to  the  manner 
of  placing  artificial  obstructions  in  the  channels  of 

1  Lord  Russell  had  probably  forgotten  that  a  provision  of  the 
treaty  of  Utrecht  (1713)  inserted  in  favor  of  England  stipulated 
for  the  filling  up  of  the  harbor  of  Dunkirk,  and  that  this  was 
done  soon  after  the  execution  of  the  treaty. 


342  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

rivers  leading  to  ports  which  have  been  seized  by 
insurgents  in  their  attempts  to  overthrow  this  gov- 
ernment. I  am  nevertheless  desirous  that  the  ex- 
aggerations on  that  subject  which  have  been  in- 
dulged abroad  may  be  corrected."  He  adds  that 
he  has  applied  to  the  Navy  Department  for  infor- 
mation, and  has  learned  that  there  are  two  ship 
channels  in  which  no  artificial  obstructions  have 
been  or  are  to  be  placed,  and  which  are  guarded 
only  by  the  blockading  squadron.  Nothing  fur- 
ther was  heard  from  Great  Britain  on  the  subject. 
The  sunken  hulks  were  gradually  washed  away  by 
storms,  and  the  necessity  for  the  discussion  disap- 
peared with  the  obstructions. 

The  personal  questions  as  to  foreigners  were 
not  confined  to  matters  having  their  origin  in  our 
blockade.  There  were  numerous  complaints  of 
unjust  imprisonment  or  of  hard  usage  as  to  their 
persons  or  property  by  resident  foreigners  of  vari- 
ous nationalities.  Care  and  patience  were  requi- 
site for  the  examination  of  these,  and  tact  and 
good  sense  for  deciding  them;  but  they  were  all 
disposed  of  without  hard  feeling,  except  those 
arising  out  of  General  Butler's  government  at 
New  Orleans.  The  foreign  population  there,  of 
which  a  majority  was  French,  had  strong  seces- 
sion sympathies,  and  was  not  disposed  to  submit 
quietly  to  Butler's  arbitrary  proceedings.  Com- 
plaints from  the  foreign  ministers  came  thick  and 
fast ;  some  were  of  a  very  serious  nature,  involving 
claims  for  large  amounts  of  property  confiscated, 


DIPLOMATIC    QUESTIONS   OF   THE  WAR    343 

of  money  seized,  without  apparent  justification, 
together  with  demands  for  indemnity  for  personal 
insults  and  injuries.  They  engrossed  half  Sew- 
ard's  time,  and  were  seriously  endangering  our 
friendly  relations  with  the  great  powers  of  Europe, 
until,  "to  relieve  their  uneasiness,"  Banks  was 
sent  to  succeed  Butler.  Butler's  proceedings  were 
gratifying  to  the  vindictive  feelings  of  the  North 
towards  the  secessionists,  and  at  the  time  were 
much  approved.  They  may  have  been  necessary 
for  the  maintenance  of  public  order;  if  they  were 
not  so,  it  was  certainly  injudicious  to  run  such 
risks  of  a  rupture  with  France,  which  would  prob- 
ably have  involved  one  with  England  also.  It  is 
not  impossible  that  the  action  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment on  some  of  these  complaints  of  the  foreigners 
at  New  Orleans  may  have  been  the  alleged  "inter- 
ference with  our  generals,"  which  was  urged  as 
one  of  the  reasons  for  asking  Se ward's  removal. 

There  is  a  wide  difference  between  a  proclama- 
tion of  neutrality  in  the  case  of  a  war  between  two 
states  already  recognized  as  belonging  to  the  fam- 
ily of  nations,  and  a  similar  proclamation  in  a  case 
where  bands  of  insurgents,  or  provinces  in  revolt, 
are  seeking  to  wrest  their  independence  from  their 
government.  In  the  former  case  the  proclamation 
makes  no  change  in  the  existing  status,  it  is  a 
mere  cautionary  notice  of  undisputed  facts,  which 
are  thus  called  to  the  attention  of  the  subjects  of 
the  government  issuing  it,  to  remind  them  of  their 


344  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

rights  and  duties.  In  the  latter  it  alters  the  pre- 
vious conditions,  and,  so  far  as  the  citizens  of  the 
country  issuing  it  are  concerned,  actually  creates 
what  it  only  professes  to  recognize,  either  calling 
into  being  as  a  full-grown  nation  (if  it  acknow- 
ledges their  independence)  a  body  of  people  who 
had  previously  no  political  existence  whatever,  or 
turning  a  rebellion  into  a  war,  if  it  only  calls  them 
belligerents.  It  is  really  not  a  declaration  of  neu- 
trality, but  a  mild  form  of  intervention  on  behalf 
of  an  incipient  revolution,  and  when  made  jointly 
by  several  powerful  nations  at  the  same  time,  is  a 
pretty  efficacious  one;  it  is  also  distinctly  an  act 
injurious  to  the  government  endeavoring  to  put 
down  its  rebellious  citizens.  The  only  way  for 
any  foreign  nation  to  maintain  a  real  neutrality 
in  such  a  struggle  is  to  leave  the  rebels  alone 
to  gain  their  independence  if  they  can,  and  their 
government  undisturbed  to  crush  the  insurrection 
if  it  is  able.  It  was  not  this  absolute  neutrality 
which  England  and  France  assumed  to  maintain 
towards  us  during  the  rebellion.  Their  proclama- 
tions at  the  outset  gave  countenance  to  the  South, 
and  the  hope  of  something  more. 

Our  complaints  of  these  proclamations  at  the 
time  they  were  issued  have  already  been  spoken 
of.  It  soon  appeared  that,  so  far  as  England 
was  concerned,  the  immediate  and  principal  effect 
of  her  course  was  to  stimulate  all  her  industries 
and  manufactures,  and  to  encourage  her  people  to 
do  their  utmost  to  supply  the  needs  of  our  States 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    345 

in  rebellion,  whose  only  resources  were  agricul- 
tural, whose  main  dependence  for  everything  es- 
sential to  carrying  on  their  struggle  was  the  work- 
shops and  factories  of  Great  Britain,  and  who, 
without  the  supplies  received  in  this  way,  would 
have  been  speedily  subdued.  The  perception  of 
these  facts  quickened  and  intensified  our  sense  of 
the  wrong  done  us  by  England  at  the  outset;  it 
gave  rise  to  a  general  conviction  that  the  British 
government  was  not  reluctant  to  gain  advantages 
for  its  own  citizens  at  our  expense,  and  was  the 
source  of  a  widespread  belief  that  to  secure  this 
result  had  been  the  purpose  of  its  original  action. 

We  also  complained  that  England  persistently 
violated  in  various  ways  the  duties  and  obligations 
of  the  neutrality  she  had  declared.  We  charged 
her  with  doing  so  by  permitting  the  Confederates 
to  use,  first  Nassau  in  the  British  Bahamas,  and 
later  Bermuda,  as  military  bases,  and  depots  for 
their  arms,  ammunition,  stores,  and  equipments. 
Against  this  use  of  these  ports  Seward  protested 
strenuously;  but  his  remonstrances  produced  no 
effect.  If  England  had  made  no  proclamation  of 
neutrality,  such  assistance  to  unrecognized  rebels 
would  not  have  been  tolerated;  but  under  the 
circumstances  it  is  doubtful  if  it  was  a  technical 
breach  of  neutrality,  though  if  it  had  clearly  been 
so,  it  could  not  have  done  us  more  grievous  harm. 

Our  complaints  against  England's  violations  of 
neutrality,  however,  went  far  beyond  this.  We 
charged  her  with  gross  breaches  of  it  in  permitting 


346  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

rebel  cruisers,  intended  to  prey  upon  our  com- 
merce, to  be  built  in  her  ship-yards,  equipped 
and  armed  from  her  workshops,  provisioned  and 
manned  by  her  sailors  and  subjects.  Early  in 
1862,  complaint  was  made  to  the  British  govern- 
ment as  to  the  construction  of  a  vessel  for  this 
purpose.  She  was  finished,  registered  as  an  Eng- 
lish ship,  and  cleared  as  such  for  Palermo.  She 
never  went  there,  but  appeared  at  Bermuda,  even- 
tually ran  the  blockade  into  Mobile,  where  she  was 
armed,  successfully  escaped  from  there,  and  cruised 
as  the  Florida.  She  made  many  prizes  in  the 
Atlantic,  and  having  burnt  one  of  our  ships  off 
the  Irish  coast,  went  in  to  Brest  to  land  its  crew 
and  make  some  repairs,  and,  in  spite  of  our  re- 
monstrances, was  there  allowed  to  ship  a  fresh 
crew  for  herself  and  start  again.  She  ended  her 
career  in  October,  1864,  at  Bahia.  She  was  cut 
out  from  under  the  guns  of  a  Brazilian  battery 
and  the  broadside  of  a  guard-ship,  by  the  United 
States  steamer  Wachusett,  and  brought  into  Hamp- 
ton Roads,  where  she  fortunately  solved  a  diplo- 
matic difficulty  by  springing  a  leak  and  sinking. 
Brazil  accepted  our  apology  for  the  violation  of 
her  sovereignty  in  the  attack  on  the  rebel  ship, 
and  the  removal  of  our  consul  who  had  advised  it, 
with  the  sending  of  the  commander  of  the  Wachu- 
sett before  a  court-martial,  as  sufficient  amends 
for  the  offense. 

•Towards   the   end   of   June   in   the   same  year 
(1862),  Mr.  Adams  informed  Lord  Russell  that 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    347 

a  new  and  more  powerful  steamer  was  nearly 
ready  to  leave  Liverpool  on  the  same  errand  as 
the  Florida.  She  did  not  in  fact  sail  until  the 
29th  of  July,  but  the  British  government  was  not 
able  during  this  whole  month  to  satisfy  itself,  until 
it  was  too  late,  that  there  was  any  evidence  which 
would  justify  her  detention.  This  vessel  was  the 
Alabama.  She  slipped  out  of  port  and  waited  off 
the  coast  until  she  had  received  a  crew  of  forty 
men  sent  to  her  in  a  tug  from  Liverpool ;  off  the 
Azores  she  was  met  by  two  vessels,  which  had 
sailed  directly  from  England,  bringing  all  her 
armament,  clothing  for  her  crew,  a  supply  of  coal, 
and  her  captain  and  officers.  As  British  ships 
are  British  territory,  it  seems  that  in  this  case 
the  vessel  was  built,  equipped,  armed,  and  manned 
under  the  British  flag  and  protection;  and  that 
the  breach  of  neutrality  and  the  violation  of  the 
spirit,  if  not  of  the  letter,  of  the  municipal  law  of 
England  were  complete  in  every  particular  before 
she  hoisted  the  Confederate  colors.  It  has  been 
admitted  by  a  British  jurist,  that  "had  the  whole 
series  of  transactions  which  finally  placed  her  on 
the  ocean  armed,  manned,  provisioned,  and  com- 
missioned for  war,  been  within  the  knowledge  of 
the  British  government,  and  within  its  power  of 
control,  she  would  never  have  left  the  Mersey;" 
and,  if  it  be  conceded  that  the  display  of  the  Con- 
federate flag  and  the  exhibition  of  a  Confederate 
commission,  under  the  circumstances  stated,  so 
changed  her  character  that  she  could  no  longer 


348  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

be  proceeded  against  and  condemned  in  any  Brit- 
ish court,  it  may  fairly  be  claimed  that  a  due  regard 
to  the  neutrality  they  professed,  to  the  dignity  of 
the  crown,  and  to  the  spirit  of  their  laws  would 
have  more  than  justified  the  British  ministry  in 
refusing  to  this  vessel,  English  in  everything  but 
the  name,  an  asylum  in  any  harbor  under  their 
jurisdiction.  Instead  of  this  she  was  received  at 
every  British  port  she  chose  to  visit,  and  met  there 
a  liberal  hospitality  quite  different  from  the  bare 
toleration  which  was  grudgingly  given  to  our  men- 
of-war.  She  began  her  predatory  cruising  in  Au- 
gust, 1862,  and  finished  it  twenty-two  months  later, 
in  June,  1864,  when  she  was  sunk  off  Cherbourg 
by  the  United  States  steamer  Kearsarge  after  an 
hour's  action.  During  her  cruises  she  captured 
and  destroyed  about  sixty  American  vessels,  most 
of  which  were  merchantmen  employed  in  foreign 
voyages. 

Applications  to  the  ministry  having  proved  inef- 
fectual to  prevent  the  sailing  of  the  rebel  cruisers, 
Seward  wrote  to  Mr.  Adams:  "As  one  more  re- 
source, it  is  deemed  advisable  that  an  effort  be 
made  to  secure  the  enforcement  of  the  enlistment 
laws  through  the  action  of  the  courts  "  (April  2, 
1863).  In  pursuance  of  these  instructions  Mr. 
Adams  furnished  the  British  government  with  such 
evidence  that  proceedings  were  begun  against  the 
owners  of  the  steamer  Alexandra.  At  the  trial 
there  was  no  dispute  about  the  facts.  The  vessel 
was  built  under  a  contract  with  the  agent  of  the 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    349 

Confederate  government  and  was  intended  for  use 
as  a  man-of-war.  She  was  not  finished  at  the  time 
the  proceedings  were  begun;  and  the  jury  were 
instructed  that,  to  bring  the  case  within  the  provi- 
sions of  the  foreign  enlistment  act,  her  equipment 
must  have  been  so  far  completed  in  British  terri- 
tory that  she  was  capable  of  hostile  operations;  or 
that,  if  it  were  not  already  so  complete,  it  must  be 
proved  that  it  was  intended  that  it  should  be  com- 
pleted in  British  territory.  They  were  also  told 
that,  although  the  vessel  had  been  built  and  was 
to  be  used  as  a  cruiser,  if  it  was  intended  to  put 
the  arms  on  board  at  a  place  beyond  British  juris- 
diction there  would  be  no  violation  of  the  foreign 
enlistment  act.  Upon  these  instructions  the  jury 
found  for  the  defendants.  The  subsequent  action 
of  the  judge  who  presided  at  the  trial  was  such  as, 
under  the  English  forms  of  procedure,  precluded 
any  final,  authoritative  decision  as  to  the  construc- 
tion of  the  statute.  The  case  left  the  Confeder- 
ates at  liberty  to  violate  without  substantial  incon- 
venience the  spirit  of  international  law,  and  to 
evade  both  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  municipal 
statutes. 

The  gravity  of  the  situation  was  at  once  appre- 
ciated here,  and  Seward  wrote  to  Mr.  Adams  that, 
if  the  law  of  this  case  was  to  regulate  the  action 
of  Her  Majesty's  government,  the  United  States 
would  be  without  any  guarantee  against  the  un- 
limited employment  of  capital  by  British  subjects 
in  building  and  sending  forth  ships  of  war  from 


350  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

British  ports  to  make  war  against  the  United 
States,  and  that  this  would  be,  in  effect,  "a  war 
waged  against  this  country  by  a  portion  at  least 
of  the  British  nation,  and  tolerated,  though  not 
declared,  by  the  British  government."  He  sug- 
gested to  the  English  ministry,  whether  Parlia- 
ment would  "not  consider  it  just  and  expedient 
to  amend  the  existing  statute  in  such  a  way  as  to 
effect  what  the  two  governments  actually  believed 
it  ought  to  accomplish;"  and  he  added,  that  if 
Her  Majesty's  government  should  desire  such  a 
proceeding,  the  President  would  not  hesitate  to 
apply  to  Congress  for  an  equivalent  amendment  of 
the  laws  of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Adams  made 
the  suggestion,  and  Earl  Russell  expressed  his 
willingness  to  propose  amendments,  on  condition 
that  they  should  also  be  adopted  in  the  American 
act;  but  when  Mr.  Adams  informed  him  later  of 
the  assent  of  our  government  to  this  proposal, 
he  was  told  that  Her  Majesty's  government  had 
reconsidered  the  matter  and  declined  to  suggest 
any  amendments.  This  closed  the  negotiations; 
the  act  remained  unchanged  till  the  end  of  the 
rebellion. 

The  English  government,  however,  became  more 
ready  to  exert  themselves  to  prevent  the  construc- 
tion and  sailing  of  Confederate  cruisers.  Two 
rams  that  were  building  in  Liverpool,  under  the 
supervision  of  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  Con- 
federate naval  bureau  of  construction  there,  were 
seized  and  detained,  and  were  finally  bought  by 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    351 

the  crown.  The  only  vessel  of  importance  which 
subsequently  got  away  was  the  Shenandoah,  whose 
depredations  were  continued  long  after  the  South- 
ern armies  had  surrendered  and  peace  had  been 
restored.  In  October,  1864,  when  Sherman  had 
already  taken  Atlanta,  Farragut  had  captured 
Mobile,  and  the  fall  of  the  Confederacy  was  evi- 
dently a  mere  question  of  months,  she  left  London 
as  the  Sea  King.  Off  a  little  island  near  Madeira 
she  met  by  appointment  another  steamer  direct 
from  Liverpool,  from  which  she  received  her  arms, 
ammunition,  and  stores;  she  raised  the  Confeder- 
ate flag  and  started  on  her  cruise  as  the  Shenan- 
doah. In  January,  1865,  she  put  in  at  Melbourne, 
filled  up  her  crew,  and  proceeded  to  the  Arctic 
Ocean,  where  she  destroyed  the  American  whaling 
fleet,  continuing  her  depredations  until  she  learned 
in  August  from  an  English  ship  that  the  Confed- 
eracy had  ceased  to  exist.  Returning  to  Liver- 
pool, she  was  taken  possession  of  by  the  crown, 
and  was  subsequently  delivered  to  the  government 
of  the  United  States. 

All  these  vessels,  not  only  those  that  have  been 
mentioned,  but  others  that  have  not  been  named, 
though  called  Confederate  cruisers,  were  built  to 
overhaul,  plunder,  and  destroy  unarmed  merchant- 
men, but,  as  the  captain  of  one  of  them  frankly 
admitted,  not  to  fight,  "unless  in  a  very  urgent 
case."  Their  operations  occasioned  an  enormous 
amount  of  diplomatic  correspondence  and  negotia- 
tion, which  lasted  after  Seward  ceased  to  be  secre- 


352  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

tary  of  state.  So  long  as  Mr.  Adams  remained  in 
England  it  was  conducted  by  him,  upon  general 
lines  laid  down  by  Seward,  but  with  the  largest 
discretion  given  to  Mr.  Adams.  For  a  time  each 
new  vessel  destroyed  was  made  the  subject  of  a 
fresh  complaint,  until  this  constant  repetition  of 
similar  demands  drew  from  Lord  Russell  the  im- 
patient declaration,  "that  he  wished  to  say  once 
for  all,  that  Her  Majesty's  government  disclaimed 
any  responsibility  for  these  losses,  and  hoped  they 
had  made  their  position  perfectly  clear."  Never- 
theless a  subsequent  ministry  expressed  Her  Majes- 
ty's regret  for  the  escape  of  these  vessels  from 
British  ports  and  for  the  depredations  committed 
by  them,  agreed  to  submit  to  arbitration  the  ques- 
tion of  Great  Britain's  liability  for  these,  and 
consented  that  the  arbitrators  should  accept  as  the 
law  which  should  govern  their  decision  the  rules : 
that  a  neutral  power  is  bound  to  use  due  dili- 
gence to  prevent  the  fitting  out,  arming,  or  equip- 
ping within  its  jurisdiction  of  any  vessel  which  it 
has  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  is  intended  to 
cruise  or  carry  on  war  against  any  power  with 
which  it  is  at  peace;  that  it  is  bound  in  the  same 
way  to  prevent  the  departure  from  its  jurisdiction 
of  any  such  vessel  which  has  been  either  wholly  or 
partly  fitted  there  for  such  warlike  use;  that  it 
cannot  permit  a  belligerent  to  use  its  ports  or 
waters  as  a  base  of  naval  operations  against  his 
enemy,  or  for  the  purpose  of  renewing  or  increasing 
his  arms  or  other  military  supplies,  or  of  enlisting 


men;  and  lastly,  that  it  must  exercise  due  dili- 
gence as  to  all  persons  and  places  within  its  juris- 
diction to  prevent  the  violation  of  these  obliga- 
tions. By  the  award  of  the  arbitrators  to  whom 
was  submitted  the  question  of  Great  Britain's  lia- 
bility under  these  rules  for  the  acts  of  the  Confed- 
erate cruisers,  she  was  compelled  to  pay  fifteen 
million  five  hundred  thousand  dollars  ($15,500,000) 
for  property  actually  destroyed  by  them.  This 
sum  was  intended  as  a  compensation  to  American 
shipowners  and  citizens  for  the  loss  of  their  pro- 
perty; but  for  the  heaviest  loss  to  the  country,  and 
one  from  which  it  has  never  recovered,  that  of  its 
share  in  the  carrying  trade  of  the  world,  no  com- 
pensation was  made.  It  was  this  trade  to  which 
Mr.  Adams  referred  when  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Seward 
early  in  the  war,  that  "the  English  people  would 
be  gratified  at  anything  which  would  inflict  an 
injury  on  American  commerce,  of  which  they  are 
very  jealous." 

The  building  and  depredations  of  the  Alabama 
and  her  sister  ships  were  not,  however,  the  only 
matters  of  diplomatic  correspondence  and  com- 
plaint as  to  these  cruisers.  Their  reception  in 
foreign  ports,  the  right  of  coaling,  and  other  privi- 
leges accorded  them  there,  and  the  courtesies  al- 
leged to  have  been  shown  to  their  officers,  but 
refused  to  ours,  were  the  subject  of  constant  remon- 
strances from  the  State  Department;  and  though 
some  of  these  matters  might  seem  trifling,  and  the 
complaints  unavailing,  Mr.  Seward's  repeated  criti- 


354  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

cisms  served  to  make  the  colonial  governors  of  the 
various  European  powers  more  cautious  about  over- 
stepping the  bounds  of  neutrality,  and  to  lessen 
the  instances  in  which  they  actually  did  so.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  was  charged  that  our  naval  offi- 
cers pursued  blockade  runners  into  neutral  waters, 
lay  in  wait  for  Confederate  cruisers  in  foreign 
harbors,  and  often  failed  to  observe  the  courtesies 
expected  from  ships  of  war  in  friendly  ports ;  and 
every  such  complaint  required  to  be  investigated, 
and  explained  or  answered,  or  an  apology  made 
whenever  there  was  shown  to  be  just  ground  of 
offense. 

There  were  also  other  matters  as  to  which  we 
considered  that  Great  Britain  gave  us  good  cause 
of  complaint. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  war,  in  October,  1864, 
a  few  men,  coming  as  ordinary  travelers  from 
Canada  to  St.  Albans,  Vermont,  were  met  there 
by  others  arriving  from  Chicago;  the  two  bands, 
having  joined  forces,  attempted  unsuccessfully  to 
set  the  town  on  fire;  they  robbed  the  banks  of 
their  specie  and  then  crossed  the  frontier  into  Can- 
ada, where  several  of  them  were  arrested.  Seward 
endeavored  in  vain  to  obtain  their  extradition  as 
criminals.  British  writers  have  admitted  that, 
had  they  been  caught  in  Vermont,  they  would  have 
had  no  claim  to  be  treated  as  military  prisoners ; 
but  the  Canadian  court  refused  to  surrender  them, 
on  the  ground  that  what  they  had  done  was  not  a 
crime,  but  an  act  of  war.  Somewhat  similar  occur- 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    355 

rences  took  place  on  board  steamers  on  the  lakes 
or  on  coastwise  voyages  on  the  Atlantic.  When 
parties  of  apparently  innocent  passengers  threw 
off  their  disguise  and  seized  and  plundered  the 
steamers  on  which  they  had  embarked,  their  sur- 
render was  refused  on  similar  grounds,  the  court 
saying :  either  this  is  an  act  of  piracy  on  the  high 
seas,  in  which  case  the  men  can  be  tried  here;  or 
of  war,  in  which  case  they  cannot  be  tried  any- 
where. 

It  is  certainly  not  for  the  interests  of  civiliza- 
tion that  acts  of  this  character,  done  by  bands  of 
desperadoes  for  their  private  gain  and  without 
authority,  should  be  treated  as  acts  of  war  by  a 
neutral.  It  is  doubtful  whether  any  one  con- 
nected with  any  of  these  expeditions  held  any  regu- 
lar commission  from  the  Confederate  authorities; 
it  is  quite  certain  that  no  one  of  the  men  was  at 
the  time  a  soldier  in  the  Confederate  service,  and 
there  was  no  evidence  that  any  of  the  expeditions 
were  in  pursuance  of  the  orders  of  the  Confederate 
government  or  of  any  of  its  agents.  They  were 
the  work  of  marauders.  The  Canadian  govern- 
ment was  so  ashamed  of  the  conduct  of  its  judi- 
ciary that  it  refunded  the  gold  value  of  the  paper 
money  stolen  at  St.  Albans,  which  by  order  of 
court  had  been  given  back  to  the  thieves,  from 
whose  possession  it  had  been  taken  by  the  police. 

Aside  from  the  diplomatic  difficulties  directly 
connected  with  the  rebellion,  the  state  of  affairs 


356  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

in  Mexico  was  a  source  of  great  anxiety  during 
Lincoln's  administration.  We  were  not  only  un- 
easy as  to  the  temporary  effect  which  the  trou- 
bles there  might  have  upon  our  foreign  relations, 
but  we  were  also  apprehensive  lest  they  should 
have  a  serious  influence  upon  the  future  of  our 
country. 

Mexico  in  1861  was  indebted  to  citizens  of 
France,  England,  and  Spain,  who  complained  that 
they  could  not  obtain  payment  of  the  money  due 
them.  The  governments  of  these  three  countries, 
realizing  that  our  domestic  difficulties  were  their 
opportunity,  made  an  alliance  in  the  autumn  of 
that  year,  the  purpose  of  which  was,  not  merely 
to  enforce  the  payment  of  these  debts,  but  also  to 
secure  a  better  protection  for  foreigners  resident  in 
Mexico.  A  month  after  the  treaty  was  executed 
we  were  invited  to  join  in  it.  Seward  declined 
the  invitation.  He  suggested  that  we  might  guar- 
antee the  Mexican  debt,  and  that  in  this  way  the 
necessity  for  foreign  intervention  would  be  avoided. 
This  suggestion  was  not  accepted ;  it  was  said  that 
it  would  leave  untouched  one  of  the  objects  of  the 
alliance,  —  security  for  the  future  good  treatment 
of  foreigners  living  in  Mexico.  The  original  scheme 
of  the  three  powers  evidently  contemplated  a  tem- 
porary and  limited  occupation  of  the  territory,  if 
nothing  more.  In  declining  to  become  a  party  to 
the  treaty,  Seward  stated  our  strong  interest  that  no 
foreign  power  should  acquire  territory  in  Mexico, 
or  gain  any  peculiar  advantage  there,  or  exercise 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    357 

any  influence  to  interfere  with  the  free  choice  by 
the  Mexicans  of  their  own  form  of  government. 

It  soon  became  evident  that  Louis  Napoleon  had 
aims  quite  different  from  those  of  the  other  powers, 
and  early  in  April,  1862,  the  Spanish  and  English 
commissioners,  finding  that  the  French  were  giving 
military  aid  to  the  monarchical  party,  withdrew 
from  cooperation  with  them,  and  the  alliance  was 
dissolved.  Mexico  at  this  time  was  divided  be- 
tween the  church  party,  which  was  monarchist 
and  conservative,  and  the  liberal  party,  which  was 
republican.  The  actual  government  was  republi- 
can and  liberal,  but  it  was  weak  and  unstable. 
Napoleon's  plan  was  to  use  his  power  and  influence 
in  favor  of  the  monarchists,  and  to  obtain,  at  an 
election  to  be  held  under  the  auspices  and  the  con- 
trol of  the  French  troops,  a  plebiscite  creating  a 
monarchy  and  calling  a  foreign  prince  to  the  throne. 
He  knew  that  it  was  the  settled  policy  of  this  coun- 
try not  to  permit  the  establishment  by  a  Euro- 
pean power  of  any  monarchy  in  America,  and  that, 
if  our  condition  permitted  it,  we  should  interfere, 
by  force  if  need  be,  to  prevent  it.  But  our  hands 
were  tied,  and  he  took  advantage  of  our  necessities 
to  attempt  to  carry  out  his  project.  Before  the 
departure  of  the  first  expedition  for  Mexico,  ru- 
mors that  this  was  the  emperor's  scheme  were  rife 
in  Europe ;  but  the  French  ministers  in  conversa- 
tions, apparently  frank,  with  our  representatives, 
and  in  their  diplomatic  correspondence,  not  only 
at  that  time  but  during  the  whole  French  occupa- 


358  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

tion  of  Mexico,  persistently  denied  that  there  was 
any  foundation  for  these  reports,  or  that  the  em- 
peror had  any  purpose  of  forcing  a  government 
upon  that  country.  Though  it  was  difficult  to 
reconcile  these  statements  with  the  reports  of  the 
English  and  Spanish  commissioners,  Seward  in 
his  correspondence  accepted  them  as  true,  and  in- 
structed our  minister  to  say  that  we  relied  on  them 
as  such;  and  that  while  we  recognized  the  right 
of  France  to  make  war  against  Mexico,  and  to  de- 
termine for  herself  the  cause,  we  had  "a  right  and 
interest  to  insist  that  she  should  not  improve  the 
war  to  raise  up  in  Mexico  an  anti -republican  or 
an  anti-American  government,  or  to  maintain  such 
a  government  there." 

An  assembly  of  notables,  convened  July  10, 
1863,  by  direction  of  the  French  general,  voted 
to  establish  an  imperial  government  and  elected 
the  Archduke  Maximilian  of  Austria  to  the  throne. 
In  a  dispatch  of  September  26,  1863,  Seward 
stated  with  great  distinctness  the  views  of  our 
government  upon  this  matter.  He  said  that  the 
United  States  had  neither  a  right  nor  a  disposition 
to  intervene  by  force  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Mexico,  either  to  maintain  a  republic  or  to  over- 
throw an  imperial  government,  if  Mexico  chose  to 
establish  the  one  or  the  other;  but  that  our  gov- 
ernment knew  that  the  inherent  normal  opinion  of 
Mexico  favored  a  republican  and  domestic  govern- 
ment in  preference  to  any  monarchy  imposed  from 
abroad,  and  that  if  France  should  determine  to 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    359 

adopt  in  Mexico  a  policy  adverse  to  these  views, 
it  would  probably  scatter  seeds  which  might  ulti- 
mately "ripen  into  collision  between  France  and 
the  United  States  and  other  American  republics." 
It  was  intimated  to  Seward  that  the  early  acknow- 
ledgment of  Maximilian's  government  by  this  coun- 
try would  tend  to  shorten,  or  perhaps  to  end,  the 
French  occupation  of  Mexico.  To  this  intimation 
he  replied  that  the  French  government  had  been 
already  informed  that  in  the  opinion  of  the  United 
States  the  permanent  establishment  of  a  foreign 
and  monarchical  government  in  Mexico  would  be 
found  neither  easy  nor  desirable ;  that  this  opin- 
ion remained  unchanged;  and  that,  so  long  as 
the  United  States  continued  to  regard  Mexico  as  the 
theatre  of  a  war,  which  had  not  yet  ended  in  the 
subversion  of  the  existing  republican  government 
with  which  this  country  remained  in  relations  of 
peace  and  friendship,  we  were  not  at  liberty  to 
consider  the  question  of  recognizing  a  government 
which,  in  the  further  chances  of  war,  might  come 
into  its  place. 

In  all  his  diplomatic  correspondence  after  the 
recognition  of  the  Confederates  as  belligerents  by 
Great  Britain,  Seward  was  hampered  by  a  sense 
of  the  possibility  of  a  combination  between  one  or 
more  of  the  great  maritime  powers  with  the  insur- 
gents, and  an  apprehension  of  the  probable  effect 
of  such  a  combination  upon  our  contest  for  the 
preservation  of  the  Union;  and  his  efforts  were 
directed  to  preserving  peace  with  all  other  nations 


360  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

without  impairing  the  dignity  of  his  own  country. 
He  had  stated  with  entire  frankness,  and  with 
unmistakable  distinctness,  though  in  courteous  lan- 
guage, our  position  as  to  the  French  intervention 
in  Mexico,  yet  had  been  careful  to  avoid  using  any 
expressions  which  could  be  construed  into  a  threat, 
or  give  France  an  opportunity  for  breaking  with 
us.  The  members  of  the  legislative  department 
of  the  government  were  not  so  wise.  Resolutions 
upon  this  subject  were  introduced  into  both  the 
House  and  Senate  in  the  winter  of  1864.  In  the 
Senate  they  were  laid  on  the  table  on  the  motion 
of  Sumner,  who  said  that  if  they  meant  anything, 
if  they  were  not  mere  words,  they  meant  war. 
The  House,  however,  voted  that  they  were  unwill- 
ing by  silence  to  "leave  the  world  under  the  im- 
pression that  they  were  indifferent  spectators  of 
the  deplorable  events  transpiring  in  the  republic 
of  Mexico,  and  thought  fit  to  declare  that  it  did 
not  accord  with  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to 
acknowledge  any  monarchy  erected  in  America 
upon  the  ruins  of  any  republic,  under  the  auspices 
of  any  European  power." 

This  action  naturally  excited  the  French  govern- 
ment, and  brought  from  it  the  direct  inquiry  to  our 
minister,  "Do  you  mean  peace  or  war?  "  When 
this  question  was  put  to  him  he  had  heard  nothing 
from  home,  and  could  only  answer  that  the  terms 
of  the  resolution  were  opposed  to  the  instructions 
contained  in  his  dispatches.  The  French  gov- 
ernment, however,  considered  the  resolves  as  a 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    361 

serious  matter,  and  the  secessionists  in  Paris  were 
jubilant  until  some  days  later  a  dispatch  was  re- 
ceived, in  which  Seward  said,  that  the  question  of 
the  recognition  of  a  monarchy  in  Mexico  was  a 
purely  executive  one,  the  decision  of  which  constitu- 
tionally belonged  "  not  to  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives, or  even  to  Congress,  but  to  the  President 
of  the  United  States;"  that,  while  the  President 
received  a  declaration  from  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives with  the  respect  to  which  it  was  en- 
titled, he  did  not  contemplate  any  departure  from 
the  policy  he  had  hitherto  pursued  as  to  France 
and  Mexico;  and  that  the  French  government 
would  be  seasonably  apprised  of  any  change  which 
he  might  at  any  future  time  think  proper  to  adopt.1 
Fortunately  this  declaration  calmed  the  French 
government,  and  the  new  war,  which  Congress 
seemed  to  court,  without  considering  that  in  all 
probability  it  might  have  been  fatal  to  our  suc- 
cess in  the  struggle  we  had  already  on  hand,  was 
averted  by  the  good  sense  of  the  President  and 
Seward. 

Maximilian  never  obtained  the  popular  vote  call- 
ing him  to  the  throne,  upon  which  he  had  at  first 
insisted  as  a  condition  precedent  to  his  acceptance 
of  the  crown.  He  went  to  Mexico  in  the  summer 
of  1864.  Negotiations  were  had  from  time  to 
time  between  this  government  and  France  to  in- 

1  April  7,  1864.  Dip.  Corr.,  1865,  pt.  3,  pp.  356-357.  See, 
also,  Williams  v.  Suffolk  Ins.  Co.,  3  Sumner,  372,  13  Peters,  U.  S. 
Sup.  Ct.  Reports,  p.  415. 


362  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

duce  the  emperor  to  withdraw  his  troops.  After 
the  collapse  of  the  Confederacy,  attempts  were 
made  to  persuade  the  administration  to  force 
France  to  withdraw  her  troops  at  once ;  but  Sew- 
ard  thought  it  wiser  to  give  her  the  opportunity  to 
act  in  the  matter,  in  appearance  at  least,  upon  her 
own  judgment,  and  not  under  compulsion.  He 
succeeded  in  doing  this.  The  French  troops  were 
gradually  withdrawn  during  the  year  1867,  with- 
out our  having  assumed  any  position  which  could 
wound  the  pride  of  our  old  Revolutionary  ally. 
When  they  left,  Maximilian  declined  to  desert  his 
Mexican  supporters.  He  was  captured  by  the 
republican  army.  Seward  interfered  in  vain  to 
procure  his  release  and  liberty  to  return  to  Eu- 
rope; the  soldiers  insisted  on  his  execution,  and 
the  Mexican  President  did  not  dare  to  refuse  their 
demand. 

If  among  Seward's  dispatches  during  the  course 
of  the  war  there  are  some  that  deal  with  generali- 
ties, and  seem  prolix  and  dull,  yet  his  discussions 
of  the  actual  questions  submitted  to  him  are  open 
to  no  such  criticism.  They  are  vigorous,  simple, 
direct,  and  to  the  point,  and  always  manly  and 
dignified.  Lord  Russell  said  no  more  than  the 
truth,  when  he  spoke  of  the  singular  and  varied 
ability  exhibited  in  them.  They  are  a  credit  to 
American  diplomacy,  a  monument  to  Seward's 
unwearied  powers  of  work,  and  to  his  intellectual 
capacity  and  resources. 


DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR    363 

Tried  by  its  results,  the  success  of  his  diplomacy 
during  the  four  years  of  Lincoln's  administration 
is  entitled  to  the  highest  praise.  We  were  en- 
gaged in  a  domestic  struggle  which  was  taxing  our 
resources  to  the  utmost,  and  in  which  we  had  not 
the  cordial  good-will  of  a  single  one  of  the  great 
nations  of  the  world,  unless  it  were  Russia.  The 
opportunities  for  differences  with  these  countries 
were  numerous,  the  dangers  of  the  interference  or 
intervention  of  one  or  more  of  them,  or  of  the 
outbreak  of  a  war  between  us  and  any  one  of 
them,  were  almost  constant.  Seward  conducted 
us  safely  through  all  these  perils,  with  no  breach 
of  the  peace  and  no  sacrifice  of  the  honor  or  dig- 
nity of  the  country. 


CHAPTER   XXI 

SECRETARY  OF   STATE   UNDER   JOHNSON  —  RETIRE- 
MENT  FROM   PUBLIC   LIFE 

THE  Union  troops  entered  Richmond  on  the  3d 
of  April,  1865.  Two  days  later  Seward  was 
thrown  from  his  carriage ;  his  right  shoulder  was 
dislocated,  his  jaw  broken  on  both  sides,  and  he 
was  otherwise  so  badly  injured  that  for  a  time  his 
life  was  despaired  of.  Nine  days  afterwards,  late 
at  night,  when  only  his  nurse  and  daughter  were 
with  him,  an  unknown  man  succeeded  in  entering 
the  house,  burst  open  the  door  of  his  chamber, 
rushed  to  his  bedside,  and  with  a  bowie-knife 
slashed  and  stabbed  him  in  the  face  and  throat, 
till,  alarmed  by  the  wakening  household,  the 
would-be  assassin  hastened  to  escape,  fled  through 
the  open  door,  mounted  his  horse,  and  rode  away. 
This  assault  was  one  act  in  the  conspiracy  of 
which  the  supreme  tragedy  was  the  murder  of  Lin- 
coln in  the  theatre. 

Seward  survived ;  but  for  more  than  a  year  he 
was  compelled  to  wear  mechanical  appliances  to 
retain  the  broken  jaw  in  its  place.  Before  he 
could  leave  his  bed  he  insisted  on  trying  to  work, 
and  scrawled  on  scraps  of  paper  directions  for  his 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    365 

letters ;  so  soon  as  he  could  be  moved  he  was  car- 
ried daily  to  his  chair  in  the  State  Department, 
where  he  sat,  the  shrunk,  maimed,  and  disfigured 
semblance  of  his  former  self.  The  injuries  which 
he  survived  brought  on  him  the  great  sorrows  of 
his  life.  Mrs.  Seward,  who  had  been  for  some 
time  an  invalid,  hastened  from  Auburn  to  Wash- 
ington on  learning  of  his  accident.  On  the  night 
of  the  assault  she  was  roused  by  the  screams  of 
her  daughter,  and  rushing  from  her  room  found 
her  husband  in  the  state  we  have  described.  The 
shock  was  too  much  for  her;  she  survived  it  only 
two  months,  dying  on  the  21st  of  June.  The  trib- 
utes of  praise  to  her  knew  no  exception.  Sew- 
ard's  friends  and  foes  alike  recognized  her  charm 
and  her  worth,  and  knew  that  for  him  the  loss  was 
irreparable.  But  this  was  not  the  only  life  that 
was  sacrificed  to  the  assault  upon  him.  His  only 
daughter,  who,  next  to  her  mother,  was  the  person 
dearest  and  most  important  to  him,  was  in  his 
room,  saw  the  attack,  his  struggles  and  attempts, 
in  spite  of  his  feebleness,  to  shield  her  from  any 
blows,  and  the  scenes  of  that  night  killed  her. 
She  lived  little  more  than  a  year ;  and  her  death 
left  Seward  very  desolate. 

Though  for  some  days  after  his  injuries  Sew- 
ard's  life  was  in  great  danger,  yet  thanks  to  his 
vigorous  constitution,  his  unfailing  courage,  his 
excellent  physical  condition,  and  his  equable  tem- 
perament, his  recovery  was  rapid,  and  less  than 
four  weeks  after  the  attack  on  him  he  was  able  to 


366  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

receive  the  President  and  cabinet  at  his  house. 
In  this  short  time  there  had  been  a  revolution  in 
our  political  world.  The  Southern  Confederacy 
had  ceased  to  exist,  its  government  had  collapsed, 
its  officials  were  dispersed,  its  soldiers  had  been 
paroled  and  sent  home  by  our  victorious  generals. 
The  questions  of  the  true  relation  of  all  the  seced- 
ing States  to  the  Union,  and  of  the  proper  treat- 
ment of  these  States,  had  therefore  to  be  dealt  with 
at  once,  —  whilst  their  secession  had  been  more 
gradual,  some  of  them  having  been  the  ringleaders 
in  rebellion,  and  others  having  followed  with  more 
or  less  reluctance  and  hesitation.  It  had  been 
Mr.  Lincoln's  idea  that  no  uniform  rule  should  be 
established,  to  be  applied  indiscriminately  to  the 
rehabilitation  of  all  these  States;  but  that  each 
one  should  be  treated  as  seemed  wisest  with  refer- 
ence to  its  own  people  and  condition,  without 
regard  to  the  others,  always  bearing  in  mind  the 
declared  object  of  the  contest  on  our  part,  —  "the 
maintenance  and  preservation  of  the  Union,"  — 
and  troubling  ourselves  as  little  as  possible  with 
theories  as  to  the  effect  of  their  attempted  seces- 
sion upon  the  relations  of  these  States  to  the  fed- 
eral government.  He  also  believed  that  it  was 
for  him,  as  President,  to  determine  when  the  re- 
bellion had  been  so  far  crushed  that  military  rule 
could  come  to  an  end,  the  troops  be  withdrawn, 
the  ordinary  machinery  of  civil  government  put  in 
motion,  and  the  State  left  to  itself;  each  house 
of  Congress  having,  as  to  any  of  the  States  in 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    367 

rebellion,  the  same  constitutional  right  that  it  has 
as  to  all  the  States,  to  be  "the  judge  of  the  elec- 
tions, returns,  and  qualifications  of  its  own  mem- 
bers." He  had  already  put  in  practice  in  Loui- 
siana a  scheme  which  seemed  to  him  satisfactory 
for  that  State,  and  two  representatives  chosen 
there  in  the  autumn  of  1862  had  been  admitted  as 
members  of  Congress  in  February  of  the  following 
year.  A  similar  experiment  was  tried  in  Arkan- 
sas about  the  same  time. 

In  his  annual  message  in  December,  1863,  the 
President  made  a  full  statement  of  what  he  had 
done  to  bring  about  the  resumption  of  the  national 
authority  in  the  States  where  it  had  been  sus- 
pended, and  transmitted  with  the  message  a  copy 
of  an  amnesty  proclamation,  granting  a  pardon 
to  those  persons  concerned  in  the  rebellion,  who 
would  take  an  oath  to  support  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  the  Union  of  the  States  there- 
under, and  all  acts  of  Congress  with  reference  to 
slaves  passed  during  the  rebellion,  "so  long  and 
so  far  as  not  repealed,  modified,  or  held  void  by 
Congress,  or  by  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court." 
Six  classes  of  persons  were  excepted  from  the 
promised  pardon.  Whenever  in  any  of  the  States 
in  rebellion  a  number  of  voters,  not  belonging  to 
any  of  the  excepted  classes,  and  equal  to  ten  per 
cent,  of  those  voting  for  President  in  1860,  should 
have  taken  the  required  oath,  he  was  willing  to 
trust  them  to  form  a  state  government,  and,  if  it 
were  such  a  republican  government  as  the  Consti- 


368  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

tution  provides  that  the  United  States  shall  guar- 
antee to  every  State  in  the  Union,  to  recognize  it 
as  the  true  government  of  the  State.  He  was 
careful  to  say  that  he  did  not  intend  this  to  be 
a  Procrustean  bed  to  which  exact  conformity  was 
indispensable,  and  that  he  would  by  no  means 
exclude  consideration  and  adoption  of  other  plans. 
The  message  and  proclamation  were  not  well 
received  by  Congress.  There  was  a  general  feel- 
ing of  irritation  that  the  President  should  have 
assumed  upon  his  own  responsibility  the  initiative 
and  power  of  decision  in  a  matter  which,  it  was 
said,  was  either  exclusively  a  subject  for  legisla- 
tion, or  one  about  which  Congress  should  at  least 
have  been  consulted.  In  the  Senate  Sumner  of- 
fered a  resolution  declaring  that  a  State  pretending 
to  secede  from  the  Union,  and  "battling  against 
the  general  government  to  maintain  that  position, 
must  be  regarded  as  a  rebel  State  subject  to  mili- 
tary occupation,  and  without  representation  .  .  . 
until  it  has  been  re-admitted  by  both  houses  of 
Congress."  The  Senate  was  not  yet  ready  for  so 
strong  a  statement,  and  a  resolve  that  "the  rebel- 
lion was  not  so  far  suppressed  in  Arkansas  as  to 
entitle  that  State  to  representation  in  Congress" 
was  substituted  and  passed.  The  definitive  action, 
however,  in  reply  to  the  President,  was  a  bill, 
—  the  first  reconstruction  act,  —  passed  on  the 
last  day  of  the  session,  July  4,  1864.  This  act 
required  the  President  to  appoint  a  provisional 
governor  for  each  of  the  States  which  had  been 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    369 

declared  in  rebellion,  who,  when  military  resistance 
ceased,  should  make  an  enrollment  of  the  white 
male  citizens.  If  a  majority  of  them  should  take 
an  oath  to  support  the  Constitution,  the  governor 
was  to  order  an  election  of  delegates  for  a  consti- 
tutional convention.  This  convention  was  to  de- 
clare on  behalf  of  the  people  of  the  State  their 
submission  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
and  also  to  insert  in  the  constitution  to  be  framed 
for  the  State,  articles  providing  that  no  office- 
holder under  the  Confederate  government,  except 
civil  officers  merely  ministerial  and  military  offi- 
cers of  inferior  grades,  should  ever  vote  for,  or  be, 
either  governor  or  a  member  of  the  state  legisla- 
ture; that  no  rebel  war  debt,  state  or  Confederate, 
should  ever  be  paid,  and  that  slavery  was  forever 
prohibited.  When  a  constitution  containing  these 
provisions  should  have  been  adopted  by  a  majority 
of  the  popular  vote,  the  governor  was  to  certify 
the  fact  to  the  president,  and  the  president,  after 
receiving  the  assent  of  Congress,  was  to  recognize 
the  state  government  as  established. 

This  act  was  not  signed  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  and 
a  few  days  after  the  adjournment  of  Congress,  he 
made  public  his  reasons  for  this,  which  were,  that 
he  was  not  willing  to  commit  himself  to  one  in- 
flexible plan  of  restoration ;  or  to  discourage  and 
repel  the  loyal  citizens  of  Louisiana  and  Arkansas, 
and  set  aside  their  free  state1  governments;  or 

1  Slavery  had  already  been  abolished  in  both  these  States  by 
constitutional  amendments. 


370  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

to  declare  Congress  constitutionally  competent  to 
abolish  slavery  in  the  States.  He  said,  however, 
that  if  any  States  chose  to  adopt  the  plan  proposed 
in  the  bill,  he  would  render  them  all  possible 
executive  assistance  and  would  appoint  military 
governors  to  act  according  to  its  provisions.  Wade 
of  the  Senate,  and  Henry  Winter  Davis  of  the 
House,  replied  to  the  President  in  a  paper  person- 
ally vituperative,  and  reflecting  on  his  motives, 
which  the  country  knew  to  be  above  suspicion. 
Lincoln  was  reflected.  Congress  at  its  next  ses- 
sion (February  4,  1865)  passed  a  joint  resolve 
declaring  certain  States  not  entitled  to  representa- 
tion in  the  electoral  college.  This  resolve  excluded 
Arkansas  and  Louisiana,  and  was  intended  as  a 
rebuke  to  the  President.  It  was  sent  to  him  for 
his  signature.  He  returned  it,  signed,  but  with 
a  message  stating  that  he  signed  it  "in  deference 
to  the  views  implied  in  its  passage  and  presenta- 
tion," though  he  thought  Congress  had  complete 
power  to  exclude  all  electoral  votes  which  it  deemed 
illegal,  and  that  the  President  could  not  by  his 
veto  obstruct  or  defeat  the  exercise  of  this  power. 
He  disclaimed  all  right  of  interference,  and  said 
that  by  his  signature  he  expressed  no  opinion  on 
the  recital  of  the  preamble,  and  no  judgment  upon 
the  subject  of  the  resolve. 

This  short  statement  shows  the  substance  of 
what  had  been  done  in  the  way  of  reconstruction 
before  Lincoln's  death,  and  makes  sufficiently  clear 
the  radical  difference  already  existing  between  the 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    371 

President  and  Congress,  and  the  measures  adopted 
by  Congress  to  assert  and  maintain  its  right  of 
control  in  the  matter  of  reconstruction.  Lincoln 
was  very  desirous  to  avoid  a  personal  issue,  and 
willing  to  make  any  concessions  which  did  not  in- 
volve a  sacrifice  of  his  convictions,  or  of  what  he 
believed  to  be  the  prerogatives  and  duties  of  his 
office.  In  his  last  public  utterance,  only  a  few 
days  before  his  death,  he  reaffirmed  his  faith  in 
the  wisdom  and  justice  of  his  course,  and  his  con- 
viction that  any  inflexible  plan  of  reconstruction 
would  be  a  mistake.  He  had  originally  called  for 
troops  to  suppress  a  resistance  to  the  execution  of 
the  laws,  too  powerful  to  be  overcome  by  the  ordi- 
nary judicial  processes.  There  is  no  question  that 
it  is  for  the  president  alone  to  determine  when 
the  emergency  has  arisen  which  authorizes  him  to 
require  the  aid  of  the  soldiery  for  this  purpose; 
and  in  the  absence  of  any  express  provision  of 
law,  it  seemed  to  Lincoln  a  legitimate  conclusion, 
that  it  was  also  for  him  to  decide  when  the  exi- 
gency had  ceased  and  the  enforcement  of  the  laws 
could  safely  be  left  to  the  civil  authorities;  and 
that  it  was  his  duty,  therefore,  to  ascertain,  by 
whatever  means  seemed  to  him  best  adapted  for 
the  purpose,  the  facts  necessary  for  his  decision 
upon  this  point. 

All  that  Lincoln  did  as  to  reconstruction  may 
be  explained  and  justified  as  being  the  means  he 
adopted  to  satisfy  himself  as  to  the  public  opinion 
and  temper  of  the  South,  and  to  determine  whether 


372  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

the  troops  could  be  withdrawn,  and  the  execution 
of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  safely  intrusted 
to  the  ordinary  civil  government.  To  secure  this 
it  was  necessary  that  the  leading  men  of  the  South 
should  accept  without  reservation  all  the  results  of 
the  failure  of  their  attempted  revolution,  should 
honestly  endeavor  to  make  the  best  of  the  situa- 
tion, should  be  ready  to  take  the  hand  that  Lincoln 
was  holding  out  to  them,  and  to  cooperate  heartily 
with  him  to  bring  about  the  harmonious  restoration 
of  the  Union.  If  they  would  not  do  this,  either 
they  must  be  disfranchised  and  the  work  intrusted 
to  less  competent  hands,  or  the  military  rule  must 
be  prolonged  until  there  should  be  some  satisfac- 
tory security  that  the  rebel  States  had  not  merely 
laid  down  their  arms,  but  that  they  would  not  try 
to  evade  the  new  conditions  imposed  upon  them 
by  the  emancipation  of  their  slaves  and  the  aboli- 
tion of  slavery.  Possibly,  if  Lincoln  had  lived, 
their  confidence  in  his  candor,  his  integrity,  his 
magnanimity  and  kindliness,  aided  by  his  own  rare 
tact  and  knowledge  of  men,  might  have  caused 
his  plan  to  be  honestly  accepted  by  the  Southern 
leaders.  If  he  had  succeeded  in  this,  it  is  more 
than  probable  that  he  would  have  had  the  support 
of  a  majority  in  the  thirty -ninth  Congress  (March 
4,  1865,  to  March  4, 1867),  which,  as  we  shall  see, 
was  at  first  induced  with  some  difficulty  to  overrule 
Johnson's  vetoes;  if  his  plan  had  not  worked  satis- 
factorily, he  would  have  been  open-minded  enough 
to  recognize  its  failure,  and  wise  enough  to  modify 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    373 

or  even  to  abandon  it,  as  the  case  might  require. 
Whether  he  would  ever  have  assented  to  imposing 
upon  the  South  the  emancipated  slaves  as  voters 
is  more  doubtful.  He  would  not  have  excluded 
any  one  from  the  ballot  on  account  of  his  color; 
but  he  never  went  farther  than  to  suggest  that  it 
was  worthy  of  consideration  whether  the  franchise 
might  not  be  conferred  as  a  special  privilege  on 
some  of  the  more  capable  and  deserving  of  the 
colored  citizens.  He  would  have  been  extremely 
reluctant  to  subject  the  white  population  of  the 
South  to  what  he  would  have  realized  they  must 
feel  as  so  gross  a  wrong  and  humiliation,  or  to 
impose  on  them  as  voters  an  ignorant  proletariat 
of  a  different  race,  the  mass  of  whom  were  totally 
unfit  for  the  ballot,  whose  number  in  all  the  seced- 
ing States  taken  together  was  only  one  fifth  less 
than  that  of  the  whites,  while  in  three  of  them  it 
was  actually  greater.  In  the  end  Congress  gave 
the  colored  people  the  ballot,  as  essential  to  their 
protection;  but  the  race  problem  at  the  South, 
even  though  the  outlook  should  be  thought  hope- 
ful, is  by  no  means  yet  settled. 

There  were  persons  both  in  Congress  and  in  the 
country  who  thought  that  the  accession  of  Johnson 
to  the  presidency  would  save  us  from  the  conse- 
qtfences  of  what  seemed  to  them  Lincoln's  ill-ad- 
vised leniency  and  trust.  A  caucus  of  politicians 
holding  these  views  was  held  on  the  very  day  of 
Lincoln's  death,  to  consider  the  questions  of  a 
new  cabinet  and  of  a  less  conciliatory  policy ;  and 


374  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

on  the  next  morning  the  chairman  of  the  recon- 
struction committee  said  to  the  new  President: 
"Johnson,  we  have  faith  in  you.  By  the  gods, 
there  will  be  no  trouble  now  in  running  the  gov- 
ernment." 

Both  before  and  after  his  inauguration,  Johnson 
had  talked  of  treason  as  a  crime  to  be  punished, 
and  this  and  similar  sayings  of  his  had  created  an 
impression  that  he  would  make  harder  terms  with 
the  States  in  rebellion,  before  permitting  them  to 
get  back  into  their  "proper  practical  relations 
with  the  Union,"  than  Lincoln  would  have  done. 
But  no  such  inference  is  fairly  to  be  drawn  from 
what  he  had  said.  He  was  speaking,  not  of  harsh- 
ness to  communities,  but  of  the  punishment  of  in- 
dividuals, and  hoped  for  convictions  for  treason 
just  as  he  desired  the  condemnation  of  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's assassins.  The  legal  and  practical  difficul- 
ties in  the  way  of  obtaining  such  convictions  he 
realized  later. 

The  thirty-eighth  Congress  had  expired  with 
the  close  of  Lincoln's  first  administration;  and 
unless  the  President  should  call  an  extra  session, 
it  would  be  nearly  nine  months  before  the  new 
Congress  met.  Johnson  did  not  call  it  together 
sooner;  in  this  he  followed  the  plan  of  Mr.  Lin- 
coln, who  had  thought  it  fortunate  that  there  was 
to  be  so  long  an  interval  between  the  end  of  the 
rebellion  and  the  coming  together  of  Congress. 
Johnson's  constitutional  opinions  were  well  known. 
He  believed  the  Union  intact,  and  that  it  included 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    375 

as  well  the  States  which  had  undertaken  to  secede 
as  those  which  had  remained  loyal.  "It  is  the 
doctrine  of  the  Constitution,"  he  had  said,  "that 
no  State  can  go  out  of  this  Union,  and  moreover 
Congress  cannot  eject  a  State  from  this  Union." 
He  had  resigned  his  seat  in  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  and  gone  to  Tennessee  at  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's solicitation,  as  military  governor,  to  facili- 
tate the  resumption  by  that  State  of  her  proper 
relations  to  the  federal  government;  he  had  initi- 
ated the  measures  necessary  for  this  purpose,  ac- 
cepting and  acting  upon  the  policy  which  Lincoln 
had  employed  in  Louisiana,  —  that  civil  govern- 
ment should  be  substituted  for  military  rule  when- 
ever armed  resistance  had  ceased,  and  the  presi- 
dent, as  commander-in-chief,  was  satisfied  that 
the  people  of  a  State  were  prepared  loyally  to  ac- 
cept and  abide  by  the  results  of  the  struggle,  how- 
ever bitter  they  might  feel  them  to  be.  It  would 
have  been  impossible  for  Johnson  to  hold  any 
other  opinion  upon  the  constitutional  questions 
involved  in  the  rebellion.  Only  upon  the  theory 
that  Tennessee,  in  spite  of  the  ordinance  of  seces- 
sion, was  still  an  integral  part  of  the  Union  could 
he  properly  have  retained  his  seat  as  senator  from 
that  State,  or  been  nominated  and  elected  as  vice- 
president,  or  be  now  discharging  the  duties  of 
president  of  the  United  States.  This  opinion  was 
not  the  outcome  of  his  controversy  with  Congress; 
it  was  his  settled  conviction  before  any  controversy 
arose,  and  it  governed  all  his  official  action  on  the 


376  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

different  reconstruction  measures  that  came  before 
him. 

Early  in  May,  1865,  he  issued  a  proclamation 
announcing  that  hostilities  had  ceased.  Three 
weeks  later  he  published  a  proclamation  of  am- 
nesty, the  terms  of  which  were  identical  with  those 
granted  by  Lincoln,  except  that  he  added  seven 
more  to  the  classes  of  persons  excluded  from  the 
benefits  of  the  former  proclamation.  No  criticisms 
were  made  as  to  any  of  these  additions,  unless  it 
be  as  to  the  last,  which  shut  out  from  the  right  to 
a  pardon  "all  voluntary  participants  in  the  rebel- 
lion having  more  than  twenty  thousand  dollars 
worth  of  taxable  property."  He  has  been  charged 
with  having  inserted  this  for  the  purpose  of  strik- 
ing at  a  class  of  men  "whom  he  personally  hated;  " 
but  the  accusation  seems  unjust.  This  exception 
would  not  strike  the  aristocratic  slaveholders,  who 
had  lost  everything  by  the  extinction  of  slavery, 
and  of  whom  Johnson  might  personally  complain, 
but  the  prosperous  business  men  and  traders,  ear- 
nest Southern  sympathizers,  active  and  influential 
in  promoting  the  rebellion,  of  whom  Johnson  had 
just  had  experience  in  Tennessee,  who  were  not 
included  in  any  of  the  previously  excepted  classes, 
but  who  were  in  his  opinion  equally  undeserving 
of  pardon. 

There  was  also  added  to  this  proclamation  a 
clause  that  special  application  for  pardon  might 
be  made  by  any  one  belonging  to  the  excepted 
classes,  and  that  such  clemency  would  be  extended 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    377 

him  as  might  be  "consistent  with  the  facts  of  the 
case  and  the  peace  and  dignity  of  the  United 
States."  It  has  been  said  that  this  clause  was  in- 
serted at  Seward's  instance,  and  that  he  favored 
it  for  various  petty  reasons,  as  it  is  also  asserted 
that  he  resisted  as  long  as  he  could  the  previous 
clause  excepting  men  of  property.  What  founda- 
tion there  may  be  for  these  assertions  it  is  difficult 
to  ascertain,  but  the  imputation  of  low  motives  is 
a  purely  gratuitous  aspersion.  The  final  clause 
is  an  extremely  proper  one,  and  should  not  have 
been  omitted.  It  was  substantially  copied  by  Con- 
gress when  it  had  succeeded  in  obtaining  control 
of  the  whole  subject  of  reconstruction ; l  and  the 
reasons  for  its  insertion  were  in  each  case  the  same. 
That  the  clemency  sanctioned  by  this  clause  was 
abused  is  unquestionable;  but  this  would  not 
justify  omitting  the  clause  itself.  The  pardoning 
power  is  often  unwisely  exercised,  but  the  neces- 
sity for  its  existence  is  everywhere  recognized;  and 
it  cannot  be  denied  that  Congress  as  well  as  the 
President  made  mistakes  as  to  some  of  the  persons 
restored  to  the  rights  of  citizenship. 

On  the  day  that  this  proclamation  was  issued, 
Johnson  appointed  a  provisional  governor  for  North 
Carolina,  and  before  the  middle  of  July  had  made 
similar  appointments  for  the  other  rebel  States  for 
whose  government  there  were  no  existing  provi- 
sions. These  officers  were  directed  to  take  mea- 
sures to  call  conventions  to  be  composed  of  dele- 

1  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  Constitution,  Sec.  iii. 


378  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

gates  chosen  by  the  loyal  voters  of  the  respective 
States.  These  voters  were  defined  to  be  those 
persons,  possessing  the  qualifications  required  by 
the  laws  of  the  State  before  its  secession,  who  were 
entitled  to  the  benefits  of  the  amnesty  proclama- 
tion, and  who  had  taken  the  prescribed  oath. 
These  requirements  followed  the  precedents  estab- 
lished by  Lincoln  in  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  and 
Tennessee,  and  restricted  the  suffrage  to  white 
men.  The  object  of  each  convention  was  declared 
to  be  to  secure  to  its  State  that  republican  form 
of  government  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States;  the  insurrection  having  de- 
prived the  States  in  rebellion  of  all  recognized 
civil  governments.  The  convention,  or  the  subse- 
quent legislature  in  each  State,  was  to  prescribe, 
it  was  said  by  the  President,  "the  qualifications 
of  electors,  and  the  eligibility  of  persons  to  hold 
office  under  the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  State,1 
a  power  the  people  of  the  several  States  composing 
the  federal  Union  have  rightfully  exercised  from 
the  origin  of  the  government  until  the  present 
time." 

This  last  sentence  emphasizes  one  point  in  the 
differences  between  Congress  and  himself.  The 
bill  of  the  previous  July  had  insisted  that  the  state 
constitutions  to  be  adopted  must  provide  that  no 
Confederate  officer  of  rank  or  importance,  civil  or 
military,  should  ever  vote  for,  or  be,  governor,  or 

1  Lincoln  took  a  similar  view  as  to  the  work  of  the  Louisiana 
convention.  N.  $•  H.  viiu  p.  434. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    379 

a  member  of  the  legislature;  and  the  President 
now  declared  that  in  his  opinion  these  were  mat- 
ters to  be  determined  not  by  congressional  dicta- 
tion, but,  as  they  always  had  been,  by  the  several 
States,  each  for  itself,  and  that  the  Southern  States 
had  not  by  the  rebellion  lost  the  right  to  do  this. 
Both  the  President  and  Congress,  however,  were 
agreed  that  something  was  required,  as  proof  that 
the  rebellion  was  really  over,  before  the  troops 
could  be  properly  withdrawn  and  the  people  of 
any  seceding  State  be  permitted  to  organize  a  civil 
government  and  resume  their  old  relations  to  the 
Union;  they  were  also  agreed  that  some  oath 
should  be  required  of  these  people.  The  President 
during  this  summer  had  further  insisted  with  each 
of  these  States  upon  its  abolition  of  slavery,  its 
ratification  of  the  thirteenth  constitutional  amend- 
ment, which  forever  prohibited  slavery,  and  its 
absolute  repudiation  of  all  rebel  war  debts,  declar- 
ing that  he  could  "not  recognize  the  people  of  any 
State  as  having  resumed  the  relations  of  loyalty 
to  the  Union,  who  admitted  the  legality  of  obliga- 
tions contracted  or  debts  created  in  their  name  to 
promote  the  war  of  the  rebellion." 

In  all  that  he  was  doing  the  President  assumed 
to  act  in  the  exercise  of  the  war  power,  and  by 
virtue  of  his  authority  as  commander-in-chief. 
For  any  legislation  by  Congress  authority  must  be 
found  either  in  the  Constitution  itself,  —  where 
the  only  clause  which  seemed  to  have  any  bearing 
on  the  matter  was  that  which  makes  each  house 


380  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

the  judge  of  the  elections,  returns,  and  qualifica- 
tions of  its  own  members,  —  or  in  the  assumption 
that  the  seceding  States  had  forfeited  all  their 
constitutional  rights,  were  to  be  treated  like  any 
conquered  people,  and  that  therefore  Congress  had 
absolute  authority  over  them.  This  assumption 
is  the  ground  upon  which  the  constitutionality  of 
the  reconstruction  act  of  March  2,  1867,  is  to  be 
defended;  yet  in  this  very  act  Congress  showed 
its  want  of  confidence  in  the  soundness  of  this 
theory.  It  recognized  these  States  as  constituent 
members  of  the  Union  for  the  purpose  of  vot- 
ing on  the  fourteenth  constitutional  amendment, 
while  with  a  palpable  inconsistency  it  denied  them 
their  right  of  representation,  unless  they  voted 
in  a  particular  way.  This  theory  was  originally 
propounded  by  Thaddeus  Stevens  in  the  House 
and  by  Sumner  in  the  Senate,  in  the  resolve 
already  quoted.  It  was  never  thoroughly  accepted 
even  in  Congress,  was  not  sustained  by  the  Su- 
preme Court,  was  never  believed  in  by  Lincoln, 
and  was  denied  by  many  leading  statesmen  and 
jurists.1 

To  get  the  votes  of  those  who  could  not  accept  Stevens' 
theory,  the  reconstruction  acts  were  declared  to  be  an  exercise 
of  authority  under  that  clause  of  the  Constitution  by  which 
the  United  States  is  to  guarantee  to  every  State  in  the  Union  a 
republican  form  of  government.  This  declaration  afterward 
found  support  in  the  opinion  of  Chief  Justice  Chase  in  Texas 
v.  White  (7  Wallace,  700).  To  maintain  this  view,  however, 
seems  to  oblige  one  to  do  violence  to  the  natural  and  obvious 
meaning  of  this  clause,  and  to  give  it  an  effect  certainly  never 
contemplated  by  the  makers  of  the  Constitution. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    381 

It  has  been  asserted  that  Johnson,  after  he  be- 
came president,  changed  his  whole  opinion  of  the 
proper  policy  to  be  pursued  towards  the  seceding 
States,  and  that  this  change  was  owing  to  Seward's 
persuasive  powers  and  the  immense  influence  he 
had  thereby  acquired  over  the  President.1  The 
two  statements  depend  on  each  other;  if  there  was 
no  such  change  in  the  President,  then  it  was  cer- 
tainly not  caused  by  Seward's  influence.  The 
real  difficulty  with  Johnson  was  exactly  the  oppo- 
site one,  —  the  obstinacy  with  which  he  adhered 
to  his  policy  towards  the  South,  after  it  became 
evident  that  it  was  a  mistake  and  a  failure.  The 
persons  who  charge  the  President  with  reversing 
his  entire  policy  towards  the  South  have  confounded 
two  things  which  Johnson  himself  kept  quite  dis- 
tinct, the  proper  treatment  of  individual  wrong- 
doers, the  leaders  in  rebellion,  for  whom  he  thought 
no  punishment  too  severe,  and  the  leniency  to  be 
shown  to  the  communities  who  had  followed  their 
guidance,  whom  he  was  always  disposed  to  treat 
with  the  utmost  consideration.  His  opinions  upon 
constitutional  questions  were  those  he  had  main- 
tained before  his  election  as  vice-president.  He 
believed  that  the  Union  was  indissoluble ;  that  the 
Constitution  secured  certain  rights  to  the  States 
as  well  as  to  the  federal  government;  that  though 
the  exercise  of  these  rights  on  the  one  side  or  the 

1  This  is  the  view  of  Mr.  Blaine ;  but  General  Grant,  whose 
relations  with  the  President  entitle  his  conclusions  to  much  more 
weight,  "  thought  the  plan  the  child  of  Johnson's  own  brain." 


382  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

other  might  be  for  a  time  suspended  or  prevented, 
the  rights  themselves  could  not  be  forfeited  or  lost ; 
and  his  course  as  president  and  all  his  vetoes  were 
not  merely  consistent  with  this  view,  they  depended 
upon  it  and  were  its  logical  outcome.  In  appoint- 
ing provisional  governors  of  the  several  rebel 
States,  and  in  all  that  he  did  towards  bringing 
them  back  to  their  true  position  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  Union,  he  believed  himself  to  be  care- 
fully following  in  Lincoln's  footsteps.  He  un- 
doubtedly hoped  and  expected  in  this  way  to  con- 
vert repentant  rebels  into  loyal  Unionists;  yet 
before  Congress  met,  he  had  ample  evidence,  if 
he  had  chosen  to  heed  it,  that  the  Southerners 
were  neither  loyal  nor  submissive,  but  absolutely 
unregenerate  and  untrustworthy.  Had  he  been 
a  man  of  a  different  nature  he  would  have  seen 
this,  and  would  have  modified  his  treatment  of 
them  when  he  found  that  it  was  resulting  in  the 
restoration  of  authority  to  insurgents,  who,  while 
laying  down  their  arms,  retained  their  hostility  to 
the  government  that  had  compelled  their  submis- 
sion. But  he  had  neither  the  perception,  nor  the 
flexibility,  nor  the  breadth  of  mind  necessary  for 
this.  He  was  a  person  essentially  narrow,  obsti- 
nate, and  conceited,  was  coarse  and  vulgar,  and 
possessed  of  a  very  bad  temper  which  caused  him 
to  lose  his  head  when  it  got  the  mastery.  Like 
many  common  men  he  was  conscious  of  his  defects, 
very  sensitive  to  ridicule  or  to  any  mark  of  disre- 
spect, and  easily  affected  by  attentions  or  even 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    383 

gross  flattery.  He  had  made  an  unfortunate  exhi- 
bition of  himself  on  inauguration  day,  and  never 
forgot  that  Sumner  had  urged  that,  in  consequence 
of  this,  he  should  be  requested  to  resign.  His 
first  message  in  December,  1865,  shows,  however, 
that  he  had  then  no  wish  or  expectation  of  quar- 
reling with  Congress.  But  in  little  more  than  a 
month  after  the  beginning  of  the  session,  a  reso- 
lution offered  by  a  Republican,  expressing  confi- 
dence in  the  President  and  in  his  cooperation  with 
Congress  in  restoring  to  their  equal  position  and 
rights  the  States  lately  in  insurrection,  was  buried 
by  sending  it  to  the  committee  on  reconstruction; 
and  Johnson  felt  most  keenly  the  indignity  thus 
offered  him  by  his  own  party. 

In  his  message  in  December  the  President  had 
stated  correctly  the  alternative  modes  of  dealing 
with  the  Southern  States.  Either  they  must  be 
retained  under  military  subjection  for  a  period 
longer  or  shorter  as  circumstances  might  require, 
or  they  must  be  brought  back  into  practical  rela- 
tions with  the  Union,  as  quickly  as  possible,  by 
methods  which  necessarily  implied  a  trust  in  the 
loyalty  of  the  people.  The  objections  to  the  former 
scheme  were,  that  it  was  opposed  to  all  our  ideas 
as  to  the  right  of  self-government,  and  that  it 
assumed  that  the  seceding  States  were  practically 
out  of  the  Union,  and  the  South  a  conquered 
country  over  which  we  had  full  power.  The 
objections  to  the  latter  course  were,  that  it  seemed 
to  impose  no  penalty  on  rebellion,  and  that  its 


384  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

success  depended  upon  the  existence  at  the  South 
of  a  sufficient  body  of  people  loyal  to  the  United 
States,  and  prepared  to  accept  the  results  of  the 
war.  Lincoln  and  Johnson  both  believed  in  the 
existence  of  such  a  body,  large  enough  to  form 
and  organize  state  governments  and  to  serve  as 
a  nucleus  round  which  the  mass  of  the  citizens 
would  crystallize.  Time  showed  that  they  were 
mistaken  in  this  belief,  and  that  the  four  years  of 
war  had  substantially  extinguished  for  the  time 
the  Union  sentiment  in  the  seceding  States,  as  it 
had  destroyed  the  peace  Democracy  at  the  North. 
The  congressional  plan  of  reconstruction,  which 
was  finally  adopted,  assumed  that  the  North  had 
prevailed  in  a  war  of  conquest,  and  had  the  con- 
querors' right  to  deal  with  the  Southerners  as  a 
subjugated  people.  Johnson  opposed  this  plan  by 
all  the  means  in  his  power.  The  contest  between 
him  and  Congress  was  most  bitter ;  it  was  carried 
on  by  vetoes  on  the  one  side,  and  by  the  passage 
of  bills  over  these  vetoes  on  the  other,  by  attacks 
of  the  President  on  Congress  in  various  public 
addresses,  while  in  Congress  there  were  attacks 
upon  him,  equally  bitter  and  unjustifiable,  which 
resulted  in  an  impeachment  and  a  trial,  upon 
which  no  man  not  a  partisan  can  reflect  without  a 
sense  of  shame. 

Before  Lincoln's  death  an  act  of  Congress  had 
established  the  freedmen's  bureau.  Early  in  1866 
a  bill  was  passed  enlarging  the  powers  of  this 
bureau,  and  extending  the  period  of  its  existence. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    385 

This  bill  the  President  vetoed  on  constitutional 
and  other  grounds,  and  his  veto  was  sustained. 
A  second  bill  was  then  introduced,  drawn  not  with 
a  view  to  overcoming  the  President's  objections 
and  obtaining  his  approval,  but  with  regard  to  the 
ability  to  pass  it  over  his  veto,  which  was  done  on 
the  same  day  that  the  veto  message  was  received 
(July  16,  1866).  "It  required,  however,  potent 
persuasion  reinforced  by  the  severest  party  disci- 
pline to  prevent  a  serious  break  in  both  houses 
against  the  bill,"  and  to  carry  it  over  the  veto. 

In  April,  before  the  passage  of  this  act,  a  civil 
rights  bill,  giving  to  the  colored  people  in  every 
State  equal  civil  rights  with  the  whites,  had  also 
been  passed  over  the  President's  veto;  but  to  se- 
cure the  majority  required  to  do  this,  it  had  been 
found  necessary  to  unseat  by  a  strict  party  vote  a 
Democrat,  who  would  otherwise  have  retained  his 
place  in  the  Senate,  and  to  insist  upon  a  vote, 
when  one  of  the  Republicans  who  sided  with  the 
President  was  ill  and  unable  to  be  in  his  seat.  In 
December,  1865,  Congress  had  passed  the  thir- 
teenth amendment  to  the  Constitution.  This  pro- 
hibited slavery  everywhere.  In  June,  1866,  they 
passed  the  fourteenth  amendment,  which  declared 
all  persons  born  or  naturalized  here  to  be  citizens, 
prohibited  any  State  from  abridging  their  privi- 
leges or  immunities,  and  proportionally  reduced 
the  representation  in  Congress  and  in  the  electoral 
college  of  any  State  which  denied  to  any  of  its 
male  citizens  the  right  of  suffrage.  This  amend- 


386  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

ment  also  prohibited  any  person  who,  having  taken 
an  oath  to  support  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  had  engaged  in  insurrection,  from  holding 
any  office  under  the  United  States  or  in  any  State, 
unless  this  disability  should  have  been  removed 
by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  both  houses  of  Congress. 
The  proposed  amendment  was  no  affair  of  the 
President's,  but  he  very  unwisely  sent  to  Congress 
a  message  expressing  his  disapproval  of  it. 

By  a  series  of  offensive  speeches,  beginning  on 
Washington's  Birthday  and  culminating  in  those 
which  he  delivered  at  various  places  during  a  sum- 
mer tour  in  1866,  Johnson  had  succeeded  in  utterly 
disgusting  the  people,  and  had  wholly  lost  the 
confidence  of  the  country.  The  autumn  elections 
went  decidedly  against  him,  and  gave  to  his  oppo- 
nents a  free  hand.  In  the  following  year  Congress 
passed  the  military  reconstruction  bill,  which  laid 
down  the  conditions  required  of  any  State  to  obtain 
the  admission  of  its  senators  and  representatives  to 
Congress,  and  the  counting  of  its  votes  in  the  elec- 
toral college.  These  conditions  were:  the  adop- 
tion of  a  constitution  which  granted  universal 
suffrage,  which  abolished  slavery  forever,  which 
prohibited  the  payment  .of  any  rebel  war  debt, 
which  secured  absolute  equality  between  all  classes 
of  citizens;  and  the  ratification  by  the  State  of 
both  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  amendments  to 
the  Constitution.  To  these  was  added  one  further 
condition.  No  State  in  insurrection  was  to  be 
admitted  to  representation  in  Congress  or  in  the 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    387 

electoral  college  until  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth 
amendments  had  become  part  of  the  Constitution 
by  the  ratification  of  two  thirds  of  the  States. 
Meantime  the  Southern  States  were  divided  into 
various  military  districts,  several  States  being 
united  for  this  purpose,  and  placed  under  a  single 
commander.  This  bill  was  vetoed  by  the  Presi- 
dent, but  was  passed  over  the  veto. 

This  was  the  plan  of  reconstruction  which  was 
finally  carried  out.  Whether  it  would  have  worked 
satisfactorily  had  the  President  and  Congress  been 
cordially  at  one  in  endeavoring  to  promote  its 
success,  is  uncertain.  Before  it  was  adopted  the 
President's  plan  had  failed.  Unrepentant  rebels 
had  got  control  of  state  governments  which  he  had 
recognized;  there  were  outrages  and  riots,  and, 
though  slavery  had  been  technically  abolished,  va- 
grant and  apprentice  laws  had  been  passed  in  sev- 
eral of  the  Southern  States,  the  purpose  and  effect 
of  which  was  to  reduce  the  colored  people  to  a 
condition  analogous  to  that  from  which  they  were 
supposed  to  have  been  freed.  The  seceding  States 
at  last  accepted  the  terms  which  Congress  had  pre- 
scribed, but  only  because  they  found  there  was  no 
escape  from  doing  so,  if  they  wished  to  be  repre- 
sented in  the  House  and  Senate.  In  1868  they  all, 
with  the  exception  of  Virginia,  Mississippi,  and 
Texas,  yielded  to  the  requirements  of  the  law,  and 
the  three  States  last  named  made  their  submission 
in  1870.  Although  the  States  had  accepted  these 
conditions  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  their  old 


388  WILLIAM  HENRY  SEWARD 

rights,  they  felt  that  they  were  not  bound  to  ob- 
serve in  good  faith  the  obligations  which  had  been 
forced  upon  them,  and  for  several  years  they  re- 
sorted to  all  sorts  of  expedients  to  deprive  the 
freedmen  of  the  free  and  fair  exercise  of  the  suf- 
frage to  which  they  were  legally  entitled.  The 
success  of  the  congressional  reconstruction  scheme 
was  therefore  by  no  means  an  unqualified  one. 
It  was  disapproved  of  at  the  time  by  some  of  the 
leaders  and  by  a  number  of  the  members  of  the  Re- 
publican party,  and  it  had  a  considerable  influence 
in  inducing  many  of  the  most  conservative  of  them 
to  join  at  last  the  ranks  of  the  Democracy. 

Though  the  President's  reconstruction  policy 
was  not  inspired  by  Seward,  but  had  its  origin  in 
Johnson's  own  convictions  as  to  the  proper  con- 
struction of  the  Constitution  and  the  true  position 
of  the  seceding  States,  and  was  in  harmony  with 
that  which  he  had  with  Lincoln's  approval  pursued 
in  Tennessee,  yet  it  was  the  logical  sequel  of  the 
doctrines  reiterated  by  Seward  again  and  again 
in  his  dispatches  as  secretary  of  state.1 

It  would  have  been  obviously  impossible  for 
Seward,  after  having  labored  for  four  years  to 

1  In  Senator  Sherman's  Recollections,  published  since  this 
chapter  was  written,  he  says :  "  After  this  long  lapse  of  time  I 
am  convinced  that  Mr.  Johnson's  scheme  of  reconstruction  was 
wise  and  judicious."  [Vol.  i.  p.  361.]  Was  it  not  the  hostility 
between  Congress  and  the  President,  rather  than  Johnson's  pol- 
icy, that  encouraged  the  subdued  secessionists  to  try  to  evade  the 
legislation  of  four  years  and  escape  the  consequences  of  their 
unsuccessful  rebellion  ? 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON     389 

satisfy  the  governments  of  Europe  that  the  Union 
was  intact,  that  we  were  engaged  in  quelling  an 
insurrection  and  were  not  embarked  in  a  war  of 
conquest,  to  deny  his  own  instructions  and  assent 
to  the  new  congressional  theories  and  to  the  legis- 
lation which  followed  them.  He  thought  the  course 
of  Congress  unwise  as  well  as  unconstitutional;  he 
knew  the  President's  honesty  of  purpose  and  hoped 
to  restrain  his  impetuosity  of  speech  or  to  modify 
its  consequences ;  he  believed  in  the  soundness  of 
his  constitutional  views  and  the  correctness  of  his 
vetoes;  he  regretted  extremely  the  dissensions 
which  had  arisen  from  the  differences  of  opinion 
as  to  the  best  mode  of  reconstruction ;  but  did  not 
consider  these  differences  or  dissensions  as  of  pri- 
mary importance.  He  had  no  doubt  that  the  States 
which  had  ceased  their  resistance  in  the  field  would 
in  some  way,  after  no  long  delay,  come  again  into 
the  full  enjoyment  of  their  privileges  as  members 
of  the  Union;  and  that  time  would  not  merely 
heal  the  wounds  of  the  war,  but  would  also  efface 
any  bitterness  which  might  follow  the  harsh  mea- 
sures of  Congress ;  and  so  believing,  he  was  not  a 
violent  partisan  of  either  party.  Speaking  at  the 
Cooper  Institute  on  Washington's  Birthday,  he 
said:  "I  am  not  here  as  an  alarmist;  I  am  not 
here  to  say  that  the  nation  is  in  peril  or  danger  — 
in  peril  if  you  adopt  the  opinions  of  the  President; 
in  peril  if  you  reject  them ;  in  peril  if  you  adopt 
the  views  of  the  apparent  or  real  majority  of  Con- 
gress, or  if  you  reject  them.  Nor  do  I  think  the 


390  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

cause  of  liberty  and  human  freedom,  the  cause  of 
progress  or  civilization,  the  cause  of  national  ag- 
grandizement present  or  future,  material  or  moral, 
is  in  danger  of  being  long  arrested,  whether  you 
adopt  one  set  of  political  opinions  or  another. 
The  Union  has  been  rescued  from  all  its  perils. 
The  noble  ship  has  passed  from  tempest  and  bil- 
lows within  the  verge  of  a  safe  harbor,  without  a 
broken  spar  or  a  leak,  starboard  or  larboard,  fore 
or  aft.  There  are  some  small  reefs  yet  to  pass  as 
she  approaches  her  moorings.  One  pilot  says  that 
she  may  safely  enter  directly  through  them.  The 
other  says  that  she  must  back,  and,  lowering  sail, 
take  time  to  go  around  them.  That  is  all  the 
difference  of  opinion  between  the  pilots.  I  should 
not  practice  my  habitual  charity  if  I  did  not  admit 
that  I  think  them  both  sincere  and  honest.  But 
the  vessel  will  go  in  safely,  one  way  or  the  other. 
The  worst  that  need  happen  will  be  that,  by  taking 
the  wrong  instead  of  the  right  passage,  or  even 
taking  the  right  passage  and  avoiding  the  wrong 
one,  the  vessel  may  roll  a  little,  and  some  honest, 
capable,  and  even  deserving  politicians,  statesmen, 
president,  or  congressmen  may  get  washed  over- 
board. I  should  be  sorry  for  this,  but  if  it  cannot 
be  helped,  it  can  be  borne.  If  I  am  one  of  the 
unfortunates,  let  no  friend  be  concerned  on  that 
account." 

Seward  remained  in  the  cabinet,  however,  not 
so  much  to  take  part  in  the  process  of  reconstruc- 
tion as  because  he  wished  to  dispose  of  the  diplo- 


matic  questions  which  the  war  had  left  unsettled, 
and  thus  to  finish  his  work ;  he  knew  that  he  would 
have  freedom  of  action  in  dealing  with  foreign 
powers,  and  thought  it  his  duty  under  the  circum- 
stances to  remain  at  his  post,  and  there  is  no  reason 
to  suppose  that  he  ever  regretted  doing  so.  The 
labors  of  his  office  he  found  much  less  onerous  than 
during  the  war,  and  more  fruitful  and  agreeable 
in  their  results.  He  made  treaties  with  the  vari- 
ous states  of  Central  and  South  America  for  the 
settlement  of  all  outstanding  claims,  and  a  conven- 
tion with  Nicaragua,  containing  stipulations  for 
a  transit  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans, 
the  Nicaragua  Canal.  As  has  already  been  stated, 
the  French  were  induced  by  negotiations,  and 
without  a  resort  to  war  on  our  part,  to  withdraw 
their  troops  from  Mexico,  and  the  republican  gov- 
ernment was  reestablished  there,  though  its  advent 
to  power  was  stained  by  the  execution  of  Maximil- 
ian, whose  life  Seward's  exertions  were  unable  to 
save. 

The  European  governments  had  always  denied 
the  right  of  any  native-born  subject  to  cast  off 
his  allegiance  to  his  own  country  and  to  become 
a  citizen  of  an  adopted  one.  Our  naturalization 
laws  permitted  a  foreigner  to  do  this,  and  personal 
complications  were  constantly  arising  on  account 
of  this  difference.  Seward  succeeded,  at  first  with 
Prussia  and  afterwards  with  various  other  coun- 
tries of  Europe,  in  arranging  this  matter  on  a 
satisfactory  basis.  He  also  made  a  treaty  with 


392  WILLIAM   HENRY  SEWARD 

the  island  of  Madagascar  which  opened  to  us  trade 
and  commerce  there,  and  under  which  this  country 
absorbed  about  two  thirds  of  the  entire  foreign 
business  of  that  island,  and  retained  it  until  the 
recent  conquest  and  annexation  of  Madagascar  by 
France. 

Any  practical  discussion  of  the  Alabama  claims 
was  negatived  by  Lord  Russell's  emphatic  refusal 
to  admit  England's  liability  on  this  account;  this 
matter  therefore  remained  in  abeyance  until  the 
change  of  ministry  in  1868.  Mr.  Adams  had 
resigned  at  the  close  of  the  previous  year,  and 
Reverdy  Johnson  had  been  sent  to  England  in  his 
place.  He  negotiated  with  Lord  Clarendon  a 
treaty  for  the  settlement  of  these  claims,  which 
was  known  as  the  Johnson-Clarendon  treaty.  It 
gave  to  the  United  States,  in  substance,  all  that 
it  got  by  the  treaty  of  Washington;  but  it  was 
rejected  by  the  Senate,  upon  the  ground  that  it 
belittled,  by  its  form,  the  work  to  be  done,  ignored 
the  greater  national  grievances,  and  contained 
no  word  of  regret  for  the  fact  that  American  com- 
merce had  been  swept  from  the  sea  by  the  rebel 
cruisers,  and  for  the  enormous  loss  thus  inflicted 
on  the  country.  Though  the  actual  treaty  failed  to 
be  ratified,  Seward  had  secured  by  it  the  essential 
concession,  —  an  admission  of  the  principle  of 
arbitration  for  the  settlement  of  our  claims  against 
Great  Britain  for  the  losses  occasioned  by  these 
cruisers;  and,  this  concession  once  made,  a  satis- 
factory treaty  was  sure  sooner  or  later  to  follow. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE  UNDER  JOHNSON    393 

The  most  important  and  successful  treaty  with 
which  Se ward's  name  will  always  remain  associ- 
ated, was  that  for  the  purchase  of  Alaska.  To 
many  people  it  seemed  a  wild  and  visionary  scheme 
to  annex,  at  the  cost  of  more  than  seven  millions 
of  dollars,  this  frozen  region  of  the  north;  but 
Mr.  Sumner  was  induced  to  see  both  its  political 
and  pecuniary  value,  and  he  made  these  so  clear 
to  the  Senate  that  the  treaty  was  easily  ratified. 
Subsequent  events  have  justified  its  wisdom ;  Alaska 
has  returned  to  the  treasury  of  the  United  States 
many  fold  the  original  purchase  money. 

Another  treaty  to  which  Seward  attached  great 
importance,  that  for  the  purchase  from  Denmark 
of  the  island  of  St.  Thomas  in  the  West  Indies, 
failed  in  the  Senate,  partly,  one  cannot  but  think, 
because  of  the  bitter  enmity  of  that  body  and  its 
leaders  to  the  President.  We  had  suffered  ex- 
ceedingly during  the  whole  civil  war  from  the  want 
of  a  foothold  and  a  harbor  of  our  own  in  the  West 
Indies,  which  might  serve  as  a  coaling  and  naval 
station ;  and  the  great  importance  of  a  possession 
of  this  sort  to  us,  in  any  war  in  which  we  might 
be  either  neutrals  or  belligerents,  had  been  recog- 
nized by  our  military  and  naval  commanders.  St. 
Thomas  fulfilled  exactly  the  desired  conditions. 
A  small  island,  with  a  limited  population,  its  pur- 
chase would  give  rise  to  no  embarrassing  questions 
as  to  how  its  people  should  be  governed,  or  as  to 
their  participation  in  the  public  affairs  of  this 
country.  It  is  poor  in  agricultural  products  and 


394  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

resources,  but  has  a  magnificent  land-locked  har- 
bor ;  it  was  at  that  time  the  great  commercial  en- 
trepot for  trade  with  Venezuela,  Porto  Rico,  San 
Domingo,  and  Hayti,  and  the  principal  rendezvous 
for  the  steam  packets  of  various  important  West 
India  lines;  it  had  a  population  two  thirds  Protes- 
tant, with  a  language  almost  exclusively  English. 
The  facts  that  its  agricultural  products  were  few, 
and  that  it  suffered  from  time  to  time,  like  other 
tropical  islands,  from  the  violent  disturbances  of 
the  elements,  rendered  it  no  less  valuable  or  im- 
portant to  us  for  the  purposes  for  which  we  re- 
quired it. 

This  treaty  had  been  much  valued  by  Seward, 
and  was  vigorously  championed  by  him,  though  it 
was  not  finally  disposed  of  until  after  his  term  of 
office  had  expired.  "It  became  a  part  of  the  great 
controversy  between  the  Executive  and  Congress. 
The  President  and  the  State  Department  had  ne- 
gotiated this  treaty,  and  therefore,  if  for  no  other 
reason,  the  Senate  would  not  consent  to  it."1 
There  were  questions  as  to  the  price  to  be  paid, 
and  other  financial  considerations,  which  might 
have  led  to  its  rejection;  but  the  judgment  of 
practical  experts  like  Secretary  Fox  and  Admiral 
Porter,  that  the  island  would  be  of  the  greatest 
value  and  importance  to  us  for  naval  purposes,  is 
certainly  entitled  to  far  more  weight  than  the 
opinions,  however  emphatic  and  decided,  of  those 
persons  who  had  no  such  special  knowledge  or 
1  Dawes's  Sumner,  282. 


RETIREMENT  FROM  PUBLIC   LIFE         395 

qualifications.  The  admiral  and  the  secretary 
were  both  strenuous  advocates  of  this  treaty. 

At  the  close  of  President  Johnson's  administra- 
tion Seward  resigned  his  office,  and  left  Washing- 
ton. "I  never  saw  him,"  wrote  a  friend  at  this 
time,  "more  happy  than  he  is  now;  so  different 
(without  his  stilts)  from  what  he  has  been  the  last 
ten  years." 

With  short  intervals  of  rest  at  home,  the  next 
two  years  and  a  half  were  spent  by  him  in  travel. 
He  visited  the  western  coast  of  America  from 
Alaska  to  Lower  California,  crossed  Mexico  and 
returned  by  the  West  Indies,  and  later  made  a 
journey  round  the  world,  of  which  an  account  has 
been  published,  taken  from  his  journals  and  dicta- 
tion. After  his  return  he  passed  the  remainder 
of  his  days,  either  in  his  homestead  at  Auburn, 
or  in  his  son's  cottage  on  Owasco  Lake.  Here, 
with  his  strength  gradually  failing,  his  temper 
always  serene  and  cheerful,  his  mind  clear  and 
untouched,  he  waited  the  slow  approach  of  Death. 
At  work  in  the  morning  with  his  adopted  daughter 
on  his  notes  of  travel,  he  lay  down  to  rest,  and 
the  end  came.  He  died  on  the  10th  of  October, 
1872. 

It  may  not  be  entirely  amiss  here  to  say  a  word 
of  Seward  as  a  man.  In  all  the  relations  of  pri- 
vate life  he  was  most  admirable:  a  devoted  hus- 
band, a  kind  and  sympathetic  father,  a  firm  and 
loyal  friend,  an  excellent  neighbor  and  citizen. 
The  bitter  disappointment  of  the  people  of  Auburn 


396  WILLIAM  HENRY   SEWARD 

at  his  failure  to  receive  the  presidential  nomina- 
tion in  1860  showed  the  love  they  bore  him.  His 
optimism  in  politics  and  in  life  generally  was  not 
merely  the  result  of  a  disposition  naturally  cheer- 
ful and  buoyant,  but  of  a  firm  faith  in  an  overrul- 
ing Providence.  His  industry  was  tireless,  his 
capacity  for  work  enormous.  He  often  wrote  far 
into  the  night,  and  during  the  years  of  his  active 
practice  as  a  lawyer  the  young  men  in  his  office 
would  frequently  find  in  the  morning  the  floor  of 
his  room  strewn  with  papers  which  he  had  written 
while  they  were  asleep. 

His  political  life  stretched  over  a  period  of 
nearly  forty  years,  occupied  with  the  discussion 
and  settlement  of  the  most  vital  and  exciting  ques- 
tions both  by  legislation  and  war.  He  has  been 
charged  with  having  no  political  convictions,  but 
an  examination  of  his  public  career  seems  to  prove 
exactly  the  contrary.  From  first  to  last  he  was  a 
consistent  Whig.  He  believed  in  and  advocated 
a  protective  tariff,  internal  improvements,  and  all 
the  doctrines  which  formed  the  policy  of  that 
party.  His  hostility  to  slavery  began  with  his  life 
in  Georgia,  and  what  he  saw  there,  while  he  was 
yet  a  mere  lad.  His  opposition  to  it  never  ceased 
so  long  as  slavery  in  any  form  was  a  political  ques- 
tion; and  he  had  the  satisfaction,  as  secretary  of 
state,  of  signing  his  name  not  merely  to  the  Pro- 
clamation of  Emancipation,  but  to  both  the  con- 
stitutional amendments  which  secured  to  the  col- 
ored people  of  this  country  complete  civil  equality 


RETIREMENT   FROM   PUBLIC   LIFE         397 

with  the  whites.  He  was  never,  however,  an  abo- 
litionist. He  was  a  steady  and  persistent  advocate 
of  gradual  and  compensated  emancipation.  From 
his  short  life  at  the  South  he  realized  more  fully 
perhaps  than  any  other  Northern  statesman  the 
enormous  difficulties  and  embarrassments  which 
the  sudden  and  violent  freeing  of  tjie  slaves  would 
bring  about  at  the  South,  —  the  destruction  of 
property  and  the  temporary  ruin  of  all  industries 
which  such  an  emancipation  would  be  likely  to 
cause;  and  he  had  therefore  a  compassion  for  the 
people  of  that  region,  rebels  though  they  had  been, 
which  people  at  the  North  could  hardly  understand. 
He  not  only  had  convictions,  but  he  had  the 
courage  of  his  convictions,  and  did  not  hesitate  to 
separate  himself  from  his  friends,  to  oppose  his 
party,  or  to  risk  his  own  popularity  in  support  of 
these  convictions.  His  defense  of  the  poor  negro 
Freeman  is  a  striking  example  of  this.  His  politi- 
cal life  is  full  of  illustrations  of  the  same  quality. 
His  persistent  support  of  what  he  regarded  as 
the  rights  of  the  Roman  Catholics  in  the  public 
schools,  and  his  opposition  to  the  Know-nothing 
party,  which  cost  him  his  nomination  at  Chicago, 
are  marked  instances  of  it.  His  political  contro- 
versies never  degenerated  into  personalities.  He 
gave  to  his  opponents  the  same  credit  for  honesty 
of  conviction  which  he  expected  them  to  accord 
to  him,  and  numbered  among  his  friends  many  of 
those  who  in  public  life  were  his  political  oppo- 
nents. He  was  not  a  shrewd  political  manager; 


398  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

he  trusted  to  others  to  manage  for  him.  Perfectly 
clean-handed  himself,  by  the  admission  of  those 
who  had  the  least  confidence  in  him,  he  may  have 
permitted  his  political  managers  and  friends  to  do 
what  they  thought  was  for  his  interest;  but  he 
knew  very  little  about  this;  he  surrendered  him- 
self entirely  into  their  hands,  and  had  to  bear  the 
consequences  of  their  mistakes,  as  well  as  receive 
the  benefit  of  their  successes.  The  severest  judg- 
ments on  him  came  from  members  of  his  own 
party,  from  whom  he  happened  to  differ  as  to  a 
particular  measure  or  policy,  who  were  not  clear- 
sighted enough  to  see,  as  he  did,  that  "one  half 
the  effort  of  the  anti-slavery  men  was  lost,  because 
it  consisted  of  the  incrimination  of  other  anti- 
slavery  men  for  shades  of  difference  of  opinion; 
and  that  the  field  was  broad  enough  for  all." 

He  was  most  severely  attacked,  however,  by  the 
leaders  of  his  own  party  for  remaining  in  John- 
son's cabinet;  and  they  spoke  of  him  and  treated 
him  as  a  traitor.  It  would  have  been  easier  and 
pleasanter  for  him  to  have  resigned,  but  to  aban- 
don Johnson  under  the  actual  circumstances  would 
have  seemed  to  Seward  like  desertion,  and  he  had 
to  bring  himself  to  bear,  with  such  equanimity  as 
he  was  master  of,  his  old  friends'  avoidance  of 
him.  The  cordial  welcome  he  received  and  the 
honors  paid  him  in  all  parts  of  the  world  during 
the  next  two  years  must  have  served  to  efface  the 
recollection  of  this  coldness  and  neglect.  Though 
he  never  recovered  his  vigor  of  body  after  his 


RETIREMENT  FROM  PUBLIC   LIFE         399 

injuries  in  1865,  the  activity  of  his  mind  was  in- 
exhaustible. He  planned  his  travels,  lest  "rest 
should  mean  rust,"  and  with  the  thought  that  the 
study  of  mankind  would  be  the  most  interesting 
and  least  fatiguing  pursuit  for  him.  He  might 
have  expected  a  kindly  welcome  in  California,  for 
whose  admission  as  a  free  State  he  had  labored  in 
the  Senate,  and  in  Alaska,  which  he  had  made  a 
part  of  our  country.  He  might  have  looked  for 
a  friendly  reception  from  the  republican  president 
of  Mexico,  who  was  largely  indebted  to  him  as 
secretary  of  state ;  but  he  could  hardly  have  thought 
that  from  the  day  of  his  arrival  until  the  day  of 
his  departure  from  that  country  he  was  to  be,  at 
every  stage  of  his  journey  and  at  every  resting 
place,  not  merely  the  government's,  but  the  peo- 
ple's guest.  There  was  apparently  no  hamlet  so 
small  that  his  name  and  fame  had  not  preceded 
him  there.  Not  the  least  grateful  token  of  recog- 
nition that  he  received  was  in  a  village  of  cane 
huts,  where  the  tall,  swarthy  headman  handed 
into  the  carriage,  with  a  profound  bow,  a  scroll  on 
which  was  written,  "  To  the  great  statesman  of  the 
great  Republic  of  the  North.  Techaluta  is  poor, 
but  she  is  not  ungrateful." 

In  the  East  he  was  everywhere  received  with  the 
highest  honors.  The  Mikado  of  Japan  unveiled 
his  face  to  him  in  a  friendly  audience,  an  honor 
said  to  have  been  never  before  bestowed  on  a  for- 
eigner; he  also  desired  his  ministers  to  converse 
with  him  on  affairs  of  state,  and  it  must  have  been 


400  WILLIAM   HENRY   SEWARD 

gratifying  to  Seward  to  have  been  asked  by  them 
to  observe  that,  in  dealing  with  the  vanquished 
party  in  a  late  rebellion,  "the  government  of 
Japan  had  copied  the  example  of  toleration  given 
them  by  the  United  States." 

Throughout  the  entire  East  his  reception  was 
the  same.  His  reputation  had  everywhere  pre- 
ceded him.  The  prince-regent  of  China  rose  from 
a  sick-bed  to  visit  him.  The  ministers  of  the  va- 
rious countries  were  eager  to  see  and  to  talk  with 
the  distinguished  statesman  of  the  West,  of  whom 
they  had  heard  so  much ;  the  European  governors 
and  native  princes  of  India  vied  with  each  other 
in  their  attentions  to  him. 

Seward 's  observation  was  quick  and  his  percep- 
tions acute,  and  he  returned  home  with  his  mind 
stored  with  the  results  and  experience  of  travel, 
and  with  new  and  healthful  interests  and  occupa- 
tions for  the  remainder  of  his  days.  In  spite  of 
his  great  sorrows  and  of  his  increasing  infirmities, 
his  last  years  were  happy  ones.  Even  in  the 
busiest  period  of  his  life  his  own  hearthstone  had 
been  always  the  place  dearest  to  him,  and  now  the 
companionship  and  affection  of  his  children  and 
grandchildren  and  the  society  of  his  lifelong  friends 
and  neighbors  were  the  solace  and  enjoyment  of 
his  serene  old  age. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


ABOLITIONISTS,  applaud  Seward's  ac- 
tion in  Virginia  controversy,  35;  be- 
gin agitation,  57,  58. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  nominated 
for  vice-president,  49;  appointed 
minister  to  England,  268  ;  his  com- 
ing to  be  awaited  by  Russell  before 
determining  England's  attitude,276; 
sails  for  England,  278;  his  instruc- 
tions, 279 ;  reminds  Russell  of  par- 
allel case  of  1774,  281  ;  tries  to  ne- 
gotiate adherence  of  United  States 
to  Treaty  of  Paris,  289,  290;  with 
Seward's  approval,  declines  to  sign 
on  Russell's  terms,  290;  cautious 
letter  of  Seward  to,  on  Trent  affair, 
303  ;  in  1865  tells  Seward  to  dismiss 
fear  of  intervention,  326;  complains 
of  construction  of  Alabama,  346;  in- 
structed to  bring  matters  before  the 
courts,  348;  by  Seward's  instruction 
asks  England  to  amend  foreign  en- 
listment act,  349,  350  ;  continues  to 
protest  against  privateering,  352;  on 
English  jealousy  of  America,  353 ; 
resigns,  392. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  his  reelection 
favored  by  Seward,  6,  10;  visited 
by  Seward,  13 ;  joins  anti-Masonic 
movement,  13,  14;  thinks  Seward 
damaged  by  controversy  over  slave- 
stealers,  37;  defends  right  of  peti- 
tion, 58. 

Alabama,  Confederate  cruiser,  career 
of,  347,  348;  diplomatic  difficulties 
over,  348-350,  392. 

Alaska,  purchase  of,  393;  visited  by 
Seward,  395,  399. 

Albany  Regency,  attacked  by  Seward, 
8;  controls  New  York  Democracy, 
16. 

Albert,  Prince  Consort,  causes  modi- 


fication of  English  dispatch  in  Trent 
affair,  299. 

Amnesty  proclamation  of  Lincoln, 
367,  368;  of  Johnson,  376,  377. 

Anderson,  General  Robert,  commands 
at  Fort  Sumter,  206;  sends  news  of 
his  situation,  231,  232. 

Andrew,  John  A.,  on  Seward's  leader- 
ship, 196. 

Anti-Masonic  party,  its  origin  in  west- 
ern New  York,  11,  12  ;  holds  a  na- 
tional convention,  12, 13  ;  nominates 
Wirt  for  president,  13;  loses  ground 
in  1832, 13,  14;  causes  for  its  failure, 
14,  15. 

Arkansas,  reconstruction  in,  367,  368, 
370. 

Ashburton,  Lord,  his  connection  with 
McLeod  affair,  33. 

Atchison,  David  R.,  advocates  seizure 
of  Kansas  by  South,  152,  154  ;  leads 
Missourians  to  burn  Lawrence,  155; 
denounced  by  Sumner,  162. 

BANKS,  GENERAL  NATHANIEL  P.,  re- 
places General  Butler  at  New  Or- 
leans, 343. 

Bates,  Edward,  candidate  for  Republi- 
can nomination  in  1860, 198 ;  named 
for  attorney-general,  213,  230;  his 
character,  230;  opposes  provisioning 
of  Fort  Sumter,  233,  234;  describes 
agreement  of  cabinet  to  Seward's 
position  in  Trent  affair,  306;  urges 
issuing  emancipation  proclamation, 
336. 

Beauregard,  General  P.  G.  T.,  informs 
Campbell  that  Sumter  is  not  evacu- 
ated, 245;  ordered  to  continue  pre- 
parations to  bombard  it,  251. 

Bell,  John,  votes  against  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill,  118 ;  opposes  Lecomp- 


404 


INDEX 


ton  bill,  183  ;  nominated  for  presi- 
dent in  1860,  193. 

Benjamin,  Judah  P.,  plots  secession, 
209. 

Ben  ton,  Thomas  H.,  hopes  of  Free- 
soilers  to  nominate,  in  1854, 136;  op- 
poses repeal  of  Missouri  Compro- 
mise, 146,  147. 

Birney,  James  G.,  nominated  for  presi- 
dent by  Liberty  party  in  1843,  44; 
attacked  by  Seward,  46. 

Black,  Jeremiah  8.,  author  of 
Buchanan's  views  on  secession,  207; 
changes  opinions  and  urges 
Buchanan  to  enforce  laws  in  South 
Carolina,  208. 

Blair,  Montgomery,  accuses  Seward  of 
instigating  Dixon  to  move  repeal  of 
Missouri  Compromise,  123  ;  falsity 
of  his  story,  129,  130;  named  for 
place  in  cabinet  by  Lincoln,  213;  ob- 
jected to  by  Weed,  214;  his  nomina- 
tion offends  Republicans,  226,  227 ; 
favors  attempt  to  relieve  Fort  Sum- 
ter,  233, 234;  says  emancipation  pro- 
clamation will  lose  election  for  Lin- 
coln, 336. 

Blockade,  reasons  for  its  employment 
in  1861,  268,  269;  its  success,  270. 

Border  ruffians,  in  Kansas,  151,  154, 
155,  157. 

Boston,  Whig  society  in,  ignores  Sew- 
ard, 135. 

Brooks,  Preston  8.,  assaults  Simmer, 
163;  applauded  by  South,  164. 

Brown,  John,  his  raid  into  Virginia, 
188. 

Buchanan,  James,  fails  to  get  Demo- 
cratic nomination  in  1852, 112;  nom- 
inated in  1856, 147;  his  electoral  and 
popular  vote,  149;  predicts  Dred 
Scott  decision  in  his  inaugural,  168, 
172;  denounced  by  Seward,  172; 
promises  that  any  constitution 
framed  for  Kansas  shall  be  sub- 
mitted to  people,  173;  unable  to 
induce  Walker  to  support  Lecomp- 
ton  Constitution,  175;  defends  his 
course  regarding  Kansas,  176;  sub- 
mits Lecompton  Constitution  to 
Congress,  178,  179;  denies  Seward's 
charge  of  collusion  with  Taney,  180; 
his  course  helps  Republicans,  187; 


his  situation  in  1860,  206;  his  views 
on  secession,  207;  yields  to  Black's 
views  and  reconstructs  cabinet,  208; 
his  attitude  keeps  South  from  seiz- 
ing Washington,  210 ;  injurious  ef- 
fect of  his  attitude  upon  Europe, 
265,  273. 

Buck-tails,  New  York  Republican  fac- 
tion supporting  Tompkins,  7. 

Bunch,  British  consul  at  Charleston, 
his  dealings  with  Confederacy  for 
England,  292,  293. 

Butler,  General  Benjamin  F.,  applies 
term  "  contraband  "  to  negroes,  334; 
his  conduct  at  New  Orleans  com- 
plained of,  342;  removed  to  please 
European  powers,  343. 

CALHOUN,  JOHN  C.,  connected  with 
anti-Masons,  14;  offers  resolutions 
on  slavery  in  Territories,  61 ;  in  de- 
bate on  compromise,  79,  91. 

California,  gold  craze  in,  62;  begin- 
nings of  government,  63;  adopts 
constitution,  63,  67  ;  plan  of  South 
to  secure  as  a  slave  State,  65;  urged 
by  Taylor  to  adopt  a  constitution, 
66;  acts  independently,  67;  its  ad- 
mission opposed  by  South,  68;  urged 
by  Taylor,  77,  83;  in  compromise  of 
1850, 78, 92;  speech  of  Seward  upon, 
83,  84;  admitted  to  Union,  97. 

Cameron,  Simon,  fails  to  support  Sew- 
ard at  Republican  convention,  200  ; 
his  supporters  won  by  Lincoln's 
managers,  201,  230;  opposes  at- 
tempt to  provision  Fort  Sumter,  233. 

Campbell,  Justice  John  A.,  accuses 
Seward  of  perfidious  treatment  of 
Southern  commissioners,  238,  251- 
253;  remains  in  office  although  a 
secessionist,  238,  239;  hopes  to  pre- 
vent war  by  securing  evacuation  of 
Sumter,  239;  his  position  not  under- 
stood by  Seward,  239,  241;  wishes 
Seward  to  confer  with  commission- 
ers, 240 ;  reports  Seward's  remarks 
to  commissioners,  241;  his  action 
aids  commissioners  to  gain  time,  242 ; 
informs  Davis  that  Seward  author- 
ized him  to  announce  evacuation  of 
Sumter,  242-244;  not  justified  in 
calling  Seward's  remark  a  promise, 


INDEX 


405 


243, 244;  receives  promise  from  Sew- 
ard  of  warning  in  case  situation  at 
Surater  is  altered,  245,  246;  secures 
more  definite  promise,  247,  248; 
again  reassured  by  Seward,  250 ; 
accuses  Seward  of  equivocation,  251 ; 
complains  to  Stan  ton,  252;  discus- 
sion of  his  conduct,  252,  253. 

Canada,  rebellion  of  1837  in,  26,  27; 
Confederate  raids  from,  in  18G4,  354, 
355;  refuses  to  surrender  raiders, 
354;  restores  stolen  property,  355. 

Caroline,  burnt  by  Canadians,  20; 
apology  for  destruction  of,  refused 
by  English,  27,  33. 

Cass,  Lewis,  connected  with  McLeod 
case,  29;  nominated  for  president, 
49;  on  squatter  sovereignty,  64; 
fails  to  gain  renomination,  112;  loses 
seat  in  Senate,  150. 

Chandler,  Zachariah,  reconciled  by 
Seward  with  Davis,  177;  votes  to 
organize  Territories  without  prohib- 
iting slavery,  221. 

Chase,  Salmon  P.,  signs  appeal  of  In- 
dependent Democrats,  119;  attacked 
by  Douglas,  119  ;  candidate  for  Re- 
publican nomination  in  1856,  143; 
his  name  withdrawn,  145;  candi- 
date for  Republican  nomination  in 
1860,  200 ;  named  for  Treasury  De- 
partment, 213,  230;  wishes  Fort 
Sumter  provisioned,  233,  234;  ac- 
cepts Seward's  view  in  Trent  affair, 
306;  disapproves  of  congressional 
attack  on  Seward,  333 ;  resigns, 
then  returns  to  his  post,  333;  disap- 
proves of  emancipation  proclama- 
tion, 336. 

Civil  rights  bill,  385. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  negotiates  treaty  for 
settlement  of  Alabama  claims,  392. 

Clay,  Henry,  opposes  anti-Masons,  13; 
defeated  by  Jackson,  13  ;  supported 
in  1844  by  Seward,  43,  45-47  ;  at 
first  opposes  annexation  of  Texas, 
44,  46 ;  later  writes  letter  favoring, 
and  thus  ruins  his  chances  of  elec- 
tion, 47  ;  refuses  to  support  Taylor, 
73  ;  offers  compromise  of  1850,  77, 
78 ;  his  speech,  79 ;  on  Seward's 
speech  on  compromise,  83 ;  his 
statesmanship,  91  ;  his  measures 


first  defeated,  92,  93 ;  denounces 
agitation  in  1851,  102. 

Clinton,  De  Witt,  nominates  Seward 
for  surrogate,  6 ;  supports  Jackson 
in  1828,  6;  leads  faction  of  New 
York  Republicans,  7,  8  ;  his  advo- 
cacy of  Erie  Canal,  22. 

Clintonians,  Republican  faction  in 
New  York,  7. 

Cobb,  Howell,  leaves  Buchanan's  cabi- 
net, 208. 

Collamer,  Jacob,  upholds  Topeka  Con- 
stitution of  Kansas,  158,  159. 

Compromise  of  1850 :  questions  at 
issue  in  1849,  69,  70;  Taylor's  atti- 
tude toward,  76,  77 ;  proposed  by 
Clay,  77,  78 ;  debate  upon,  in  Sen- 
ate, 79-92  ;  speech  ot  Seward  upon, 
84-90 ;  reported  in  Omnibus  bill, 
92;  apparent  defeat  of,  92,  93; 
eventually  passed  after  death  of 
Taylor,  93,  94;  does  not  represent 
any  real  common  feeling  of  North 
and  South,  94  ;  fails  to  satisfy  North, 
98,  99 ;  upheld  in  congressional 
manifesto,  102,  105 ;  announced  as 
final  by  party  conventions,  112 ; 
used  to  justify  repeal  of  Missouri 
Compromise,  125. 

Confederate  States  of  America,  formed 
in  1861, 206,  231 ;  sends  commission- 
ers to  treat  with  United  States,  237; 
refused  reception,  237  ;  question  of 
Seward's  "  perfidy  "  toward,  238- 
253  ;  attempt  of  Campbell  to  pre- 
vent war  with,  238-252  ;  joined  by 
Southern  officers,  263;  blockaded, 
209, 270;  expects  European  recogni- 
tion, 272,  273;  its  apparent  success 
satisfies  Europe,  273,  274  ;  prepares 
for  war,  274  ;  sends  commissioners 
to  negotiate  for  recognition,  276, 
277;  recognized  as  belligerent  by 
England,  279-287  ;  by  France,  282  ; 
declares  war  on  the  United  States, 
284 ;  issues  letters  of  marque,  289, 
290 ;  dealings  of  England  with,  re- 
garding Treaty  of  Paris,  291-293; 
military  success  in  1861,  296 ;  sends 
Mason  and  Slidell  as  ministers,  297  ; 
its  military  successes  in  1862, 324  ; 
project  of  France  and  England  to 
recognize,  324,  325  ;  collapses,  366. 


408 


INDEX 


Constitution,  views  as  to  its  applica- 
tion to  slavery  in  Territories,  70, 
71, 88 ;  in  relation  to  Missouri  Com- 
promise, 117  ;  in  relation  to  recon- 
struction, 36C,  367,  378-380,  388. 

Constitutional  Union  party,  its  origin 
and  candidates,  193. 

Corwin,  Thomas,  in  Fillmore's  cabi- 
net, 93. 

Cowley,  Lord,  letter  of  Lord  John 
Russell  to,  recognizing  belligerency 
of  Confederacy,  285. 

Crittenden,  J.  J.,  reconciles  Wilson 
and  Gwin,  177  ;  opposes  Lecomp- 
ton  Constitution,  183 ;  offers  com- 
promise in  1860,  215. 

Crittenden  compromise,  215,  216. 

Cuba,  attempt  to  purchase,  in  1858, 
187, 188. 

Curtis,  Benjamin  R.,  in  Dred  Scott 
case,  170,  171. 

DALLAS,  GEORGE  M.,  remark  of  Lord 
John  Russell  to,  280,  282. 

Davis,  Henry  Winter,  denounces  Lin- 
coln for  vetoing  reconstruction  bill, 
370. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  on  divine  origin  of 
slavery,  88, 89 ;  leads  secession  party 
in  Mississippi,  105  ;  persuades  Pierce 
to  favor  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  118  ; 
on  peaceable  terms  with  Repub- 
licans, 177  ;  offers  resolutions  em- 
bodying Dred  Scott  doctrine,  188  ; 
plots  secession,  209 ;  offers  ultima- 
tum on  slavery,  217  ;  informed  by 
Campbell  of  Seward's  promise  con- 
cerning Sumter,  242 ;  sends  com- 
missioners to  negotiate  for  recogni- 
tion of  Confederacy,  276 ;  issues 
letters  of  marque,  283,  289;  sends 
Mason  and  Slide]!  to  Europe,  297. 

Democratic  party,  controls  New  York 
until  1838,  21  ;  responsible  for  New 
York  debt,  21,  22;  advocates  an- 
nexation of  Texas,  44;  nominates 
Cass,  49 ;  approves  Mexican  war, 
50 ;  on  slavery,  04 ;  divides  on 
slavery  question,  68  ;  upholds  final- 
ity of  compromise,  112  ;  nominates 
Pierce,  112 ;  wins  election  of  1852, 
113,  114 ;  again  divides  on  slavery 
issue,  133  ;  gains  ground  in  election 


of  1855, 142 :  nominates  Buchanan  in 
1856,  147 ;  carries  election  of  1856, 
149 ;  attack  of  Seward  upon,  in 
"  irrepressible  conflict "  speech,  186, 
187  ;  adopts  doctrine  of  non-inter- 
vention, 189;  attacked  as  sectional 
by  Seward,  191  ;  again  divides  on 
slavery  question  in  1860,  193. 

Denver,  James  W.,  governor  of  Kan- 
sas, opposes  Lecomptou  Constitu- 
tion, 179. 

Diplomatic  history :  Caroline  case, 
27,  33;  McLeod  case,  27-33;  mis- 
sion of  Ashburton  to  United  States, 
33;  question  of  "intervention"  in 
case  of  Hungary,  108-114 ;  foreign 
policy  of  United  States  as  inter- 
preted by  Seward,  110,  111 ;  Sew- 
ard's proposed  vigorous  policy  in 
1861,  255-257  ;  dispatch  of  Seward 
to  ministers  to  counteract  in  Europe 
effect  of  Buchanan's  message  on 
secession,  265-267  ;  danger  of  pro- 
test from  Europe  against  a  paper 
closure  of  Southern  ports,  268,  269; 
question  of  recognition  of  Southern 
belligerency,  276-287;  refusal  of 
Seward  to  permit  joint  French  and 
English  action,  278  ;  recognition  of 
belligerency  by  England,  278-287  ; 
Adams's  mission  to  English,  278- 
282  ;  Seward's  protest  against  Eng- 
land's action,  279 ;  criticism  of 
England's  action,  280-287  ;  refusal 
of  United  States  to  accede  to  Treaty 
of  Paris,  288  ;  attempt  of  Seward  to 
secure  accession  of  United  States, 
289-291 ;  mission  of  Bunch  to  Con- 
federate States,  292 ;  negotiations 
over  suspension  of  habeas  corpus, 
293,  294  ;  the  Trent  affair,  297-319 ; 
English  view  of  international  law, 
299;  modification  of  English  dis- 
patch by  Prince  Albert,  299;  cau- 
tious attitude  of  Lincoln  and  Sew- 
ard, 301-303  ;  English  demand,  SOS- 
SOS  ;  preparation  of  American  reply, 
305-311  ;  Seward's  argument,  311- 
317;  England's  reply,  318,  319; 
result  of  episode  upon  international 
law,  319 ;  efforts  of  Seward,  by  un- 
official emissaries,  to  affect  Euro- 
pean opinion,  320,  322 ;  danger  of 


INDEX 


407 


English  intervention,  323-326;  offer 
and  refusal  of  French  mediation, 
325,  326  ;  slave-trade  treaty,  327  ; 
attitude  of  Seward  regarding  cap- 
tures at  sea,  338,  339;  question 
of  foreign  mails,  339,  340  ;  difficul- 
ties regarding  English  and  French 
privileges  in  passing  blockade,  340 ; 
question  of  stopping  Charleston  har- 
bor, 340-342;  difficulties  arising 
from  Butler's  rule  at  New  Orleans, 

342,  343 ;  lack  of  complete  neutral- 
ity on  part  of  England  and  France, 

343,  344;  difficulties  over  Confed- 
erate use  of    English    ports,   345 ; 
dispute   over    building  of   Confed- 
erate   cruisers,    345-353 ;    question 
of  the  seizure  of  the  Florida,  346 ; 
question  of  the  sailing  of  the  Ala- 
bama, 347-350 ;  refusal  of  England 
to  amend    laws    on  subject,    350 ; 
agreement  to  arbitrate,   352,   353 ; 
complaints  as  to  English  aid  to  Con- 
federate cruisers,  353,  354;  dealings 
with  Canada  concerningConfederate 
raids,  354,  355 ;  refusal  of  Seward 
to  join  in  alliance  against  Mexico, 
356,  357  ;  dealings  with  France  con- 
cerning Mexican    expedition,   357- 
362;  Seward's  protest  against  estab- 
lishment of  a  monarchy  by  France, 
358,    359;     dangers    of    war    with 
France  avoided,   360,  361 ;    review 
of  Seward's  part  in  diplomatic  his- 
tory, 362,  363  ;  treaties  made  under 
Johnson,  391,  392  ;  Johnson-Claren- 
don arbitration   treaty,   392 ;    pur- 
chase of  Alaska,   393  ;   attempt  of 
Seward  to    purchase    St.   Thomas, 
393-395. 

Diplomatic  service,  appointments  to, 
under  Lincoln,  267,  268. 

District  of  Columbia,  question  of  abo- 
lition in,  70  ;  slave  trade  in,  abol- 
ished, 78,  92,  98  ;  abolition  in,  pro- 
hibited by  Crittenden  compromise, 
215. 

Disunion,  danger  of,  denied  by  Seward, 
9,  89;  threatened,  in  1850, 76, 89, 90; 
attitude  of  Taylor  toward,  94,  95  ; 
probably  would  have  failed  in  1850, 
95;  dangers  of,  minimized  by  Sew- 
ard, 192;  determined  upon  by  South- 


ern leaders,  203-205 ;  process  of, 
205, 206  ;  aided  by  administration  of 
Buchanan,  206,207;  Buchanan's  doc- 
trine of,  207 ;  impossibility  of  peace- 
ful disunion,  211;  consequences  of, 
predicted  by  Seward,  219,  220,  222  ; 
optimistic  view  of  Seward  regard- 
ing, 222-225  ;  evil  effect  of  Buch- 
anan's message  on,  in  Europe,  265, 
266. 

Dix,  John  A.,  in  Buchanan's  cabinet, 
209. 

Dixon,  Archibald,  said  by  Blair  to 
have  been  instigated  by  Seward  to 
move  repeal  of  Missouri  Compro- 
mise, 123 ;  discussion  of  his  motives, 
126,  127. 

Dodge,  Henry,  introduces  bill  to  or- 
ganize Nebraska,  124. 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  reports  bill  to 
organize  Nebraska,  117,  124;  re- 
ports Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  118, 
124 ;  attacks  Chase  and  Sumner, 
119  ;  supported  by  Northern  Demo- 
crats, 122  ;  question  of  his  being  in- 
fluenced by  Dixon,  126,  127;  his 
motive  in  introducing  Nebraska  bill, 
127, 128;  denounces  Know-Nothings, 
138;  condemns  Emigrant  Aid  So- 
ciety, 158  ;  proposes  bill  to  settle 
Kansas  dispute,  159 ;  vituperated 
by  Sumner,  163 ;  discusses  Kansas 
question  with  Buchanan,  177  ;  hated 
by  South,  177 ;  denounces  Lecomp- 
ton  Constitution,  177,  178;  his  atti- 
tude praised  by  Seward,  178;  dis- 
trusted by  Republicans,  182;  deter- 
mination of  Southern  Democrats  to 
drive  from  party,  188;  nominated 
for  President  by  Democrats,  193. 

Dred  Scott  case,  facts  in,  168,  169; 
decision  of  Supreme  Court  in,  169- 
172;  denounced  by  Seward,  179; 
question  of  its  betrayal  to  Buch- 
anan, 179-181 ;  its  doctrines  adopted 
by  Democratic  party,  189. 

Durfee, ,  killed  in  Caroline  affair, 

27,  28. 

EDUCATION,  in  New  York,  23. 
Emigrant    Aid    Society,    established, 

152;  attacked  in  Senate,  158,  159. 
England,   declines    to    apologize    for 


408 


INDEX 


burning  of  Caroline,  27;  demands 
release  of  McLeod,  28,  29;  visit  of 
Kossuth  to,  106  ;  proposal  of  Seward 
to  seek  explanations  from,  255 ;  its 
sympathy  expected  by  North,  272; 
upper  classes  in,  rejoice  at  disunion, 
275;  attempt  of  Confederacy  to 
secure  recognition  from,  276,277; 
accepts  plan  of  France  to  act  in 
concert,  277;  recognizes  Southern 
belligerency,  279;  criticism  of  its 
action,  280-287  ;  its  real  motives, 
285-287  ;  naturally  inclined  to  favor 
weaker  party,  286,  287  ;  effect  of  its 
action,  287  ;  refuses  to  let  United 
States  accede  to  Treaty  of  Paris  on 
its  own  terms,  289,  290;  attempts 
negotiation  with  Confederacy  over 
Treaty  of  Paris,  292,  293;  refuses  to 
apologize  for  Bunch's  actions,  293; 
complains  of  arrests  of  British  sub- 
jects, 293,  294;  enraged  at  seizure 
of  Trent,  298;  prepares  for  war, 
298,  304;  believes  United  States  to 
have  planned  capture,  298,  299;  de- 
mands reparation,  303-305 ;  does 
not  press  for  an  apology,  304;  ac- 
cepts surrender  of  prisoners,  318 ; 
considers  possible  intervention,  320, 
321,  323;  declines  France's  propo- 
sal to  mediate,  325;  makes  treaty 
to  abolish  slave  trade,  327 ;  protests 
against  blocking  Charleston  harbor, 
340-342;  effect  of  its  neutrality  pro- 
clamation upon  South,  345 ;  difficul- 
ties over  Confederate  use  of  its 
ports,  345 ;  allows  Coufederate  pri- 
vateers to  be  built  in  its  ports,  345- 
353;  refuses  to  amend  its  law  o*n  the 
subject,  350  ;  detains  later  vessels, 
350 ;  disclaims  any  responsibility, 
351,  352;  later  agrees  to  arbitration, 
352 ;  joins  with  France  and  Spain 
against  Mexico,  350 ;  withdraws, 
357;  by  Johnson-Clarendon  treaty 
agrees  to  arbitrate,  392. 

Erie  Canal,  a  political  issue  in  New 
York,  7,  22. 

Erie  Railway,  celebration  over  its  com- 
pletion, 104. 

Everett,  Edward,  connected  with  anti- 
Masons,  14;  nominated  for  vice- 
president,  193. 


FESSENDEN,  W.  P.,  regrets  Se ward's 
vote  for  Utah  regiments,  185. 

Filluiore,  Millard,  nominated  for  vice- 
president,  49;  becomes  president, 
favors  compromise,  93;  opposed  to 
Seward,  95,  9G;  proscribes  Seward's 
friends,  97 ;  his  excursion  over  Erie 
Railway,  104;  candidate  of  conser- 
vative Whigs  for  renominatiou,  112, 
113;  candidate  in  1856,  his  vote, 
149. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  elected  to  Senate,  101. 

Florida,  admitted  by  South  as  balance 
to  Iowa,  Cl. 

Florida,  career  of  the,  346. 

Floyd,  John  B.,  in  Buchanan's  cabi- 
net, 209. 

Foote,  Henry  S.,  leads  Union  party  in 
Mississippi  in  1851,  105. 

Forsyth,  John,  complains  to  British 
minister  of  Caroline  affair,  27;  de- 
clares inability  to  release  McLeod, 
28. 

Fourteenth  amendment,  passed,  385. 

Fox,  Captain  G.  V.,  ought  to  be  cred- 
ited with  success  of  navy  during 
war,  231;  plans  to  relieve  Fort 
Sumter,  233,  234;  his  expedition 
fails,  235,  236;  on  plan  to  annex  St. 
Thomas,  394. 

Fox,  Henry  S.,  declines  to  apologize 
for  Caroline  affair,  27;  demands 
McLeod's  release,  28;  sends  ultima- 
tum to  Webster,  29. 

France,  proposal  of  Seward  to  demand 
explanations  from,  255-257;  ex- 
presses friendly  feelings  before  war 
of  secession,  272;  proposes  to  Eng- 
land and  Russia  to  act  in  concert 
regarding  the  United  States,  277; 
recognizes  belligerency  of  Confed- 
eracy, 282;  considers  joint  interven- 
tion with  England,  320,  321 ;  takes 
part  of  England  in  Trent  affair,  322; 
declines  to  withdraw  recognition 
of  belligerency,  323  ;  suggests  joint 
mediation,  325;  offers  to  mediate, 
325;  difficulties  with,  arising  from 
Butler's  rule  in  New  Orleans,  343, 
joins  with  England  and  Spain  against 
Mexico,  356;  aids  monarchical  party, 
357 ;  plans  to  establish  a  monarchy 
in  Mexico,  357 ;  threatened  by  Sew- 


INDEX 


409 


ard,  359;  asks  whether  United 
States  wishes  war,  3GO,  361 ;  with- 
draws troops,  362. 

Freedman's  bureau,  384,  385 

Freeman,  ,  insane  negro  crim- 
inal, defended  by  Seward,  41-43. 

Free  Soil  party,  nominates  Van  Buren 
and  Adams,  49,  50;  decides  election 
in  favor  of  Taylor,  50;  members  of, 
in  Congress,  injure  their  own  cause, 
68;  dislikes  Seward,  135;  wishes  to 
form  a  new  party,  136. 

Fremont,  John  C.,  movement  to  nom- 
inate in  1856,  143,  144;  nominated 
by  Republicans,  145;  reasons  for 
his  popularity,  146,  147;  defeated  in 
1856,  149. 

Fugitive  Slave  Law,  demanded  by 
South,  70;  proposed  by  Clay,  78, 92; 
speech  of  Seward  upon,  85,  8G;  in 
Omnibus  bill,  92;  its  passage  enrages 
North,  98,  99,  100;  attempts  to  en- 
force, 100,  101;  opposition  to,  in 
North,  101;  its  actual  working,  101, 
102;  bill  to  make  more  rigorous, 
102 ;  gradual  decrease  of  excitement 
over,  105,  204;  revision  proposed  in 
Crittenden  compromise,  215;  also 
by  Seward,  216. 

GBAKY,  JOHN  W.,  his  career  as  gov- 
ernor of  Kansas,  157 ;  resigns,  172. 

Gilmer,  Thomas  W.,  refuses  to  sur- 
render a  fugitive  to  New  York,  37 ; 
resigns,  37 ;  thought  by  Virginians  a 
match  for  Seward  in  argument,  37. 

Grant,  Ulysses  S.,  expects  a  short 
war,  224. 

Greece,  its  recognition  by  England  as 
belligerent  considered  by  Russell  a 
precedent  in  1861,  281. 

Greeley,  Horace,  expects  Whig  nom- 
ination for  governor  in  1854,  140; 
angry  with  Seward  for  failing  to 
aid  him,  140, 141 ;  becomes  Seward's 
enemy,  141;  his  hostility  surprises 
Seward,  144;  works  to  defeat  Sew- 
ard's nomination  in  1860,  196-199; 
causes  for  his  hatred  of  Seward, 
197;  writes  bitter  letter  to  Seward, 
197,  198;  conceals  his  enmity,  198; 
supports  Bates  in  Republican  con- 
vention, 198;  rejoices  at  Seward's 


defeat,  199;  publishes  his  letter  of 
1854  to  Seward,  199;  disgusts  Weed, 
199. 

Gwiu,  William  M.,  reconciled  by  Sew- 
ard and  others  with  Wilson,  177. 

HABEAS  CORPUS,  suspension  of,  Sew- 
ard's connection  with,  293-295. 

Hale,  John  P.,  deplores  Seward's  vote 
for  Utah  regiments,  185. 

Harrison,  William  Henry,  connected 
with  anti-Masons,  19;  elected  presi- 
dent, 29;  in  McLeod  case,  29;  ir- 
ritated by  Seward's  action,  32; 
refuses  to  consider  possibility  of 
Seward's  entering  his  cabinet,  34. 

"Higher  Law,"  Seward's  statement 
of,  86-89. 

Holland  Company,  dealings  of  Seward 
with,  19. 

Holt,  Joseph,  in  Buchanan's  cabinet, 
209. 

House  of  Representatives,  passes  Kan- 
sas-Nebraska bill,  130;  sectional  or- 
ganization of,  in  1855, 149 ;  organiza- 
tion of,  in  1856,  158;  demands  re- 
storation of  Missouri  Compromise, 
158;  appoints  committee  to  investi- 
gate Kansas  troubles,  159;  fails  to 
punish  Brooks,  163;  report  of  its 
committee  on  Kansas,  166 ;  passes 
bill  to  admit  Kansas,  167 ;  commit- 
tee of,  on  compromise  in  1861,  217; 
votes  Wilkes  a  gold  medal,  300; 
passes  resolution  not  to  recognize 
monarchy  in  Mexico,  360. 

Houston,  Samuel,  favors  each  one  of 
compromise  measures,  94;  votes 
against  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  118. 

Hughes,  Archbishop  John,  sent  by 
Seward  to  France,  321. 

Hungary,  revolt  of,  in  1849,  105,  106; 
crushed  by  Russia,  106;  sympathy 
for,  in  England,  106:  and  in  United 
States,  107-109. 

"INDEPENDENT  DEMOCRATS,"  address 
of,  against  Kansas-Nebraska  bill, 
118,  119;  attacked  by  Douglas,  119. 

Internal  improvements,  not  a  party 
question  in  1828,  17;  craze  for,  in 
New  York,  22,  23;  advocated  by 
Seward  in  1852,  111,  112. 


410 


INDEX 


Intervention,  question  of,  in  case  of 

Hungary,  106-111. 
Iowa,  its  admission  refused  by  South 

unless  together  with  Florida,  61 
"  Irrepressible  conflict,"  186. 

JACKSON,  ANDREW,  supported  by  Clin- 
ton in  1828,  6;  elected  in  1832,  13; 
removes  deposits  from  Bank,  13; 
reasons  for  his  success,  17,  18;  his 
theory  of  a  popular  mandate,  18; 
recommends  punishing  the  circula- 
tion of  anti-slavery  documents  in 
mail,  58. 

Jennings, ,  mother  of  Be  ward,  2; 

visits  Niagara,  8. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  raises  hopes  of 
radicals  upon  succeeding  Lincoln, 
374;  his  hatred  for  rebels,  374;  fol- 
lows Lincoln's  plan  of  reconstruc- 
tion, 374;  considers  States  as  never 
out  of  Union,  375;  issues  amnesty 
proclamation,  376;  appoints  pro- 
visional governors,  377,  378;  his 
conditions  to  seceded  States,  379; 
bases  authority  on  war  power,  379; 
said  to  have  been  changed  by  Sew- 
ard's  influence,  381;  this  assertion 
erroneous,  381,  382;  intends  to  fol- 
low Lincoln,  382;  why  his  plan 
failed,  382,  383;  his  message  to 
Congress,  383;  believes  in  loyalty 
of  part  of  South,  384;  opposes 
congressional  reconstruction,  384; 
vetoes  freedman's  bureau  bill,  385; 
vetoes  other  bills  in  vain,  385;  ex- 
presses disapproval  of  fourteenth 
amendment,  386;  disgusts  people 
by  offensive  behavior,  386;  vetoes 
reconstruction  bill  in  vain,  387 ;  his 
plan  of  reconstruction  fails,  387; 
supported  by  Seward,  388,  389. 

Johnson,  Herschel  V.,  nominated  for 
vice-president,  193. 

Johnson,  Reverdy,  negotiates  treaty 
for  settlement  of  Alabama  claims, 
392. 

KANSAS,  struggle  over  organization  of, 
151-190;  sides  in  struggle  over,  151 ; 
its  possession  as  slave  State  con- 
sidered vital  by  South,  152;  organ- 

.   ized  immigration  iuto*  from  North 


and  South,  152,  153;  first  election 
of  delegate  in,  153;  legislature  of, 
elected  by  Missourians,  154;  adopts 
Missouri  statutes,  155;  violence  in, 
under  Shannon,  155,  157;  formation 
and  destruction  of  free-state  Topeka 
government  in,  156;  administration 
of  Geary  in,  157;  policy  of  Pierce 
toward,  157,  158;  affairs  in,  dis- 
cussed by  Congress,  158-1G2;  burn- 
ing of  Lawrence  in,  164;  failure  of 
attempts  to  admit,  under  a  com- 
promise, 165-167;  administration 
of  Walker  in,  172-175;  free  vote  on 
constitution  of,  promised  by  Buch- 
anan, 173;  election  of  convention 
and  of  legislature,  173, 174;  Lecomp- 
ton  Constitution  urged  upon,  174, 
175;  Stanton's  administration  in, 
176;  rejects  Lecomptou  Constitu- 
tion, 176  ;  attempt  of  Buchanan  to 
force  Lecompton  Constitution  upon, 
176,  178,  179;  attitude  of  Douglai 
toward,  177,  178,  181 ;  debate  upon, 
in  Senate,  178-183;  rejects  Lecomp- 
ton Constitution  definitely,  184;  its 
admission  under  Wyandot  Constitu- 
tion debated  in  Senate,  190. 

Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  events  leading 
up  to,  116,  117, 124-126;  introduced 
and  passed,  118;  denounced  by  "In- 
dependent Democrats,"  118,  119; 
debate  upon,  119;  alleged  responsi- 
bility of  Seward  for,  123-130;  car- 
ried through  House,  130. 

King,  Thomas  B.,  sent  by  Taylor  to 
urge  people  of  California  to  form  a 
state  government,  66,  67. 

Know-Nothing  party,  its  principles 
and  origin,  137;  joined  by  Whigs, 
137,  138;  influenced  by  anti-slavery 
members,  138;  denounced  by  Doug- 
las, 138;  attitude  of  Seward  toward, 
139;  in  New  York  election,  139; 
carries  New  York  and  other  States 
in  1855,  142;  proposed  fusion  of, 
with  Republican  party,  142;  op- 
posed by  Seward,  143;  members  of, 
join  Republican  party,  145;  its  vote 
in  1856,  149;  merges  in  Constitu- 
tional Union  party,  193;  members 
of,  in  Republican  party,  dislike 
Seward,  200. 


INDEX 


411 


Kossuth,  visits  United  States,  105- 
109 ;  flies  to  Turkey,  106;  visits 
England,  106;  wishes  to  gain  help 
from  England  and  United  States, 
107 ;  question  of  his  reception,  107 ; 
applauded  by  anti-slavery  element, 
108;  fails  to  interest  South,  108. 

LAFAYETTE,  MARQUIS  DE,  visits  New 
York  in  1826,  6;  visited  by  Seward, 
17. 

Lai  nnn,  Marshal  Ward  H.,  visits 
Charleston  in  1861,  247. 

Lane,  Joseph,  nominated  for  vice- 
president,  193. 

Liberty  party,  nominates  Birney,  44 ; 
holds  balance  of  power  in  New  York, 
45;  appeal  of  Seward  to,  45,  46. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  meets  Seward,  his 
remark  on  slavery,  50;  denounces 
Supreme  Court  for  Dred  Scott  de- 
cision, 172 ;  nominated  for  president 
in  I860,  194 ;  his  career,  reasons  for 
his  nomination,  194,  195 ;  how  his 
nomination  was  secured,  201 ;  offers 
Seward  State  Department,  213; 
visited  by  Weed,  213 ;  his  cabinet 
plans  criticised  by  Weed,  213,  214 ; 
tries  in  vain  to  get  a  Southern  mem- 
ber in  cabinet,  226  ;  offends  Seward, 
227 ;  refuses  to  accept  his  with- 
drawal, 228 ;  seems  undignified,  228 ; 
bis  cabinet  heterogeneous,  229,  230; 
his  perplexity  over  Sumter  situa- 
tion, 232;  asks  opinions  of  officers 
and  of  cabinet,  232-234  ;  decides  to 
relieve  both  Sumter  and  Pickens, 
234,  235  ;  notifies  governor  of  South 
Carolina,  235 ;  authorizes  Seward 
to  promise  to  warn  South  of  any 
action  regarding  Sumter,  246 ;  sends 
committee  to  investigate  situation, 
247;  Seward's  "thoughts"  for, 
254-258 ;  does  not  regard  them  as 
an  offer  from  Seward  to  assume  re- 
sponsibility for  administration,  259, 
261 ;  continues  on  good  terms  with 
Seward,  261,  262 ;  his  inaugural  ad- 
dress circulated  by  Seward  in  Eu- 
rope, 266 ;  brought  by  Seward  to 
consider  fitness  in  diplomatic  ap- 
pointments, 267  ;  modifies  Seward's 
instructions  to  Adams,  279;  sus- 


pends writ  of  habeas  corpus,  293  ; 
requests  Seward's  aid,  295  ;  said  to 
have  forced  Seward  in  Trent  affair, 
306,  307;  doubtfulness  of  story, 
308-310  ;  doubtful  what  to  do  with 
prisoners,  308  ;  thinks  of  arbitra- 
tion, 309  ;  not  proved  to  have  con- 
sulted secretly  with  Seward,  309; 
really  was  reluctant  to  yield  prison- 
ers, but  yielded  to  Seward,  310  ;  his 
mastery  recognized  by  Seward,  332; 
requested  by  Republican  senators 
to  dismiss  Seward,  332,  333;  an- 
noyed at  request,  333;  refuses  to 
accept  resignations  of  Seward  and 
Chase,  333;  States'  union  to  be  ob- 
ject of  war,  335,  336  ;  submits  eman- 
cipation proclamation  to  cabinet, 
33G;  adopts  Seward's  suggestion  to 
wait  until  a  victory,  336;  his  recon- 
struction theories,  366  ;  issues  am- 
nesty proclamation,  367;  vetoes 
reconstruction  act,  369 ;  his  rea- 
sons, 369,  370;  denounced  by  Wade 
and  Davis,  370;  signs  resolution  ex- 
cluding South  from  electoral  vote, 
370 ;  opposes  any  inflexible  plan  of 
reconstruction,  371;  his  plans  dis- 
cussed, 372,  373. 

Lossing,  Benson  J.,  on  Lincoln's  sup- 
posed position  in  Trent  case,  307. 

Louisiana,  reconstruction  in,  367,  370. 

Lovejoy,  Owen,  votes  to  organize  Ter- 
ritories without  prohibiting  slavery, 
221. 

Lyons,  "Lord,  describes  Seward's  op- 
timism in  I860,  222,  223  ;  letters  of 
Russell  to,  recognizing  belligerency 
of  Confederacy,  282,  285;  shows 
caution  after  Trent  affair,  303  ;  pre- 
sents Russell's  demand,  303,  305; 
his  instructions,  304 ;  directed  to 
remonstrate  against  closing  Charles- 
ton harbor,  341. 

Me  CL  ELL  AN,  GEORGE  B.,  said  to  have 
told  Seward  that  success  in  war 
with  England  was  impossible,  302. 

Mcllvaine,  Bishop  Charles  P.,  sent  by 
Seward  on  a  mission  to  England, 
322. 

McLean,  John,  candidate  for  Repub- 
lican nomination  in  1856,  145. 


412 


INDEX 


McLeod,  Alexander,  boasts  of  killing 
Durfee  in  Caroline  affair,  27,  28; 
arrested  by  New  York,  28 ;  his  re- 
lease demanded  by  England,  28,  29  ; 
his  discharge  requested  from  Se  ward 
by  Webster,  29 ;  his  trial  insisted 
upon  by  New  York,  30;  defended 
by  federal  attorney,  30  ;  acquitted, 
31. 

Madagascar,  treaty  with,  392. 

Marcy,  William  L.,  candidate  for  De- 
mocratic nomination  in  1852, 112. 

Marshall,  John,  at  national  anti-Ma- 
sonic convention,  13,  14. 

Mason,  James  M.,  on  slavery  in  Ter- 
ritories, 88;  plots  secession,  209; 
sent  as  Confederate  minister  to 
England,  297  ;  captured  by  Wilkes, 
298 ;  surrendered,  318. 

Massachusetts,  anti-Masons  in,  12, 13. 

Mathew,  Father,  70. 

Maximilian,  elected  Emperor  of  Mex- 
ico, 358 ;  fails  to  obtain  popular 
support,  361 ;  futile  attempt  of 
Seward  to  save,  362. 

Mercier,  M.,  advises  Napoleon  to  re- 
cognize Confederacy  and  raise  block- 
ade, 320. 

Mexico,  war  with,  begun,  61 ;  carried 
on  mainly  'by  South,  67  ;  plans  of 
France  and  Spain  to  invade,  256, 
257 ;  alliance  of  Spain,  England, 
and  France  against,  356;  proposal 
of  Seward  to  protect,  356 ;  plan  of 
Napoleon  to  erect  a  monarchy  in, 
357,  358;  elects  Maximilian,  358; 
question  of  recognition  of  govern- 
ment of,  by  United  States,  359-361 ; 
abandoned  by  France,  362 ;  kills 
Maximilian,  362  ;  visit  of  Seward  to, 
399. 

Miller,  Elijah,  law  partner  of  Seward, 
5,  6;  visits  Niagara  with  Seward,  8. 

Miller,  Frances,  marries  Seward,  5 ; 
her  death,  365. 

Mississippi,  Union  party  in,  defeats 
secessionists,  105. 

Missouri,  emigrants  from,  enter  Kan- 
sas, 153;  sends  illegal  voters  to 
carry  Kansas  elections,  153, 154, 155. 

Missouri  Compromise, called  "forgot- 
ten "  by  Seward  in  1825,  9 ;  cir- 
cumstances of  its  adoption,  115, 


116 ;  regarded  as  sacred,  116 ;  vio- 
lated in  1836,  116;  validity  of,  ques- 
tioned by  committee  of  Senate,  117; 
repeal  moved,  118;  debate  upon, 
121,  122,  125-127;  in  Dred  Scott 
case,  169-171;  its  revival  no  longer 
looked  upon  by  Seward  as  necessary, 
181,  182  ;  renewal  proposed  in  Crit- 
tenden  compromise,  215. 

Monroe  doctrine,  Seward's  view  of, 
110 ;  in  connection  with  French  in- 
vasion of  Mexico,  356,  358. 

Morgan,  William,  proposes  to  publish 
exposure  of  Masonry,  11 ;  perse- 
cuted and  murdered  by  Masons,  11, 
12. 

Motley,  John  L.,on  English  recogni- 
tion of  Southern  belligerency,  286. 

NAPOLEON  III.,  expresses  cordiality 
toward  United  States,  272;  proposes 
to  act  in  concert  with  England  in 
regard  to  Confederate  States,  277  ; 
urged  by  Mercier  to  recognize  Con- 
federacy and  raise  blockade,  320; 
prepared  to  aid  England  in  Trent 
affair,  322 ;  proposes  joint  interven- 
tion to  England  and  Russia,  325; 
his  Mexican  scheme,  357  ;  wishes  to 
establish  a  monarchy  while  United 
States  is  occupied,  357  ;  withdraws 
troops,  362. 

Navy,  development  of,  during  civil 
war,  338. 

Negro  suffrage,  Lincoln's  attitude 
toward,  373  ;  wisdom  of,  373. 

Nelson,  Judge  John,  with  Campbell 
calls  on  Seward,  238,  239;  dreads 
war,  240;  does  not  consider  Seward 
as  having  promised  evacuation  of 
Sumter,  '244;  ceases  to  aid  Camp- 
bell, 245. 

New  Mexico,  question  of  slavery  in, 
69,  92,  98. 

New  York,  visit  of  Lafayette  to,  6; 
political  parties  in,  after  1824,  7; 
National  Republican  party  in,  10} 
origin  of  anti-Masonic  party  in,  11, 
12;  campaign  of  1832  in,  13;  sena- 
torial career  of  Seward  in,  15-17, 
19;  election  of  1834  in,  19;  carried 
by  Whigs,  21;  Seward's  career  as 
governor  of,  21-38;  internal  im- 


INDEX 


413 


provements  in,  22,  23;  education 
in,  23;  spoils  system  in,  24-26;  Mc- 
Leod  case  in,  28-31;  controversy 
with  United  States,  30,  31;  defeat 
of  Whigs  in,  39  ;  decides  election  of 
1844,  45,  47;  decides  election  of 
1848,  50,  55;  campaign  of  Seward 
in,  50-52;  elects  Seward  senator, 
55 ;  Fillmore  and  Seward  factions 
in,  9G;  campaign  of  1854  in,  138- 
140;  carried  by  Know-Nothings,  142. 

Nicaragua,  treaty  with,  concerning 
canal,  391. 

North,  its  intention  in  1825  to  work 
for  emancipation  stated  by  Seward, 
10;  its  interpretation  of  squatter 
sovereignty,  64 ;  reasons  for  its  op- 
position to  slavery  extension,  71, 
72;  disappointed  at  Webster's  7th 
of  March  speech,  80;  enraged  at 
Fugitive  Slave  Law,  98,  99,  100; 
meetings  in,  to  uphold  law,  100 ; 
resistance  in,  to  law,  101;  weary 
of  slavery  agitation  in  1852,  114 ; 
alarmed  at  Kansas-Nebraska  bill, 
127,  128;  becomes  consolidated  in 
Congress  of  1856,  149,  150;  deter- 
mines to  save  Kansas  for  freedom, 
152 ;  affected  by  Kansas  outrages, 
162  ;  enraged  by  assault  on  Sumner, 
164 ;  its  economic  situation  described 
by  Seward,  190,  191 ;  wishes  to  stop 
secession  by  concessions,  209 ;  ex- 
pects European  sympathy  in  war 
with  South,  271 ;  its  slowness  leads 
Europe  to  consider  disunion  suc- 
cessful, 273,  274;  tour  of  Seward  in, 
to  urge  a  fresh  call  for  troops,  327. 

North  Carolina,  reconstruction  in,  377. 

Nott,  Dr.  Eliphalet,  his  relations  with 
Seward  while  at  Union  College,  3. 

OHIO,  Seward's  tour  in,  during  cam- 
paign of  1848,  51. 

PALMEESTON,  LORD,  threatens  war  in 
case  McLeod  is  executed,  28,  29; 
refuses  an  apology  for  Caroline  case, 
33;  disapproves  Russell's  proposal 
to  intervene  with  France  between 
North  and  South,  321;  agrees  in 
1862  to  intervene,  324. 

Peace  Congress  of  1861,  217. 


Pickens,  Francis  W.,  interview  of 
Lamon  with,  247  ;  expects  Sumter 
to  be  evacuated,  247;  asks  commis- 
sioners for  information,  217;  pro- 
mised a  warning  by  Lincoln,  247, 
248,  250. 

Pickens,  Fort,  its  successful  relief, 
234,  236. 

Pierce,  Franklin,  nominated  for  pre- 
sident, 112;  elected,  113,  114;  his 
first  message,  115;  persuaded  to 
favor  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  118;  ap- 
points Reeder  governor  of  Kansas, 
153  ;  replaces  him  by  Shannon,  155 ; 
calls  free-state  organization  trea- 
sonable, 156 ;  replaces  Shannon  by 
Geary,  157;  his  policy  condemned, 
157, 158 ;  denounced  by  Seward,  160, 
161,  166. 

Polk,  James  K.,  nominated  for  presi- 
dent in  1844,  44  ;  orders  Taylor  to 
invade  Mexico,  61 ;  urges  Congress 
to  organize  Territories,  62. 

Popular  sovereignty  in  Territories, 
doctrine  of,  announced  by  Cass,  64; 
different  interpretations  of,  64. 

Porter,  Admiral  David  L>.,  on  annexa- 
tion of  St.  Thomas,  394. 

Postage,  cheap,  efforts  of  Seward  to 
secure,  104. 

Protection,  attempt  of  Whigs  to  make 
a  party  question  in  1832,  18. 

Prussia,  naturalization  treaty  with, 
391. 

Pugh,  George  E.,  votes  against  Davis'a 
resolutions  on  slavery,  189. 

RAYMOND,  HENBY  J.,  defeats  Greeley 
for  Whig  nomination  for  governor, 
140. 

Reconstruction,  Lincoln's  plan  of,  366- 
368, 371;  first  congressional  bill  for, 
passed,  368,  369;  Lincoln's  veto, 
369,  370;  controversy  between  Con- 
gress and  Lincoln  over,  3G9,  370; 
possibility  of  success  of  Lincoln's 
plan,  371-373;  Johnson's  plan  of, 
374-377,  381-384;  carried  out  by 
Johnson,  377;  congressional  theory 
of,  380;  controversy  between  John- 
son and  Congress  over,  384-388; 
passage  of  freedman's  bureau  act 
over  veto,  385;  passage  of  civil  rights 


414 


INDEX 


act    and    fourteenth    amendment, 

385,  386;  of  congressional  bill  for, 

386,  387;    failure  of  Johnson's  plan 
of,  387;  completion  of,  under  con- 
gressional scheme,  387,    388;  Sew- 
ard's  attitude  toward,  388-390. 

Reeder,  Andrew  H.,  governor  of  Kan- 
sas, his  career,  153-155;  removed 
by  Pierce,  155;  petitions  for  seat  as 
territorial  delegate,  159. 

Republican  party,  of  Jefferson,  its 
divisions  in  1824,  7. 

Republican  party,  proposed  in  1854, 
133;  formed  in  Northern  States,  134; 
slower  to  form  in  East,  134;  gains 
strength  in  1855,  141;  proposed  al- 
liance of,  with  Know-Nothings,  142, 
143  ;  holds  national  conventions, 
143-145;  candidates  for  its  nomina- 
tion, 143,  144;  nominates  Fremont, 
145;  not  as  advanced  in  anti-slavery 
principles  as  Seward,  145,  14C;  rea- 
sons for  its  nomination  of  Fremont, 
146, 147 ;  discouraged  by  Democratic 
nomination  of  Buchanan,  147;  its 
vote  in  1856,  149,  150;  its  position 
in  Kansas  struggle,  151,  165;  embit- 
tered by  Dred  Scott  decision,  171; 
gains  ground  in  Congress  of  1856- 
67,  176,  177;  loses  in  1857,  186; 
aided  by  Buchanan's  mistakes  in 
1858,  187 ;  ignores  Davis' s  non-in- 
tervention resolutions,  189;  de- 
fended by  Seward  from  charge  of 
sectionalism,  191,  192;  its  national 
convention  of  1860,  193-202;  nomi- 
nates Lincoln  over  Seward,  194 ; 
reasons  for  its  nomination,  194, 195 ; 
Seward  its  real  leader,  195,  196; 
Greeley's  intrigues  in,  against  Sew- 
ard, 196-199 ;  elements  in,  opposed 
to  Seward,  199,  200;  bargains  of 
Lincoln's  managers  to  secure  its 
nomination,  201;  its  campaign  in 
1860,  202  ;  factions  of,  conciliated 
by  Lincoln's  cabinet,  213-215,  226- 
229;  fears  prevention  of  Lincoln's 
inauguration,  217;  members  of,  dis- 
trust Seward,  328;  angered  by  Sew- 
ard's  language,  330;  considers  Sew- 
ard responsible  for  failures  of  war, 
331,  332 ;  attempt  to  force  Lincoln 
to  dismiss  cabinet,  332,  333. 


Riley,  General  Bennett,  his  position 
as  military  governor  of  California, 
63 ;  calls  a  convention,  63,  64  ;  not 
instructed  by  Taylor,  nor  aided  by 
King,  06,  67. 

Rush,  Richard,  connected  with  anti- 
Masons,  14. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  letter  of  Lyons  to, 
222 ;  on  effectiveness  of  blockade, 
270;  announces  intention  to  wait 
for  Adams  before  determining  at- 
titude of  Great  Britain,  27C,  280; 
recognizes  belligerency  of  Confed- 
eracy before  arrival  of  Adams,  278, 
280 ;  refers  to  recognition  of  Greece 
as  precedent,  281 ;  his  apparent  bad 
faith,  282  ;  explanation  of  his  haste, 
10-986;  does  not  advance  blockade 
as  pretext,  284;  possibly  influenced 
by  Southern  free-trade  offers,  284, 
285;  prevents  accession  of  United 
States  to  Treaty  of  Paris,  290;  criti- 
cises suspension  of  habeas  corpus  as 
unconstitutional,  293  ;  his  demand 
in  Trent  case,  303-305  ;  understands 
United  States  to  claim  right  of 
search,  313:  314;  denies  that  ambas- 
sadors are  contraband  of  war,  319; 
suggests  joint  intervention  with 
France  to  end  blockade,  320,  321; 
agrees  in  1862  to  intervene,  324; 
remonstrates  against  proposed  clos- 
ing of  Charleston  harbor,  341 ;  will- 
ing to  amend  foreign  enlistment 
act,  350;  reconsiders  matter,  350; 
disclaims  any  responsibility  for 
losses  from  Confederate  cruisers, 
352;  compliments  Seward 's  ability, 
362. 

Russell,  Dr.  W.  H.,  correspondent  of 
"  London  Times,"  on  cautious  recep- 
tion of  Trent  affair  by  State  Depart- 
ment, 301. 

Russia,  crushes  Hungarian  rebellion, 
106;  denounced  by  Seward,  108; 
proposal  of  Seward  to  seek  explana- 
tions from,  255;  declines  to  act  in 
concert  with  England  and  France, 
277,325. 

ST.  THOMAS,  attempt  of  Seward  to 

purchase,  393-395. 
San  Domingo,  revolution  in,  256. 


INDEX 


415 


Scott,  Sir  William,  on  status  of  ene- 
mies' ambassadors,  315. 

Scott,  General  Winfield,  candidate  of 
anti-slavery  Whigs,  112;  nominated 
for  president,  113;  defeated,  113, 
114  ;  believes  it  impossible  to  relieve 
Fort  Sumter,  232  ;  advises  abandon- 
ment of  Fort  Pickens,  234. 

Seaton,  WilliamW. ,  interviews  Seward 
as  to  quarrels  in  cabinet,  327,  328. 

Secession.     See  Disunion. 

Senate,  debate  in,  over  slavery  in  Ter- 
ritories, and  compromise  of  1850, 
77-98;  debate  in,  over  Kansas-Ne- 
braska bill,  11C-132;  debates  Kan- 
sas troubles,  158-163  ;  investigates 
Brooks  assault  on  Sumner,  163; 
debates  and  passes  bill  for  a  new 
organization  of  Kansas,  165-167; 
debates  Lecomptou  Constitution, 
177-183;  controlled  by  Buchanan, 
183;  debates  Davis's  non-interven- 
tion resolution,  188-100  ;  cowed  by 
Southern  senators  in  1861,  212; 
debates  Crittenden  compromise, 
215,  216  ;  rejects  Seward's  compro- 
mise, 217,  218;  opposition  in,  to 
Seward,  328,  330-333;  disapproves 
of  Lincoln's  amnesty  proclamation, 
368 ;  rejects  Johnson  -  Clarendon 
treaty,  392. 

Seward,  F.  W.,  on  Seward's  reticence 
in  Trent  affair,  302. 

Seward,  John,  grandfather  of  W.  H. 
Seward,  his  career,  1. 

Seward,  Samuel  8.,  father  of  W.  H. 
Seward,  his  career,  1;  refuses  to 
pay  his  son's  debts,  3, 4  ;  encaged  at 
his  leaving  college  to  teach,  4;  aids 
him  to  begin  law  practice,  5 ;  his 
political  views,  7;  visits  Niagara,  8; 
goes  with  his  son  to  Europe,  17. 

Seward,  William  Henry,  his  career 
summarized,  v-viii  ;  birth  and  an- 
cestry,!^; education,  2;  his  home 
duties,  2;  slightly  priggish,  2,  3; 
extravagant  in  dress  at  college, 
3 ;  runs  away  to  Savannah,  3,  4 ; 
teaches  in  Georgia,  4 ;  studies  law, 
4  ;  returns  to  college,  4  ;  admitted 
to  bar,  5;  begins  successful  prac- 
tice, 5  ;  marries  Miss  Miller,  5 ;  his 
first  case,  5,  6;  nominated  by  Clin- 


ton for  surrogate,  6;  favors  Adams 
for  president  and  loses  nomination, 
6;  in  militia,  6,  7. 

New  York  Political  Leader.  A 
Buck-tail  in  politics,  7  ;  denounces 
Erie  Canal,  7  ;  abandons  party 
and  supports  Clinton,  8 ;  visits  Ni- 
agara, meets  Weed,  8 ;  publishes  at- 
tack on  Albany  Regency,  8:  on 
impossibility  of  sectional  parties,  9, 
10 ;  presides  over  convention  in  sup- 
port of  Adams,  10;  joins  anti-Ma- 
sons, 10,  11 ;  attends  national  con- 
vention, 12,  13  ;  visits  Boston,  12 ; 
meets  Adams,  13 ;  his  reasons  for 
joining  anti-Masons,  15  ;  elected  to 
State  Senate,  15  ;  his  career  during 
term,  16,  17 ;  visits  Europe,  17 ; 
Whig  candidate  for  governor,  19 ; 
returns  to  legal  practice,  19 ;  deals 
with  settlers  on  Holland  Company 
lands,  19,  20 ;  elected  governor,  20, 
21. 

Governor  of  New  York.  Urges 
public  education,  23  ;  stirs  opposi- 
tion by  urging  simplification  of  legal 
procedure,  24 ;  favors  charities,  24  ; 
his  pardons,  24  ;  follows  spoils  sys- 
tem in  appointments,  24, 25  ;  keeps 
temper  when  opposed  by  legislature, 
26  ;  declines  to  interfere  in  McLeod 
case,  30 ;  objects  to  appearance  of 
U.  S.  attorney  for  McLeod,  30; 
charged  with  collusion  with  federal 
government,  31 ;  irritated  by  treat- 
ment of  Whig  administration,  32 ; 
question  of  his  rejection  by  Harrison 
for  cabinet  position,  33,  34  ;  refuses 
to  deliver  to  Virginia  agent  persons 
aiding  fugitive  slaves,  35  ;  his  letter 
discussing  law  of  extradition,  36 ; 
praised  by  Adams,  37 ;  displeases 
conservative  Whigs,  37  ;  refuses  to 
transmit  resolution  of  legislature 
denouncing  slave-stealing,  38. 

In  Private  Life.  Thinks  political 
career  closed,  37  ;  resumes  success- 
ful practice  of  law,  40  ;  in  Freeman 
murder  case,  41-43  ;  declines  politi- 
cal nominations,  43  ;  labors  in  1844 
to  induce  anti-slavery  men  to  sup- 
port Clay,  45 ;  his  arguments,  45, 
46;  depressed  by  Clay's  Alabama 


416 


INDEX 


letter,  47  ;  rises  in  esteem  of  Whigs, 
47,  43 ;  declines  nomination  to  Con- 
stitutional convention,  48 ;  predicts 
Taylor's  nomination,  48  ;  hopes  that 
Barnburners  will  divide  Democratic 
vote,  49;  fears  evil  consequences 
from  election  of  Fillmore,  49 ;  labors 
in  campaign  of  1848,  60,  51;  his 
speech  on  the  Western  Reserve,  51- 
54;  not  an  effective  speaker,  54,55; 
elected  United  States  senator,  55 ; 
review  of  his  connection  with,  and 
leadership  in,  Whig  party,  55-60; 
on  Southern  demands,  58 ;  coura- 
geous in  expressing  opinions,  59 ;  his 
share  in  building  up  anti-slavery 
sentiment,  59,  60. 

United  State*  Senator,  Approves 
of  Taylor's  message  to  California, 
6C  ;  gains  influence  over  Taylor,  74, 
75 ;  his  friendship  hurts  Taylor  with 
conservatives,  75 ;  his  share  in  slav- 
ery debates,  76  ;  abused  by  Southern 
senators,  82 ;  his  defense,  82 ;  his 
speech  on  the  compromise  measures, 
83-87 ;  his  statement  about  "  Higher 
Law  "  not  novel,  87-89;  not  alarmed 
by  threats  of  disunion,  89,  90  ;  ex- 
pects gradual  abolition  of  slavery, 
90 ;  summary  of  his  position  as  to 
slavery,  91  ;  loses  influence  with 
Taylor's  death,  95  ;  unfriendly  with 
Fillmore,  95,  96 ;  his  friends  pro- 
scribed by  Fillmore,  97 ;  indorsed 
by  New  York  state  convention,  97  ; 
repudiates  charge  of  seeking  agita- 
tion, 103;  on  postal  system,  104; 
makes  excursion  over  Erie  Railway 
with  Fillmore,  104  ;  offers  resolu- 
tion of  welcome  to  Kossuth,  107  ; 
offers  resolution  denouncing  Russia, 
108 ;  his  speech  favoring  interven- 
tion, 109-111 ;  rashness  of  his  pro- 
posed policy,  111  ;  in  committee  on 
commerce,  111 ;  advocates  govern- 
ment aid,  112  ;  disappointed  at  Whig 
platform  in  1852,  113;  predicts  de- 
feat of  Scott,  113 ;  does  not  sign 
address  of  "  Independent  Demo- 
crats," 119 ;  makes  speeches  on 
Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  119, 121, 122 ; 
their  effect,  120,  121 ;  discouraged 
at  situation,  122,  123  ;  said  by  Blair 


to  have  instigated  Dixon  to  move 
repeal  of  Missouri  Compromise,  123, 
124 ;  falsity  of  story  shown,  124-130; 
his  comments  on  bill  show  inno- 
cence, 126,  127, 130 ;  shows  depres- 
sion in  final  speech,  131,132;  op- 
poses national  anti-slavery  organi- 
zation in  1854,  134  ;  unpopular  with 
conservative  Whigs,  135  ;  neglected 
in  Boston,  135  ;  describes  his  em- 
barrassing situation  between  Whig 
and  Free  Soil  parties,  136 ;  takes  no 
part  in  campaign  of  1854,  139 ;  cau- 
tion of  his  conduct  justified,  139 ; 
reflected  senator,  140 ;  beginning 
of  Greeley's  enmity  toward,  140, 
141 ;  favors  Republican  movement 
in  1855,  141 ;  refuses  to  share  in 
any  coalition  with  Know-Nothings, 
143;  his  possible  presidential  can- 
didacy, 143,  144;  dreads  action  of 
Republican  convention,  144 ;  sur- 
prised at  Greeley's  behavior,  144  ; 
satisfied  with  Republican  platform, 
145 ;  not  likely  to  have  secured 
nomination  in  any  case,  145,  146; 
considers  Buchanan  a  strong  can- 
didate, 147  ;  his  labors  in  campaign, 
148;  on  possession  of  government 
by  slaveholders,  148 ;  on  nature  of 
conflict,  148,  149 ;  proposes  admis- 
sion of  Kansas  under  Topeka  Consti- 
tution, 159-161 ;  denounces  Pierce, 
160, 161 ;  moves  for  committee  to 
investigate  assault  on  Sunnier,  163 ; 
on  effect  of  assault  on  Northern 
feeling,  1G4 ;  on  Douglas's  bill  to 
regulate  Kansas,  166 ;  denounces 
Dred  Scott  decision,  172 ;  gratified 
at  growing  strength  of  Republicans 
in  Senate,  177  ;  on  Douglas's  posi- 
tion against  the  Lecompton  Consti- 
tution, 178  ;  rejoices  in  Douglas's 
aid,  178;  accuses  Buchanan  and 
Taney  of  conspiracy,  179;  denounced 
by  them,  179,  180 ;  willing  to  let  re- 
peal of  Missouri  Compromise  stand, 
181,  182 ;  his  speech  not  one  of  his 
best,  182, 183 ;  favors  raising  regi- 
ments to  punish  Mormons,  184  ;  de- 
nounced by  Republicans,  185;  his 
policy  toward  Utah  justified,  185, 
1S6 ;  asserts  an  "  irrepressible  con- 


INDEX 


417 


flict "  between  freedom  and  slavery, 
186;  denounces  Democratic  party 
as  pro-slavery,  186;  urges  passage 
of  homestead  bill,  187,  188  ;  visits 
Europe,  188 ;  his  speech  urging  ad- 
mission of  Kansas  under  Wyandot 
Constitution,  190-192;  on  history 
of  Democratic  and  Whig  parties, 
190,  191 ;  defends  Republican  party 
from  charge  of  sectionalism,  191, 
192  ;  minimizes  danger  of  disunion, 
192  ;  his  nomination  by  Republican 
National  Convention  expected,  194  ; 
his  real  leadership  of  Republicans, 
195 ;  opinion  of  South  concerning, 
195, 1% ;  reasons  for  his  failure  to 
secure  nomination,  196-201;  accused 
by  Greeley  of  treachery  in  1854, 
197;  regrets  Greeley 's  anger,  198; 
remains  on  friendly  terms  with 
Greeley,  198 ;  labors  of  Greeley 
against,  199  ;  his  supposed  radical- 
ism the  real  cause  of  his  failure  to 
be  nominated,  199,  200  ;  disliked  by 
old  Whigs,  Free  Boilers,  and  Know- 
Nothings,  200;  relies  on  Weed's 
management,  201 ;  writes  paragraph 
for  press  approving  Lincoln's  nomi- 
nation, 201;  although  disappointed, 
takes  part  in  campaign,  202 ;  sup- 
posed to  have  inspired  Weed's  arti- 
cle urging  conciliation  in  1861,  211 ; 
in  reality  simply  drifts  with  events, 
212  ;  doubts  possibility  of  concilia- 
tion by  constitutional  amendment, 
212  ;  invited  to  enter  Lincoln's  cabi- 
net, 213  ;  confers  with  Weed,  213, 
215 ;  accepts  nomination,  215 ;  on 
committee  to  consider  Crittenden 
compromise,  215 ;  offers  compro- 
mise resolutions,  216,  217 ;  his 
speech  on  benefits  of  union,  219, 
220  ;  calls  slavery  in  Territories  no 
longer  a  practical  question,  220; 
denounced  for  abandoning  princi- 
ples, 221 ;  defends  his  course,  221, 
222;  his  hopes  described  by  Lord 
Lyons,  222  ;  thinks  time  will  soon 
bring  a  reconciliation,  223. 
Secretary  of  State.  Does  not  ob- 
ject to  Blair  in  the  cabinet,  226; 
declines  State  Department,  227, 228; 
Lincoln's  comment  upon,  228  ;  not 


trying  to  coerce  Lincoln,  229 ; 
agrees  to  take  office,  229 ;  opposes 
attempt  to  provision  Sumter,  233  ; 
his  responsibility  for  failure  of  at- 
tempt, 235 ;  files  memorandum  giv- 
ing reasons  for  refusing  to  receive 
Confederate  commissioners,  237, 
238 ;  accused  of  perfidy  by  South, 
238  ;  visited  by  Judges  Campbell 
and  Nelson,  238 ;  ignorant  of  Camp- 
bell's position,  239  ;  wishes  to  avoid 
bloodshed  in  order  to  retain  border 
States,  240 ;  urged  by  Campbell  to 
write  to  commissioners,  240  ;  de- 
clines to  do  so,  241  ;  said  by  Camp- 
bell to  have  promised  evacuation  of 
Sumter,  241-243  ;  his  statement  un- 
guarded, but  not  a  promise,  243  ; 
does  not  think  of  Campbell  as  repre- 
senting South,  244  ;  visited  again 
by  Campbell,  245 ;  authorized  by 
Lincoln  to  promise  to  warn  Camp- 
bell of  any  attempt  to  relieve  Sum- 
ter, 245-248  ;  repeats  promise  in 
April,  250  ;  refuses  to  answer  Camp- 
bell's charge  of  double-dealing,  251, 
252;  led  by  optimism  to  be  indis- 
creet, but  not  deceitful,  252,  253 ; 
submits  "  Thoughts  for  the  Presi- 
dent's Consideration,"  254,  255 ; 
deprecates  further  delay  in  adopt- 
ing a  policy,  254;  wishes  to  put 
issue  of  union  or  disunion  in  place 
of  slavery,  254,  255 ;  urges  a  vigo- 
rous foreign  policy,  255 ;  demands 
that  some  one  assume  responsibility, 
255 ;  this  letter  unknown  for  a  quar- 
ter of  a  century,  255,  256  ;  malign 
interpretation  of  his  position,  256  ; 
aware  of  revolution  in  San  Domingo, 
256 ;  learns  of  Napoleon's  Mexican 
schemes,  256 ;  wishes  to  prevent 
these  by  a  bold  front,  257  ;  does 
not  urge  war  with  England  or  Rus- 
sia, 257;  does  not  mean  war,  but 
peace,  with  France  and  Spain,  258; 
does  not  offer  to  assume  Lincoln's 
responsibilities,  258,  259 ;  later  takes 
responsibility  of  arbitrary  arrests, 
259 ;  merely  means  to  offer  entire 
assistance,  259;  his  reference  to 
matters  outside  his  province  refers 
merely  to  sending  agents,  260  ;  bel- 


418 


INDEX 


ligerent  interpretation  of  letter  con- 
tradicted by  Seward's  whole  career, 
261 ;  not  regarded  as  presumptuous 
by  Lincoln,  2C1,  262  ;  continues  on 
good  terms  with  Lincoln,  262 ;  de- 
scribes to  Adams  the  collapse  of 
administration  at  Washington  and 
in  South,  263-265 ;  sends  circular  to 
foreign  representatives,  266  ;  urges 
importance  of  union,  266,  267;  de- 
sires ability  in  diplomatic  service, 
267  ;  finds  it  hard  to  persuade  Lin- 
coln, 267  ;  secures  appointment  of 
Adams  to  England,  267,  268;  advo- 
cates blockade  of  South,  269;  his 
knowledge  of  Europe,  275,  276; 
alarmed  at  Napoleon's  proposal  to 
act  in  concert  with  England,  277 ; 
notifies  ministers  not  to  recognize 
any  joint  action,  278;  refuses  to  re- 
ceive English  and  French  ministers 
together,  278 ;  angered  at  English 
recognition  of  Southern  belliger- 
ency, 279,  286;  his  fiery  dispatch 
modified  by  Lincoln,  279 ;  instructs 
ministers  to  negotiate  for  accession 
of  United  States  to  treaty  of  1856, 
289 ;  approves  Adams's  course  in 
refusing  to  sign  on  Russell's  terms, 
290,  291  ;  his  reasons  for  proposing, 
290;  on  England's  reasons  for  iui-  | 
posing  terms  on  accession  of  United 
States,  291;  protests  against  Eng- 
lish negotiations  with  Confederacy 
through  Bunch,  292,  293 ;  declines 
to  discuss  question  of  habeas  corpus 
with  Russell,  294;  called  a  tyrant, 
294 ;  not  officious  in  assuming  charge 
of  these  matters,  205 ;  alarmed  at 
effect  of  Feder.il  defeats  upon  Eu- 
rope, 296;  said  by  Welles  and  others 
to  have  rejoiced  at  capture  of  Mason 
and  Slidell,  301;  in  reality  refuses 
from  outset  to  commit  himself, 
301,  302;  consults  McClellan  as  to 
chances  in  a  war  with  England,  302 ; 
in  dispatches  to  Adams  refrains 
from  committing  himself,  302,  303; 
evidently  foresees  danger,  303  ;  re- 
ceives British  demands,  303,  305; 
studies  the  case,  305 ;  reads  reply 
to  cabinet,  305,  306 ;  comments  of 
Bates  and  Chase  upon,  306;  said  to 


have  been  led  by  Lincoln,  306,  307; 
no  foundation  for  story,  309 ;  his 
own  statement  of  Lincoln's  reluc- 
tance to  yield  the  prisoners,  310; 
his  technical  argument,  310-318; 
disclaims  right  of  search,  319;  holds 
that  ambassadors  are  lawful  contra- 
band of  war,  314,  315;  admits  error 
of  Wilkes's  method,  316,  317;  dreads 
offers  of  mediation  from  Europe, 
320;  sends  unofficial  agents  to  Eu- 
rope, 321,  322  ;  sends  optimistic  ac- 
counts of  situation  to  ministers,  323 ; 
tries  to  persuade  Europe  to  with- 
draw recognition  of  belligerency, 
323 ;  refuses  French  offer  of  media- 
tion, 325, 326;  rejoices  at  treaty  with 
England  to  extirpate  slave  trade, 
327 ;  visits  leading  men  to  induce 
governors  to  urge  a  fresh  call  for 
troops,  327;  visited  by  Beaton,  327; 
asserts  his  own  harmony  with  Lin- 
coln, 328;  understands  attitude  of 
his  enemies,  328;  refuses  to  resign, 
328 ;  exasperated  at  quarrels  in 
Congress,  329;  condemns  extrem- 
ists, 329 ;  willing  that  slavery  ques- 
tion should  wait,  330;  angers  radicals 
by  dispatch  to  Adams,  330;  held 
responsible  by  Republican  senators 
for  failures  of  war,  331,  332  ;  recog- 
nizes Lincoln's  mastery,  332  ;  his 
removal  urged  by  Republican  lead- 
ers, 332,  333  ;  sends  Lincoln  his  re- 
signation, 333  ;  returns  to  post,  333; 
suggests  withholding  of  emancipa- 
tion proclamation  until  after  some 
victory,  336;  willing  to  make  con- 
cessions of  belligerent  rights  to  con- 
ciliate Europe,  338;  admits  for- 
warding of  captured  mails  as  matter 
of  expediency,  339 ;  permits  French 
to  leave  New  Orleans,  340  ;  protests 
against  English  violation  of  block- 
ade, 340;  his  reply  to  Russell's  pro- 
test against  blocking  Charleston 
harbor,  341,  342;  harassed  by  com- 
plaints of  French  against  Butler, 
343 ;  urges  Adams  to  prevent  en- 
listment of  Confederate  privateers 
in  England,  348;  complains  of  Eng- 
lish decision  in  Alexandria  case, 
34  J ;  suggests  amendments  to  law. 


INDEX 


419 


350 ;  lays  down  pener.il  lines  of 
Adams's  policy,  352;  complains  of 
assistance  to  Confederate  cruisers 
in  English  colonies,  353  ;  fails  to 
secure  extradition  of  Canadian  raid- 
ers, 354;  declines  to  join  in  treaty 
of  1861  with  regard  to  Mexico, 
356  ;  states  Monroe  doctrine,  356  ; 
accepts  statements  of  French  gov- 
ernment, 358 ;  protests  against  es- 
tablishment of  Maximilian's  gov- 
ernment, 358,  359 ;  refuses  to  re- 
cognize Maximilian,  359 ;  fears  a 
combination  of  maritime  powers  to 
intervene,  359,  360 ;  wishes  to  avoid 
war  with  France,  360  ;  calms  French 
resentment  at  resolutions  of  Con- 
gress, 361;  refuses  after  fall  of 
Confederacy  to  threaten  France, 
362;  tries  in  vain  to  rescue  Maxi- 
milian, 362 ;  character  of  his  dis- 
patches, 362  ;  general  survey  of  his 
diplomacy,  362,  363;  attempt  to  as- 
sassinate in  1865,  364  ;  loses  health, 
364,  365  ;  loses  wife  and  daughter, 
365 ;  continues  in  office,  365. 

Secretary  of  State  —  Johnson.  Said 
to  have  induced  Johnson  to  insert 
pardon  clause  in  amnesty  proclama- 
tion, 377  ;  said  to  have  gained  in- 
fluence over  Johnson,  381 ;  agrees 
with  Johnson's  theory  of  recon- 
struction, 388,  389  ;  thinks  course 
of  Congress  unconstitutional,  389  ; 
his  optimistic  view  of  results  of 
war,  389,  390  ;  remains  in  cabinet 
to  conclude  diplomatic  questions, 
390,391;  makes  treaties,  391,  392; 
connected  with  Johnson-Clarendon 
treaty,  392 ;  secures  purchase  of 
Alaska,  393 ;  wishes  to  purchase 
St.  Thomas,  393,  394  ;  resigns  office, 
395. 

Last  Years.  Travels  in  America 
and  around  world,  395  ;  last  days 
and  death,  395  ;  his  private  life  and 
character,  395,  396 ;  his  political 
consistency,  396-398 ;  a  consistent 
Whig,  396 ;  his  opposition  to  slavery, 

396,  397  ;    scrupulous    fairness   to 
Catholics,  397  ;  fairness  in  politics, 

397,  398;   attacked  for   remaining 
in  Johnson's  cabinet,  398  ;  his  activ- 


ity of  mind,  399 ;  his  enthusiastic 
welcome  in  Mexico,  399 ;  in  Japan, 
399 ;  in  China,  400 ;  his  last  years 
happy,  400. 

Personal  Traits.  Absence  of  vin- 
dictiveness,  53,  54,  389,  397 ;  ambi- 
tion, 55,  143,  202 ;  coolness,  26,  302; 
courage,  41^13, 365,  397  ;  diplomatic 
ability,  362,  363  ;  fidelity,  229,  258- 
260.  294,  328,  332 ;  incautiousness, 
36,  241,  329 ;  industry,  396  ;  leader- 
ship, 195,  196  ;  legal  ability,  6,  19, 
40,  42,  310,  311;  literary  ability, 
362;  optimism,  222-224,  252,  323, 
390 ;  personal  appearance,  16,  54 ; 
pride,  227,  228  ;  private  life,  395 ; 
unfavorable  views  of,  34,  39,  42,  82, 
200,  221,  243,  331,  398. 

Political  Opinions.  Anti-Masons, 
11,  13,  15  ;  blockade,  269,  339-341 ; 
California,  admission  of,  84;  Caro- 
line case,  30,  33 ;  colonies,  393 ; 
compromise  of  1850,  84-87 ;  com- 
promise in  1861,  211,  212,  215-217  ; 
disunion,  9,  16,  51,  89,  90,  218,  219, 
222,  254  ;  education,  sectarian,  23, 
397;  emancipation,  253,  336,  396, 
397;  England,  policy  toward,  278, 
279,  286,  289,  292,  322,  348,  349; 
foreign  policy  in  1861,  255-262; 
France,  policy  toward,  278,  289, 
321,  325,  326,  342,  343,  358-362; 
Fugitive  Slave  Law,  85 ;  higher  law, 
86  ;  imprisonment  for  debt,  16;  in- 
ternal improvements,  22,  104,  112; 
intervention,  108-111 ;  irrepressi- 
ble conflict,  51,  131,  148,  182,  183, 
186,  190,  191 ;  Kansas  troubles,  160, 
161,  179,  182,  190,  220;  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill,  121-124, 126,  127, 129, 
130,  131,  132 ;  Know-Nothings,  139, 
143;  Monroe  doctrine,  110,  356, 
358-361;  paper  money,  57;  political 
parties,  9,  25 ;  protection,  57,  111 ; 
reconstruction,  388-390  ;  Republi- 
can party,  135,  178,  191  ;  slavery, 
35-38,  46,  52,  59,  87,  131,  220,  396; 
spoils  system,  24,  25,  267  ;  Sumter, 
Fort,  relief  of,  233,  239-253  ;  Texas, 
annexation  of,  45-47  ;  third  parties, 
35,  46,  51 ;  Trent  affair,  301-319 ; 
Whig  party,  6,  7,  10,  19,  35,  43,  52, 
56-60,  136, 191,  396. 


420 


INDEX 


Shannon,  Wilson,  his  career  as  gov- 
ernor of  Kansas,  155. 

Shenandoah,  career  of  the,  351. 

Slavery,  its  position  in  United  States 
according  to  Seward,  51-54 ;  be- 
comes a  political  question,  58-60; 
Calhoun's  resolutions  on,  61,  62; 
question  of  its  existence  in  Terri- 
tories, 66-70,  86 ;  held  by  South  to 
be  specially  protected  by  Constitu- 
tion, 71 ;  its  absolute  security  and 
protection  demanded  by  South  as 
condition  of  continuing  in  Union, 
218, 219  ;  its  existence  in  Territories 
no  longer  considered  a  question  by 
Seward,  220;  attitude  of  Union 
armies  to,  raises  a  problem,  333, 
334  ;  demand  for  its  abolition,  334 ; 
objections  to  emancipation  procla- 
mation, 335,  336 ;  Lincoln's  emanci- 
pation proclamation  delayed  at  Sew- 
ard's  suggestion,  336,  337. 

Slemmer,  Lieutenant  Adam  J.,  saves 
Fort  Pickeus,  206. 

Slidell,  John,  plots  secession,  209; 
sent  as  minister  to  France,  297;  cap- 
tured by  Wilkes,  298  ;  surrendered, 
318. 

Slidell,  Miss,  informs  English  minis- 
try that  Wilkes  acted  without  or- 
ders, 299. 

Smith,  Caleb  B.,  gives  vote  of  Indiana 
delegation  to  Lincoln  in  1860,  201  ; 
named  for  Lincoln's  cabinet,  230 ; 
opposes  provisioning  Fort  Sumter, 
233. 

South,  impossibility  of  its  secession 
stated  by  Seward,  9,  10 ;  unpopular- 
ity of  Seward  in,  35 ;  adopts  definite 
policy  of  pro-slavery,  61 ;  insists  on 
equality  with  free  States,  61 ;  it* 
interpretation  of  squatter  sover- 
eignty, 64 ;  plans  to  secure  Califor- 
nia as  slave  State,  65;  unable  to 
compete  with  North  in  settlement, 
65 ;  intends  Mexican  war  to  secure 
its  future  predominance,  67 ;  op- 
poses admission  of  California,  68  ; 
its  views  as  to  slavery  in  Territories 
under  Constitution,  70,  71,  88;  rea- 
sons for  its  political  headship,  72  ; 
its  demands  denounced  by  Seward, 
85;  not  believed  by  Seward  to  be 


sincere  in  threatening  secession,  90 ; 
attacks  Omnibus  bill,  '.>-' ;  bitterness 
of  Taylor  against,  94 ;  dislikes  Kos- 
suth's  appeal,  107,  108;  makes  im- 
mediate gains  by  Missouri  Compro- 
mise, 115,  116  ;  later  wishes  to  over- 
throw it,  116;  cynicism  of  its  policy 
in  1854,  119, 120  ;  expects  to  placate 
North  by  leaving  Nebraska  free, 
128  ;  becomes  consolidated  in  Con- 
gress of  1856,  149,  150 ;  its  position 
in  Kansas  struggle,  151  ;  considers 
slavery  in  Kansas  necessary,  152  ; 
hates  Douglas  as  a  deserter,  177, 
188 ;  adopts  Dred  Scott  case  doc- 
trine, 179  ;  urges  purchase  of  Cuba, 
187;  opposes  homestead  bill,  187, 
188 ;  its  policy  described  by  Seward, 
190, 218;  considers  Seward  as  leader 
of  North,  195, 196  ;  its  leaders  deter- 
mine to  secede  before  Lincoln's 
election,  203,  204  ;  has  no  real  griev- 
ances, 204;  its  real  motive  politi- 
cal ambition,  204,  205  ;  dreads  loss 
of  political  control,  204 ;  process 
of  secession  in,  205,  206 ;  leaders 
of,  plot  secession  in  Washington, 
209,  210;  its  ultimatum,  217,  218; 
failure  of  secession  in,  hoped  by 
Seward,  224,  225;  its  commerce 
ruined  by  blockade,  270.  See  Con- 
federate States,  and  Reconstruc- 
tion. 

South  Carolina,  fails  to  secede  in  1851, 
105;  leads  secession  in  1860,  205; 
demands  evacuation  of  Fort  Sum- 
ter, 207,  208 ;  visit  of  Fox  to,  233, 
234 ;  promise  of  Lincoln  to  warn  of 
any  attempt  to  relieve  Sumter,  245- 
251. 

Spain,  Reward's  proposal  to  demand 
explanations  from,  255,  25(5 ;  joins 
France  in  alliance  against  Mexico, 
356 ;  withdraws,  357. 

Spoils  system  in  New  York,  24-26. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  in  Buchanan's 
cabinet,  209  ;  on  Campbell's  charges 
of  deceit  against  Seward,  252,  253; 
favors  immediate  issue  of  emanci- 
pation proclamation,  336. 

Stanton,  Frederic  P.,  succeeds  Walker 
as  governor  of  Kansas,  175 ;  sum- 
mons legislature,  176 ;  removed  by 


INDEX 


421 


Buchanan  for  allowing  a  popular 
vote  on  Lecompton  Constitution, 
176. 

Stephens,  Alexander  H. ,  secures  pass- 
age of  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  through 
House,  130;  on  policy  and  aims  of 
secessionists,  205. 

Stevens,  Thaddeus,  votes  to  organ- 
ize Territories  without  prohibiting 
slavery,  221 ;  his  theory  of  recon- 
struction, 380. 

Story,  Joseph,  connected  with  anti- 
Masons,  14. 

Sumner,  Charles,  elected  to  Senate, 
101 ;  signs  address  of  Independent 
Democrats,  119  ;  defends  Emigrant 
Aid  Society,  159;  his  bitter  speech 
on  Kansas,  1C2,  163 ;  assaulted  by 
Brooks,  163;  in  eyes  of  North  be- 
comes a  martyr,  164  ;  votes  to  or- 
ganize Territories  without  prohibit- 
ing slavery,  221 ;  on  Seward's  cau- 
tion in  Trent  affair,  301,  302;  on 
Lincoln's  reticence  in  Trent  case, 
308 ;  denies  that  Mason  and  Slidell 
were  contraband  of  war,  315 ;  his 
reconstruction  resolution,  368 ;  an 
opponent  of  Johnson,  383 ;  aids 
Seward's  plan  to  purchase  Alaska, 
393. 

Sumter,  Fort,  held  by  Anderson,  206; 
its  surrender  demanded  by  South 
Carolina,  208;  attitude  of  Black 
toward,  208 ;  question  of  its  relief 
by  Lincoln,  231-236;  relief  con- 
sidered impossible  by  officers  and 
cabinet,  232,  233;  its  relief  at- 
tempted, 235,  236 ;  bombardment  of, 
235  ;  discussion  of  Seward's  alleged 
promise  of  its  evacuation,  241-253 ; 
Lincoln's  promise  to  warn  South  of 
any  attempt  to  relieve,  245-250. 

Supreme  Court,  desire  of  Taylor  to 
submit  Texan  boundaries  to,  69  ;  its 
action  in  Dred  Scott  case,  1C8-172; 
denounced  by  Republicans,  172  ;  up- 
holds blockade,  270. 

TAMMANY.    See  Buck-tails. 

Taney,  Roger  B.,  Chief  Justice  of  Su- 
preme Court,  violates  judicial  pro- 
prieties in  Dred  Scott  decision,  170, 
171 ;  his  decision  becomes  platform 


of  South,  179;  declares  intention  to 
refuse  to  administer  oath  of  office 
to  Seward,  179;  denies  Seward's 
charge  of  collusion  with  Buchanan, 
180,  181;  his  motives  for  decision, 
181  ;  declares  suspension  of  habeas 
corpus  unconstitutional,  293. 

Taylor,  Zachary,  his  nomination  fore- 
seen by  Seward,  48 ;  nominated 
without  a  platform,  49;  supported 
by  Seward,  51 ;  elected,  56 ;  at 
Folk's  order,  begins  Mexican  war, 
61  ;  wishes  to  hasten  organization 
of  Territories,  66;  sends  King  to 
suggest  state  convention  for  Cali- 
fornia, 66  ;  urges  admission  of  Cali- 
fornia as  a  State,  69;  on  Texan 
boundary,  69;  elected  free  from 
pledges,  72  ;  not  sure  of  Whig  sup- 
port, 73  ;  not  supported  by  Clay  or 
Webster,  73,  74  ;  alienates  Southern 
Whigs,  74;  consults  Seward,  74,  75; 
his  character  and  principles,  76; 
opposes  Clay's  compromise,  77,  93  ; 
considers  secession  treason,  89,  94 ; 
his  death,  its  political  effects,  93- 
96  ;  his  attitude  enough  to  prevent 
secession,  94,  95. 

Tennessee,  Johnson's  career  as  gover- 
nor of,  375. 

Texas,  annexation  of,  becomes  issue 
in  1844,  43,  44;  failure  of  Calhoun's 
treaty  with,  44 ;  attitude  of  parties 
on,  44  47  ;  annexed,  61 ;  question  of 
its  boundaries,  69,  70,  78,  92,  98. 

Thomas,  Philip  F.,  in  Buchanan's 
cabinet,  208. 

Thompson,  Jacob,  leaves  Buchanan's 
cabinet,  209. 

Tompkins,  Daniel  D.,  leads  "Buck- 
tail  "  faction,  7  ;  welcomed  by  Sew- 
ard to  Union  College,  7. 

Toombs,  Robert,  offers  bill  to  regu- 
late Kansas,  165;  considers  acquisi- 
tion of  Cuba  more  important  than 
homestead  bill,  188  ;  says  Seward 
blocked  Crittenden  compromise, 
216. 

Treaty  of  Paris,  its  terms,  288 ;  refu- 
sal of  United  States  to  accede,  288 ; 
attempt  of  Seward  to  secure  acces- 
sion of  United  States,  289-291 ;  at- 
titude of  England  toward,  290,  291. 


422 


INDEX 


Trent  affair.    See  Diplomatic  History. 
Tyler,  John,  his  dislike  of  Seward, 

34  ;  plans  annexation  of  Texas,  44  ; 

his  presidency,  58;  signs  resolution 

annexing  Texas,  61. 

UNION  COLLEGE,  studies  of  Seward  at, 

2,4. 
Utah,  organization  of,  in  compromise 

of  1850, 92, 93 ;  Mormon  troubles  in, 

184 ;  additional  troops  for,  debated 

in  Senate,  184-186. 

VAN  BUREX,  Martin,  leads  Albany  Re- 
gency, 8  ;  loses  nomination  in  1844, 
44;  nominated  by  Free  Soil  party, 
49. 

Vermont,  votes  for  Wirt  in  1832,  13 ; 
Confederate  raid  into,  361,  353. 

Victoria,  Queen,  disapproves  of  Eng- 
lish demand  in  Trent  affair,  299. 

Virginia,  its  political  decline,  9  ;  con- 
troversy of  New  York  with,  concern- 
ing extradition  of  persons  aiding 
fugitive  slaves  to  escape,  35-38 ; 
enraged  at  Seward's  letter  on  slav- 
ery, 36;  asks  support  of  South,  37; 
retaliates  on  New  York,  37 ;  defeat 
of  Know-Nothings  in,  138 ;  raid  of 
John  Brown  in,  188  ;  invites  Peace 
Congress,  217. 

WADE,  BENJAMIN  F.,  elected  to  Sen- 
ate, 101 ;  his  retort  to  Toombs,  188  ; 
votes  to  organize  Territories  with- 
out prohibiting  slavery,  221 ;  vitu- 
perates Lincoln  for  vetoing  recon- 
struction bill,  370. 

Walker,  Robert  J.,  appointed  gover- 
nor of  Kansas,  172,  173  ;  convinces 
free-state  men  of  his  fairness,  173, 
174 ;  realizes  that  Kansas  is  lost  to 
slavery,  173 ;  refuses  to  sanction 
Lecompton  Constitution,  175;  re- 
signs, 175. 

Washington,  full  of  secessionists  in 
1861,  206,  207,  209 ;  danger  of  its 
seizure  by  South,  210,  211,  263; 
demoralization  of  civil  service  in, 
263-265. 

Webster,  Daniel,  urges  release  of  Mc- 
Leod,  29;  suggests  that  McLeod 
appeal  to  federal  courts,  30,  31 ;  his 


attitude  complained  of  by  Seward, 
32 ;  annoyed  at  Seward's  obstinacy, 
33 ;  tries  to  get  from  Ashburton  an 
apology  in  the  Caroline  case,  33  ; 
advises  Harrison  concerning  his 
cabinet,  34;  angered  at  Taylor's 
nomination,  74;  declines  to  support 
his  administration,  74 ;  approves 
Clay's  compromise,  78  ;  makes  7th 
of  March  speech,  79-81 ;  favored  by 
cities,  denounced  by  rural  districts, 
81 ;  his  devotion  to  Union  above 
slavery,  91 ;  enters  FUlmore's  cabi- 
net, 93 ;  on  effect  of  Taylor's  death, 
95;  on  success  of  Fugitive  Slave 
Law,  100 ;  candidate  for  nomination 
in  1852, 112,  113. 

Weed,  Thurlow,  meets  Seward,  8  ;  his 
connection  with  anti-Masons,  11, 
12 ;  denies  that  Seward  is  a  can- 
didate for  Republican  nomination 
in  1856,  143,  144  ;  deceived  by  Gree- 
ley's  professions  of  friendship,  198 ; 
on  Greeley's  letter  to  Lincoln,  199  ; 
urges  conciliation  in  1860,  211 ; 
visits  Lincoln,  213  ;  criticises  Lin- 
coln's cabinet  plan,  213,  214;  in- 
forms Seward  of  Lincoln's  plans, 
215;  sent  by  Seward  on  a  mission 
to  England,  322 ;  contradicts  stories 
of  Seward's  hostility  to  England, 
322. 

Welles,  Gideon,  named  for  secretary 
of  navy,  213;  recommended  by  Ham- 
lin,  214 ;  objected  to  by  Weed,  214  ; 
his  appointment,  230 ;  not  a  success 
as  secretary  of  navy,  230;  opposes 
provisioning  Fort  Sumter,  233 ;  in* 
terferes  in  expedition  to  relieve 
Fort  Sumter,  235  ;  praises  Wilkes, 
300 ;  says  Seward  rejoiced  over 
Wilkes's  actions,  301 ;  on  Lincoln's 
position  in  Trent  case,  308. 

Whig  party,  begins,  as  National  Re- 
publican party,  to  advocate  a  tariff, 
18;  definitely  formed  in  1834,  18, 
19 ;  in  New  York,  nominates  Sew- 
ard for  governor,  19  ;  damaged  in 
New  York  by  McLeod  case,  32,  34, 
39;  dislikes  Seward's  anti-slavery 
attitude,  38;  defeated  in  1843,  39; 
nominates  Clay,  43;  silent  as  to 
Texas,  44;  campaign  of  Seward  for, 


INDEX 


423 


45-47;  defeated  through  Clay's 
error,  47 ;  becomes  reconciled  to 
Seward's  anti-slavery  attitude,  47, 
48  ;  nominates  Taylor  and  Fillrnore, 
49,  50 ;  its  position  as  to  slavery, 
54,  59;  carries  New  York,  55 ;  elects 
Seward  senator,  55 ;  review  of  Sew- 
ard's leadership  in,  56-60 ;  divides 
on  slavery  question,  G8  ;  does  not 
feel  bound  to  follow  Taylor,  72,  73 ; 
really. destroyed  in  1849,73;  splits 
into  "Conscience"  and  "Cotton" 
Whigs,  80,  81 ;  Seward  faction  of, 
in  New  York,  proscribed  by  Fill- 
more,  97  ;  upholds  finality  of  com- 
promise, 112  ;  nominates  Scott,  112, 
113;  considered  dead  by  Seward, 
113;  defeated  in  election,  113; 
breaks  on  slavery  issue,  133;  groups 
of,  in  1854,  134,  135;  unpopularity 
of  Seward  with  conservative  wing 
of,  135, 136;  members  of,  join  Know- 
Nothings,  138 ;  causes  for  its  death 
described  by  Seward,  191 ;  its  mem- 
bers join  the  Republican  party  in 
1856,  199. 

Whitfield,   J.  W.,  leads  border  ruf- 
fians to  burn  Osawatomie,  156;  his 


seat  as  territorial  delegate  contested 
by  Reeder,  159. 

Wilkes,  Captain  Charles,  seizes  Mason 
and  Slidell  on  the  Trent,  298 ;  acts 
without  orders,  300;  praised  by  peo- 
ple, 300,  313;  congratulated  by 
Welles,  300 ;  voted  a  gold  medal  by 
the  House,  300;  his  act  disavowed 
by  Seward,  314,  316,  317. 

Wilmot  Proviso,  struggle  over,  in  Con- 
gress, 62,  64;  claimed  by  Webster 
as  his  thunder,  80  ;  its  necessity 
stated  by  Seward,  87  ;  later  aban- 
doned by  him,  220  ;  ignored  by  Re- 
publicans in  organization  of  Terri- 
tories in  1861,  220,  221. 

Wilson,  Henry,  reconciled  by  Seward 
and  others  with  Gwin,  177. 

Wirt,  William,  nominated  for  presi- 
dent by  anti-Masons,  13. 

Wisconsin,  admitted  as  a  State,  to 
counterbalance  Texas,  61. 

YANCEY,  WILLIAM  L.,  his  resolutions 
on  non-interference  with  slavery  in 
Territories  rejected  in  1848,  189; 
tells  Lord  John  Russell  that  tariff 
was  cause  of  secession,  284. 


etc  lube  rstbc  $rextf 

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